Diana Inquest: Corruption at Scotland Yard

By John Morgan

This explosive book exposes high-level corruption in London’s Metropolitan Police Service following the August 1997 death of Princess Diana in Paris. Over the ensuing decade Scotland Yard carried out one of the biggest and most wide-reaching cover-ups in its history. Police Commissioners Paul Condon and John Stevens should have conducted a thorough investigation. Instead, they sought to prevent the truth of the Alma Tunnel car crash – the assassination of Princess Diana – from being revealed to the British public. Just 18 days after the crash Princess Diana’s lawyer, Victor Mishcon, presented to Paul Condon documentary evidence of Diana’s belief she would be killed in a car crash. Instead of investigating this, Condon locked the evidence in his office safe – and there it stayed for six years. But it is worse: this book reveals that in 2007 – the year following the death of Mishcon – Condon and his assistant, David Veness, fabricated a document to “show” that Mishcon agreed with the suppression of the evidence. They used this fabricated document – with Condon’s forged signature – to support their perjury at the 2007-8 inquest, where they falsely claimed Mishcon had insisted on the suppression of the Diana evidence. Corruption at Scotland Yard shows that Lord John Stevens, Lord Paul Condon and Sir David Veness colluded and lied repeatedly during their extensive inquest cross-examinations. The book also reveals that Stevens presided over one of the largest sham investigations in the history of British policing – Operation Paget. An operation that the public believed was designed to investigate the Paris crash was instead used to cover up the truth of what occurred – protecting the perpetrators of the assassination of Princess Diana. This book reveals that on the very day of the crash Condon and Veness deliberately appointed Jeffrey Rees – a corrupt officer – to head the investigation, even though he was not available and had a clear conflict of interest. Corruption at Scotland Yard exposes police corruption involving top police on a scale that will shock most members of the British public.

• Language: English
• Publisher: John Morgan
• Release date: Jun 16, 2015

Book preview

DIANA INQUEST

The Untold Story

PART 6:

CORRUPTION AT SCOTLAND YARD

John Morgan

Copyright © 2013, 2015 John Morgan

Published by Shining Bright Publishing

Cover Picture:

The famous revolving sign in front of London’s police headquarters. Another side of the sign reads: Metropolitan Police – Working together for a safer London. In the case of the death of Princess Diana the London MPS worked to protect the perpetrators, not the victims.

eBook Design by acepub

Diana Inquest: The Untold Story

Is dedicated

To

Diana, Princess of Wales

And

Dodi Fayed

Killed in a mindless tragedy

The crash in the Alma Tunnel, Paris, at 12.23 a.m., 31 August 1997

And

To those few in their and Henri Paul’s families

Who have had the courage to fight for the truth to come out

Who have been confronted with an unconscionable travesty of justice

Known as the official investigations

That commenced in Paris immediately after the crash

That concluded at 4.33 p.m. on 7 April 2008 in London’s Royal Courts of Justice

Special Author’s Note

April 2013

It is with some sadness that I write this, because I was really hoping I would be able to complete this series. As it has turned out, the illness that has plagued me for the last ten years – multiple system atrophy – may have the final word.

Having said that, I also write with a sense of accomplishment – that so much has been achieved in the compilation of this work.

I am left with no regrets that I have spent the last eight years – possibly my final years – working on what I see as the investigation of one of the most shocking crimes of the 20th century. I feel that enough evidence has been compiled to show that Princess Diana was assassinated by sections of the British Establishment and that a huge cover-up ensued.

There are some aspects that – had time permitted me – I intended to address in the final volume: the mismanagement and corruption at the inquest; Diana’s wooden box; Diana’s pregnancy; Trevor Rees-Jones’ memory and the UK break-ins.

It seems that book will not be written and this volume will be the final.

I wish to thank those readers – past, present and future – who have taken the time to read this series and I sincerely hope it has been a positive experience for you.

I believe that it is only through the exposure of injustice that some form of justice may be achieved. And I deeply wish that these volumes, which have been researched and written under adverse circumstances, will play a part in some future justice for the occupants of the Mercedes S280 that died on that fateful night in Paris – Diana, Princess of Wales, Dodi Fayed and Henri Paul.

Other Volumes In This Series

Part 1: Diana Inquest: The Untold Story (2009)

Covers pre-crash events in the Ritz Hotel, the final journey and what happened in the Alma Tunnel

Part 2: Diana Inquest: How & Why Did Diana Die? (2009)

Covers possible motives for assassination and post-crash medical treatment of Princess Diana – including mistreatment in the ambulance

Part 3: Diana Inquest: The French Cover-Up (2010)

Covers the autopsies of the driver, Henri Paul, and the misconduct of the French investigation into the crash

Part 4: Diana Inquest: The British Cover-Up (2011)

Covers the post-death treatment of Princess Diana – including the embalmings and autopsies carried out in both France and the UK and the post-crash cover-up by UK authorities, including the Queen

Part 5 : Diana Inquest:Who Killed Princess Diana? (2012)

Covers the involvement of MI6 and senior British royals in the assassinations of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed

Diana Inquest: The Documents the Jury Never Saw (2010)

Reproduces hundreds of key documents from within the British Paget investigation – all documents that the inquest jury were prevented from seeing

Paris-London Connection: The Assassination of Princess Diana (2012)

A short, easy-to read, fast-moving synopsis of the complete story of the events, including the lead-up, the crash and the ensuing cover-up – based on the Diana Inquest series

How They Murdered Princess Diana: The Shocking Truth (2014)

A narrative abridgement of the Diana Inquest series. This is the most complete single volume account of the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed yet written.

Other Books by John Morgan

Cover-Up of a Royal Murder: Hundreds of Errors in the Paget Report (2007)

Alan Power Exposed: Hundreds of Errors in The Princess Diana Conspiracy (2013)

Flying Free: A Journey from Fundamentalism to Freedom (2005)

John Morgan’s Investigation Website: www.princessdianadeaththeevidence.weebly.com

Acknowledgements

During the years of research I have received invaluable support from various individuals.

No acknowledgements could start with anyone other than my wife, Lana – she has been a huge rock of strength amidst the madness of constant writing and progressing illness.

