Guadalcanal 1942–43: America's first victory on the road to Tokyo

By Mark Stille and Peter Dennis

Using black and white contemporary photographs, illuminative maps and stunning battle scene illustrations, this comprehensive, detailed account completes the story of the Guadalcanal campaign - possibly the most important of the whole Pacific War.

The Guadalcanal campaign began with an amphibious assault in August 1942 – the US's first attempt to take the fight to the Japanese. It escalated into a desperate attritional battle on land, air, and sea, and by the time the Japanese had evacuated the last of their forces from the island in 1943, it was clear that the tide of the war had turned. The inexorable Japanese advance and the myth of Japanese invincibility shattered.

In this study of the campaign, Pacific War expert Mark Stille draws on both US and Japanese sources to give a balanced and comprehensive account of a crucial, brutal conflict. Analyzing the three Japanese attempts to retake the island in the face of ferocious American resistance, this book shows how the battle was won and lost, and how it affected the outcome of the Pacific War as a whole.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
• Release date: Aug 20, 2015
• ISBN: 9781472806956

Mark Stille

Mark Stille is the author of numerous Osprey titles focusing on naval history in the Pacific. He recently concluded a nearly 40-year career in the intelligence community, including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships. He received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and also holds an MA from the Naval War College.

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ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The first American offensive of the Pacific War came eight months to the day after the war began on December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. When American Marines stormed ashore at several points in the southern Solomon Islands in the South Pacific on August 7, 1942, it was the start of an epic struggle between Japan and the United States, which would last over six months and would feature an almost unrelenting succession of air, naval, and ground battles. At the end of the campaign, Japanese air and naval forces had suffered heavy attrition, which was clearly beyond their ability to withstand. Almost forgotten in this titanic naval clash was the fact that the US had also dealt the Imperial Japanese Army its first major defeat of the war. The brutal ground battle on Guadalcanal created the template for future clashes on islands throughout the Pacific.

After their successful operation at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had little trouble conducting what they called the First Operational Phase. This called for the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Rabaul on the island of New Britain in the South Pacific. Rabaul was the gateway for further Japanese expansion in the South Pacific with its large harbor and several airfields. In January 1942, the Japanese occupied Rabaul against minimal Australian resistance.

Except for the Philippines, which would not fall in their entirety until May 1942, the Japanese quickly achieved all their First Operational Phase objectives. The next step was to create strategic depth for their new possession – this was the goal of the Second Operational Phase. This presented the Japanese with a much more ambitious set of objectives and quickly challenged available Japanese forces and shipping resources. While the Aleutians and Midway Atoll were eyed for attack, most of the anticipated future expansion was planned for the South Pacific. This included eastern New Guinea, Fiji Samoa, and strategic points in the Australian area. Unable to conduct simultaneous operations into the Central and South Pacific, the Japanese had to decide how to sequence their operations. Between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, and within the IJN itself, there were sharp differences of opinion about how to proceed. Within the IJN, the commander of the Combined Fleet, Yamamoto Isoroku, wanted to move first into the Central Pacific and use Midway as a means to draw out the remaining units of the US Pacific Fleet into a major battle and complete the defeat of American naval power. However, the Naval General Staff advocated an immediate advance into the South Pacific to cut the sea lines of communications between the United States and Australia. The IJA left the direction of Japanese strategy in the Pacific to the IJN, but it made clear that it would support only operations that required minimal numbers of ground forces. This precluded an attack on Australia, but smaller operations against South Pacific islands were still possible with the limited numbers of troops available.

Yamamoto used the threat of resignation, and his views prevailed. However, as part of the compromise reached with the Naval General Staff, the Combined Fleet would conduct a set of tightly sequenced operations beginning in the South Pacific in early May, and then against Midway and the Aleutians in early June. Elements of the Combined Fleet’s carrier force would be allocated to support an invasion set for May to seize Port Moresby on New Guinea and occupy Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. This was a major operation with some 60 ships and could not escape the notice of American intelligence, which had the advantage of being able to break a limited percentage of Japanese naval code traffic. When the scope of the Japanese plan became clear, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, committed two carrier groups to defeat the invasion. The result of the ensuing battle of the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942 was the first strategic Japanese defeat of the war. The first carrier battle of the war resulted in all three Japanese carriers present being placed out of action (one was sunk, one damaged, and the third had its air group decimated), which eliminated air cover for the invasion of Port Moresby forcing the cancellation of the entire operation. Almost forgotten in this victory was that the first phase of the Japanese operation went according to plan, resulting in the occupation of the island of Tulagi on May 3. Tulagi was useful as a seaplane base and gave the Japanese their first foothold in the southern Solomons. Tulagi was not big enough for an airfield, but it was located some 20 miles (32km) north of a virtually unknown island named Guadalcanal.

