A Matter of Weeks Rather Than Months: The Impasse Between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War 1965-1969

By J.R.T. Wood

Founded on 35 years of research into o the post-1945 Anglo-Rhodesian history, this book complements Richard Wood's The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963 (1983) and So Far and No Further! Rhodesia's bid for independence during the retreat from empire: 1959-1965 (2005). Of So Far, Michael Hartnack wrote that 'Once in a lifetime comes a book which must force a total shift in the thinking person's perception of an epoch, and of all the prominent characters who featured in it.'
A Matter of Weeks Rather than Months recounts the action and reaction to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of Rhodesia's independence, the second such declaration since the American one of 1776. It examines the dilemmas of both sides. Smith's problem was how to legitimise his rebellion to secure crucial investment capital, markets, trade and more. His antagonist, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was determined not to transfer sovereignty until Rhodesia accepted African majority rule in common with the rest of Africa. Given British feelings for their Rhodesian kith and kin and Rhodesia's landlocked position, Wilson eschewed the use of force. He could only impose sanctions but hoped they would defeat Smith 'in a matter weeks rather than months'. The Rhodesians, however, evaded the sanctions with such success that they forced Wilson to negotiate a settlement. Negotiations were nevertheless doomed because the self-confident Rhodesians would not accept a period of direct British rule while rapid progress to majority rule was made or the imposition of restraints on powers they had possessed since gaining self-government in 1923. In tune with their allies in the African National Congress of South Africa, the Rhodesian or Zimbabwean African nationalists had already adopted the Marxist concept of the 'Armed Struggle' as a means to power. Sponsored by the Communist Bloc, its surrogates and allies, they began a series of armed incursions from their safe haven in Zambia. Although bloodily and easily repulsed, they would learn from their mistakes as the Rhodesian forces would discover in the 1970s. Consequently, this is a tale of sanctions, negotiations and counter-insurgency warfare.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Trafford Publishing
• Release date: Aug 2, 2012
• ISBN: 9781466934108

J.R.T. Wood

Richard Wood was a Commonwealth scholar and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and is the foremost historian and researcher on Rhodesia in the decades following World War II. He lives in Durban, South Africa with his wife Carole.

Book preview

‘A matter of weeks

rather than months’

The Impasse between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith

Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War 1965-1969

J.R.T.Wood

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© Copyright 2012 J.R.T.Wood.

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ISBN: 978-1-4669-3409-2 (sc)

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Trafford rev. 08/21/2012

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Dedication

to

AMP CAW & ATW

MR

PMB & TJB

CJSW & EMGW

CDM & JM

All of whom have continued to inspire and help me selflessly.

Contents

Acknowledgements

Part 1: Outrage and Retribution

Chapter 1  Outrage and Immediate Retribution: The Reaction to UDI

Chapter 2  The Stick and the Carrot Oil Sanctions and the First Tentative British Thoughts of Re-establishing Negotiations

Chapter 3  ‘Within a matter of weeks rather than months’ Surviving the Oil Embargo

Chapter 4  Considering a coup d’état The visit of Watson during the British general election.

Part 2: The First Attempt to Settle

Chapter 5  Wilson’s Second Term: the Joanna K Affair: and the Launching of the Second Chimurenga

Chapter 6  Constitutional Stalemate and the ‘Battle of Sinoia’, the First Clash of the Second Chimurenga

Chapter 7  Exploration of the Possibilities of a Settlement The First Round of Talks between Officials The Viljoen Murders

Chapter 8  Preparations for the Next Round

Chapter 9  Going Round ‘the Mulberry Bush a Bit More’ The Second Round of Talks between Officials

Chapter 10  ‘There is nobody in Rhodesia capable of working out a sensible new approach in detail.’

Chapter 11  A Stay of Execution Harold Wilson and the Consequences of the Commonwealth Conference

Chapter 12  First Contact with a British Minister Herbert Bowden’s Attempt to Settle the Rhodesian Issue

Chapter 13  The Tabling of the First British Terms for a Settlement The Visit of Sir Morrice James

Chapter 14  Ian Smith’s Reply to the British Terms

Chapter 15  Herbert Bowden’s Second Visit and its Product

Chapter 16  Stalemate on HMS Tiger

Chapter 17  The rejection of the Tiger Proposals

Part 3: Mandatory Sanctions

Chapter 18  ‘Now grave actions must follow…’ The Adoption of Mandatory Sanctions and NIBMAR

Chapter 19  Fostering Opposition in Rhodesia The Reconnaissance Mission of Lord Head

Chapter 20  Taking Charge of Rhodesia’s Future The Appointment of the Whaley Commission

Chapter 21  Banking on Mandatory Sanctions to Induce Change

Chapter 22  Further Reconnaissance The Visit of Lord Alport

Chapter 23  First Tentative Moves to Re-open the Dialogue Operation Nickel and Reinforcement by South Africa

Chapter 24  George Thomson and the Consequences of Operation Nickel on the Anglo-Rhodesian Dialogue

Chapter 25  The Fruitless First Visit of George Thomson

Chapter 26  The Visit of Sir Alec Douglas-Home and the Defacto Ruling

Chapter 27  The Death Sentence Ruling and the Resumption of Hanging: and Operation Cauldron

Chapter 28  The Whaley Commission Report, the British Move to Tighten Sanctions and Mopping Up Cauldron

Chapter 29  Steps towards Restarting the Negotiations The Dismissal of Harper, the Yellow Paper, and the De jure Court Decision Operations Glove, Griffin, Mansion and Excess

Part 4: The Second Attempt to Settle

Chapter 30  Clandestine Third Party Negotiations The Secret Mission of Aitken and Goodman Operation Gravel

Chapter 31  Supping with the Devil Seeking the Intervention of B.J.Vorster

Chapter 32  The Visit of James Bottomley, and the Decision to Talk aboard HMS Fearless

Chapter 33  Thwarted aboard HMS Fearless Wilson’s Insistence on the Double Safeguard

Chapter 34  The Attempt to Shift Wilson Off the Double Safeguard

Chapter 35  The Attempt to Salvage the Fearless Agreement The Visit of George Thomson

Chapter 36  Thomson’s Return to Rhodesia and Deadlock

Chapter 37  Marking Time until the Commonwealth Conference The End of George Thomson’s Stewardship

Chapter 38  The First Steps Towards Becoming a Republic

Chapter 39  Winning the 1969 Referendum The Decision to Become a Republic

Appendix 1

Select Bibliography

Endnotes

Acknowledgements

Following my two published works on post-Second World War Rhodesian history, The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia andNyasaland: 1953-1963 and So Far and No Further! Rhodesia’s bid for independence during the retreat from empire: 1959-1965, this book is the third fruit of my 37 years of research.

