Discourse on Ethics

By Paul O’Hara

Paul OHara, the second
of five children, was born
and educated in Perth,
Western Australia.
During his formative years
his enquiring mind has
caused him to focus on
the deeper questions of
life. His interests include
poetry, chess, astronomy
and genealogy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris AU
• Release date: Sep 19, 2012
• ISBN: 9781477153185

Paul O’Hara

Paul O’Hara, the second of five children, was born and educated in Perth, Western Australia. During his formative years his enquiring mind has caused him to focus on the deeper questions of life. His interests include poetry, chess, astronomy and genealogy.

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Copyright © 2012 by Paul O’Hara.

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Contents

Introduction

1. Pleasure and Pain

2. The Passions

3. Good and Evil

4. Virtue and Vice

5. Happiness

6. Reward and Punishment

7. Reason and Objectivity

8. Duty and Self-Interest

9. Past, Present, Future

10. Man the Social Being

11. Motives and Consequences

12. Benevolence and Malevolence: Self and Others

13. Disinterestedness: The Ultimate End

Introduction

What constitutes the good life, what is the source of true happiness, how do we achieve a sense of self-fulfilment? These are questions that hark back to the ancients and invite a variety of responses. For one school, the Epicurean, the answer pertains to the material conditions for a good life. Since everything in the physical world is composed of particles in a constant jostling, living things have an inner soul that informs the body by producing sensations, and fundamentally the two kinds we call pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain therefore are the only source of what is good and bad, since any sentient being is automatically attracted to the one and repelled by the other. Any desire that frees the body from pain and anxiety must be deemed a good, and that includes the basic necessities of life such as food and shelter, in addition to more cultivated delights such as friendship, sex, and love. For another school, the Stoic, there are two fundamental principles that govern the universe, one that is active and one that is inert. The first of these is a Supreme Being both immanent and omnipresent. The second of these is unqualified matter that can be beaten and hammered into shape. In the realm of animate things imbued with reason, living wisely and living well simply means ‘living in accordance with nature’. In order to better appreciate this we need to distinguish between an unconditional end such as virtue or honour, and any proximate means that might conduce to such an end. Health and wealth for instance are useful in the pursuit of virtue, but that is only because the former may make us more temperate and the latter may make us more benevolent. The cultivation of virtue alone is thus all that is required if we wish to be happy.

Ethics belongs to a branch of knowledge that could be called prescriptive rather than descriptive. So far as it concerns the latter we are quite familiar with the physical sciences, that is, the question ‘from whence does something originate or in what does it consist’. So far as it concerns the former the question becomes ‘how do we appraise something according to a certain set of standards, norms or rules?’ Aesthetics deals with the objects, in this case perceptual or audible, that we call beautiful or ugly, logic deals with the objects, in this case propositions or statements, that we call true or false, and ethics deals with the objects, in this case the actions or motives of men, that we call good or bad. What distinguishes the normative from the descriptive also concerns the validity or propriety with which we judge that such and such is the case and not merely state that such and such is the case. An anthropologist is someone who records the different morés and customs that exist in different societies, but it is not the job of an anthropologist to say which are good and which are bad, or which are better and which are worse: likewise for a botanist who classifies the various plants, or a psychologist who classifies the various mental states.

In more contemporary terms let us proceed to a brief overview of those basic concepts we have just touched on, the concepts of happiness and virtue, together with duty. To begin with, happiness does not consist in indifference to the things of this world nor in a state of self-containment. Happiness may have a spiritual source in one respect but it also has a material source in another. To the degree that it has a spiritual source what we mean is that it consists in self-realization, but that comes not through indifference but a sense of commitment to those tasks we undertake. To the degree that it has a material source what we mean is that it consists in health, wealth, and all the other positive things that may befall us either by nature or custom. There is also the question how we view the distribution of happiness – is it fitting that the virtuous should be happy but not the vicious, that the wise should be happy but not the ignorant? To this our answer is that happiness reflects the value that each and every person has, that there is no distinction between a person’s right to happiness and to prosper through his talents or his gifts. This is reflected in our public institutions, in our system of justice, in our catalogue of rights.

So far as concerns the relation between adversity and prosperity, how we view the former is not necessarily how we view the latter: that is, although we would not say that adversity, together with such ills as poverty and sickness, constitutes a deterrent to virtue, neither would not say of its opposite that such was an inducement to vice. Prosperity in itself is not something we connect with either virtue or vice, and that is because there is a difference if it befalls a person quite casually or as the result of his own resourcefulness and hard work. Adversity it should be clear is not something an agent would wish upon himself, but it may nonetheless be something that befalls him; prosperity on the other hand is something that an agent may both wish upon himself and may actively pursue. Thus a person who benefits from his own efforts is neither virtuous nor vicious (but, if either, the former), and we would not say that prosperity of itself is likely to make him aloof, indifferent or uncaring.

