The Language of Liberty: The Political Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln

By Joseph R. Fornieri

The Civil War is a defining event in American history and Abraham Lincoln is the central figure of both the Civil War and American history. In his struggle to preserve the Union and redeem the nation from the original sin of slavery, Abraham Lincoln provided the most compelling expression of the American Dream and the preeminent justification of the American regime. Indeed, at Gettysburg he distilled the very essence of the nation's political creed. His political thought and leadership are of enduring significance to democracy at home and abroad.

To further appreciate and perpetuate Lincoln's legacy, The Language of Liberty offers the definitive one-volume collection of the Sixteenth President's speeches and writings. Unlike so many other collections, in which Lincoln's speeches and writings have been substantially edited, this volume provides a comprehensive selection of the Sixteenth President's most important speeches and writings in their entirety.

The volume is conveniently divided both chronologically and thematically into five periods/chapters from 1832-1865. A final chapter offers a compilation of Lincoln's speeches and writings on the theme of religion and politics. Each speech is preceded by an informative head-note, which places Lincoln's words in context for the reader. In addition, each period/chapter includes a concise historical, political, and biographical overview of the major events in Lincoln's life and the life of the nation, thereby providing an even wider context for understanding the Sixteenth President's language of liberty. To assist the reader, crucial terms, dates, events and issues of the Civil War have been defined. Also unique to this volume is the final section on Lincoln's Political Faith, which includes an offering of his public and private utterances on religion, and a definition of this political faith based upon the first principles of the Declaration of Independence.

A selected bibliography of secondary sources has been included for further reading on various topics related to the Sixteenth President. Finally, the volume includes an extensive introduction on Lincoln's Prudent Leadership and his application of the natural law to the circumstances of the Civil War Era. Indeed, this introduction provides a crucial understanding of the relationship between Lincoln's political thought and political action, between the world of theory and practice.

In sum, The Language of Liberty provides an indispensable guide to the lay reader, the Lincoln aficionado, and the scholar. All now have access to a single volume collection of his great political speeches and writings with unedited versions, concise historical overviews, and scholarly reflections on the enduring significance of Lincoln's political philosophy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Gateway Editions
• Release date: Jan 11, 2009
• ISBN: 9781596980952

Book preview

001

Table of Contents

Title Page

PREACE TO THE BICENTENNIAL EDITION

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Introduction

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. - I Am Young and Unknown 1832-1854

TO THE PEOPLE OF SANGAMO COUNTY: POLITICAL ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 9, 1832

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SANGAMO JOURNAL JUNE 13, 1836

SPEECH IN THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE JANUARY 11, 1837

PROTEST IN ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE ON SLAVERY MARCH 3, 1837

LETTER TO MISS MARY OWENS MAY 7, 1837

THE PERPETUATION OF OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: ADDRESS BEFORE THE YOUNG MEN’S ...

LETTER TO MRS. O. H. BROWNING APRIL 1, 1838

THE SUBTREASURY: SPEECH AT A POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN THE HALL OF THE HOUSE OF ...

LETTER TO MISS MARY SPEED SEPTEMBER 27, 1841

LETTER TO JOSHUA F. SPEED JANUARY 3, 1842

LETTER TO JOSHUA F. SPEED FEBRUARY 3, 1842

TEMPERANCE ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE SPRINGFIELD WASHINGTON TEMPERANCE ...

LETTER TO JOSHUA F. SPEED JULY 4, 1842

CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THE LINCOLN-SHIELDS DUEL SEPTEMBER 17, 1842

MEMORANDUM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO E. H. MERRYMAN, LINCOLN’S SECOND SEPTEMBER 19, 1842

MY CHILDHOOD HOME I SEE AGAIN AND THE BEAR HUNT [1846]

RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 22, 1847

THE WAR WITH MEXICO: SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ...

LETTER TO WILLIAM H. HERNDON FEBRUARY 15, 1848

SPEECH IN UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS ...

LETTERS TO MARY TODD LINCOLN APRIL 16, 1848

LETTER TO MARY TODD LINCOLN JUNE 12, 1848

LETTER TO MARY TODD LINCOLN JULY 2, 1848

THE PRESIDENTIAL QUESTION: SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ...

REMARKS AND RESOLUTION INTRODUCED IN UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ...

FRAGMENT: NOTES FOR A LAW LECTURE [JULY 1, 1850?]

LETTER TO JOHN D. JOHNSTON JANUARY 12, 1851

RESOLUTIONS IN BEHALF OF HUNGARIAN FREEDOM JANUARY 9, 1852

EULOGY ON HENRY CLAY DELIVERED IN THE STATE HOUSE AT SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS JULY ...

FRAGMENTS ON GOVERNMENT JULY 1, 1854

II. - A House Divided 1854-1858

FRAGMENTS: ON SLAVERY [JULY 1, 1854?]

THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND THE PROPRIETY OF ITS RESTORATION: ...

LETTER TO OWEN LOVEJOY AUGUST 11, 1855

LETTER TO GEORGE ROBERTSON AUGUST 15, 1855

LETTER TO JOSHUA F. SPEED AUGUST 24, 1855

SPEECH AT BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS MAY 29, 1856

SECTIONALISM [OCTOBER 1?], 1856

SPEECH AT A REPUBLICAN BANQUET, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS [DECEMBER 10, 1856]

FIRST LECTURE ON DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS [APRIL 6, 1858]

SECOND LECTURE ON DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS [FEBRUARY 11, 1859]

THE DRED SCOTT DECISION: SPEECH AT SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS. JUNE 26, 1857

A HOUSE DIVIDED: SPEECH DELIVERED AT SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, AT THE CLOSE OF THE ...

FRAGMENT ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SLAVERY JULY 1858

SPEECH IN REPLY TO DOUGLAS AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS JULY 10, 1858

SPEECH IN REPLY TO DOUGLAS AT SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS JULY 17, 1858

FRAGMENT: ON SLAVERY [AUGUST 1, 1858?]

III. - The Lincoln-Douglas Debates 1858

FIRST JOINT DEBATE, AT OTTAWA AUGUST 21, 1858.

