The Seven Days Campaign, fought June 25–July 1, 1862, prevented the Army of the Potomac from capturing the Confederate capital of Richmond, Va., at a critical junction early in the Civil War; established Robert E. Lee as an army commander, which would be an instrumental factor in extending the war for another three years; and forced the Lincoln administration to grapple with the issue of emancipation. The fighting and maneuvering that raged that summer from north of Richmond to 16 miles southeast along the James River unfolded as it did because of 16 critical decisions made before, during, and after the battles by commanders in both armies and at all levels. Of these decisions, three were strategic, four operational, eight tactical, and one personnel. Four were national-level decisions, nine army-level, one wing-level, and two division-level. Seven were made by Union commanders, nine by Confederate commanders. All were implemented by the thousands of soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac.
1 McClellan Decides on a Turning Movement
Army-Level Strategic Decision
UNDER PRESSURE to begin operations in the spring of 1862, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, developed a plan using Union naval power to move his army from the vicinity of Washington, D.C., 87 miles south to Urbana, Va. In March, General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate army retreated south from Centreville, Va., to the Rappahannock River, about 36 miles, which blocked McClellan’s intended Urbana movement.
The Union general then modified his plan and moved the army to Fort Monroe on the tip of the Virginia Peninsula. Shifting the center of fighting in the Eastern Theater to the Peninsula put the Confederate capital in jeopardy of capture if sufficient forces could not be redeployed in time for
