History shows that when conducting consecutive wars, military leaders fight the ‘next’ war with doctrine, equipment and tactics stemming from the previous. If it worked last time, the prevailing wisdom has been that it should work now. Training and tactics take a long time to change, and with most armed forces the rate of change is slow. A prime example of this is the Second World War where the frontlines were – for the most part – clearly defined and continuous, without gaps or separation between defending units. Commanders advanced their troops into enemy territory carefully, safe in the knowledge their enemy was predominantly in front of them. In the next major conflict, the Korean War (1950-53), these conditions would be turned on their head. But why? The answer, in part, is terrain, in part resources.
Out with the new, in with the old
The Korean peninsula, then as now, is made up of mountainous terrain with high peaks and low valleys, limiting the use of the large-manoeuvre tactics that had seen such success less than a decade prior. The peninsula’s narrow valleys did not lend themselves to large armoured columns because the proximity of steep slopes and sharp peaks left these columns vulnerable – from below and above – to a variety of the latest anti-armour