SECOND JOINT DEBATE, AT FREEPORT AUGUST 27, 1858

THIRD JOINT DEBATE, AT JONESBORO SEPTEMBER 15, 1858

FOURTH JOINT DEBATE, AT CHARLESTON SEPTEMBER 18, 1858

FIFTH JOINT DEBATE, AT GALESBURG OCTOBER 7, 1858

SIXTH JOINT DEBATE, AT QUINCY OCTOBER 13, 1858

SEVENTH JOINT DEBATE, AT ALTON OCTOBER 15, 1858

IV. - I Would Save the Union 1859-1863

LETTER TO J. W. FELL, ENCLOSING AUTOBIOGRAPHY DECEMBER 20, 1859

ADDRESS AT COOPER INSTITUTE, NEW YORK

FRAGMENT: THE CONSTITUTION, THE DECLARATION, AND THE UNION [1860?]

LETTER TO GEORGE ASHMUN MAY 23, 1860

ADDRESS TO THE NEW JERSEY SENATE AT TRENTON, NEW JERSEY FEBRUARY 21, 1861

ADDRESS IN INDEPENDENCE HALL, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA FEBRUARY 22, 1861

FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS MARCH 4, 1861

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION JULY 4, 1861

LETTER TO O. H. BROWNING SEPTEMBER 22, 1861

ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS DECEMBER 3, 1861

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS MARCH 6, 1862

LETTER TO JAMES A. MCDOUGAL MARCH 14, 1862

LETTER TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APRIL 16, 1862

PROCLAMATION REVOKING GENERAL HUNTER’S ORDER OF MILITARY EMANCIPATION OF MAY 9, 1862

APPEAL TO BORDER STATE REPRESENTATIVES TO FAVOR COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION JULY ...

LETTER TO AUGUST BELMONT JULY 31, 1862

LETTER TO HORACE GREELEY AUGUST 22, 1862

LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN OCTOBER 13, 1862

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN OCTOBER 24, 1862

ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS DECEMBER 1, 1862

PRELIMINARY EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION SEPTEMBER 22, 1862

V. - The Last Full Measure 1863-1865

TO THE WORKINGMEN OF MANCHESTER, ENGLAND JANUARY 19, 1863

ABRAHAM LINCOLN LETTER TO GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER JANUARY 26, 1863

LETTER TO MARY TODD LINCOLN JUNE 9, 1863

LETTER TO ERASTUS CORNING AND OTHERS JUNE 12, 1863

LETTER TO GENERAL N. P. BANKS AUGUST 5, 1863

LETTER TO JAMES C. CONKLING AUGUST 26, 1863

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE DEDICATION OF THE CEMETERY AT GETTYSBURG NOVEMBER 19, 1863

PROCLAMATION OF AMNESTY AND RECONSTRUCTION DECEMBER 8, 1863

TO FREDERICK STEELE JANUARY 20, 1864

LETTER TO GOVERNOR MICHAEL HAHN MARCH 13, 1864

ADDRESS AT A SANITARY FAIR IN BALTIMORE APRIL 18, 1864

LETTER TO CHARLES D. ROBINSON AUGUST 17, 1864

LETTER TO HENRY W. HOFFMAN OCTOBER 10, 1864

RESPONSE TO A SERENADE NOVEMBER 10, 1864

LETTER TO MRS. BIXBY NOVEMBER 21, 1864

ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS DECEMBER 6, 1864

SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS MARCH 4, 1865

LAST PUBLIC ADDRESS APRIL 11, 1865

VI. - Lincoln’s Political Faith

THE PERPETUATION OF OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: ADDRESS BEFORE THE YOUNG MEN’S ...

TEMPERANCE ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE SPRINGFIELD WASHINGTON TEMPERANCE ...

LETTER TO JOSHUA F. SPEED JULY 4, 1842

RELIGIOUS VIEWS: LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE ILLINOIS GAZETTE AUGUST 11, 1846

FRAGMENT: ON SLAVERY [OCTOBER 1, 1858?]

FRAGMENT: NOTES FOR SPEECHES [OCTOBER 1, 1858?]

LETTER TO H. L. PIERCE AND OTHERS APRIL 6, 1859

SPEECH AT CINCINNATI, OHIO SEPTEMBER 17, 1859

FRAGMENT ON FREE LABOR

SPEECH AT NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT MARCH 6, 1860

ADDRESS TO THE NEW JERSEY SENATE AT TRENTON, NEW JERSEY FEBRUARY 21, 1861

REMARKS TO A DELEGATION OF PROGRESSIVE FRIENDS JUNE 20, 1862

REPLY TO EMANCIPATION MEMORIAL PRESENTED BY CHICAGO CHRISTIANS OF ALL ...

MEDITATION ON THE DIVINE WILL SEPTEMBER [30?], 1862

REPLY TO MRS. ELIZA P. GURNEY OCTOBER 26, 1862

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE DEDICATION OF THE CEMETERY AT GETTYSBURG NOVEMBER 19, 1863

TO EDWIN M. STANTON FEBRUARY 5, 1864

TO ALBERT G. HODGES APRIL 4, 1864

TO GEORGE B. IDE, JAMES R. DOOLITTLE, AND A. HUBBELL MAY 30, 1864

LETTER TO MRS. ELIZA P. GURNEY SEPTEMBER 4, 1864

REPLY TO LOYAL COLORED PEOPLE OF BALTIMORE UPON PRESENTATION OF A BIBLE ...

STORY WRITTEN FOR NOAH BROOKS DECEMBER 6, 1864

SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS MARCH 4, 1865

LETTER TO THURLOW WEED MARCH 15, 1865

PROCLAMATIONS OF PRAYER AND THANKSGIVING

INDEX

NOTE ON THE EDITOR

Copyright Page

001

PREACE TO THE BICENTENNIAL EDITION

The publication of the revised edition of this book coincides with the occasion of Abraham Lincoln’s bicentennial, 1809-2009. This bicentennial edition includes a revised, corrected, and expanded version of the 2003 edition with some new material.

This work was originally designed for my students. In teachings classes on Abraham Lincoln’s political thought and leadership, I soon discovered that I could not presume that a majority of students had a working knowledge of American History and the Constitution, without which the speeches and writings of the Sixteenth President cannot be fully understood and appreciated. In order to remedy this gap, I have attempted to provide a broad overview of the historical, legal, and political context of Lincoln’s thought and leadership, defining crucial terms, events and issues. I also wanted to equip students with a single volume of Lincoln’s most important speeches and writings, in which those included would be published in their entirety, rather than in mere excerpts. Fortuitously, Series Editor Christopher B. Briggs’s objectives for this leadership series corresponded exactly with the vision I intended for my students.

