The Roman army is often considered an invincible, unstoppable war machine that crushed any group, no matter how large, that was foolish enough to stand in its way. Cohort after cohort of hardfaced heroes in gleaming armour, ploughing their way through a disorganized horde of long-haired, screaming barbarians, helpless to stop the pre-determined success of the Roman Empire as it extended its tendrils to the limits of the known world. Reality, however, was something rather different, and certainly something altogether more complex. The Roman military suffered many losses in its long history, including some rather significant ones. Sometimes these losses also had serious ramifications for the future, inducing a level of anxiety in Roman officials regarding the stability of the empire. They worried about the future of the Roman state, and a select few posited their own ideas on how the situation could be remedied. One such loss was Adrianople in AD 378, and the man was Publius Vegetius Renatus (hereafter referred to as Vegetius), who offered his suggestions for reform in his work De re Militari (Concerning Military Matters).
Vegetius was a highly placed Roman civil servant who composed sometime between AD 383 and 450, dedicating his work to the reigning emperor. Who that emperor was, is disputed. Some scholars argue it was Theodosius I (r. 379-395), and others propose an earlier publication date and reign, around the time of Valentinian II (r. 388-392). Vegetius’ treatise has been characterized as one of the most systematic