Lana – who identifies herself as the devil’s advocate – has contributed immensely as a regular sounding board for ideas and analysis and has provided invaluable input into concepts and opinion during the development of the Diana Inquest volumes.

On top of that, Lana has acted as artistic director with the principal role of designing the cover for each volume. She has also assisted with editing, thoroughly reading and re-reading manuscripts prior to publication.

Without Lana’s support these volumes could never have been produced.

Paul Sparks, UK-based journalist and film producer, has been an extremely consistent support right from the earliest beginnings of this series. Paul has provided invaluable help in filling the inevitable geographical void that is created as a result of the books being written in Australia – thousands of kilometres away from where the key events occurred.

I also am indebted to a forensic investigator in London, who commenced assembling an extensive archive with case notes on the Paris crash and its aftermath, within a week of the tragedy occurring. This person has constantly maintained and updated their records over the ensuing 15 years and has kindly passed on research information from that archive whenever I have requested it. They wish to remain anonymous.

As well, it should be evident to any reader of these volumes that the hundreds of documents from within the MPS Paget investigation that were passed onto me a few years ago have been a huge help in completing a thorough investigation of the crash and the resulting cover-up. I am very grateful to the people in the UK who threw caution to the wind and courageously provided me with that invaluable information. Without those documents virtually none of Part 4 could have been written. So, although the documents the jury never saw have lengthened this investigative project, it has more importantly filled in critical gaps in the jigsaw that would otherwise have been impossible to fit.

There are other people in the UK who have assisted in sometimes critical ways, but wish or need to remain anonymous. To those people, who know who they are, I am extremely thankful for their assistance and they can hopefully appreciate that they have contributed towards establishing the historical record of what occurred in certainly one of the most significant assassinations of our time.

Then there are more individuals – mostly living outside of the UK – who have assisted in various ways and I wish to gratefully acknowledge their support: Belinda Frost, Jayne Dean, Richard Lancaster, Emmanuelle Quignon, Monica Hudson, Margaret Deters, Jos Deters, Rex Morgan, Sue Hindle, Anne Pledger and Tina Jones.

In specific reference to the knowledge now available regarding the activities of MI6, I wish to acknowledge the uncompromising courage of the late Peter Wright¹, Richard Tomlinson, David Shaylerand Annie Machon. They have all been prepared to go public to address important issues that would otherwise have remained officially buried and hidden from our collective understanding.

Table of Contents

Special Author’s Note

Acknowledgements

Preface

The Witnesses Not Heard

The Lawyers & Representation

The Organisations

Timeline of Events

Introduction

1: Early UK Investigations

Jeffrey Rees

Peter Heard

Geoffrey Hunt

Why Was Rees Appointed?

Was This An Investigation?

Other Issues

Conclusion

2: The Mishcon Note

Timeline of Events

Witness and Documentary Evidence

Role of Victor Mishcon

Post-Burrell Note Events

Suspicious Factors

Flawed Police Testimony

Paul Condon

David Veness

John Stevens

Audi Brake Failure

BMW Crash

Camilla Car Crash

Abdication Speculation

Tiggy Legge-Bourke

Reliable Sources

Coroner’s Statements

Opening Remarks

Summing Up

Conclusion

3: Operation Paget

Ten Years of Delay

MI6 and MPS Relationship

Role of John Stevens

Terms of Reference

Paget and the Inquest

Treatment of Witnesses

Tom Richardson and Joanna Luz

Souad Moufakkir

Grigori Rassinier

Richard Tomlinson

Gary Dean

Robert Thompson

Stephen Donnelly

Claude Roulet

Martin Quaife

Karen MacKenzie

Alberto Repossi

Gilbert Pépin

Interviewing Methods

Use of LGC

Henri Paul’s Finances

Stevens-Pauls Meeting: 8 November 2006

Your Son Was Not Drunk

Incalculable Repercussions

Getting the Evidence Right

Analysis

Police Conduct

Allegations Against Paget

Break-Ins

Conclusion

4: Conclusion

5: Conclusion to the Series

Bibliography

Author Information

Notes

Preface

On 31 August 1997 one of the most significant assassinations of the 20th century took place on the streets of central Paris.

Diana, Princess of Wales, and her boyfriend, Dodi Fayed, travelling in a Mercedes S280 were killed in an orchestrated car crash in the Alma Tunnel.

Within hours of this assassination senior British police – operating in conjunction with France’s elite Brigade Criminelle – instigated what would become a massive, lengthy and wide-ranging cover-up of the events that occurred.

This huge Scotland Yard operation commenced within hours of the crash and essentially finished with the conclusion of the London inquest into the deaths on April 7th 2008.

Initially called Operation Paris and later changed to Operation Paget, this massive cover-up was masterminded by two successive police commissioners – Lord Paul Condon and Lord John Stevens – men who have displayed a depth of corruption that is beyond the comprehension of the vast majority of the British public.

This book contains the chilling story of that state-authorised police cover-up.

Diana Inquest: Corruption at Scotland Yard will reveal:

on the day of the Paris crash a corrupt officer was chosen to lead the British police investigation – even though he was not the most available or appropriate choice

in 2007 senior Scotland Yard officers fraudulently fabricated documents, ahead of testifying at the inquest, to cover up evidence of earlier illegal actions

Paul Condon and John Stevens deliberately and illegally suppressed critical evidence for a period of six years

Condon, Stevens and Veness² misrepresented the content of conversations with the deceased London lawyer, Victor Mishcon, and lied under oath about his beliefs regarding what became known as the Mishcon Note

John Stevens committed perjury when testifying about his meeting with the parents of Mercedes driver Henri Paul, held just 36 days before the publication of his Paget Report.

This volume of the series will also explain why the British police could carry out a three-year intensive investigation into the crash and conclude it was an accident, whilst the inquest jury – after just six months – found more correctly that it was unlawful killing.³

In short, this book will expose the extraordinary actions the British police took to cover up one of the most important state-authorised assassinations of the 20th century.⁴

The issues regarding Operation Paget addressed in this volume are generally in addition to what was covered in the 2007 book Cover-Up of a Royal Murder: Hundreds of Errors in the Paget Report.⁵ It is recommended that the reader goes to that book to achieve a fuller understanding of the flaws in the official report.