With these common pedagogical objectives in mind, I have chronologically divided Lincoln’s speeches and writings based upon the major events in his life and the life of the nation into five chapters/sections. Each chapter includes a broad historical and political overview of the major events related to Lincoln’s life and the life of the nation during that particular time. The final chapter/section of the volume, however, is thematic, offering a compilation of Lincoln’s speeches and writings on the important subject of religion and politics.

Though the volume was designed originally for students, it will be useful to the Lincoln aficionado and scholar alike who now have access to a single volume collection of his great political speeches and writings, which are now published in their entirety, not merely excerpted. Moreover, my introductory essay on Lincoln, The Natural Law and Prudence should be of interest to students, general readers, and scholars alike.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the concise chapter overviews are in no way intended as a substitute to the more elegant and in-depth histories and biographies of the following Lincoln scholars to whom I am particularly indebted: Roy P. Basler, Gabor S. Boritt, Richard N. Current, Kelly Hanlon, David Herbert Donald, Don E. Fehrenbacher, Allen C. Guelzo, Lewis E. Lehrman, James M. McPherson, Mark E. Neely, Allan Nevins, Stephen B. Oates, and Benjamin P. Thomas. Any study of Abraham Lincoln should either include or refer to the magisterial works of these scholars. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Hadley Arkes, whose Lincolnian logic is truly an inspiration.

In addition to the historians above, my own scholarship on the subject of Lincoln’s political thought is indebted to the magisterial work of Harry V. Jaffa. I am also grateful to George Anastaplo for his scholarship on Lincoln and the Constitution. And I have found William Lee Miller’s Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography to be an indispensable guide for understanding the character of our most admired President.

In sum, my own work has built upon the sturdy foundation laid by these scholars (See The Selected Bibliography). My hope is that this modest volume may contribute in some way to inspiring others to learn from our greatest president—Abraham Lincoln.

Joe Fornieri

Rochester New York,

April 2008.

To Pam

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my wife Pam for her support; my parents Joseph P. and Beatrice A. Fornieri; My in-laws, Alice and Dick Hawkins, who embody so many of Lincoln’s virtues.

Three cheers for Christopher B. Briggs whose friendship, tenacity, and vision was indispensable in bringing about the revised, bicentennial edition of this book.

Thanks to Bruce Meister Frohnen; Lee Cheek, Southern Gentleman, who knows that deep down in his heart that he really loves Lincoln; Dick Kieffer, whose advice and conversations over the years have been greatly appreciated; my friends and colleagues in the political science department at RIT including John Murley, Sean Sutton, Ivan Keneally, Lauren Hall.

Thanks to my students Adam Botzenhart and Angelo Valente for assisting me with the revisions and corrections.

I must also thank my Lincoln friends for their correspondence, counsel, advice and support throughout the years: Wendy Allen, Herman Belz, Joseph Garrera, Allen C. Guelzo, Phil Henderson, Harold Holzer, Father Matt Kawiak, Lew Lehrman, William Lee Miller, Lucas Morel, James Oakes, Richard Striner, David Walsh, and Frank J. Williams.

A special thanks to Sara V. Gabbard at the Lincoln Museum in Fort Wayne and Editor of Lincoln Lore for her extraordinary work throughout the years. She is a living testimony to the greatness of the greatest generation.

Thanks to Ralph Lerner and Dennis J. Hutchinson for using the book in their Lincoln Seminar at the University of Chicago and for bringing its errors to my attention.

Last but not least, I word of thanks to Kenneth L. Deutsch. It has been said that, You can take the New Yorker out of New York, but you can’t take New York out of the New Yorker—thank goodness!

INTRODUCTION

LINCOLN, THE NATURAL LAW, AND PRUDENCE

a

LINCOLN’S LEADERSHIP is of enduring significance because it reveals the important connection between law and morality. In his related struggle to preserve the Union and to end slavery, he sought to bring the regime into conformity with the principles of the Declaration, America’s Decalogue, which promulgated the creed of its political faith. Those who would wish to learn about the theory of natural law and the virtue associated with its practice—prudence—would do well to ponder his example. It is the purpose of this essay to reveal how Lincoln prudently applied the moral precepts of the natural law to the circumstances of the Civil War era. More specifically, it will demonstrate how his leadership on the Emancipation Proclamation was exemplary in this regard. In recent times, the theory and practice of natural law so exemplified by the sixteenth president is in grave danger of being eclipsed by the increasing public acceptance of moral relativism or moral idealism as legitimate alternatives to resolve political conflicts. As will be seen, Lincoln relentlessly opposed both of these alternatives during the Civil War era, and revealed them as profoundly flawed interpretations of public life. His prudent statesmanship may thus serve as a guide for contemporary leaders who would seek to reinvigorate the moral foundations of the American regime, and to affirm its principles vis á vis the political circumstances and ethical challenges of the twenty-first century.

I. LINCOLN AND THE NATURAL LAW.

Lincoln’s view of the relationship between law and morality was firmly rooted in the natural law tradition of western civilization derived from ancient Jewish, Neo-Platonic, and Roman sources, adapted by Christian thinkers; modified by modern political philosophers like John Locke; and embraced by the Founders of the American Republic.¹ This tradition presumed a trust in the ability of human reason to apprehend and discern principles of right conduct. The binding force and normative character of these principles were expressed in terms of a universal law; for like a law, their rational dictates commanded some moral obligation or duty concerning how things ought to be. Thus, symbolically, the natural law represented a pre-existing moral order that was discovered rather than created by human beings, and it pointed to a transcendent ground or ultimate source of authority in the universe—namely, God, who was its author, promulgator, and judge. As a transcendent standard, the law constituted a rule and measure to judge the rectitude of human actions and institutions. Human laws, customs, and actions were judged in terms of their conformity with its rational dictates. The existence of an objective moral order that made claims upon human beings was taken for granted by the Founders; the difficulty was not in acknowledging the law, but in correctly applying its principles to particular and varying circumstances.

Unlike some modern conceptions of natural right that divorce duty (moral obligation) from right (equal entitlement), Lincoln saw duty and right as correlative. He believed that the gift of freedom necessarily implied a moral obligation or duty to exercise it responsibly in conformity with a transcendent standard. Freedom unbounded by duty was morally indistinguishable from license. Under such a conception, nothing in principle could prevent a majority of the people from freely choosing to enslave a minority. In fact, this is precisely how Lincoln’s rival, Stephen A. Douglas, defined liberty—the freedom to do wrong. From the standpoint of duty, Lincoln maintained that the Declaration imposed a moral obligation upon the regime to resist the evil of slavery; however, from the standpoint of right, it entitled African-Americans to equal treatment by the regime. The moral duty on the part of leaders and the government to render equal justice to all human beings necessarily implied a right that each person was equally entitled to given his or her spiritual dignity created in the image of God. In this respect, Lincoln viewed duty and right as correlative; one implied the other.