As in So Far, this book concentrates on the Anglo-Rhodesian political and constitutional wrangle over independence in the immediate post-UDI period, culminating in Ian Smith’s declaration of a republic. It describes also the first phase of the ultimately successful African nationalist armed bid for power. This bid was fuelled by the Cold War sponsorship of national liberation struggles. The after effects of this are still being felt in Africa as a consequence of the flooding of the continent with AK-47 assault rifles and similar weapons. Training was also supplied for young African recruits sent abroad to Soviet and Chinese Communist guerrilla warfare schools and to similar establishments in their satellite and allied countries. What the Zimbabwe African National Union and its rival, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, and the latter’s ally, the African National Congress of South Africa, lacked in this period was sufficient popular support. Their leaders, however, misunderstood this and sent young men across the Zambezi River into Rhodesia to spark an uprising. There they rarely avoided arrest or death, many of them being captured by the rural African people and handed over to the security forces. Although this could be interpreted as evidence of support for the Rhodesian Government, it is more likely a reflection of the universal conservatism of the subsistence farmer who has everything to lose if current order is disturbed. It was also a rejection of the violent intimidation which characterised the African nationalist pre-UDI and post-UDI campaigns. Whatever the politicians on both sides might have said or pretended, the African population remained largely neutral, biding their time for better days. Admittedly, Africans served loyally and fiercely in the British South Africa Police and the armed forces but then, universally, soldiers fight for the men on either side of them and for their unit.

If this initial success did not mislead the Rhodesian military hierarchy about the threat posed by the African nationalist insurgency, it did their political masters. It led them to disregard it and to concentrate on the immediate problem of resolving the political and constitutional impasse. There was, however, no political solution which would be acceptable either to the British Labour Government of Harold Wilson, still smarting over Ian Smith’s rebellions, or the defiant Rhodesian Front one of Ian Smith. It meant that, not only was Rhodesia hobbled by sanctions but it was denied any form of legitimacy while Britain refused to transfer sovereignty. Without sovereignty, Rhodesia was denied access to international support, capital and more. The reality remained that no British government during post-Second World War retreat from empire could grant independence on the basis of the denial of majority African rule. Despite being committed to political evolution, the Rhodesian whites knew, however, that an early transfer of power to the African elite spelled the end of their control of all of the modern state they had built in 70 years in the heart of Africa. They knew that it was political suicide. The British on the other side of the negotiating table, constrained by domestic, Commonwealth and international realities, could offer only the minimum reprieve. This was a period of impotent frustration on all sides.

My detailed reconstruction of the events of 1965-1969 is again based on my access to the Papers of Ian Smith, housed in the Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. I have used the collections in the Library of Rhodes House, Oxford, and The National Archives at Kew, London. [I am among the many lovers of tradition who deplore the dropping of the name, ‘Public Record Office’, by the modernising New Labour administration. Every country has a national archives. Only Britain had the PRO.] I have also had the fortune to be trusted with access to the hitherto secret archives of the Rhodesia Army Association now housed in the British and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol, England.

I have continued to be assisted and sustained by the generosity of others. The same generous friend who rescued my project in 1999 has funded my research and the long days of writing. The Hon. Ian Douglas Smith has also assisted with access to his papers with unstinting willingness to answer questions. Colonel John Redfern and members of the Flame Lily Foundation have also assisted with advancement on sales and access to information. Colleagues with similar interests, notably Major Charles David Melson, the Chief Historian of the United States Marine Corps has helped in innumerable ways including providing a constant stream of photo-copied material of his own research into the Rhodesian counter-insurgency effort. In this, he was aided by the author, Alexandre Binda of the new regimental histories, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry and Masoja: The History ofthe Rhodesian African Rifles, who has sent to both of us the documents underpinning his research. My sister, Patricia, and her husband, Tim Broderick, in Harare, Zimbabwe, have continued to pass on documents, cuttings, messages and securing interviews. My work was founded on the enduring generosity of others who made trips to libraries and archives abroad possible. I still owe debts of gratitude to Christopher and Geraldine Woodwark, Michael and Karen Woodwark, Charles and Janet Melson, Michael and Ann Noone, Craig and Diohn Benedict, Ivor and Sally Ingall, Rowena and Bill Quantrill, my late cousin, David Arnold and his wife, Patricia, and Brigadier David Heppenstall and his wife, Ann. James Porter assisted with access to computers. Professor Michael Laidlaw and Genevieve Hadlow have repaired and maintained my computers and solved many problems. Professor Irina Filatova and Bill Johnson have supported me. John Devereux, a man of great talent and patience, is responsible for laying out the book and designing the cover. Dr James Hargrave, the archivist of the Welensky Papers, has never failed to offer advice and assistance. Selvie Pillay has attempted to make me appear tidy. My son, Andrew, has cheerfully endured the disruption of my visits to his house in London and has patiently answered questions on the mysteries of the computer and has sourced and secured equipment and the like.

My greatest debt remains to my lovely and wonderful wife, Carole, who has not only sustained me through the toil of this production with unfailing patience but has read every word that I have written with unwavering accuracy.

Finally I need to acknowledge the many people who were willing to share with me their memories, many of them sadly passed on. They include: Lieutenant-Colonel Garth Barrett, Assistant-Commissioner Derek Bennison, Senator Harry Byrd III, Evan Campbell, Nobby Clark, Lord Deedes, the Hon. Geoffrey Ellman-Brown, Sir Patrick Fletcher, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Lord Greenhill, Lieutenant-General John Hickman, Brigadier Peter Hosking, the Hon. J.H. Howman, Dick Isemonger, Major-General Leon Jacobs, Sir John Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel Mick McKenna, Air Marshal Mick McLaren, Judge Hector Macdonald, Judge N.J. McNally, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Merrington, Senator S.E. Morris, the Hon. B.H. Mussett, W.H.H. Nicolle, Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer, Major-General R.R.J. Putterill, Lieutenant-Colonel R.F. Reid-Daly, the Hon. Harry Reedman, Lieutenant-Colonel B.G. Robinson, Judge L.G. Smith, Donald Sole, Colonel Basil Spurling, the Hon. A.R.W. Stumbles, Air Marshal Norman Walsh, the Hon P.K. van der Byl and D.W. Young.

Part 1: Outrage and Retribution

Chapter 1

Outrage and Immediate Retribution: The Reaction to UDI

11 November-13 December 1965

Having declared Rhodesia independent at 1.30 p.m., an exhausted Ian Smith took to his bed on the afternoon ofThursday, 11 November 1965. By acting unilaterally, he had, however, passed the initiative thenceforth to his enemies in Britain, Africa and the United Nations. It meant that thenceforth he could only react to counter whatever they did.

Smith had thrust the outraged British Prime Minister, James Harold Wilson, into the command of a process he could not always control. Although they could not solve the problem, the Rhodesians could take whatever punishment he meted out. Indeed, they did so with some ease until a world economic crisis and a growing insurgency, fuelled from within and without, crippled them. Because the Rhodesian whites were used to being cast as international pariahs, the challenges of the UDI would merely awake in them an ingenuity, which surprised both themselves and their opponents. Perhaps their experience of creating something out of the raw bush had attuned them to learn quickly how to outwit their opponents and to surmount most obstacles in the next decade.