Diana Inquest: Corruption at Scotland Yard has drawn heavily on the information – 7,000 pages of transcripts and other evidence – that is on the official inquest website.

In 2011 a decision was made at the Royal Courts of Justice to close down the official inquest website – which had been www.scottbaker-inquests.gov.uk Following that move, the inquest transcripts and evidence can now only be found in the UK National Archives. The easiest way to access them – at the time of writing – is using Google search with the words: Diana inquest transcripts.⁶

All quotes throughout this book have been fully referenced, and I encourage readers to look up the website⁷ for the full transcript of any particular piece of witness evidence they need to view in its complete context.

This volume also uses material from the 2010 book Diana Inquest: The Documents the Jury Never Saw – often simply referred to as The Documents book. Generally the page number references from that book have been shown in the footnotes or endnotes in this volume.

Page numbers referenced to The Documents book relate to the UK edition. Readers who have the US edition of The Documents book will be able to locate the same excerpts within a few pages of the UK edition page number. For example, if the UK edition quote is from page 300, it will appear before page 310 in the US edition.

Extensive witness lists shown at the start of Part 1 have not been included in this book in an effort to save space. All witnesses mentioned in Part 6 have been included in the index, and of course are also mentioned in the lists in Part 1.⁸

I have deliberately included verbatim inquest testimony in this book – it reveals the words of the witnesses themselves as they describe what they saw or heard.

Points to assist with the reading of Diana Inquest and accessing evidence:

Transcript quotes have been referenced through the book as follows:

Example:

Claude Garrec, Henri Paul’s Closest Friend: 31 Jan 08: 124.15:

Hough: Q. Did he have any ambition to become the head of security?

A. No

Claude Garrec = Witness name

Henri Paul’s Closest Friend = Witness’ position or relevance

31 Jan 08 = Date of testimony at the inquest

124 = Page number – note that page numbers appear at the bottom of each page on the inquest website transcripts

15 = Line number on the page

Hough = Lawyer doing the questioning – there is a list of lawyers and who they represent near the front of this book

Q = Statement made by the lawyer or questioner

A = Statement made by the witness or answerer

The inquest website⁹ contains a large number of significant items of evidence: photos, documents, letters and so on. It is important to note that none of this evidence is stored in numerical or subject order – the easiest way to locate these items is by scrolling down the evidence list looking for the specific reference number you are seeking. The reference numbers, which always begin with the prefix code INQ, will often be found in the footnotes or endnotes in this book.

In addition, the website has several interesting and useful videos that are available for viewing by the public. These are also not as easy to access as the transcripts. To reach the videos, click on Evidence, then click on any date on the calendar, then scroll down or up until you come to an item of evidence that is obviously a video. When you click on that item, a page will open up that will give you access to all of the videos on the website.

Throughout this book underlining of words or phrases has been used as a means of emphasising certain points, unless otherwise stated.

Jury Didn’t Hear appears in bold before:

Any evidence that was not heard during the inquest

Written documents from the Coroner not seen by the jury.

Jury Not Present appears in bold before any statement made in court where the jury wasn’t present.

Word usage:

Autopsy and post-mortem are synonymous – autopsy is generally used in France, whereas post-mortem is generally used in the UK

KP = Kensington Palace, Diana’s home

Sapeurs-Pompiers = Paris Fire Service

BAC = Blood Alcohol Concentration

Cours la Reine, Cours Albert 1er, Avenue de New York and Voie Georges Pompidou are all names for the same riverside expressway that runs into the Alma Tunnel. The parallel service road is also known as Cours Albert 1er

Fulham Mortuary = Hammersmith and Fulham Mortuary

Imperial College = Charing Cross Hospital¹⁰

MI6 = SIS = Secret Intelligence Service

MI5 = SS = Security Service

The Witnesses Not Heard

Parts 1 to 5 included lists of 257 witnesses not heard at the inquest. The following 15 witnesses should be added to that number, giving a new total of 272.¹¹

WitUnheardWitUnheard1WitUnheard2

The Lawyers & Representation

Lawyers

The Organisations

Org1org2org3

Timeline of Events

1995

Oct 30 - Meeting between Princess Diana and her lawyer, Victor Mishcon – Diana says she fears a staged car crash

Nov - Approaching a red light in London the brakes fail in Diana’s Audi

20 - BBC Panorama broadcasts Diana interview by Martin Bashir

1996

Mar 23 - Diana’s BMW is extensively damaged after being hit by a Fiat Uno whilst driving at night in London

1997

May - Allegation of theft from Harrods safety deposit boxes made against Mohamed Al Fayed by Tiny Roland

Jeffrey Rees is appointed SIO heading the safety deposit box investigation

Jun 11 - Camilla Parker-Bowles involved in a serious car crash at Norton, Wiltshire

Aug 31 - Princess Diana, Dodi Fayed and Henri Paul die following a 12.23 a.m. car crash in the Alma Tunnel, Paris

French crash investigation begins

Jeffrey Rees is appointed SIO in charge of the British crash investigation

Sep

1 - Operation Paris set up with terms of reference: Gathering evidence and facts on behalf of the coroners

17 - French police announce they are looking for a second car that was involved in the Alma crash – a white Fiat Uno. The driver of the car has not come forward

Diana’s lawyer, Victor Mishcon, phones MPS Commissioner, Paul Condon

18 - Mishcon delivers to Condon the 1995 meeting note – the Mishcon Note – revealing that Diana predicted her death by staged car crash. Condon, and later John Stevens, lock the Mishcon Note in their office safe for the next six years

26 - Rees completes a report outlining his role in the investigation

Dec - Rees informs Martine Monteil that Mohamed Al Fayed and some other Harrods staff could be arrested regarding the deposit box investigation

1998

Jan 22 - Rees completes a report recording his concerns over being appointed to head the British investigation into the Paris crash

Feb - Niall Mulvihill requests French help to conduct filming of the final journey route by British police

Mar - Rees arrests Mohamed and five Harrods staff in connection with the safety box investigation. No charges were ever laid

1999

Sep 3 - French investigation ends, concluding that the Alma crash was caused by a drunk driver, Henri Paul, who was also speeding

2000

Jan 19 - Stevens takes over as MPS Commissioner from Condon. Condon passes on control of the Mishcon Note – Stevens locks it away for four further years