From the time of the Founding to the Civil War era, the foregoing conception of natural law and right was taken for granted by leaders, judges, and the regime’s cultural elite.² It was part of the nation’s public philosophy.³ Sir William Blackstone whose Commentaries on the Laws of England profoundly influenced generations of lawyers from the time of the Founding to the early twentieth century declared that [T]he law of nature . . . dictated by God himself... is binding... in all countries and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.⁴ Similarly, John Dickinson, patriot and chairman of the Committee for the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed during the Revolution that, Our liberties do not come from charters; for these are only the declarations of preexisting rights. They do not depend on parchment or seals; but come from the King of Kings and the Lord of all the earth.⁵ And John Adams affirmed the natural law when he stated, Let it be known, that British liberties are not the grants of princes of parliaments, but original rights, conditions of original contracts.... Let them search for the foundations of British laws and government in the frame of human nature, in the constitution of the intellectual and moral world. Indeed, Founders like John Dickinson and John Adams admired the British constitutional tradition not simply because it was ancestral, but because it conformed to the dictates of an objective moral order found in nature and confirmed by revelation. While many of these rights were embodied concretely within the tradition of British constitutionalism, they were not merely the product of British convention or human artifice, but universal. For this reason, they were not subject to the whim of any human authority or institution, neither the King nor the Parliament.

The Declaration of Independence, the very foundation of the American experiment according to Lincoln, was predicated upon the foregoing view of natural law. It presumed the existence of a Creator God who established conditions of human flourishing. Indeed, there are four references to the divinity in the Declaration: God is represented as a lawgiver, (the laws of nature and nature’s God), a creator (all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights), a judge (the Supreme Judge of the world), and as a personal, Judeo-Christian deity who intervenes in Creation (a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence). The laws of God were apprehended by the Founders as self-evident truths, and subsequently promulgated as the inalienable rights to equality, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The binding force of these principles constituted a normative standard that served the regime as a guide, a moral compass, and boundary that circumscribed the actions of a just government.

In A New Birth of Freedom, Harry V. Jaffa concisely explains the conception of the natural law implicit to the Declaration:

...the perspective of the Declaration is in agreement with Thomas Aquinas’s conception of the natural law as the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law, the law by which God governs the universe. The Declaration also assumes the existence of an eternal law when it speaks of an appeal to the supreme judge of the world and of the protection of divine providence. The voice of right reason in the natural law, therefore, is as much the voice of God as is divine revelation. Also, since every member of the human species has the potentiality to participate in the natural law, in this decisive respect, all men are created equal."⁶

Yet, despite the fact that the very moral foundations of the American Republic are built upon the natural law, the concept has been reviled, repudiated, and tragically misunderstood in recent times. Those on both the left and right wing of the political spectrum are equally suspicious of what they consider to be an abstract, antiquated, and dangerous concept. Critics mistakenly associate the natural law with the puritanical imposition of morality upon others. Or they dismiss it as a peculiarly sectarian (Roman Catholic) doctrine that violates the separation of church and state. In any event, the invocation of the natural law seems to carry a stigma in contemporary political discourse that gives pause to today’s leaders. It will be recalled that Democratic Senator Joseph Biden attempted to discredit Justice Clarence Thomas during his confirmation hearing by alleging that the latter was a practitioner of the natural law. And the ostensibly conservative chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, William Rehnquist, likewise eschewed the natural law in opposing the notion of a living constitution and defending original intent:

[t]he . . . difficulty with the . . . notion of the living Constitution is that it seems to ignore totally the nature of political value judgments in a democratic society. If such a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards do indeed take on a generalized moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural justice, but instead simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by a people. Within the limits of our Constitution, the representatives of the people in the executive branches of the state and national governments enact laws. The laws that emerge after a typical political struggle in which various individual value judgments are debated likewise take on a form or moral goodness because they have been enacted into positive law. It is the fact of their enactment that gives them whatever moral claim they have upon us as a society, however, and not any independent virtue they may have in any particular citizen’s own scale of values."⁷

Remarkably, Rehnquist seems to deny the intrinsic goodness or evil of political norms. He suggests that the moral rightness or goodness of value judgments is entirely relative to what people find socially acceptable at a given time and thus incorporate in their constitution and laws. Though he correctly warns against the dangers of a living constitution, Rehnquist’s prescription of legal positivism—the idea that justice and moral right are completely relative to the commands and enactments of those in power—is entirely foreign to the political philosophy of the Founders who penned the Declaration.

The immense moral evil of slavery magnifies the erroneous practical reasoning of critics who reject the natural law. It should never be forgotten that at one time in America’s history slavery assumed a general social acceptance and was thereby incorporated by southern people into their state and local constitutions. If consistently applied to the politics of the Civil War era, the complete separation of law and morality endorsed by today’s cultural elite would have dictated the toleration of slavery. Indeed, far too many of today’s liberals and conservatives alike embrace a defective philosophy of law that dangerously obscures the moral clarity so desperately needed to resist the new and subtle threats that technology poses to the integrity of human life and the preservation of human liberty.

Lincoln’s appeal to the Declaration as a normative standard against slavery raises timeless questions about the relationship between law and morality. Can the appeal to moral absolutes be reconciled with the rule of law? How does Lincoln’s invocation of equality differ from the utopian prescriptions of idealists like the radical abolitionists? Most importantly, if Lincoln’s prudence involved a harmonization between law and morality, then how did he reconcile his moral obligation to the precepts of the Declaration with his legal obligation to the Constitution and the rule of law?

Though the tension between different spheres of moral, legal, and political obligation is an insoluble fact of human experience, the prudential balancing of these spheres has remained primarily a historical aspiration, not a reality. More often than not, leaders have either sought to divorce morality from politics or to coerce their idealistic visions through the instrumentality of the state at the expense of ordered liberty. The former solution to resolving the dynamic tension between law and morality is indicative of contemporary liberal democracy; the latter is characteristic of both secular and religious utopianism. Both visions of the public good are myopic and flawed. Although the invocation of moral authority is an inevitable part of public life, under American republicanism, the national enforcement of moral aspirations is legally constrained by the Constitution to ensure an ordered liberty that balances both freedom and authority. As Lincoln recognized, the public good of a nation involves the prudential balancing of moral right within the legal confines of the rule of law.

