PANZER INVASION
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In May 1940, the world turned upside-down when Nazi Germany launched a campaign in Western Europe against the Low Countries, and most critically, France. Then a major power with a large colonial empire, France had a huge number of armed forces at its disposal. With extensive support from the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and formidable border defences, it was entirely possible that the Nazis’ expansion would be stopped in the West.
Nevertheless, in a brief six-week campaign from 10 May 1940, France, Belgium and the Netherlands fell in one of the most dramatic, audacious campaigns in military history. Characterised by rapid ‘blitzkrieg’ warfare, the German victory was largely due to how it deployed its armoured forces.
Tanks played a critical role in this campaign, where speed and mobility counted more than armoured engagements. The fall of France in particular was a watershed moment that left Britain almost without allies and destroyed the Third French Republic. In armoured terms, the Germans had achieved this with just a few Panzer divisions, which highlighted the military importance of tanks like never before.
However, the famous images of Panzers rolling through the French countryside towards a seemingly inevitable victory are actually misleading. David Willey, curator of the Tank Museum, explains that Germany’s armoured success in France was by no means guaranteed. He discusses how unprepared the German tank force was and why the Panzers’ achievements in May 1940 subtly began the process of the Nazis’ final defeat.
Development
During the interwar period, Germany underwent a series of programmes to experiment with armour, “Germany had only built 20 tanks during WWI,” Willey explains. “Although the tank had not been a massive success, there was a perception in the military that it had partially influenced Germany to sue for an armistice. This had a huge psychological impact, so the commander of the Reichswehr, Hans von Seeckt, started an investigation into why they lost and how they would do it better next time.
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“The Germans performed exercises during the 1920s-30s and learned that motorised mechanisation was effective in
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