Aug - Set up of Operation Paget

2002

Mar - Royal coroner John Burton resigns. He is replaced by Michael Burgess

2003

Oct

20 - Publication of the Burrell Note in the Daily Mirror – handwritten by Diana, it accuses Prince Charles of planning her death in a car crash²²

23 - John Stevens, MPS Commissioner, seeks legal advice regarding disclosure of the Mishcon Note

27 - Victor Mishcon phones John Stevens but he is unavailable

29 - Mishcon again phones Stevens and again he is unavailable

30 - Meeting at Scotland Yard between Mishcon, Stevens and David Veness. Agreement is made to disclose the Mishcon Note to the coroner

Dec

20 - MPS interview Patrick Jephson in connection with the Mishcon Note

22 - Mishcon Note is delivered by the police to the royal coroner, Michael Burgess

2004

Jan

6 - British inquest into the deaths of Diana and Dodi opens

Burgess requests the British police to conduct a full inquiry into the deaths

Inquest is adjourned while the police investigation proceeds

7 - Burgess appoints MPS Commissioner John Stevens to be head of Operation Paget, the British inquiry

2005

Jan - Stevens resigns as MPS Commissioner but stays on as Head of Operation Paget

2006

Jan

27 - Victor Mishcon dies at home, age 90, following a lengthy illness

Publication of transcript of TV interview with John Stevens – Stevens states that the Paget investigation was more complex than anticipated

28 - Burglary at John Stevens’ office in Newcastle – two laptops and £750 cash is taken

Feb 5 - Second burglary at Stevens’ office complex – nothing stolen

Mar

1 - David Forster arrested and charged with Stevens’ burglary

22 - Forster convicted and jailed over Stevens’ burglary

Jul 22 - Royal coroner Michael Burgess resigns from the case, citing a heavy workload

Sep 7 - Appointment of Elizabeth Butler-Sloss as new coroner

Nov 8 - Meeting at British Embassy in Paris between Stevens and Henri Paul’s parents

Dec 14 - British inquiry ends and the Paget Report is published. Stevens concludes that the crash was caused by the driver, Henri Paul, who had been drinking alcohol and was also speeding

2007

Senior British police – Condon, Veness and Stevens – fabricate documentary evidence pertaining to the Mishcon Note ahead of the opening of the inquest into the deaths

Apr 24 - Elizabeth Butler-Sloss resigns as coroner for the case, citing inexperience with the jury system

Jun - Scott Baker takes over as coroner

Oct 2 - British inquest main hearings begin with an 11-person jury

2008

Apr 7 - British inquest concludes with the jury’s verdict that the crash was caused by unlawful killing, grossly negligent driving of the following vehicles and of the Mercedes

8 - Worldwide media reports alter the wording of the verdict to read paparazzi instead of following vehicles

Introduction

²³

On Sunday morning, 31 August 1997, a Parisian council truck slowly trundled through the Alma Tunnel, washing it clean with a mix of detergent and water.²⁴

Meanwhile, across the channel in London, senior officers at Scotland Yard were formulating one of the greatest cover-ups in British police history.

1: Early UK Investigations

²⁵

On Sunday 31 August 1997 word of the death of Princess Diana spread quickly around the world.

Simultaneously decisions were being made at Scotland Yard that have become the subject of considerable controversy.

There are three significant issues:

the appointment of Jeffrey Rees on 31 August 1997²⁶ to head the Scotland Yard investigation

why was the MPS Organised Crime Group used to investigate what was apparently a car accident in Paris?

were the British police liaising²⁷ or investigating between 1997 and 2004 before Operation Paget commenced?²⁸

David Veness, MPS Asst Commissioner Specialist Operations, UK: 15 Jan 08: 45.25:

Hilliard: Q. When did you first hear that [Diana] was in Paris at all?

A. When the news coverage of the tragic events began to be broadcast on that morning, and I was subsequently advised by my own officers of this tragic news.

Q. You got a call, is this right, from the Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Group and, as it were, received official confirmation?

A. That is so.

....Q. You say in your statement that after that call ... there then followed, you say, many telephone calls during the morning and throughout the day dealing with many issues, including ... trying to establish what had happened.

A. That is correct.

Q. I think during that day, you called and chaired a meeting in Buckingham Gate, at the base for the Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Group, and that’s just across the road from Buckingham Palace; is that right?

A. That is so.

....Q. When you say forensic issues in your witness statement, what do you mean by those, just so we understand?

A. That there should be appropriate arrangements made at the post-mortem²⁹ in order that all appropriate samples and forensic exhibits should be properly collated and recorded.

Q. Right. As a result of appreciating the need for that, what did you do?

A. I asked my staff officer to contact an investigating officer within the command in order to address the forensic aspects and to attend the post-mortems. That officer was Superintendent Jeffrey Rees.

Q. Is this right, that the senior detective officer ... was somebody called Detective Chief Inspector Peter Heard; is that right?

A. He was the senior on call, yes.

Q. But there was a difficulty with him, is this right, because he was due to fly to Canada on business the next morning; is that right?

A. That was my understanding.

Q. So obviously he was going to be no good – I say no good – not appropriate –

A. Yes.

Q. – a long way away. In those circumstances, you, is this right, gave instructions that Mr Rees should deal with it?

A. Yes. Mr Rees is an officer of enormous competence and expertise, and I regarded him as an ideal choice, particularly with his experience of handling forensic matters.

Q. Right. Aside from those considerations, Sir David, was there any other factor that played a part in the selection of Mr Rees?

A. No, there was not.

Q. Now, terms of reference were agreed with Mr Rees; is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. He told us this: that his responsibilities were, first of all, to liaise closely with the French authorities and provide them with any appropriate assistance; secondly, to facilitate any enquiries that they might wish carried out in the United Kingdom; to keep you informed of all significant developments; and to liaise closely with the British Ambassador and his staff at the Embassy in Paris and keep them informed of developments. Does that accord with your recollection?³⁰

A. That’s precisely the recollection. Two points arise. I believe I discussed those terms of reference with him on the following morning, the Monday morning. It was also very clear in all of our minds that this was a French investigation and the role of Scotland Yard at this stage would be to act in liaison.