II. LINCOLN AND THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE.

What then is the virtue of prudence, and how does it relate to Lincoln’s approach to law and morality? Prudence may be defined as the ability to judge well in practical matters; it is tantamount to right reason applied to the realm of moral and political action.⁸ Prudent judgment involves the just application of means to ends. Aquinas states, it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.⁹ In politics, this end represents the overarching common good affirmed by the regime. ¹⁰ However, the end of a particular regime may or may not accord with true justice as measured by the natural law. A nation may be dedicated to the apparent good of racial supremacy, or the selfish interest of a particular faction. In such a case, the prudent leader must seek to move the regime towards a truly just end as much as possible. In contradistinction to the ends, the means of prudent decision-making represent all just measures and policies adapted to reach the common good. In making decisions to benefit the common good, the prudent leader is bound to consider both universal ethical principles and the application or determination of these principles to a myriad of legal, social, and political contingencies.¹¹ Prudence thus involves the harmonization of universal moral precepts under the circumstances. St. Thomas Aquinas states: But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters; and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.¹²

Prudence and natural law are logical corollaries; one implies the other. Those who act in accordance with the dictates of the natural law, or who make efficacious its general principles by applying them under the circumstances, act in a prudent manner. Prudence is the excellence associated with the human agent’s virtuous practice of the natural law. Comparatively speaking, this virtue may be viewed as a mean between the two extremes or vices of (a) moral idealism, and (b) political pragmatism. Each vice involves a crucial defect or omission in right reasoning through precipitous or thoughtless practical judgment. Political idealism, for example, precipitously omits the consideration of particular circumstances in decision-making.¹³ It involves a negligence and blindness to the concrete realities that surround political action. ¹⁴ The tenacious adherence to moral principle in its abstract purity blinds the idealist to the consequences of his actions and to the inherent limits of human nature and politics.

The policy of prohibition provides an instructive example of political idealism. Through its precipitous disregard of the extent to which the consumption of alcohol was an ingrained custom in American culture, the prohibition movement had the unintended consequence of stimulating the activities of organized crime in purveying bootleg liquor. The moral crusade to abolish the evils of alcohol actually backfired by undermining respect for the rule of law and by enhancing the public status of organized crime.

The vice or extreme of political pragmatism, on the other hand, misjudges moral principle in practical decision-making. Pragmatism implies an ethical relativism. It views moral standards as merely conventional and therefore relative to short-term interest, utility, or expediency. Its crucial defect or omission consists in an ethical myopia that is blind to the authoritativeness of moral claims in guiding public policy. Pragmatism thus resembles "[c]unning (astutia)...the most characteristic form of false prudence."¹⁵ Those politicians who decide policies almost exclusively upon the basis of public opinion polls to further their own selfish interests without any consideration of whether or not the underlying principles governing such policies are intrinsically right or wrong provide a vivid contemporary example of political pragmatism. In short, the pragmatist believes that politics should be freed from absolute moral boundaries, and that the notions of right and wrong and good and evil are not inherently so, but relative to what people decide at a given moment.

The moral end of Lincoln’s prudent leadership was to preserve an ordered liberty that secured the long-term freedom, safety, and happiness of the American people. Daniel Webster, Lincoln’s Whig predecessor, tersely articulated this end for a generation of nationalist leaders, liberty and Union, one and inseparable. For Lincoln, Clay, and Webster the inseparability of liberty and Union meant the perpetuation of a national Union dedicated to both the moral precepts of the Declaration and the legal framework of the Constitution. That is to say, freedom was best secured under the auspices of a national Union committed to civil and religious liberty found in the Declaration. These leaders were correctly convinced that the fate of the American experiment in Republican government depended upon the maintenance of a strong national Union committed to legitimate moral ends. For this reason, the Founders replaced the weaker Articles of Confederation with a more perfect Union established by the Constitution of 1787.

Lincoln interpreted the Declaration as the moral covenant of American republicanism. He regarded it as the foundation of the American experiment. He viewed the principles of Jefferson as the definitions and axioms of free society. ¹⁶ And he confessed that, All the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn....from the Declaration of Independence.¹⁷ Indeed, Lincoln interpreted the Declaration as a declaration of natural law and right.¹⁸ It promulgated universal principles of reason that were to guide the regime. As an expression of the natural law, the Declaration provided a transcendent rule and measure—a normative standard, to judge the moral and political progress of the nation. The moral imperatives of the Declaration included both positive injunctions to extend freedom and negative prohibitions against its deprivation. ¹⁹ Among the principles of the Declaration, Lincoln assigned priority to the self-evident truth of equality, which he understood to be the father of all moral principle and the central idea of the American regime.²⁰

In Lincoln’s view, the moral precepts of the Declaration were confirmed by the complementary traditions of republicanism, reason, and revelation .²¹ The teachings of these traditions coincided, validated, and confirmed one another in providing guidance for public life. The political thought of Sir William Blackstone whose Commentaries on the Laws of England profoundly influenced the legal mind of both the Founders and Lincoln envisioned a harmony between the laws of reason and revelation in jurisprudence: Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human law should be suffered to contradict these. James Wilson, a Founder at the Constitutional Convention and Supreme Court justice, characterized the compatibility between faith and reason in these terms: How shall we, in particular cases, discover the will of God? We discover it by our conscience, our reason, and by the Holy Scriptures. The law of nature and the law of revelation are both divine; they flow, though in different channels, from the same adorable source. It is, indeed, preposterous to separate them from each other. The object of both is—to discover the will of God—and both are necessary for the accomplishment of that end.²²

In a like manner, Lincoln maintained that the Declaration’s assertion of equality coincided with the biblical precept of Genesis 1:27 which taught that all human beings possessed an equal rational and spiritual dignity created in the image of God (imago Dei): nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on, and degraded, and imbruted by its fellows.²³ According to Lincoln, the biblical precept of The Golden Rule in Matthew 7:12 likewise confirmed the republican principle of equal consent in the Declaration: "As I would not be a slave so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy.²⁴ Because no one himself would wish to be treated as a slave, no one was entitled to enslave another: I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing, that no man desires for himself."²⁵

Perhaps the biblical precept most often cited by Lincoln to validate the republican principle of free labor in the Declaration was derived from Genesis 3:19 whereby God decreed that all human beings must labor as a consequence of their fallen condition:

