WARRING COMMANDERS
Relations between top Army and Marine commanders became testy in early 1968 as generals with clashing views on battle tactics attacked not only the enemy but also each other. The squabble was focused on the northernmost region in South Vietnam, the only part of the country with a heavy concentration of both Army and Marine units.
The spark for the feud was lit when Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of all U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam as head of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, decided to add a top Army commander to the northern region, where a Marine general was already in charge.
In the South Vietnamese army, the northernmost region of the country was under the command of its I Corps unit and designated the I Corps Tactical Zone, a collection of five provinces. I Corps was one of four military zones organized in the South during the late 1950s and early ’60s.
The American unit in charge of U.S. troops in the I Corps Tactical Zone was the III Marine Amphibious Force, formed in May 1965, after the Marine landing at Da Nang in March brought the first U.S. ground combat unit to Vietnam. That unit, the 3rd Marine Division, was joined by the 1st Marine Division in February 1966. The 3rd Marine Division focused on the two provinces closest to the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam, while the 1st Marine Division handled I Corps’ lower provinces. Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman took command of III MAF in June 1967.
Westmoreland, concerned about increased activity by the North Vietnamese Army in late 1967, prepared contingency plans in January 1968 for a second high-level I Corps command, headed by an Army general. Army historian Graham A. Cosmas observed that Westmoreland thought there would be a major NVA offensive and “did not trust III MAF to be able to control the battle.” On Jan. 31, just
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