Q. Now we know that Mr Rees had expressed concerns about his position because he was also in charge of an investigation into allegations of theft from a safety deposit box at Harrods; do you remember that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. We know that he actually put his concerns, in due course, into writing in January of the next year and that those concerns sort of went up the chain and that essentially the view was that it was quite right to raise them and record them, but that it was not felt that there was in fact a conflict of interest.

A. I understand that decision was made.

Q. Now were you aware of the concern that Mr Rees had actually at the time?

A. I think it certainly – the matters were discussed. May I say candidly that I think –

Q. Can we just take it stage by stage? If we go right back to on the ground and 1997/1998, as you recall it, were you aware that he had got the concern?

A. Yes, indeed.

Coroner: Before you appointed him?

A. I was – no. The appointment was made effectively on the –

Coroner: On the day.

A. – on the Sunday. I thought he was the right person for the job. I was aware, sir, that there was an antecedent³¹ matter which could cause the possibility of perception that this was inappropriate. The subsequent expression by Mr Rees, I was aware. I did not see the precise papers on which the decision was made where he had raised those issues.

Coroner: But when you made the decision on the Sunday to appoint him, do I understand you to be saying, Yes, I was aware that he was in charge of the safety deposit box inquiry, but even to the extent that that impinged on my mind, there were other factors that overrode it?

A. Yes. I thought he was the right person and he was available at that time. As I think – I have a view that with – that events were followed, it would have been fairer to Mr Rees to have changed that decision.

Q. That’s just the two things I am trying to separate. As far as at the time was concerned, you were satisfied that it was acceptable for him to carry out both roles; is that right?

A. I was.

Q. But then you say that looking back on matters – I want to be clear – what’s your view now?

A. My view is very clear, that it was perhaps unfair to Mr Rees to ask him to undertake both of those functions, particularly as time developed, on the basis that clearly there may well be a subsequent perception that we were asking him to pursue overlapping matters which, I now believe, would have been wiser to separate for the purposes of perception.³²

Coroner: Not only unfair to Mr Rees, but perhaps unfair to Mr Fayed as well.

A. Absolutely, sir. That is what I am agreeing with.

Coroner: Yes.

Q. Yes. Indeed you refer to that, not only to Mr Rees, but also to the perception that other people might have had. You say in your statement that for those reasons it would be better now in fact if it had been separated.

A. Yes, and I agreed with the point that the Coroner makes, that this is not only a perception issue; it is the reality of fairness.

... Q. Mr Rees carried on in his role until he retired from the Metropolitan Police, as we heard from him; correct?

A. That is correct.

At 81.14: Mansfield: Q. In July [1997], you knew, didn’t you, that Mohamed Al Fayed was under investigation, wasn’t he?

A. Correct.

....Q. And you knew in July 1997 that Mr Rees was involved?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. So you knew that before we ever get to September and his appointment?

A. Yes.

At 90.3: Q. We have heard from Jeffrey Rees. You have mentioned him already and obviously he is well known. We don’t need to do the background of him for the moment with you. On 31st August – have you read his statement as well?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Well, then, would you mind if I just remind you of what he is saying about the 31st? .... I will read the context of it so it’s fair to you. You can hear what he says: Soon after hearing the news [of the Paris crash], I made a professional assessment that it would be necessary to consider whether there would be a role for the OCG. The OCG being?

A. It is the Organised Crime Group.

Q. Did the Organised Crime Group at that time have a role in royalty protection of any kind?

A. No, but if there was any specific investigation to be pursued at the top tier, it necessarily encompassed the skills of some of the more experienced detectives who could be applied for a variety of roles.

Q. Investigation into what?

A. A range of activities.

Q. We will just come to this because this – just going on with his statement. So he is considering whether that group with those parameters could have a role. "This arose from the fact that the OCG formed part of the specialist operations department which covers Royal Family security. Therefore I telephoned the head of the OCG, Commander Mulvehill³³ ..." Do you remember him?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. ... to discuss the implications. During the course of the call, we assessed that short-term implications for the OCG were unlikely. That seems fair, doesn’t it?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. If this is a car accident, you don’t really need the OCG involved, do you?

A. There was – I think he was forming a view about what might have been necessary in the very near future, in the imminent hours and days ahead. They could not see a role at that stage.

Q. No. I should point out that I was neither on duty nor on call. Who was the on-call officer?

A. As I understand it, it was Chief Inspector Heard.

Q. Geoffrey Hunt, do you know him?

A. I do.

Q. He was on duty.

A. Yes, I am not sure, but I would have to confirm that he was actually part of the Organised Crime Group, as it were, reserve of senior detectives.

Q. At New Scotland Yard?

A. I am not sure he was within that group of detectives.

Q. Well, that can be no doubt checked. So he is saying – that is Rees – because you appoint him, you see. That’s why I am coming to that: ... not on call at the time. I called Commander Mulvehill, but as I was Acting Detective Chief Superintendent at the time – DCS Dixon was either on leave or on overseas inquiry at the time and the on-call SIO was Detective Chief Inspector Peter Heard, who was due to fly to Canada the next day – I assessed that my involvement was warranted. That’s how he leaves that at that stage. He had a long-standing lunch appointment and then he got a pager message, essentially from you.

A. Yes.

Q. You felt it was so imperative that he be involved, the very man who knew a great deal about Mohamed Al Fayed and the allegations, you sent a helicopter to get him, didn’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to suggest to you from the outset that if it was a perfectly legitimate situation, the one thing you wouldn’t³⁴ [sic] do in fairness, not just to Mr Rees but to Mr Al Fayed as well, was to keep Rees well out of it; do you follow?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean, it’s not a difficult decision, is it? You don’t require hindsight to work that one out, do you?

A. No, I candidly expressed my view that we certainly should have revisited the employment of Mr Rees. On that Sunday, as events were moving forward with some rapidity in that the post-mortems had been arranged at relatively short notice, which for certain reasons that appeared to be a highly desirable state of affairs, and that the bodies were returning to the United Kingdom, there was a need to move with expedition in order to have an able officer in order to conduct –

Q. Conduct what?

A. In order to conduct – assist to conduct the post-mortems.

Q. How?

A. There is a need for a very experienced officer in order to marshal the various exhibits, to arrange for the attendance of the key technical specialists, including exhibit officers, to ensure that the optimum forensic samples are recovered subject to the directions of the pathologist.