In the early days of the world, the Almighty said to the first of our race In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread [Genesis 3:19]; and since then, if we except the light and the air of heaven, no good thing has been, or can be enjoyed by us, without having first cost labour. And, inasmuch [as] most good things are produced by labour, it follows that [all] such things of right belong to those whose labour has produced them. But it has so happened in all ages of the world, that some have laboured, and others have, without labour, enjoyed a large proportion of the fruits. This is wrong, and should not continue. To [secure] to each labourer the whole product of his labour or as nearly as possible, is a most worthy object of any good government .²⁶

Based on Lincoln’s interpretation of Genesis 3:19, God had obliged the entire human race to labor as a condition of its existence. Such an exemption from laboring constituted a transgression of cosmic justice because it attempted to elevate one above the human condition at the expense of another. In Lincoln’s mind, the God-given right to enjoy the fruits of one’s own labor was thus confirmed by the Bible, the principle of equal consent in the Declaration, and the teaching of John Locke that each person has a right to property in himself. ²⁷ The precepts of the Declaration were further complemented by what Lincoln described as natural theology: I think that if anything can be proved by natural theology, it is that slavery is morally wrong. God gave man a mouth to receive bread, hands to feed it, and his hand has a right to carry bread to his mouth without controversy.²⁸

Although Lincoln believed that the moral precepts of the Bible could serve as a guide to public life, it is important to emphasize that he did not believe that its teachings could be applied literally to politics without prudential mediation. The Bible did not clearly point out what to do under particular circumstances. He knew full well that a literal interpretation of the Bible could be misinterpreted and exploited for political purposes, as it was to justify proslavery theology. In his Second Inaugural Address, he noted the supreme irony of both sides reading the same Bible and invoking the same God against each other.

Lincoln conveyed the limitations of a literal interpretation of the Bible to a group of abolitionist ministers who were convinced that the Good Book dictated the policy of immediate, uncompensated emancipation during the war:

The subject presented in the memorial is one upon which I have thought much for weeks past, and I may even say for months. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible and learn what appears to be wise and right. The subject is difficult, and good men do not agree .²⁹

Lincoln’s acknowledgment that good men do not agree on difficult moral questions reflected a humility that is diametrically opposed to the dogmatism of contemporary ideological thinking that demonizes one’s political opponents. While humbly acknowledging the vast gulf between human pretence and divine intent, Lincoln nevertheless strove for greatness in his endeavor to serve both God and country. This rare combination of a Christian humility and pagan grandeur may be characterized as a biblical magnanimity.³⁰

III. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS’S POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE ALTERNATIVE OF MORAL RELATIVISM.

The policy of popular sovereignty championed by Stephen A. Douglas represented a pragmatic alternative to resolving the slavery question before the outbreak of war. This policy granted territorial settlers the right to decide for themselves whether or not to have slavery. In Douglas’s view, popular sovereignty was the most democratic way of resolving political conflict over slavery, and the one most consistent with the liberal virtues of self-determination, diversity, and local autonomy: I hold to that great principle of self-government which asserts the right of every people to decide for themselves the nature and character of the domestic institutions and fundamental law under which they are to live. As long as the democratic process followed correct procedures, popular sovereignty was indifferent to its substantive moral outcome. Outside of the process itself, Douglas rejected the public relevance of a transcendent standard to judge policy.

It is instructive to consider the philosophical implications of popular sovereignty. The doctrine is predicated upon two related concepts: legal positivism and ethical relativism. Legal positivism identifies law and justice simply as the command of those in power. The legal positivist understands law to be univocal: justice is tantamount to the decrees of a duly constituted authority. Political institutions and public policies are thus self-legitimating. Because law is strictly identified with the will of those in power, the attempt to measure human enactments in terms of their conformity with an ultimate standard is meaningless. According to legal positivists, the appeal to an ultimate moral standard to judge the actions of the state illegitimately introduces a competing authority that necessarily undermines the concrete rule of law and established legal procedure in the name of utopian goals.

In an effort to diffuse sectional strife over slavery, Douglas suggested that moral and religious claims were neither absolute nor universal, but relative to the varying standards of each political community:

I am now speaking of rights under the constitution, and not of moral or religious rights. I do not discuss the morals of the people of Missouri, but let them settle that matter for themselves. I hold that the people of the slaveholding States are civilized men as well as ourselves, that they bear consciences as well as we, and that they are accountable to God and their posterity and not to us. It is for them to decide therefore the moral and religious right of the slavery question for themselves within their own limits."³¹

Rejecting a transcendent moral standard like so many contemporary theorists of jurisprudence, Douglas believed that the law should merely reflect the community sense of what is expedient.³²

Indeed, there is a striking resemblance between Douglas’s nineteenth century legal positivism and John Rawls’s contemporary theory of justice. Like Douglas, Rawls seeks to remove moral and religious absolutes from public life. In terms that bear comparison to Douglas, Rawls states:

Thus, the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons.... To secure this agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, questions.... The hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might call it, existing differences between contending political views can at least be moderated, even if not entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can be maintained.³³

What both Douglas and Rawls fail to see is that the public recognition of each person as free and equal is itself predicated on an absolute moral standard that affirms the spiritual dignity of all human beings. By admitting that it is good and fair to treat all citizens equally and that each person ought to be treated on the basis of mutual respect, Rawls presumes the very absolute values he seeks to reject. In fact, his theory of justice provides no fixed, external standard to choose freedom over slavery, tolerance over intolerance, and justice over injustice.

The Little Giant’s legal positivism is revealed even more clearly in his defense of the Dred Scott Decision. Because he viewed the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of the democratic process, he interpreted Lincoln’s repudiation of the Dred Scott Decision as a prescription for anarchy:

The Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the highest tribunal on earth. From that decision there is no appeal this side of Heaven. Yet, Mr. Lincoln says he is going to reverse that decision. By what tribunal will he reverse it? Will he appeal to a mob? Does he intend to appeal to violence, to Lynch law? Will he stir up strife and rebellion in the land and overthrow the court by violence?...He who attempts to stir up odium and rebellion in the country against the constituted authorities, is stimulating the passions of men to resort to violence and to mobs instead of to the law. Hence, I tell you that I take the decisions of the Supreme Court as the law of the land, and I intend to obey them as such.³⁴

Attempting to brand Lincoln as a radical abolitionist who would trample upon the rule of law in the name of abstract moral right, Douglas stated:

Mr. Lincoln, following the example and lead of all the little Abolition orators, who go around and lecture in the basements of schools and churches, reads from the Declaration of Independence, that all men were created equal, and then asks how can you deprive a negro of that equality which God and the Declaration of Independence awards to him. He and they maintain negro equality is guarantied by the laws of God, and that it is asserted in the Declaration of Independence.³⁵

In addition to legal positivism, Douglas’s version of popular sovereignty implied the related concept of ethical relativism. As seen, he asserted that domestic institutions were neither inherently good nor evil, but rather desirable or undesirable depending upon the varying interests of local communities. Justice was relative to the preferences and tastes of each territory.

