THE 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION TESTS

On March 30, 1972, some 30,000-40,000 North Vietnamese Army regulars streamed southward across the Demilitarized Zone and eastward from Laos in a strike against the recently formed 3rd Infantry Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Over the next month this force in northern South Vietnam would involve three divisions and two dozen independent regiments supported by 200 tanks, long-range 130 mm artillery guns and air defense units. About 60 miles to the south, another North Vietnamese division headed toward Hue.

The March 30 attack marked the opening of the North Vietnamese Spring-Summer Offensive of 1972 (Chien dich Xuan he 1972). The offensive consisted of a three-pronged assault that hit South Vietnam in its northern, central and southern regions. The goal was to destroy as many ARVN forces as possible, which would enable the North Vietnamese to occupy key cities and put communist troops in position to threaten Saigon and President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government, according to captured documents and information from NVA prisoners after the invasion.

Within two weeks of the initial attack across the DMZ, large battles were being fought on all three major fronts. Before the offensive was over, more than 14 NVA divisions and 26 regiments—totaling more than 130,000 troops and approximately 1,200 tanks and other armored vehicles—were committed to the fight. The North Vietnamese also brought advanced weaponry not used in previous communist offensives.

By this time, President Richard Nixon had instituted a “Vietnamization” program to turn the conduct of the war over to the South Vietnamese. This program, announced in 1969, was developed to increase ARVN capabilities and bolster Thieu’s government so the South Vietnamese could stand on their own against communist forces. Strengthening ARVN capabilities would permit the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the senior U.S. headquarters for combat operations, increased the number of military advisers assigned to ARVN forces to improve their quality, a critical function of the Vietnamization program. Although MACV advisers had worked with South Vietnamese units since 1955, the importance of the advisory program increased as the number of American combat units dwindled.

By the beginning of 1972, most U.S. ground combat forces had been withdrawn, leaving