Q. This was a car accident, albeit involving some very well known people. You had on hand a very experienced pathologist, Dr Chapman; you had a very experienced exhibits officer who had done this many times before, Mr Stoneham. You knew that?

A. Yes, indeed.

Q. You had, in fact, the makings of a team that could swing into action without sending a helicopter for Mr Rees, didn’t you?

A. No. My judgment was that we needed to initiate what potentially would be very significant post mortems with the assistance of the best officer that I could find available in the notice to hand.

Q. Therefore, at that stage on the Sunday the 31st, as far as you were concerned and he was concerned, [what] were his terms of reference with respect to a British investigation into the deaths?

A. No. I don’t think we did settle terms of reference on that Sunday. It certainly was not in my mind that there would be a British investigation because it was all – it was clear to all concerned that the French would lead in terms of an investigation.

Q.... Can I just read you something? ... I don’t know whether you have seen it. If you have seen Mr Rees’ material, I suspect you have seen all this.

A. I cannot recall this.

Q. Can I remind you? It was a report dated 28th³⁵ September 1997 from Jeffrey Rees, Detective Superintendent, to Commander Specialist Operations, OCG. In this report – I will just read you the relevant passage – Superintendent Rees begins by outlining the events in Paris on 31st August. He goes on to state – and this is what is being stated in his report: On Sunday, 31st August 1997, whilst I was the Acting OCG Commander, I was directed by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations³⁶ to act as senior investigating officer in respect of the British investigations into the deaths. Is that right?

A. No.

Q. Well, how does he come to write that a few days later?

A. Because I think he is using the term senior investigating officer to describe a generic role that would be understood within the police service. That was effectively the job that he did most of the time, day to day. Specifically his role in this case was to act as liaison.

Q. All right. It goes on to say – it itemises four responsibilities: To liaise closely with the French authorities and provide them with any appropriate assistance; to facilitate any inquiries they may wish carried out in the United Kingdom; to appraise [you, that is] of all significant developments; and liaise closely with the British Ambassador. Then there is a bit that follows that: In addition, I have been directed by the two coroners to carry out investigations into the deaths on their behalf and report my findings at the two inquests. So there are various levels here, aren’t there? There is assisting the French?

A. Yes.

Q. And assisting the British?

A. Yes.

Q. The coroners?

A. Yes, but again I think I need to make it unequivocally clear, it certainly was not in my mind – I don’t think it was in Mr Rees’ mind – that he was conducting a criminal investigation within the United Kingdom. He was acting in liaison. We anticipated that our French colleagues would wish to conduct inquiries with our assistance within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, so we anticipated that requirement. We also anticipated that the coroners concerned in two jurisdictions would require assistance in the classic format of a coroner’s officer assisting a coroner with any form of preparatory activity before an inquest. That was his role.

Q. And providing the coroners with information?

A. Yes.

Q. Information; it doesn’t have to be evidence, it may be information that may be relevant?

A. Yes.

Q. You accept that?

A. Yes, indeed.

....Q. Just to complete the picture on this front, the terms of reference were finally written out rather more specifically, at least so far as one can tell, the following day, 1st September, because we have seen a policy file. Have you seen that?

A. I can’t recall.

Q. Well may I just read you what the first decision in the policy file for 1st September – how it reads. It’s one sentence. It’s called Operation Paris and the decision at 9 am is: OCG role [that’s the group role in this case] to be that of gathering evidence and facts on behalf of the coroners. Right?

A. (Witness nods)

Q. So that’s the first matter. In fact it’s the first in the list that he reported on 28th³⁷ September. Do you follow?

A. Yes.

Q. Plainly access to the coroners is relatively straightforward from your point of view because you have got an officer who goes down to the post mortem – in fact more than one, three go; a minimum of three are there – and if you wanted to contact the coroner at any time since you are setting up really at the behest of the coroner, it’s not a problem, is it?

A. No. This was a straightforward support to the coroner.

Q. Right. There are other decisions that follow, mostly to do with the French, but not entirely, on 1st September. As you had also established, or someone had, no doubt with your authority, besides Mr Rees, you had a liaison officer in Paris³⁸, didn’t you?

A. Yes, but he was not part of this structure. His role was to perform other duties and, as such, he was assigned to the British Embassy in Paris.

Q. You wanted to keep a very close eye on the French through Mr Gargan, didn’t you?

A. I made no such specific – my instructions were to Mr Rees, and it would seem to me a matter of wisdom that he utilised an officer who was attached to the British Embassy who had excellent contacts by dint of his duties with the French authorities.

Q. Mr Rees went over very regularly?

A. That was my understanding.

Q. Well, he would have to report back to you.

A. Yes.

Q. So you knew he was going over?

A. Yes.

Q. He was repeatedly asking the question: anything suspicious yet?

A. We were certainly very keen to explore whether this was, as it appeared on all of the known facts, to be a tragic accident or whether there were other factors involved.

At 135.8: Q. Never mind the French, the English coroners, the two of them for the two different jurisdictions³⁹, were in fact asking you – well, not you personally, but Mr Rees and Mr Gargan – to conduct all sorts of things themselves, weren’t they?

A. Yes. They were certainly exploring a variety of avenues, yes.

Q. And taking trips around Paris and so on, that sort of thing. We have seen it all.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Irrespective of the French; correct?

A. I think there was still operating, as it were, in tandem because at that stage the French inquiries had not come to conclusion. I do not think at that stage that either of the two learned coroners had come to a judgment that they wished to move from effectively a coroner’s officer arrangement where general inquiries were being pursued to a criminal investigation.

Q. We will come to that. But they were actively involved in asking for inquiries to be made from September 1997 onwards.

A. Yes, indeed.

Jeffrey Rees, Head of Early Crash Investigations, British Police: 17 Dec 07: 27.18:

Hilliard: Q. Between 1995 and when you retired in September of 2000, did you serve in the post of something called a senior investigating officer, shortened to SIO, in the Organised Crime Group at New Scotland Yard?

A. I did, sir.

Q. Can you just help us about each part of that? First of all, the post of senior investigating officer. What is that post?

A. Sir, that would normally be an officer of detective chief inspector or detective superintendent rank who would take charge of serious matters.