It would take 14 defiant years before, in 1979, Smith’s successor, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rhodesia’s first African Prime Minister, was forced to understand that, for international legality to be achieved, sovereignty had to be conferred by a British act of parliament. For that to happen, any independence constitution had to satisfy the very different views of British parliamentarians whose prime motive was to extricate Britain from her last colonial problem at minimum cost. On that basis, the modern state of Zimbabwe would be founded with all the consequences that flowed.

Although the first challenge to the Rhodesians that afternoon of 11 November 1965 was to circumvent the application of sanctions, a negotiated Anglo-Rhodesian settlement remained an urgent priority even for the offended British Government; it would become more so as sanctions and psychological pressures soon failed to bear early fruit.

Any thoughts of settling were furthest from Wilson’s mind as he set his Government to punish Smith and his colleagues for their audacity. Wilson was, however, beaten to the punch by Smith’s officials. They promulgated their emergency measures to ensure stability by dampening alarm, preventing unrest, and curbing the flight of people and capital. They imposed censorship and petrol rationing, cancelled import licences and cut an emigrant’s allowance to £100. Powers to appoint extra district commissioners were gazetted and the tribal areas brought under tighter control. The problem of divided loyalty, induced by the existing oaths sworn to the monarch, were addressed by threatening servants of the state, including judges, with fines of £500 or two years’ imprisonment for abstention or refusal to perform duties. Caution was present also. For example, one power granted in anticipation of the UDI was withdrawn until Rhodesia’s new international status had been assessed. This was the discretion given by the Rhodesian Security Council on 12 August 1965 to Rhodesian Army commanders on the spot to cross the Zambezi River into Zambia in hot pursuit after a terrorist incursion. Calling for strict discipline, the Rhodesian Minister of Finance, John Wrathall, hoped that normal trading and financial relations would continue. In saying so, he understood that Rhodesia would face aggressive sanctions and ‘must be ready to endure a situation of real hardship for some time ahead.’¹

Even those who were troubled by their oaths of loyalty, such as Major-General R.R.J. Putterill, the Commander of the Rhodesian Army, were compelled to act. Following the instructions of the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, that everyone should remain at their posts, Putterill immediately ordered his troops to go about their normal duties, including the maintenance of law and order. Saying that, he reassured them that he would not order them to do anything illegal.² Gibbs’s action was reinforced by Sir Roy Welensky, the former Federal Prime Minister, who declared Although, as everybody knows, I have been against a unilateral declaration, I think it is now the duty of every responsible Rhodesian to support the revolutionary Government. We cannot afford to throw the country into a state of chaos. We must abide by the forces of law and order, whether the Government is a defacto or a de jure Government.’³ The order, of course, placed Putterill and many others in the predicament of divided loyalty, of

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having to serve two masters. Ken Flower, the Director of the Central Intelligence Organisation, found himself counselling the Governor while conveying to him repeated requests from the Rhodesian Government that he should resign. Gibbs remained steadfast, not just out of his sense of duty, but because he believed that he had to provide a conduit through which the necessary Anglo-Rhodesian settlement negotiations could be revived.4 In the event, the news of the UDI was received calmly in Rhodesia apart from some stoning of passing cars in the volatile African townships outside Bulawayo, and one unsuccessful attempt to induce a work stoppage. There were a few arrests of perceived troublemakers, the most prominent of these being the German-born Bulawayo solicitor, Leo Baron, who was detained within nine minutes of the proclamation of the UDI. He was singled out because of his close ties to Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the banned Zimbabwe African People’s Union and a key figure in the already fomented insurgency. Baron’s recent subversive activities had led to his restriction on 29 May 1965. What also troubled the authorities was his association with a Communist, Harry Chimowitz, and the Communist leanings of Baron’s family.5

The first to react to the UDI was Nkomo’s backer, President Kaunda of Zambia. He declared a state of emergency and mobilised the Zambia Rifles to cover the three crossing points on the Zambezi River, the bridges at the Victoria Falls and Chirundu, and the dam wall at Kariba. There they confronted Rhodesia’s two regular infantry battalions, the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Rhodesian Light Infantry, already deployed by Putterill on Operation Wizard, the secret contingency plan to repel a British invasion. Kaunda demanded that not only ‘this act of treason does not prosper and that this rebellion is brought to an end,’ but also that Britain, as the responsible power, should meet Zambia’s costs. These included £200,000 required to repair the Tunduma-Iringa Road as an alternate export route to Tanganyika. He also threatened that, ifBritish troops did not secure the hydroelectric installations on the Rhodesian bank of the Zambezi at Kariba, the Zambian Army would do so.6

Wilson’s reaction to the UDI was equally predictable. Although taken aback by Smith, Wilson swung into action against Rhodesia while intending to provide Kaunda some relief. Given time by Smith’s declaration being at 11.30 a.m. GMT, he postponed his Cabinet meeting and drafted a statement for the Commons. He secured the endorsement of Edward Heath and William Whitelaw of the Conservatives, and Jo Grimond of the Liberal Party, for the enabling bill (the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia Bill, 1965) to be tabled on Monday, 15 November. This sanctioned the dismissal of the Rhodesian Cabinet by Gibbs, the downgrading of the British High Commission in Salisbury to a residual mission, the withdrawal of the British High Commissioner, J.B. Johnston, from Salisbury, and the handing over of protection of British interests to the Swiss consul. The Rhodesian High Commissioner in London, Brigadier Andrew Skeen, and the Rhodesian ministers in the British embassies in Washington, Bonn and Tokyo would be expelled. Recognition would be withdrawn from Harry Reedman and John Gaunt, the Rhodesian accredited representatives in Portugal and South Africa. Rhodesian borrowing would be curbed, the import ofRhodesian tobacco and sugar banned, and the export to Rhodesia of arms and spares halted. These moves were somewhat frustrated by the Rhodesian ownership of the single railway line to sympathetic South Africa through Bechuanaland, but Wilson hoped at least to prevent it being a conduit for weapons and ammunition. He intended to secure a comprehensive trade ban, excluding oil. Export credit guarantees would be cancelled. Rhodesia would be removed from the Sterling Area. Rhodesian citizens would lose their British subject status, invalidating Rhodesian passports. Anyone purporting to stand as the proposed ‘Regent’ in Rhodesia would be condemned as a traitor. This was aimed at the Rhodesian Minister ofAgriculture, Lord Graham, the Duke ofMontrose and Premier Duke of Scotland. Wilson hated him as a right-wing aristocratic renegade. Finally, in an attempt to gain control ofany international retribution, Wilson ordered his Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, to fly to New York to secure and address an urgent meeting ofthe Security Council ofthe United Nations.7 For his part, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, summoned Skeen at 1.15 p.m., and ordered him to denounce the UDI, or face the withdrawal ofhis diplomatic immunities and privileges from 13 November and expulsion. Skeen chose expulsion and flew out of London the next evening. Simultaneously, the British Ambassador in Washington offered the option of ‘Queen or Country’ to the Rhodesian Minister, Air Vice-Marshall A.M. Bentley, and his African colleague, Lot Senda. Both chose ‘Country’ and were expelled.8