By virtue what we mean is a person’s moral character which springs from his rational rather than affective nature; but by that we do not mean that it consists solely in his rational nature; otherwise we would be confounding virtue with duty. Rather it is a quality or characteristic that centres on the fact of being human. The next thing to recognize is that virtue is a disposition and not a habit. Certainly a person may be able to cultivate good habits; and although this is compatible with virtue it is not the same as being virtuous. This also has relevance for the way we regard the will. ‘The will’, it should be clear is not the same as desire, since the will implies a ‘not-willing’ whereas desire does not imply a ‘not-desiring’. To say that desire does not imply a not desiring does not mean that it does not imply aversion, but aversion springs from our appetitive nature; in no way should it be construed as any kind of rational or deliberative act. Of virtue itself, we might enumerate the principal forms as courage, magnanimity, prudence and self-control, together with their opposites cowardice, mean-mindedness, folly, and intemperance.

In a specifically social context, another question that is frequently raised is what we mean by the dividing points for virtue and vice, or at least, what virtue and vice mean in respect to the social affections. A popular candidate would be the affections of pity and envy, but for the sake of consistency benevolence and malevolence would seem more suited to this role. If, for instance, we compare pity and envy with felicitation and fault-finding, then how we array or compare these will depend entirely on our point of view: that is, so far as there are any grounds for a comparison of means and ends, this will proceed from a purely quantitative assessment of good and evil. It thus hinges on whether we regard the situation in terms of the stability or instability of an object or an immediate or indirect engagement with an object. If the former, then it is envy and felicitation which will be coupled in one way, and fault-finding and pity in another; if the latter, then it is envy and pity which will be coupled in one way, and felicitation and fault-finding in another. On the other hand, in the case of benevolence and malevolence, then how this proceeds can be seen in a much clearer light. Firstly, we need to distinguish between what is ‘interested’ or ‘disinterested’ as an end. In the case of the former, it may sometimes be the case that an end is revealed, and at other times concealed, in its means. No doubt a person may fool another by convincing him that he is doing him good when really he is doing him harm, as in the case of a fraudulent act. Likewise, a person may be fooled into thinking he is being harmed when really he is being helped, as in the case of a strenuous dental procedure. On the other hand, pure malevolent intent and pure benevolent intent are entirely ‘disinterested’; they proceed from a good or a bad will prior to any action the agent may undertake. Surely there could be no clearer expression of what we mean for a person to be virtuous or vicious in respect to his dealings with his fellows.

Of these two goods the question might be asked: which is the more important, that we pursue happiness or that we pursue virtue? One of the advantages in adopting the view that happiness (together with pleasure) is the summum bonum is that it is at least entirely self-consistent; that is, we need not consider what is altruistic or egoistic only what is universal, we need not consider what is species-specific only what is species-indifferent. On the other hand, what it also does is dispense with the idea that as rational beings we are able to regulate our behaviour according to rigorous rules, rather, it allows us to be driven by desires that may be purely adventitious. The question it then poses is how our moral outlook should be shaped. Should it be shaped according to the needs and expectations of our own species, or should it be shaped according to the needs and expectations of all sentient beings? Rationality, it could be argued, is a double-edged sword: it may lead to acts of great depravity or it may lead to acts of great nobility. To suggest therefore that we might wish to elevate ourselves through its constant application is not altogether to the point; rather, this is what makes us distinctive without being superior withal.

Let us now consider the propositions (a) that happiness is a means to virtue or (b) that virtue is a means to happiness. In respect to the first, we might consider this in conjunction with the difference between a ‘permitted’ and a ‘dutiful’ end: that is, it could be argued that the happiness of others is a ‘permitted’ end, just as one’s own perfection is a necessary or dutiful end. Since pain and adversity are temptations to the transgression of duty, then health and well-being may also be regarded as ‘permitted’ means. Happiness as altruistic is thus a ‘permitted’ end, and happiness as egoistic is thus a ‘permitted’ means (Kant). The problem with this is that firstly, we do not accept the distinction between egoistic and altruistic happiness, and secondly, we do not accept that adversity is a temptation for the good man: rather, it enables him to display those qualities that essentially make him what he is.

In respect to the second proposition, that virtue is a means to happiness, it could be argued that happiness consists in a number of distinct elements; and as one of these elements, virtue must be described as what is desirable in itself. But we do not mean desirable so long as it remains aloof and remote, we mean desirable so far as it acquires a value in connection with other more everyday things. Whilst initially remaining indifferent to the aims and objectives of men, by association it comes to be loved in and for itself, as an instrument for the attainment of happiness and the removal of pain (Mill). The problem with this that it assumes that virtue is conceived as emanating from without and not from within: that is, like money or fame, as something we associate with a more covetous end (i.e. goods and influence). But this is to confound the affective part of our being with its moral underpinning. It suggests that the requirement for instilling virtue may be nothing more complex than undergoing some kind of habituation or Pavlovian conditioning.