A. That was a title which covered a number of small branches, but my particular part of the Organised Crime Group – and that was made up of three or four senior investigators – we dealt with inquiries or matters which did not fall naturally to any other department at Scotland Yard and, in particular, for example, kidnappings or the murders of British citizens overseas.

Q. It may be of relevance here, did you also investigate matters that put the security of members of the British Royal Family at risk?

A. We did, sir.

Q.... How it was an SIO, a senior investigating officer, might be involved in a particular inquiry, whether you were on call or not. Can you just help us with how that worked?

A. Yes, sir. We had a weekly on-call system where each senior investigator and a small team would be on call 24 hours a day, principally for kidnappings, but also to advise officers who might have inquiries.

Q. What that means is you are, amongst the other things that you are doing, on standby?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was your immediate supervisor somebody called Detective Chief Superintendent Dixon?

A. He was, yes.

Q. We will hear about him later on. And the overall head of the group was somebody called Commander Mulvihill?

A. Correct.

Q. Just so that we have the complete hierarchy, was the Organised Crime Group one of a number of branches of New Scotland Yard’s specialist operations department?

A. It was.

Q. Was it an assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Mr Veness, who headed that department?

A. That is correct.

Q.... When was it that you first became aware of the crash in Paris?

A. Around 9 o’clock in the morning on that Sunday. I learned from my newspaper delivery man.

Q. Then I think you put the news on and heard more, is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you give any thought to the question of whether or not the Organised Crime Group would have a role in any of what was going on?

A. I did. I considered whether or not there might be any implications for us.

Q. The reason, please, that you began to think about that question was what?

A. Because within the larger specialist operations, protection of the Royal Family fell to Mr Veness, and of course we used to deal with anything which could compromise the safety of the Royal Family, therefore it was natural that I considered whether or not we might have a role.

Q. Right. And as it were, the thought having crossed your mind, what did you then do?

A. I then telephoned Commander Mulvihill. I should say that I was the acting detective chief superintendent because Mr Dixon was on holiday or abroad.

Q. So aside from Commander Mulvihill, you were really at the top of the tree?

A. That day, yes.

Q. So you called him. What was the upshot of the discussion that the two of you had?

A. We discussed it and we could not see that there would be short-term implications for our branch.

Q. By that you mean, what, immediate action in the next hour or so or anything of that sort?

A. That is correct.

Q. And so, as a result – we need not go into the details – but you, I think, went off certainly some distance from London to go and have lunch with a friend, is that right?

A. I did, with my family.

Q. Perhaps as is the way of these things, no sooner had you got into your lunch than you got a pager message – is that right?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. – to contact somebody called the staff officer to Assistant Commissioner Veness. By staff officer is meant an officer who assists him day-to-day?

A. An assistant effectively.

Q. All right. What were you told once you had contacted the staff officer?

A. I was told that the bodies of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed were going to be flown back later that day. They were likely to be arriving at Fulham Mortuary around about 5 o’clock that day, and Mr Veness said I had to do whatever had to be done from the police point of view at the mortuary.

Q.... What kind of things did you envisage that might involve?

A. Sir, I think this was a situation without precedent for the Metropolitan Police and clearly it needed somebody in authority to represent the Metropolitan Police’s interests and that responsibility fell to me.

At 37.2: Q. Did you ... speak to the two coroners [at the mortuary]?

A. I did.

Q. Mainly what was that about?

A. That was about their requirements of police in the coming days and months.

At 39.6: Q. 1st September, 9 o’clock in the morning, did you have a meeting with Assistant Commissioner Veness?

A. I did.

Q. In his office at New Scotland Yard?

A. I did.

Q. Can you help us as to what happened in that meeting?

A. Yes, I told him what had happened the previous day, told him what the coroners had said, and we discussed the role that the Metropolitan Police should have and me in particular from that point onwards. Essentially it was that I would be the liaison point between the Metropolitan Police and the investigating officers in France.

Q. And that is the French investigating officers in France?

A. Correct, and that I would do whatever the coroners required of me. It was made very clear that it was not our investigation; it was a French investigation.

Q. Then, later that day, on the 1st, did you establish contact with someone we have heard from, who was then detective Chief Inspector Gargan who had been, we heard, with Leicestershire Constabulary but was now performing a bit of a different role?

A. I did, sir.

Q. Why and how did you get hold of him?

A. I needed a contact point in Paris immediately, so I needed somebody who was familiar with French investigating procedures and the role of the magistrates in France because, of course, the whole system is quite different, and somebody who is familiar with the protocols that should operate in dealing with the French. I also needed somebody who spoke French, of course, because mine is schoolboy French. So I was put in touch with Mr Gargan through Interpol.

Q. And he, at that time, was stationed at the British Embassy in Paris, is that right?

A. He was, sir.

Q. And the particular role he told us he was performing was that of drug liaison officer.

A. Correct, sir.

Q. And he told us, is this right, on 2nd September 1997, that yourself and Detective Sergeant Wall went to Paris?

A. We did.

Q. And met Mr Gargan and others there?

A. That is right.

Q. That day, the 2nd [September], and the day after, did you have meetings with a number of those on the French side?

A. I did.

Q. And who were they?

A. The first meeting was with Mr Patrick Riou, who was the investigating officer’s superior officer. We discussed how we could assist the French authorities and how they might assist us. I then met Madame Monteil, the investigating officer.

Q. In the meetings you had ... did you inquire whether there were any grounds for suspecting that the deaths occurred by means of anything other than an accident?

A. I did. Sometimes, I would make a point of asking that question directly and sometimes it would be indirectly, in passing.

Q. Is that a question, either directly or indirectly, that you asked on a regular basis as these meetings and so on were going on?

A. I think every meeting.

Q. What was the answer that you got or did it differ?

A. It was always an unequivocal no.

....Q. Can you help us? Were you yourself doing much by way of investigating at all? I understand the liaising, but were you actually doing any investigating?

A. No, I did no investigating at all, but I was a focal point for any inquiries that the French officers wanted carried out in the UK. So they would basically cut – they would send their requests through me. But carried out no investigations as such.

....Q. Now in a meeting with Madame Monteil in December of 1997, did you inform her of a matter but in strictest confidence?