Facing the crowded benches of the Commons, assembled to debate his ultimately ruinous re-nationalisation of the British steel industry, Wilson melodramatically predicted the ‘deep sadness’ with which members would hear the news of the UDI. Describing graphically the previous 48 hours, Wilson claimed to have met every Rhodesian objection in his conciliatory effort. Saying this, he kept silent about his refusal to give his last message to Smith in writing, about his Government failing to respond to Rhodesian pressure for a settlement, or his demand that the Rhodesians surrender powers they had enjoyed since 1923. Instead, he told how Smith had spurned his offer to commend to the British Parliament a unanimous report by a Royal Commission that Rhodesians embraced the 1961 Constitution as a basis for independence; the quid pro quo being that if they did not the Commission would devise a new constitution. The rejection of this had been confirmed when he had telephoned Smith that morning. Wilson said he had found the Rhodesians ‘hell-bent on illegal self-destroying’ and Smith evasive, confused, unhappy and under ‘intolerable pressure’ from the ‘unreasoning extremists of the Rhodesian Front’. It was clear, Wilson said, ‘that reason had fled the scene and that emotions, unreasoning racialist emotions at that, had taken command, regardless of the conclusions for Rhodesia, Africa, and the world.’ Although the unhappy Smith had agreed to a visit by a senior British minister, within four hours he had declared Rhodesia independent. Wilson proclaimed that the truth was that there was an unbridgeable gap ‘between different worlds and different centuries.’ He found proof of this in an admission by Smith to him that there were irreconcilable men in his Cabinet.

Because the UDI was an illegal treasonable act ofrebellion against both the Crown and the 1961 Constitution, and therefore was ‘ineffective in law, Wilson expected Gibbs, as Governor, to have already have dismissed the Rhodesian Cabinet, rendering them ‘private persons’ without legal authority. It was, Wilson declared, ‘the duty of British subjects-including all subjects of Rhodesia-to remain loyal to the Queen and the law of the land, and to recognise the continuing authority and responsibility for Rhodesia of the Government of the United Kingdom.’ Such words rang emptily in Rhodesia, as did his promise that ‘We shall have no dealings with the rebel regime.’ Wilson knew that Gibbs would also proclaim to the Rhodesians that it was ‘the duty of everyone owing allegiance to the Crown, in Rhodesia or elsewhere, to refrain from all acts which would assist the illegal regime to continue in Rhodesia in their rebellion against the Crown.’ Gibbs would also forbid the Rhodesian armed forces and police ‘from taking up arms in support of the illegal regime, and from doing anything which would help them to pursue their unlawful courses. Public servants in Rhodesia should not do any work for the illegal regime which would tend to further the success of the rebellion.’

When listing everything to be done, Wilson was surprised that his announcement of Stewart’s request for a debate in the UN Security Council evoked cries of ‘Why?’ from the hitherto silent Commons. He snapped back ‘Why? Because if we do not, somebody else will-and it is the duty ofHer Majesty’s Government to keep control of this situation. And for that reason the Foreign Secretary will be leaving for New York this evening.’

Before giving way to the Opposition, and without any self-recrimination for his role, Wilson mused sarcastically on how the Rhodesian tragedy affected millions of innocent people denied fundamental rights by ‘small, frightened men’ who lacked even the imagination not to plagiarise the American Declaration of Independence. As a former Oxford don, he should have known that all framers of such declarations had borrowed from the existing ones-the French from the American Declaration, and the Americans from the declaration of the Dutch United Provinces of 1579. He promised his Government would not shrink from this challenge they had not sought and that he was confident ‘we shall have not only the support of this House, not only the support of the nations of the world, but we shall have the clear and decisive verdict of history.’

Wilson found disturbing signs of bipartisan divergence in Heath’s reaction. In reality, however, Heath was simply attempting to placate both his right wing’s ‘kith and kin’ Rhodesian allegiance and his left wing’s pro-African nationalist inclination. Heath also understood that ultimately whatever Wilson said, the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement negotiations would have to be renewed. Although convinced that Britain’s future lay in joining Europe and consequently caring little about the fate of the Commonwealth,9 Heath used the threat to Commonwealth unity to attempt to rein in his party. He pointed out twice that day to his right wing’s influential 1922 Committee that, with the whole ‘white Commonwealth’ opposing the UDI, the Commonwealth would be ‘mortally offended’ if the Conservatives split.10 Then, cautioning Wilson that everything being done affected both the unity of Britain and of the Commonwealth, Heath asked whether the 1961 Constitution was suspended. Wilson reassured him that it was not because, being a British Act, only their Parliament held the power of suspension. Pressed further by Heath, Wilson promised that control of the Rhodesian affair would not be ceded to the UN even if the UDI were a matter of world concern. He repeated that the intention of Stewart’s mission to New York was to demonstrate that Britain was taking her responsibilities seriously and to pre-empt ‘any perhaps dangerous courses of action which we should all regret.’

Heath warned that every measure taken would be scrutinised closely by his Conservatives, but Wilson, with the air of the housemaster finding positive merit in corporal punishment, reassured the Commons ‘Our purpose is not punitive. We do not approach this tragic situation in a mood of recrimination.’ (The reality was quite the reverse. To those affected directly and immediately by British action and mood, such as Rhodesian students at British universities, ‘punitive’ aptly described the treatment meted out. A circular letter from Barbara Castle, that great champion of freedom, directly threatened the students that their British Council and Commonwealth scholarships would be in jeopardy if they dared to make any public comment, which was deemed by her Ministry of Overseas Development to be supportive of the ‘illegal regime’. So much for the hallowed British tradition of free speech.11)

The purpose, Wilson avowed, was ‘to restore a situation in Rhodesia in which there can be untrammelled loyalty and allegiance to the Crown and in which there can be, within whatever rules this House lays down, a free Government of Rhodesia acting in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.’ (Ken Flower concluded that Wilson’s ‘noble sentiments were probably forced on him by the stand Gibbs had taken in declaring his allegiance to the Queen, rather than because of any sudden conversion of the British Labour Government from Socialists to Royalists.’12) Wilson acknowledged that people could differ on how to realise these lofty aims and on the severity of the measures needed for a quick result, but he was confident no one would dispute that it was the duty of the Commons to discuss ‘the basis on which we can restore the rule oflaw, legal government, and freedom in Rhodesia.’

