PANEL / CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

“This will be seen as a hybrid war, in which a key weapon is the deliberate misreading of history”

THE PANEL

James Ellison is reader in international history at Queen Mary University of London, specialising in the history of international affairs during and after the Cold War

Artemy Kalinovsky is professor at Temple University, College of Liberal Arts, Philadelphia, and a specialist in the history of Russia and the Cold War

Liudmyla Sharipova is assistant professor at the University of Nottingham, and a specialist in Ukrainian and east European history in the early modern period

Serhy Yekelchyk is professor of history and Germanic and Slavic studies at the University of Victoria, Canada, specialising in the history of Ukraine and Russia

MORE FROM US

For more on the historical background to the war in Ukraine, including pieces by Serhy Yekelchyk and James Ellison, visit histoiyextra.com

Matt Elton Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, commentators have been drawing parallels to a whole range of historical events in an attempt to make sense of the situation. How far do you think we can reasonably take those parallels?

Liudmyla Sharipova My opinion is very much divided as to how far back our analysis of today’s war in Ukraine should go. I am obviously always very happy to talk about the medieval or early modern history of Ukraine and Muscovy. However, I also think we need to avoid falling into Vladimir Putin’s trap when we look for the roots of the present war. [The Russian president has in recent months written and spoken about his view of history, arguing that Ukraine has never been a legitimate state but instead a natural part of Russia, and that its existence is a historical mistake dating back to at least the 1920s.] I think those roots aren’t in some distant event, such as the annexation of part of Ukraine by Muscovy in the 17th century, nor in the foundation of Kyiv [in the fifth century, according to legend], but in the 20th century – and probably as recently as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

I agree. I would perhaps push it even further forward, into the 21st century, by arguing that the separation of Russian and Ukrainian attitudes to the past and to democracy really happened only after the Orange Revolution of 2004-05 [a series of popular mass protests against electoral fraud that erupted in Ukraine after proRussia candidate Viktor Yanukovych claimed the presidential election]. When we talk about the past in this situation, we’re more talking about our contemporary of the