A. I did.

Q. What was that about?

A. There was – the fact that there was a possibility that Mr Al Fayed and some of his staff might be arrested in connection with a different investigation I was heading.

Q. We will come on to a bit about that in a moment. But she had no knowledge of that, is that right?

A. None at all.

Q. By January of 1998, did you write a report that referred to the fact that, as it were, you were performing this liaison role which you have told us about, but that you were also involved in this other investigation that you have just told us about?

A. I did, sir.

OCG Policy File Document: 1 Sep 97 read out 15 Jan 08: 99.8:

"Operation Paris: 9 am:

OCG role to be that of gathering evidence and facts on behalf of the coroners.

Jeffrey Rees, Head of Early Crash Investigations, British Police: 26 Sep 97 Report read out 17 Dec 07: 76.6 and 15 Jan 08: 95.19:⁴⁰

"A report dated 26th September 1997 from Jeffrey Rees, detective superintendent to Commander Specialist Operations Organised Crime Group, New Scotland Yard, seeking retrospective authority for three recent operational visits to Paris.

"On Sunday 31st August 1997, whilst I was the acting OCG commander, I was directed by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations to act as senior investigating officer in respect of the British investigations into the deaths.

To liaise closely with the French authorities and provide them with any appropriate assistance; to facilitate any inquiries they may wish carried out in the United Kingdom; to appraise [Veness] of all significant developments; and liaise closely with the British Ambassador. In addition, I have been directed by the two coroners to carry out investigations into the deaths on their behalf and report my findings at the two inquests.

Jeffrey Rees, Head of Early Crash Investigations, British Police: 22 Jan 98 Report read out 17 Dec 07: 44.12:

"This report sets out my concerns over my involvement in two cases where at some future stage it may be alleged that there has been what could be termed a conflict of interests.

"In May 1997, an allegation was made to police that Mohamed Al Fayed, or persons employed by him, had stolen property from safe deposit boxes at Harrods Limited. The complainant was Mr Roland Walter ‘Tiny’ Rowland.... I was appointed the senior investigating officer by the OCU⁴¹ commander.... After [certain documents] have been examined, I anticipate arresting Mr Al Fayed and five of his employees....

"I was, [on 31 August 1997], the acting OCU commander and Detective Chief Inspector Heard, the on-call senior investigating officer, but as the latter was due to fly to Canada the next day on an operational matter, I was the obvious choice to take charge of the post-mortem examination arrangements. There was no time for indecision as Mr Al Fayed’s body was due to arrive at approximately 5 pm. The family were anxious that in accordance with their religious laws, he would be buried by sunset. The Princess’s body would arrive only two hours later. Mr Mohamed Al Fayed accompanied his son’s body to Fulham Mortuary and I spoke to him briefly. I was present during both post-mortem examinations and that evening discussed British police involvement in the investigation with the two coroners involved, Drs Burton and Burgess.

"The following morning, Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations confirmed that I was to act as senior investigating officer in respect of the British investigation into the deaths. My specific responsibilities were the following:

To liaise closely with the French authorities and provide them with any appropriate assistance;

To facilitate any enquiries they might want carried out in the United Kingdom;

To apprise Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations [Veness] of all significant developments in the investigation;

To liaise closely with the British Ambassador and his staff at the British Embassy in Paris and apprise them of developments.

"In addition I was directed by the two coroners to monitor the French investigations on their behalf.

"Because of the location of the deaths, I have personally carried out no investigations as such, but I have monitored the French investigation, advised on British procedures and acted as a focal point for inquiries that the French wish carried out in the United Kingdom. In due course, I will play a major part in ensuring that appropriate evidence is placed before the coroners at the two inquests and I have had a meeting with Judge Stéphan, the juge d’instruction in the French investigation to establish the most appropriate means of allowing the coroners access to evidence currently before him.

I am the only officer involved in both of the inquiries, the subject of this report. From the outset, I have made no secret of my unease at the fact that I have been involved in both inquiries. I am personally entirely happy that I have succeeded in and will continue to succeed in treating both investigations as entirely separate entities and that I have made my decisions objectively and fairly. I nevertheless feel, however, that it is necessary that I formally raise and put on record my concerns about what might be perceived as a conflict of interest in the two investigations. My doing so will help counter allegations which may be made in the future that my involvement was somehow contrived, had sinister implications or affected my judgment and impartiality.

Mike Dixon, OCG Operational Head: 28 Jan 98 Minute read out 17 Dec 07: 51.6:

"Detective Superintendent Rees has expressed concern over a potential conflict of interests between the SIO for the Harrods safe deposit box investigation and liaison for the French investigation for the deaths of Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad Fayed. Whilst I understand his view, I do not share his anxiety. The two roles are different. In the former, Fayed Senior is a potential suspect in criminal proceedings. In the latter, he is not. He is an interested party who may or may not become involved in civil litigation subsequent to the outcome of the French investigation. Detective Superintendent Rees has no influence upon such litigation.

It is my opinion that this correspondence should be placed on the policy docket of the Harrods investigation registered file. Should it become an issue at court, the fact that consideration of objectivity has been given is a matter of record.

Niall Mulvihill, Commander of Specialist Operations Crime Group: 29 Jan 98 Letter to Jeffrey Rees read out 17 Dec 07: 52.20:

"You raised this matter verbally with me last week and my response was virtually identical to the comments contained in minute 3.⁴² There is a clear distinction in the two roles being undertaken and only the most paranoid of conspiracy theorists are likely to be drawn towards any misinterpretation, although you were quite correct to raise the issue for the record. Please continue your dual roles...."

Jeffrey Rees, Head of Early Crash Investigations, British Police: 17 Dec 07: 49.11:

Hilliard: Q. Had you made no secret of [your unease]?

A. That is correct. I was uncomfortable with it.

At 53.14: Coroner: Mr Rees in hindsight – and I emphasise that word – it would have been better if you had not been selected as the senior investigating officer into the deaths in Paris?

A. With hindsight and in a perfect world, yes, sir.

Coroner: But you did not make the selection; somebody else did?

A. That is correct, sir. If I could say, that Sunday afternoon was not a time for indecision.

Q. In any event, thereafter, as the Coroner says, the choice was not yours, but what you certainly did was raise the matter verbally and put it into writing and others made the decision?

A.