Jo Grimond deplored the UDI, expressed support for Gibbs, and demanded an oil embargo and international co-operation on sanctions. Wilson recalled that Gibbs had been in tears when he had bid him farewell at Salisbury Airport, and agreed that Gibbs was ‘one of the greatest of Rhodesians’. Wilson would not, however, contemplate an oil embargo, but assured the Commons that international co-operation was being sought on all other measures. He also reconfirmed the ruling out the use of force except where ‘our troops are asked for [by the Rhodesians] to preserve law and order and to avert a tragic action, subversion, murder, and so on.’ He reassured J.B. Hynd, Labour, that nothing that Gibbs signed under duress, conferring power to ‘private persons’, would be recognised. Sympathising with the ‘cruel dilemma’ of Rhodesian civil servants, judges and police, Wilson repeated that Gibbs would have ordered them to carry on with their normal duties to maintain law and order. Such officials, Wilson felt, ‘must be the judges of any possible action they might be asked to take which would be illegal in itself or illegal in helping what has happened.’ He accepted British responsibility for financial losses by those officials but would not allow ‘a general blanket offer of compensation’. (In the coming weeks, the British Government did quietly help Rhodesian officials and others in the public sector that resigned or lost their jobs when exercising their consciences.)

Winding up the debate, Wilson reiterated that the ‘aim must be first to make this illegal act impossible, and then create among the great mass of the Rhodesian people the conditions in which we can have an orderly government there.’ This process, however, he snapped at the Conservative MP John Biggs-Davison, did not include the ‘appeasement of those who have committed this illegal, unnecessary and irrational act …’ Finally he exonerated the South African and Portuguese Governments from any role in the Rhodesian rebellion. Later in the evening, Wilson spoke to the nation in a broadcast, recounting the events and declaring himself and his Government free from any blame.13

Because Grimond, in particular, still thought that the use of force should not be ruled out, Denis Healey, the Minister of Defence, invited him to a meeting at 4.35 p.m. at the Ministry of Defence. Frederick Mulley, the Deputy Secretary of State for Defence, Field Marshal Sir Richard Hull, the Chief of Defence Staff, and P.D. Nairne, Healey’s private secretary, also attended the meeting. Leaving aside the psychological problems ofBritish troops fighting Rhodesian troops, Healey explained not only the logistical difficulties of a British or UN intervention in Rhodesia, but also the danger of provoking Rhodesia into launching pre-emptive strikes against Zambia or sabotaging the Kariba hydroelectric station. He detailed the problems of implementing a naval blockade. Forgetting that Rhodesia was landlocked, and that Portuguese territory had to be overflown, Grimond suggested the use of an aircraft carrier to knock out the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. He asked if the Rhodesian forces would fight, and was anxious to prevent aircraft spares getting to the RRAF. Grimond remained unconvinced that sufficient British troops really could not be found to make a quick meal of the small Rhodesian forces even though Healey and Hull were adamant that military intervention was impossible. One who agreed with Grimond, with hindsight when writing his memoirs, was Leonard James Callaghan, Wilson’s Chancellor of the Exchequer.14

Apart from an expression of South Africa’s neutrality by her Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd at 6 p.m., the international reaction to the UDI was immediate and uniform rejection. The Netherlands, Sweden, Kenya, India, Canada and British Guiana refused recognition of the new Rhodesian regime. The Canadian Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, announced the withdrawal of Canada’s trade commissioner from Salisbury, the abolition of preferential tariffs, and an embargo on the sale ofarms. Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand, expressed distress at the failure of Wilson’s painstaking negotiations with Smith. He worried about the likely detrimental effect of the UDI on Africa and the Commonwealth. Milton Obote of Uganda praised Gibbs’s dismissal of the Rhodesian Cabinet. France recalled her Consul-General, Jean Desparmet, from Salisbury. The United States Government deplored the ‘illegal revolution’ but avowed continued support for the search for a just solution. Moscow Radio was expectedly off beam, claiming that Britain’s ‘policy of concessions and connivance with the Rhodesian racialists has in fact, pushed Smith to the decisive action.’ Thirty-six African states drafted a UN resolution condemning the UDI and calling on Britain to ‘take all the necessary steps to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Salisbury.’ The UN General Assembly adopted it by 107-2 (France and Portugal) votes. Britain abstained, and six other UN members were absent. For its part, the Organisation of African Unity set up a committee to deal with Rhodesia and called on the UN to use force to end the rebellion.15

The next element of the preordained process of punishment and reconciliation for the following 15 years, that of attempting to settle the independence issue by negotiation, was introduced as soon as the first full day of the post-UDI era, Friday, 12 November.

The day, however, began with sporadic stoning ofAfricans on their way to work in Bulawayo which somewhat spoiled the picture painted by the morning’s press of the peaceful reception of the UDI in Rhodesia. There was no mention of the dismissal of the Rhodesian Cabinet by Gibbs or the imposition ofsanctions because the local press, of course, had been censored. The Rhodesia Herald immediately set a trend of defiance by publishing blank spaces where the censor had excised articles or commentary.16

Although Rhodesia’s defiance had earned her the excited admiration of South Africa’s white electorate, the mouthpiece of the governing National Party, Die Burger of Cape Town, warned that the UDI had imperilled the whole of Southern Africa. In particular, it feared that the necessity to prop up Rhodesia would earn South Africa the wrath of the world. At the same time, the expected failure ofBritish punitive measures in the short term would only intensify the Afro-Asian and Communist demand for the use of force.

The Times of London commented wryly that Wilson’s Government found itself ‘in a situation unprecedented in Imperial or Commonwealth history, Britain now carries executive responsibility for Rhodesia without any power to govern the country.’ The British Government had in effect become ‘a Rhodesian Government in exile’, but, because it could do nothing decisive, all that could be hoped for was a change of heart in Rhodesia, perhaps induced by economic and inflationary difficulties. The Times noted that Heath did not want to split Britain over this issue, and that Wilson’s Government understood that many families in Britain were concerned about their Rhodesian relatives.

There was, of course, much to be done in Rhodesia that second day of the UDI era. Major-General Putterill was up early visiting his troops at Kariba and the Victoria Falls. At Kariba he found the white troopers of the Rhodesian Light Infantry perfectly cheerful. His visit was observed from Zambia by Major-General Willoughby, the Commander of British Forces in the Middle East, who had arrived to inspect the Zambian defences and to assess the military potential of the confrontation. As he had entertained

Putterill to lunch in Aden six weeks previously when Putterill was en route to the Chief of Defence Staff’s exercise in Britain, Willoughby sent him a message of goodwill. Later, however, after Putterill had departed for Wankie, the trans-border mood soured when Willoughby and a party of British and Zambian officers advanced to the centre line of the dam wall and the RLI heckled them from their sandbagged bunkers on the wall’s southern end. Great offence was taken at this insult to Willoughby’s dignity.

At Wankie Putterill was forced to placate the rain-soaked African soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles who were manning their freshly dug and rain-filled trenches and were somewhat apprehensive because of a rumour that they faced attack by a British brigade from Kenya.17 At the Victoria Falls Bridge Putterill discovered he was confronting his former Federal battalion, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment renamed the Zambian Rifles. After a friendly exchange, he withdrew his forward RAR unit, B Company to avoid any untoward incident, leaving Lieutenant Mick McKenna to cover the bridge with his 81mm mortars. Later in the day, Major-General Willoughby arrived and a reporter accompanying him started to cross the bridge only to be halted by a shout from McKenna, ordering him to ‘Double Away’. The reporter complied.18

Although Rhodesia had been declared a ‘threat to peace’, Ian Smith recalls how peaceful Salisbury was that Friday morning as his driver drove him to work.19 Waiting for him was the Chief Justice, Sir Hugh Beadle, just returned from Britain. Smith briefed him, explaining that the Rhodesian Government would only have accepted Wilson’s Royal Commission on their terms, and that the obstacle had been the British demand for unanimity from the Commission.