When, as we have already suggested, desire and the will are really not the same, this has implications for the idea of a system that is supportive of itself, as in the case of the will, and both supportive and destructive of itself, as in the case of desire. If our moral world is an expanding one, then the assumption must be either that an increase in good will lead to a decrease in evil, or that an increase in evil will lead to a decrease in good. On the other hand, if our moral world is not an expanding one, then any increase or decrease in the one will lead to a similar increase or decrease in the other. So far, then, as good and evil are bound qualitatively and not quantitatively, what follows is that they are either mutually self-supportive or mutually self-destructive. And that is why when we say that desire is a plenum, what we mean is that all the elements must be combined to eschew any distinction between the turbulent and the calm, between the positive and the negative. This might also be approached from the viewpoint of what we have called ‘the metaphysic of desire’. In this case attraction and repulsion do not represent two possible reactions to one and the same object, but rather a difference between the essence and the accident. ‘To be attracted’ may imply ‘to become attractive’, but ‘to be repelled’ does not imply ‘to become repulsive’: rather, only to have the prospect for change in its quintessential being.

In respect to the relation between virtue and duty, then of the former we would say that it is strictly dispositional, and of the latter we would say that it is either dispositional or habitual. A Kantian might argue that the duty of virtue is itself based on free self-constraint, but we cannot accept a distinction between internal self-constraint where reverence is concerned, and external threats where conformance is concerned. That is, for all practical purposes we can only really only know what is meant by a system of law or a system of justice, and these may vary widely, depending upon a set of social or political mores. The argument that we can make the humanity of all men our sole and indispensable end is thus not a credible one, since what a Muslim thinks about meat may not be what a Christian does, and what a Fascist thinks about the opposition may not be what a Democrat does. Not only that, but even if we grant that a person may obey the law for its own sake, or at least that there may be some merit in obedience for its own sake, that is not to say there may not be some merit on any other terms but these. If the prospect of a lengthy prison term deters a person from robbing his neighbour, we do not quibble over whether the good citizen is compliant because he fears the law or compliant because he reveres the law, as long as the outcome is the same. So far as it concerns our basic conception of duty therefore, we would probably prefer something a little more authentic, or at least something that springs from the ad hoc challenges that confront us in life rather than a settled state of mind where every such activity is concerned.

Pleasure and Pain

14. Pleasure not to be equated with the ultimate good.

The advocates of pleasure and the pursuit thereof, as constituting the supreme good, frequently base their arguments on the inherent naturalness of avoiding pain, and may even go so far as to define their species of pain as the absence of pleasure; thus their pleasure is of a greatly attenuated and, as they would have us believe, ameliorated kind. This however does not absolve them from their attempt to equate the good with something at a recognizable distance beneath it; since recognizing what is worthy can never amount to seeking a state of ease, repose or luxury, and the pursuit of pleasure can never replace that strict formation of virtue which is the true badge of distinction for the ‘good man’. A doctrine of ethics that concentrates solely on affects has only to do with a small part of the human condition, and by no means the most important part at that.

15. Pleasure and Pain are intertwined.

That pleasure is the ultimate good is a facile formulation in the field of ethics, and that pain in some absolute sense is something to be shunned, and something that quite simply ought to be, is a natural corollary of this. Pleasure and pain are not isolated they are intertwined, and it is the most difficult thing in the world to have the one without the other, although it may be the easiest thing to desire the one without the other. That pleasure may often accompany the attainment of good there can be no doubt, but not that it is this good, or a necessary condition for its attainment.

16. Pleasure not ultimate but only ancillary in its kind.

The objects we pursue and acquire are not the means to pleasure in any absolute sense but merely the occasions for it; things which may give pleasure, but are not the very source of pleasure in itself. This point is worth making, since the impression is frequently given that pleasure itself is some ulterior object above and beyond the attainment of any more immediate end. A person who accumulates wealth for instance, does not do so in the hope of acquiring the greatest sum of pleasure, rather, in the mistaken belief that this is the only way it can be achieved. The contribution that other things may make to a person’s well-being then gives way to an obsessive pursuit which produces discontent and disaffection. Similarly where ambition is concerned, it might be thought that enjoyment of a present pleasure will be ceded for the sake of something better in the future; but again this rests on the belief that pleasure is itself the end we are seeking, that a person is fully justified in sacrificing any present favours for the sake of a more lasting gain.