Like some modern communitarians and libertarians, Douglas maintained that the federal government should not legislate morality by preferring one set of values to another. Sociopolitical conflict could be resolved by treating moral and religious claims as matters of subjective taste to be chosen or rejected by the people through their territorial and state legislatures. In effect, Douglas viewed sectional disputes as a clash over different perspectives, each moral perspective being equal to all others, and relative to the will of the majority within a given community: The great principle of this government is that each State has the right to do as it pleases on all these questions, and no other State, or power on earth has the right to interfere with us, or complain of us merely because our system differs from theirs.³⁶ Indeed, Douglas’s ethical relativism even prevented him from distinguishing between slavery and other domestic institutions like agriculture. In his view, the decision of territorial settlers to choose or reject slavery was comparable to the decision to plant corn or stock cattle.

Moreover, Douglas exhorted national leaders to refrain from even raising vexing moral questions about public policies. Because such questions were insoluble, inflammatory, and divisive, leaders should entertain moral neutrality in judging policies. In his view, the liberal virtues of pluralism and diversity demanded not only the toleration of slavery, but also the cessation of all opposition to it. Thus, he characterized the abolitionists’ moral condemnation of slavery as a fanatical expression of intolerance, one that undermined political compromise and exacerbated sectional strife. The only alternative to pluralism, toleration, and diversity was a coercive national uniformity—i.e. a puritanism that sought to coerce one way of life upon all others. According to Douglas, Lincoln’s use of the House Divided metaphor, which emphasized the underlying need for a national moral consensus regarding the evil of slavery and its threat to the Union, was an expression of abolitionist intolerance and moral fanaticism:

Mr. Lincoln likens that bond of the federal constitution joining free and slave States together to a house divided against itself, and says that it is contrary to the law of God and cannot stand. When did he learn, and by what authority does he proclaim, that this government is contrary to the law of God, and cannot stand?. . . . [O]ur government was formed on the principle of diversity in the local institutions and laws and not on that of uniformity.³⁷

In response to Douglas’s argument for an ethically neutral pluralism, Lincoln argued that the logic of popular sovereignty dictated the toleration of polygamy as well, a practice that was viewed by many nineteenth-century Victorians as even more odious than slavery. By associating slavery with polygamy, Lincoln attempted to show that the embrace of popular sovereignty necessarily led to the toleration of virtually any practice no matter how intuitively morally repugnant.

Douglas’s version of popular sovereignty was unique in combining the seemingly incompatible principles of local autonomy with a national Union. Popular sovereignty fused the nationalist sentiment of manifest destiny with the self-determination. Though the Little Giant concurred with southern Democrats of his time that one of the principal aims of national authority was to secure local autonomy, he disagreed with them on the appropriate means to secure this end. Unlike his southern brethren, he believed that the goal of local autonomy and self-determination was assured most effectively under the auspices of the national Union that expanded ever westward to secure new territories for the country’s teeming population. Douglas conveyed his political vision in these terms: Hence, the great mission of the Democracy is to unite the fraternal feelings of the whole country, restore peace and quiet by teaching each State to mind its own business, and regulate its own domestic affairs, and all to unite carrying out the constitution as our fathers made it, and thus to preserve the Union and render it perpetual in all time to come.³⁸

While Lincoln agreed with Douglas that the perpetuity of a national Union was the sine qua non of liberty, his understanding of the term differed radically from Douglas’s view. For Lincoln, liberty did not mean the right to do wrong, but consisted in the responsible exercise of freedom in conformity with the standards of the natural law. The equal dignity of all human beings placed a moral imperative upon the regime to resist slavery. Paradoxically, the conception of liberty implicit to Douglas’s moral relativism sanctioned the freedom of one people to enslave another. Because it perverted the meaning of liberty, Lincoln characterized popular sovereignty as a false philosophy and a pseudo philosophy that sought to replace the authentic political faith of the Founders with a contradictory doctrine that undermined the regime’s first principles:

The doctrine of self government is right—absolutely and eternally right—but [Douglas’s version of popular sovereignty] has no just application, as here attempted. Or perhaps I should rather say that whether it has such just application depends upon whether a negro is not or is a man. If he is not a man, why in that case, he who is a man may, as a matter of self-government, do just as he pleases with him. But if the negro is a man, is it not to that extent, a total destruction of self-government, to say that he too shall not govern himself? When the white man governs himself that is self-government; but when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more than self-government—that is despotism. If the negro is a man, why then my ancient faith teaches me that all men are created equal; and that there can be no moral right in connection with one man’s making a slave of another.³⁹

Indeed, Lincoln’s inclusive vision of the Union contrasted sharply with Douglas’s racist vision of a Union dedicated to white supremacy emphatically proclaimed during their debates: I believe this government was made on the white basis. I believe it was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity for ever, and I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men, men of European birth and descent, instead of conferring it upon Negroes, Indians and other inferior races.⁴⁰

Does it follow that the public invocation of moral claims necessarily undermines the rule of law as Douglas contended? Though Douglas correctly discerned the theological grounding of his opponent’s political thought, he confounded Lincoln’s natural law outlook with the moral idealism of the radical abolitionists in order to discredit both as extremist alternatives. He derogatorily referred to the Republicans as the Abolition party: But the Abolition party really think that under the Declaration of Independence the Negro is equal to the white man, and that negro equality is an inalienable right conferred by the Almighty, and hence, that all human laws are in violation of it are null and void.

In sum, Douglas imposed a false dilemma: the invocation of moral principle does not necessarily lead to the violation of the rule of law. Like many of today’s opponents of natural law, Douglas fallaciously equated the public appeal to moral principle with the puritanical attempt to coerce belief through the force of law and a divine imperative to overturn the established rule of law if it does not enforce the most grandiose ideals. On the contrary, Lincoln maintained that while the moral participates in the legal, the two are not strictly identical. The application of principle must take into consideration the limits of human nature and politics. As will be shown, Douglas’s condemnation of moral idealism applied not to Lincoln, but to the radical abolitionists.