Looking ahead, Beadle announced that he would meet his fellow judges on the next day, Saturday, 13 November, to consider their position regarding the new 1965 Constitution. The difficulty they would have in accepting it, he warned, was its presumption that any office-holder who refused to swear its oath of allegiance would be ‘deemed’ to have vacated his position without compensation. Smith replied that this provision was designed simply to avoid a confrontation with the judiciary.20

Smith’s Cabinet was gathering for a meeting at Milton Building. An encounter in it with Lord Graham left Flower astounded because, despite warnings by Graham’s Ministry ofAgriculture and Flower’s CIO, Graham expressed surprise at the British ban on tobacco imports, then worth £37 million per annum. Flower was further bemused by Graham asking him if the Rhodesian Cabinet would expel Gibbs from Government House, and then avowing that they would only do so over ‘his dead body’. Despite their obvious confusion, Flower conceded that the Cabinet’s depiction of themselves being embroiled in a struggle with the British Government, and not the monarchy, struck a chord and was responsible for the flood of messages being received from all over the world. It made Smith, Flower wrote, ‘a world figure overnight and a hero to millions’.21

The issue of divided loyalties confronted the Cabinet immediately because their Director of Civil Aviation, Peter Athelwold Pennant-Rea (father of Rupert, the Deputy Governor of the Bank ofEngland) had refused to take orders from the Ministry of Transport and had been suspended.

His two immediate subordinates had reserved their position but, by way of consolation for the Government, the ground and airport staff had cast their lot with it. The Cabinet confirmed the dismissal of Pennant-Rea.

Moving on to the urgent question of what was to be done to resolve the public confusion over the position of Gibbs, Smith reported that, although Gibbs had told him that he opposed the UDI and, as the Queen’s representative, would say so publicly, he would not obstruct the Government. The Cabinet despatched Smith, Clifford Walter Dupont and Desmond William Lardner-Burke to suggest to Gibbs that, if he would not resign, he should ask the Queen to relieve him of his commission. Should Gibbs prove co-operative, the Cabinet was prepared to allow him to publish a statement provided it did not embarrass them.22

At Government House, a defiant Gibbs, flanked by the irrepressible Beadle, met Smith, Dupont and Lardner-Burke. Gibbs expressed his resentment at the inference that he was ‘a traitor for splitting the country,’ and bluntly refused to resign, except at the request of the Queen, or to recognise the Rhodesian Government and the new 1965 Constitution.

Gibbs was not entirely hostile because he remained anxious to foster an Anglo-Rhodesian settlement. Thus just 24 hours after the UDI, the process of re-negotiating began at this moment. He launched this by declaring that he was certain he could persuade Wilson to concede an acceptable constitution in exchange for a renunciation of the UDI. By acceptable, Gibbs meant a constitution that preserved the power to alter the size of their Legislative Assembly granted to the Rhodesians by Section 37, Chapter Three, of the 1923 and 1961 Constitutions. By doing so, Gibbs had put his finger on the root cause of the UDI because Wilson had spent the past 13 months trying to deny the Rhodesians that power for fear that Smith would use it to remove the 15 B roll seats intended for Africans. Gibbs added that he presumed the Rhodesians would still accept a dozen seats for tribal chiefs as a quid pro quo for the retention of the 15 B roll seats.

In taking this initiative, and perhaps to emphasise his perceived neutrality, Gibbs passed around a telegraphed order from Wilson not to have any further dealings with the Rhodesian Government, an order that Wilson had already confirmed in the Commons. Certain ofsuccess, Gibbs asked Smith and his colleagues to associate themselves with an approach by him to Wilson. Smith agreed on condition that the British be prepared to pass an act conferring independence on Rhodesian terms, and that they understood that Rhodesia was already independent, at least in the eyes ofher Government.23

When Smith agreed at least to meet Wilson, Beadle telephoned Downing Street only to be told that Wilson was at the Commons. As he could only speak to D.J. Mitchell, Wilsons Principal Private Secretary, Beadle did not mention Smith’s pre-conditions. He proposed that he and Smith fly to London immediately for settlement talks. The surprised Mitchell asked why Beadle chose London instead of neutral Malta (Wilson’s last minute choice for pre-UDI talks). Beadle replied because it would be quicker to get to London. Knowing Beadle’s penchant for devising solutions, Mitchell reported to Wilson that he wondered ifSmith were even involved or if this were just ‘pure Beadlery’. Even if Smith was involved, Mitchell felt ‘we could hardly avoid putting him in the Tower the moment he touched British soil. His next job is to resign.’ Suggesting that this proposal be kept secret until Wilson was ready ‘to let it out in some form,’ Mitchell suggested having Beadle flown to Nairobi where he could be both cross-examined and have the facts oflife explained by either Malcolm MacDonald or ‘an anonymous visitor from London.’ MacDonald, the distinguished son of Britain’s first Labour Party Prime Minister, was her new Special Representative in East Africa and a crucial influence on the Labour Party’s African policy. MacDonald’s sentimental and somewhat patronising approach to African politics would serve Rhodesia ill in the coming years. Equally damaging to Rhodesia’s cause was the person with whom Wilson was conferring, namely, Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary and Wilson’s principal adviser, who had only ever spent ten days in Rhodesia. As they talked, Beadle telephoned Mitchell again, this time to reveal Smith’s conditions for the withdrawal of the UDI.24

Gibbs and Beadle then wrote out their proposal and urged Wilson to settle despite his difficulties with dealing with rebels. They summoned and handed their message to Stanley Fingland, the new head of the British Residual Mission, who had secure communications with London. Fingland had been deputy to the recalled High Commissioner, J.B. Johnston. What struck Fingland on arrival at Government House was how ‘highly agitated’ Gibbs and Beadle were over their realisation that almost all the whites and a significant number of Africans had backed Smith’s UDI.

Examining the message, Fingland asked whether Smith, Dupont and Lardner-Burke were prepared to make any concessions, and Beadle replied that they were but had not been specific. He believed that they would accept the entrenchment of the B roll seats in exchange for a fade-out mechanism for these seats.25

While they were talking, Beadle had a booked telephone call at 5 p.m. with the British Attorney-General, Sir Elwyn Jones, to explain that the Rhodesians were prepared to concede most of the points of disagreement. Beadle reassured Jones that he and his fellow judges had not been asked to take an oath of allegiance to the new 1965 Constitution and in fact had been told that they would not be required to do so.