This view from August 8 shows the uncompleted Henderson Field. Bloody Ridge is the elevated area in the center of the photo surrounded by jungle. The coconut groves on the coast are clearly evident. This airfield was to become the center of the most prolonged campaign in the Pacific War. (Official Marine Corps photo courtesy of Marine Corps History Division)

Following the battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese continued with their much larger operation against Midway and the Aleutians. The importance of the defeat at Coral Sea was felt in the Central Pacific, since it reduced the Combined Fleet by three carriers, including two fleet carriers. For this reason, but primarily because of faulty operational planning, the IJN suffered a devastating defeat at Midway with four fleet carriers being sunk or disabled on June 4. The loss of the bulk of its fleet carriers blunted Japan’s offensive power in the Pacific. On June 11, the operation to occupy New Caledonia, the islands of Fiji and Samoa was postponed. The next month it was canceled. Offensive operations were now limited to mounting an overland attack on Port Moresby by the IJA’s 17th Army.

The Japanese were not entirely passive. On June 13, they decided to build an airfield on the northern coast of Guadalcanal. On July 6, a 12-ship convoy arrived off Lunga Point on Guadalcanal with two IJN construction units to start work on the airfield, which was expected to be completed in August. With long-range aircraft based on Guadalcanal, the Japanese could threaten Allied supply lines to Australia.

ADMIRAL KING AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

While the Japanese struggled to maintain their offensive momentum in the South Pacific, the Americas were also making plans to begin offensive operations there. The driving force behind American strategy in the South Pacific was Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief US Fleet. The high priority he placed on the South Pacific was immediately impressed upon Nimitz after he assumed his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on December 31, 1941. King’s priorities for Nimitz were to hold Hawaii and Midway in the Central Pacific, followed closely by protecting the sea lanes between the United States and Australia. This required the garrisoning of a series of islands in the South Pacific as far west as Fiji Island and the New Hebrides. Just like the Japanese, the Americans would be challenged to provide adequate force and supporting shipping to secure all the points King thought necessary to safeguard the sea lanes. Since the overarching imperative of American military strategy for the conduct of the entire war was to give emphasis to defeating Germany in the war in Europe, King and Nimitz were constantly battling with the Army for more forces. This became easier after the Japanese advance into the South Pacific in January 1942, with the seizure of Rabaul looking to be the first step to further advances south against Fiji and New Caledonia. Not only did this threat, which prompted renewed Australian concerns, make it easier to acquire new forces for the South Pacific, but it further reinforced King’s thinking that he could not be passive in the South Pacific.

As early as March 1942, King admitted that he had no intention of remaining strictly defensive in the South Pacific, but envisioned an offensive from the New Hebrides into the Solomon Islands and eventually the Bismarck Archipelago to re-take Rabaul. Events in the Pacific served to drive forward King’s ambitions to conduct offensive operations. In June, the Japanese defeat at Midway meant that the Japanese threat in the Central Pacific was virtually gone, and that additional resources could be devoted to the South Pacific. While the Japanese seemed uncertain after their defeat at Midway about how they would maintain the initiative they had held since the beginning of the war, King was planning to shift to the offensive. On June 24, King directed Nimitz to come up with a plan to capture Tulagi and nearby islands. These efforts were contingent upon rearranging the command jurisdictions in the South Pacific, since the southern Solomons were actually in the Southwest Pacific Area command under Army General Douglas MacArthur. There was never any prospect in King’s mind that an operation conducted with Navy and Marines forces would be commanded by an Army general. By July 2, a deal was made between King and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall to move the command line to place the southern Solomons in the South Pacific Area under Navy control. With this major detail taken care of, time was of the essence, since King envisioned the offensive to begin on August 1 to exploit the victory at Midway. After American intelligence provided an assessment that Japanese construction troops were on Guadalcanal, the island was added as an objective on July 5. The operation was given the codename Watchtower.

The principal ground unit earmarked for Operation Watchtower was the 1st Marine Division. This unit embarked from Norfolk, Virginia in May 1942, and arrived in Wellington, New Zealand the following month. The unit’s best regiment, the 7th Marines, had been sent to Samoa to bolster the garrison there in March 1942. On June 26, shortly after arriving in New Zealand, the Marines learned of their assignment to attack Guadalcanal. On July 18, Major General Alexander Vandegrift assumed command of the South Pacific Marine Provisional Corps while still maintaining command of the 1st Marine Division. His command was spread out over a good chunk of the Pacific and it looked impossible to get his force ready and organized for a landing in the Solomons in just under three weeks. A short delay was granted, and, on July 22, the 1st Marine Division departed Wellington. At the end of the month, elements of the division conducted a rehearsal on Fiji. This was a shambolic affair, suggesting that it was very fortunate