Asean has options to tackle Myanmar's crisis. Now can it muster the will?

Yet, the world has also been witness to a population determined to demonstrate the resilience of their democratic impulses and their refusal not to return to the authoritarian years of the past. In doing so, the people of Myanmar are paying the ultimate price. They must not be left to face the consequences alone.

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The imperative for concrete action from Asean hardly needs emphasis. In the face of the most egregious abuses of human values by the junta, can or should the bloc stand aside?

How Asean addresses the crisis in Myanmar will demonstrate its relevance and whether its oft-proclaimed centrality - well justified in the past - continues to hold true today.

Asean's charter - which its sovereign member states, including Myanmar, entered into in 2007 - enshrines adherence to the rule of law, good governance, democratic principles and constitutional government, respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice. Asean cannot remain inactive in the face of flagrant violations of its charter.

Left unresolved, the Myanmar crisis risks cascading to the entire region. Consider the humanitarian impact, as the prospect of displaced populations from Myanmar increasingly seek refuge in neighbouring countries; the economic implications, as the country's economy slows and global sentiment towards the region shifts; and the regional security effects, as the potential for the proxy projection of major powers' interests emerges atop the complex ethnic tapestry of Myanmar.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Under the principle of "responsibility to protect" adopted by the United Nations at its World Summit in 2005, each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and prevent these crimes from happening.

The principle further refers to the responsibility of the wider international community to encourage and assist individual states to fulfil that responsibility. In cases where states manifestly fail to protect their populations - and in the current context this deserves emphasis - it provides for collective action by the international community in accordance with the UN Charter. Diplomatic efforts must be at the forefront of such collective action.

While views on the implementation of these principles continue to evolve, in the past there has been some recognition within Asean on the need to mainstream these principles, for they do converge with the bloc's vision for the region.

There must be consequences - not a business-as-usual reaction - for the junta's actions.

Asean member states have stepped up in the past at critical moments in Myanmar's democratic transition. Away from the public glare, member states laid down their common expectation in a robust and clear-eyed manner: that the authorities in Myanmar could not expect the solidarity and support of their regional peers without concurrent actual concrete steps towards promised democratic reform. A la carte regionalism would not be acceptable.

Hence, in 2005, Asean pressed Myanmar to relinquish its planned chairmanship for 2006, given its ongoing internal reforms; in 2008, Myanmar was again pressed to choose between going its own way, or to engage Asean in opening up to international assistance in the wake of cyclone Nargis; and in 2011, Asean did not readily accede to Myanmar's wish to chair the bloc in 2014, without the acceleration of the democratisation process.

Today, Asean must similarly make its expectations of Myanmar crystal clear. Whenever Asean interacts with the representatives of the junta, it must only be for the purpose of restoring the country along the democratic path. To speak on other "regular" Asean issues with the junta would make a mockery of the group's standing.

The Asean Charter provides that if it is seriously breached or not complied with, the matter shall be referred to the Asean Summit for a decision. Perhaps Asean leaders should actively consider this provision amid suggestions of a summit to address developments in Myanmar.

While motivations at the world's capitals may vary and may yet shift, currently there appears to be a general readiness to allow Asean to take the lead on resolving Myanmar's political crisis. Asean must seize this window of opportunity.

Not least of all, Asean collectively - or some of its member states - appears for now to enjoy the acceptability-test of the various stakeholders in Myanmar, critical for any sustained diplomatic efforts. This may not last, however, as signs abound of growing dismay at Asean's perceived lack of concrete action and relevance.

ASEAN HAS OPTIONS

Thanks to past efforts at capacity-building, Asean possesses not inconsiderable options in its diplomatic toolbox for both formal and informal approaches.

The 2007 charter allows for the bloc's chair to "ensure an effective and timely response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting Asean, including providing its good offices and such other arrangements to immediately address these concerns". The charter further provides that both the chair and the Asean secretary general, acting in ex officio capacity, may provide good offices, conciliation or mediation.

This mandate, for instance, does not appear to preclude the designation by the Asean chair or secretary general of an envoy, to informally and in a low-key manner identify the contours for a just and sustained solution to the current crisis.

Nor should one ignore the possible practical contributions of the Asean Committee in Yangon, made up of the heads of missions of the Asean member states. Acting in unison, the Asean ambassadors in the Myanmar capital may serve as an important focal point to observe Myanmar's compliance with Asean exhortations. A similar role may also be served by the Asean Committee of Permanent Representatives accredited to the Asean Secretariat in Jakarta.

If informal diplomacy is the preferred approach, the Asean Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) offers the possibility of a pool of experts from member states to assist in conflict management and conflict resolution. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the continuing challenges to the full optimisation of its work, the terms of reference of the Asean Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) include a suitably wide berth: "To perform any other tasks that may be assigned to it by the Asean Foreign Ministers Meeting." Perhaps it is time to invoke this potential.

Beyond this, Asean-led processes such as the Asean Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit also have the wherewithal to make positive contributions, including through informal and low-key efforts. Cooperation between Asean and the UN, such as through observer missions or a mission to promote and keep the peace, may be of particular import when suggestions of appropriate on-the-ground presence are explored.

Southeast Asia is replete with examples of how internal conflict situations - with actual or potential wider regional implications - have been managed and resolved through sustained, persistent and innovative regional-level diplomatic efforts. This is why it is incumbent on Asean to now marshal all available diplomatic tools and options, and deliver on its promise of "one vision, one identity, one community".

Marty Natalegawa was Indonesia's foreign minister from 2009-2014 and is the author of "Does Asean matter? A view from within" from ISEAS Publishing.

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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