The Gettysburg Campaign: Birth of the Operational Art?
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The importance of the operational level of war and its supporting art cannot be overstated. Only with a recognition of this level between those of strategy and tactics and a mastery of its art can commanders have the appropriate frame of reference to link strategic goals assigned by national authorities with the tactical activities of their subordinate commanders. Although U.S. Army doctrine may have been late in formally recognizing the existence and significance of the operational level of war and its supporting art, it may have appeared very early in our military history. Indeed, without being named as such, the concept may have been placed into effect as early as the American Civil War.
Major Kevin B. Marcus US Army
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The Gettysburg Campaign - Major Kevin B. Marcus US Army
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Text originally published in 2001 under the same title.
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THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN: BIRTH OF THE OPERATIONAL ART?
By
Major Kevin B. Marcus, United States Army
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
Abstract 5
Introduction 6
Planning, Preparation and Execution of the Gettysburg Campaign 8
Planning and Preparation 8
The Approach 12
The Battle 15
Nature and Evolution of Operational Thought 19
Analysis 25
Was the Gettysburg Campaign supported by Continuous Logistics? 30
Did the Gettysburg Campaign take advantageous of instantaneous Command and Control? 34
Was the Army of Northern Virginia composed of operationally durable formations? 38
Does the Gettysburg Campaign represent distributed deployment? 39
Conclusions 40
Appendix A (Maps) 42
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 54
Bibliography 55
Primary Sources 55
Secondary· Sources 55
Government Publications 57
Abstract
While hundreds of volumes exist on the Gettysburg Campaign, most examine the battle’s tactical framework and focus on the activities of brigades and regiments. However, of more interest to the serving military professional may be an analysis of the degree to which the Confederacy’s design and execution exemplify attributes of what is now known as the operational art. This monograph provides just such a study.
The importance of the operational level of war and its supporting art cannot be overstated. Only with a recognition of this level between those of strategy and tactics and a mastery of its art can commanders have the appropriate frame of reference to link strategic goals assigned by national authorities with the tactical activities of their subordinate commanders. Although U.S. Army doctrine may have been late in formally recognizing the existence and significance of the operational level of war and its supporting art, it may have appeared very early in our military history. Indeed, without being named as such, the concept may have been placed into effect as early as the American Civil War.
Providing a brief background of the Campaign’s plan and events, these same are then analyzed against seven characteristics of the operational level of war. Among these characteristics are the degree to which the Confederacy’s plan for the campaign (and its subsequent execution) evidenced operational vision, planned and executed distributed operations in the framework of a distributed campaign, and was supported and enabled by continuous logistics and instantaneous command and control.
Application of the criteria to the planning and execution of the Gettysburg Campaign reveals that the Gettysburg Campaign does not provide an earlier birth date of the operational art. The following issues prove most significant. First, while Lee’s operational vision resulted in a distributed operation, it was not part of a distributed campaign. While Lee could (and did) plan truly distributed operations, he did not have the authority to order other Army Commanders to design and conduct other such operations. Therefore, the Gettysburg operation was not combined with other operations to result in a distributed campaign. Next, within the operation itself, systemic failures in logistics and command and control led to an inability to sustain and coordinate the operation and limit the durability of the Army of Northern Virginia’s corps. These shortcomings (combined with others addressed at a later point) lead to the conclusion that the Army of Northern Virginia executed a major operation (vice campaign) that was modeled on the new possibilities of distributed maneuver but was not supported by the critical enablers of advanced communications and transportation technologies.
Introduction
In what many consider the pre-eminent history of the Gettysburg Campaign author Edwin B. Coddington notes that as early as 1900 at least one historian had suggested that another history of Gettysburg may seem superfluous and presumptuous
.{1} While Coddington then goes on to explain why his book can in no way be considered either, the question remains valid. Indeed, in the one hundred years since that comment, hundreds of additional books have emerged to explain, justify or memorialize the campaign and its resultant battles. So, then, what would make a monograph on any facet of the campaign any less superfluous or presumptuous
?
Some aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign have not been adequately addressed. One such aspect is the degree to which the Confederacy’s design and execution exemplify attributes of what is now known as the operational art. While discussed by students of military theory and resident in other nations’ military doctrine since the early twentieth century, the concept did not appear in U.S. Army doctrine until the publication of the 1986 version of its keystone operational doctrine FM 100-5 Operations. While the Army may have been late to recognize the importance of providing an emphasis on the concept of operations and the operational art; the concept’s significance cannot be overstated. As a successor of the 1986 version states, only the successful application of the operational art allows the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles
.{2}
Although U.S. Army doctrine may have been late in formally recognizing the existence and significance of the operational level of war and its supporting art, it may have appeared very early in our military history. Indeed, without being named as such,