Instructed by Wilson, Mitchell returned Beadle’s calls at 6 p.m., saying stuffily that propositions could only be received from the Governor. Beadle retorted that the Governor was sitting beside him. When Mitchell assumed the approach had come from Ian Smith, Beadle corrected him, saying Gibbs had put the suggestion to Smith, Dupont and Lardner-Burke, and they had agreed to support it. Replying confusingly that only an approach from Smith would be considered, Mitchell demanded to speak to Gibbs. Beadle repeated, however, that he was speaking for Gibbs who found it difficult to hear long-distance telephone calls. Mitchell asked that Gibbs telegraph him through the British Residual Mission.26 Gibbs, of course, had done this but had sent a second message urging Wilson not to neglect this opportunity. Wilson agreed on condition that Gibbs served as the conduit for any talks. To Gibbs’s biographer, this was ‘a clever move for it gave a good reason for Smith to leave Gibbs in place.’27

Smith, nevertheless, assured his public that evening that ‘any powers which Mr Wilson attributes to Sir Humphrey are fictitious.’ He added that, although Gibbs had been given notice to quit because he no longer had any constitutional role, he would not be hurried out of Government House. Smith recalls in his memoirs that Gibbs was allowed to stay because his real authority was minimal. Consequently, later in the night an umbrella-carrying, dinner-suited aide to Gibbs (black tie and evening dresses were de rigueur at Government House) braved the heavy rain to announce to the press that ‘a Government spokesman says the Governor has not been asked to leave. He is still the Governor ofRhodesia.’ The spokesman also confirmed that Beadle had taken up residence at Government House. The press concluded that Gibbs regarded himself as the Government of Rhodesia and would not recognise any message from Smith.28

This secret attempt to re-open the negotiations aside, the Rhodesians concentrated on ameliorating the effect of sanctions through import control and the allocation of currency quotas to provide for needs up to the end ofMarch 1966 for wheat, maize, bran, animal foodstuffs, jute bags, hessian, medicinal and veterinary supplies, explosives, crude oil, petroleum, fertilisers, and electricity.29

The only Rhodesian bothering to see off J.B. Johnston at Salisbury Airport was Ken Flower. Johnston astonished him by foreseeing that the UDI debacle would endure for only three months.30 Johnston, however, had a proven record ofmistaken predictions. In 1964 he had expected Smith to last in power for three months only and had thereby influenced Whitehall and its underestimation of Smith which had played a key role in the UDI saga. Johnston’s attitude prompted Sir Burke Trend to ask Roland Walter ‘Tiny’ Rowland, the controversial Rhodesian businessman and major investor in the Umtali-Beira oil pipeline, ‘Why don’t you leave this little man Smith to us? He’ll be gone in two or three months.’ Trend was replying to an offer from Rowland to form an alternative Rhodesian cabinet. He proposed to inspan Sir Roy Welensky (then a consultant to Rowland’s Lonrho), Evan Campbell, the former Rhodesian High Commissioner in London, Allan David Butler, the former Leader of the Opposition, Major-General Jock Anderson, the former Rhodesian Army Chief of Staff (who was managing Rowland’s match factory in Zambia), Sir Robert Tredgold, the former Federal Chief Justice, and Sir Hugh Beadle. Trend knew, however, that it could only be imposed by force, which Wilson would not risk and Gibbs would not condone 31

Flower, for one, regretted the closure of the British High Commission because it robbed him of direct liaison with British intelligence through the departing resident MI6 representative, John Bowman. Fingland was of little use because he, like Johnston, only mixed with Smith’s opposition. The simultaneous withdrawal of the French Consul-General, Jean Desparmet, left Flower with only Irl Smith of the American Central Intelligence Agency until 1970 when almost all the remaining consuls were withdrawn. To compensate, Flower developed clandestine links with the British MI6 but in doing so, generated such suspicions that, as early as 1966, John Wrathall ordered his Treasury to deny Flower’s CIO sensitive financial information. Flower’s often-indiscreet activities would only feed those suspicions. He defended this as normal behaviour in his field and Ian Smith accepted it as such. Flower, of course, always had his own agenda, as he did in these first days after UDI.32

To exonerate itself, the British Government published a White Paper that day, Friday, 12 November. It tabled the enabling bill in the Commons where it passed without a vote so that, once the Lords had sanctioned it on Monday, 15 November, orders in council could be issued to remove Rhodesia from the Sterling Area, to cut her exports and the like. The bill confirmed Wilson’s assertion that only a British parliamentary act could alter Rhodesia’s status. Accordingly, anything enacted in Salisbury was deemed void in terms of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and ‘Southern Rhodesia’ remained part of Her Majesty’s dominions under the authority of the British Parliament. This pertained until early 1980 when the British Parliament granted Zimbabwe independence. The general powers were embodied in four classes of orders in council. The first invalidated anything enacted by the Legislative Assembly after the UDI. It empowered Arthur Bottomley to suspend the Assembly, assume executive authority and thereby govern Rhodesia. This was done despite the lack of means to implement it beyond whatever persuasive powers the lonely and none-too-robust Sir Humphrey Gibbs possessed. The second class of orders dealt with citizenship to allow ‘loyal’ Rhodesians to obtain British passports and to prevent the return of fugitives. The third authorised the economic sanctions. The fourth permitted the confiscation of any passports issued by Rhodesia’s illegal regime.33

In the debate, Wilson bought the Conservatives’ co-operation at the price of being taxed on a number of issues. They demanded a clear statement on the British rejection of the use of force by the UN or any international body. In addition, they insisted that only Gibbs could call for military assistance to restore law and order. Wilson was questioned closely on the orders given to Rhodesian public servants, including the judges, lest they seem contradictory. He replied that public servants had simply to refuse illegal orders which would offend against anyone’s conscience ‘such as to go out and shoot all the people in a detention camp.’ (He was forgetting, of course, such an order would be illegal under any circumstances). Wilson was pressed on his denial that the measures being taken were punitive, particularly if they produced chaos in Rhodesia by engendering further acts of rebellion. Heath commented that, although Wilson might call Smith and his colleagues ‘small frightened men’, they had just demonstrated ‘they are somewhat determined men’. Alluding to South Africa and apartheid, Heath felt the danger was that, if the consequences of all actions were not weighed carefully, the result could be even ‘more determined men sliding further away from this country and the Commonwealth and further towards a form ofsociety which is abhorrent.’ Jo Grimond again demanded ‘short, sharp and effective’ military action in preference to allowing people to suffer because of ineffective sanctions. He also wanted an oil embargo.

Wilson had to endure being blamed by the backbenchers as equally responsible for the UDI. Reginald Paget of Labour commented that ultimately, whatever Wilson said about treasonable acts, he would have to deal with Smith. Provoked, Wilson hazarded a lengthy, often vivid, defence ofhis conduct ofthe Anglo-Rhodesian settlement negotiations, vowing that, despite the hatred both he and Smith had earned from the Rhodesian right wing, he had been prepared to meet any Rhodesian, including ‘Boss’ Lilford, the vice-president and co-founder with Smith of the Rhodesian Front.34

Wilson assured the Commons that, although the UN had to be involved because the UDI was already an international issue, Britain would keep control of the process. At stake was the survival of the Commonwealth. He swore again that his intention was not to inflict pain but simply to restore the rule of law and democracy by bringing down the rebel regime. He would accomplish this by persuading the Rhodesians to reject the rebels in favour of the Governor as the only lawful government. It was not a question of compromising with the rebel regime because the

British Government could neither recognise nor deal with it because it was illegal and engaged in creating an abhorrent police state.