The noted transcendentalist writer and abolitionist Henry David Thoreau advocated an idealistic vision of law and morality diametrically opposed to Douglas’s pragamatism: It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. . . . Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice.⁴¹ Thoreau believed that the canker of slavery had corrupted the entire nation beyond redemption: I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one.⁴² While reaching opposite conclusions Thoreau and Douglas both agreed that the invocation of moral principles in politics was necessarily revolutionary and subversive of the rule of law. Both conceived of a necessary antipathy between moral and legal obligation. However, while Douglas repudiated the public appeal to universal moral principles for pragmatic reasons, Thoreau upheld them for idealistic reasons. Indeed, Thoreau celebrated the very political idealism that Douglas condemned.

IV. THE RADICAL ABOLITIONISTS: THE ALTERNATIVE OF MORAL IDEALISM.

Radical abolitionism constituted the other extreme alternative, which was proffered by Northerners to resolve the slavery question before the war. The moral idealism of the radical abolitionists involved a dangerous fixation upon moral principles to the exclusion of practical circumstances. In demanding immediate and uncompensated emancipation, they ignored the inherent limits of politics. Before the war, many of the radical abolitionists endorsed non-participation in the political process to maintain the moral purity of their principled stance against slavery. They disavowed any legal obligation to the Union and to the Constitution in view of its concessions to slavery. Their motto was, No Union with slaveholders.

An early indication of Lincoln’s prudence as a leader was revealed in his opposition to the moral idealism of the Liberty Party, an abolitionist third party, which cost Henry Clay the election of 1844. Lincoln campaigned for Whig candidate Clay, his beau ideal of a statesman, in this election. He was discouraged when New York abolitionists bolted the Whig Party because they could not support Clay as a slaveholder, even though he was committed to the containment of the institution. Lincoln predicted that their uncompromising refusal to vote for Clay because he was a slaveholder would result in an even greater evil, the election of a proslavery candidate who would annex Texas and thereby aid and abet the spread of the institution throughout the Union. In a letter to Williamson Durley dated October 3, 1845, Lincoln chastised the Liberty Party for its flawed practical reasoning:

What was their process of reasoning, I can only judge from what a single one of them told me. It was this: "We are not to do evil that good may come." This general, proposition is doubtless correct; but did it apply? If by your votes you could have prevented the extention (sic), &c. of slavery, would it not have been good and not evil so to have used your votes, even though it involved the casting of them for a slaveholder? By the fruit the tree is to be known. An evil tree can not bring forth good fruit. If the fruit of electing Mr. Clay would have been to prevent the extension of slavery, could the act of electing him have been evil?⁴³

As with the election in 1844, in the next election of 1848, Lincoln consistently opposed an antislavery third party that threatened to split the Whig Party, thereby resulting in a victory for the proslavery Democrats. Speaking in Worcester Massachusetts, he criticized the flawed practical reasoning of those who sought to leave the Whigs for the Free Soil Party:

The Free Soil. . . . [in] declaring that they would do their duty and leave the consequences to God, merely gave an excuse for taking a course that they were not able to maintain by a fair and full argument. To make this declaration did not show what their duty was. If it did we should have no use for judgment, we might as well be made without intellect, and when divine or human law does not clearly point out what is our duty, we have no means of finding out what it is by using our most intelligent judgment of the consequences.

Though he consistently opposed human servitude, Lincoln rejected the political idealism of the more radical antislavery factions. Their actions would lead to consequences that hurt the cause of freedom—namely, the election of a proslavery Democrat. In both the election of 1844 and 1848, he emphasized that prudent decision making must weigh the consequences of each action. Moral principles are not applied in a theoretical vacuum apart from determinations of what is actually achievable. The fixation upon moral principles in their abstract purity may actually undermine what is politically possible under the circumstances leading to consequences that are entirely contrary to one’s moral aspirations.

Before the war, Lincoln’s prudential reconciliation of moral obligation to the Declaration and legal obligation to the Constitution may be understood as a mean between the disunionist extremes of the northern radical abolitionists and southern fire-eaters. Ironically, northern radical abolitionists and southern fire-eaters alike regarded the Constitution as a proslavery document. Consequently, both welcomed disunion as a means of establishing a more suitable form of government consonant with their own political ends. If the right to property in slave was expressly and distinctly affirmed by the Constitution as Justice Taney asserted in the Dred Scott decision, then it was unlawful to deny Southerners the right to take their property in the territories. Surely this would constitute a most fundamental violation of their liberty. On the other hand, the alleged proslavery status of the Constitution led the abolitionists to forsake the rule of law. They conscientiously believed that a Union dedicated to the immoral end of slavery was not worth keeping.

However, was the constitution a proslavery document as both extremes contended? Did the Union really stand for slavery? As a lawyer himself—a seasoned veteran of forensic battles—Lincoln brought to bear the entire force of his incisive legal mind to provide a devastating critique of Dred Scott. Carefully analyzing each aspect of the decision in the light of logic, history, precedent, and the language of the Constitution itself, he demonstrated that Taney’s legal reasoning was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the Declaration, the intentions of the Founders, and the Constitution. In Lincoln’s words, it was based on assumed historical facts which were not really true. It is no exaggeration to say that from the time of the decision in 1857 to his election as president in 1860, Lincoln devoted a considerable amount of time and energy vindicating the principles of the American regime from Taney’s proslavery re-interpretation of the Constitution.

What then was the relationship between slavery and the Constitution? In sum, Lincoln viewed slavery as an anomaly within the American republic. It was condemned in principle by the Declaration, but tolerated in practice as a matter of political necessity where it already existed at the time of the founding. He clearly defined the anomalous status of slavery to the Constitution in his celebrated Peoria Address of October 16, 1854:

I object . . . that there CAN be MORAL RIGHT in the enslaving of one man by another.... I object to it because the fathers of the republic eschewed, and rejected it. The argument of Necessity was the only argument they ever admitted in favor of slavery.... They found the institution existing among us, which they could not help; and they cast blame upon the British King for having permitted its introduction. Before the constitution, they prohibited its introduction in the north-western Territory—the only country we owned, then free from it. At the framing and adoption of the constitution they forbore to so much as mention the word slave or slavery in the whole instrument. In the provision for the recovery of fugitives, the slave is spoken of as a PERSON HELD TO SERVICE OR LABOR. In . . . prohibiting the abolition of the African slave trade for twenty years, the trade is spoken of as "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States NOW EXISTING, shall think proper to admit . . . Thus, the thing is hid away, in the constitution, just as an afflicted man hides away a wen or a cancer, which he dares not cut