Asked why tobacco had been targeted, Wilson explained that, unlike their commercial and industrial colleagues, the tobacco farmers had a malign influence over events while tobacco was the core of the Rhodesian economy. Pressed on the need to control the international reaction, he warned that the Commons might ‘dismiss the claims of the OAU as impractical or nonsense. They may dismiss the use of parachutists. But one thing they cannot dismiss is the danger of major Powers getting a foothold on the continent of Africa.’ The danger lay in the Red Army in UN blue berets taking charge. Seeking to shore up the British political consensus on Rhodesia, he quoted Churchill’s statement on Abyssinia in the early 1930s that ‘We cannot undo the past, but we are bound to pass it in review in order to draw from it such lessons as may be applicable to the future, and surely the conclusion from this story is that we should not intervene in these matters unless we are in earnest and prepared to carry our intervention to all necessary lengths.’35

In New York, the resolution of the UN General Assembly of the previous day, 11 November, sponsored by Britain and 56 Afro-Asian states, was tabled in the UN Security Council and presented by the Jordanian delegate, Mohammed H. el-Farra. Described ‘preliminary’ to further UN action against Rhodesia, it condemned the UDI as ‘illegal’ and called upon all states not to recognise or succour the Rhodesian Government. The debate allowed Michael Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, to explain that the use of force, unlike economic measures, ‘would not only bring misery to millions but would hinder a right and strong solution of the problem.’ He reminded the Council that, as the sovereign power, the resolution of this issue was Britain’s responsibility alone. Any granting of independence, he averred, would require the endorsement of the entire Rhodesian population. He was rewarded with a strong endorsement from Arthur J. Goldberg, the US Ambassador, who outlined the American action being taken including the withdrawal of diplomatic representation and arms and investment embargoes. The American sugar quota was also denied to Rhodesia but this was only a small gesture as it represented 6,000 tons worth less than $1 million.36

Predictably, the Soviet delegate, Nikolai T. Fedorenko, denounced Britain for abetting ‘the action of the racists’, and the African delegates, Ghana’s Foreign Minister, Alex Quaison-Sackey, and the Senegalese Ambassador to the UN, Ousmane Soce Diop, demanded that Britain use force. Quaison-Sackey commented how the British were always ready to ‘shoot down people when their skin is black or brown but not when they are white.’ He wanted Rhodesia declared a threat to peace so that, under a UN Chapter VII resolution, the UN could take direct action to end the rebellion. The Jordanian resolution was adopted by ten votes to nil, with France abstaining because Rhodesia was solely a British concern.

Before the Council adjourned, Stewart tabled a resolution, calling on member countries not to assist the Rhodesian Government, particularly in the realm of arms and war materiel, and to support Britain’s financial and economic measures. A counter resolution from Arsene Usher, the Ivorian delegate, with support from all African states, demanded the immediate crushing of the Rhodesian rebellion and the immediate granting of majority rule. It proposed a total embargo, including oil supplies, and the invoking ofArticles 42 and 43 of Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter, which allowed military action to maintain or restore peace.37

The United States Government immediately stopped the sale of 36 heavy diesel locomotives to Rhodesia worth £3,570,000. The French would ban Rhodesian tobacco. The Federal Republic of Germany did likewise and indicated that its policy towards Rhodesia would ‘be governed by decisions of the United Nations, by West Germany’s friendly relations with Britain, and by respect for the principle of self-determination whether for Africans, for Germans, or for populations anywhere.’ The Norwegian, Swedish and Danish Governments banned all imports from Rhodesia. Israel refused to recognise the ‘illegal regime’ in Rhodesia and promised to break all ties with it. The Turkish Government indicated support for the British action in Rhodesia.38

Yet, however impressive all this seemed, the sanctions were not total and their piecemeal application gave the Rhodesians time to devise ways oflessening the impact, aided by many nations, including the French, who turned the blind eye. An example of Rhodesian ingenuity was the issuing of traveller’s cheques by the Reserve Bank in Salisbury. As international convention demanded that these cheques be honoured, the Rhodesians were able to deplete their blocked reserves in London and funnel them elsewhere.39 Although Wilson thought the action in UN Security Council had been effective, it did not save Britain from African-sponsored condemnation, even if some of the loudest voices were from those who would trade with Rhodesia in the coming months and years. Algeria’s head of state, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, was one. He rejected the UDI as an ‘insult to Africa’ and proclaimed that Africa would never accept Smith’s ‘racist Government’. President Sekou Touré of Guinea declared that ‘all African states consider themselves in a state of war with Rhodesia.’ Belying his reputation as a moderate, the Nigerian Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, agreed that there was ‘no more effective remedy to rebellion than to crush it with force.’ The Gambia demanded Wilson arrest Smith and his accomplices to prevent ‘the inhuman crime of racial oppression’. The protest turned violent in places. A small crowd carrying placards, proclaiming ‘Smith-dead or alive’ and ‘Down with Banda’, stoned the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, breaking windows and causing much damage. In Moscow, university students threatened the British Embassy, but, when faced with the militia, only four African students handed in a petition. President Nkrumah placed Ghanaian troops at the disposal of the OAU, the UN, or Britain. He blamed Britain’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution in September 1965 for the UDI and argued that the permanent members of the UN had sufficient forces to defeat Rhodesia. He suggested Britain call up all British subjects serving in the Rhodesian security forces and that the Security Council should order South Africa to recall her citizens. This idea impressed Wilson enough to raise it with his Ministry ofDefence and Cabinet Office, only to be told it required a national emergency for British ex-servicemen to be recalled to the colours.40

Wilson had the consolation of President Nyerere ofTanzania not only remaining faithful but also improving the port facilities at Dar es Salaam and the road to Zambia. Nonetheless, Nyerere remained unconvinced about the efficacy of sanctions so long as South Africa provided a loophole. He also did not believe the British claim that Rhodesia could not survive without exports or that what was being done would induce the Rhodesians to rally to support Gibbs. Particularly he rejected the British argument that the threat of the use of force would hamstring the Rhodesian moderates. Indeed, he informed the Americans that he believed force would have to be applied, perhaps by the UN.41

Nyerere would shortly become Wilson’s most vehement African critic but, for the moment, it was Kaunda who was proving the most difficult with his persistent demands for the British seizure of Kariba and aid for Zambia’s endangered economy. He complained repetitively about how Zambia had suffered during Federation and how she had been stripped of armed forces at its break-up. Concluding that Kaunda was really seeking support for uneconomic projects such as generating power at Livingstone and exploiting the poor quality coalfield at Nkandabwe, the