17. Self-interest neither knowing nor ignorant about an end.

That the only sense in which a person who pursues pleasure can be said to be acting wrongly is if he misjudges the outcome of the act is a specious argument, and one deserving of censure. In these terms the whole of virtue could be summed up in the imperative ‘Don’t be intemperate and don’t be imprudent’. Certainly where sensual delights are concerned no one is above acting irrationally in pursuit of even the most fleeting of them, irrespective of their likely effects or how distracting they might prove to be. But there is a difference if we say that virtue resides in a proper estimate of our acts or that virtue resides in the degree of earnestness that we display. To raise pleasure to the standard of an absolute good and the ability to distinguish between the ‘real’ and the ‘ apparent’ to the level of the finest arts, is tantamount to ignoring all the real good that is done, and reducing the truly good man to a state of impotence and inertia.

18. Pursuit of pleasure unrelated to genuine use of the will.

It is misleading to represent the relationship between pleasure and pain as such that a person can simply will an increase in the one and a decrease in the other; just as one might a bath full of water by adjusting the hot and cold taps. What it is within a person’s power to do is very different from what it means to persevere, and however much he may choose to abstain from pain this will not lessen its weight or reality for him. In our haste to create a better world we frequently forget the irremediable nature of pain, that it cannot be abolished through the simple exercise of our wills but may linger on, converting a reasonably tolerable existence into a cheerless and unwelcome one.

19. Pleasure and pain have different roles where it concerns an assignment of ends.

Is it true that certain actions have a tendency to give pleasure to either the agent or others, and others pain? Can pleasure and pain be rightfully claimed as the ultimate ends of moral action? In seeking to address these questions the first thing we would like to know is if the object to be sought is the actual or intended one. While it is easy to appreciate how a person who performs an act may do so for the sake of its pleasurable outcome, where the opposite is concerned it is not nearly so clear. In what sense can an act be said to tend to the agent’s misery if it is knowingly done and its outcome a reasonably calculable one? Is it seriously to be maintained that pain can or ever ought to be sought for its own sake? Only a madman would think so! On the other hand to say that pain can never be the ultimate object does not mean it may not also be the actual object. So far as we are necessitated to pursue pleasure and avoid pain this only indicates how we should behave in the main: it does not mean that a dentist should refrain from fixing a broken tooth.

20. Moral rectitude implies steadfastness in the face of pain and moderation in the face of pleasure.

The thesis that whatever causes pain is bad and thus to be avoided, and that whatever causes pleasure is good and thus to be pursued, whilst reasonable enough on the surface of things cannot be said to address all the issues at stake. It must surely be conceded that a person’s moral constitution does to some degree hinge on his approach to pain, if not as something to be actively sought then at least as something to be earnestly borne. Likewise where pleasure is concerned, it must be conceded that its pursuit may sometimes be excessive and even issue in the opposite. Hence, what we have here is not any absolute basis for distinguishing between good and evil, but merely the quite limited effect of different stimuli on the human body.

21. Limits of pleasure and pain.

Where pleasure and pain are concerned it is necessary to distinguish between their physical limits on the one hand, and the separation of their essences on the other; that is, for something to be experienced with the same intensity is not the same as what it means to occupy the same amount of space. If our starting point is that an increase in the one will produce a decrease in the other, then what seems to follow is that the greatest amount of the one corresponds to the least amount of the other; so if by pain we designate that which is least and by pleasure that which is most, then it is the vacuum left by the former which the latter must eventually fill. On the other hand if it is our conviction that it is impossible to create space then neither can any part of it be filled, although it may be possible to create the impression that equal parts of it are filled. Thus, if pleasure and pain do not express a real magnitude neither can this be approached from the viewpoint of any graduated or calibrated scale.

22. Verisimilitude of pleasure and pain.

It is a mistake to believe that pain represents something real and pleasure something illusory, or that in pursuing the one we invariably have the other as its end; for it must be admitted that in terms of the actual rhythm of life pleasure is almost always something to be pursued and pain to be avoided, and thus that the former is at least more timely than the latter. In any event experience teaches us that the two are intertwined; not that the one supersedes the other in any absolute sense but that it is simply expecting too much to have the one without the other. In terms of any general advice it makes no more sense to say that we should focus solely on the avoidance of pain than that we should focus only on the pursuit of pleasure; rather that at times it may be necessary to mix a modicum of pleasure with a modicum of pain.

23. Mediation more important than quantification.

It is not a proposition with which we would tend to agree that the attainment of pleasure is only possible through the removal of pain. That is, it is our understanding that the one may be accomplished not in opposition but through a certain of mediation with the other. The object of pleasure may also be the agent of pleasure, that is, not only attract but make attractive as well. The object of pain on the other hand does not mean something that repels in the sense of making unattractive, it means being repulsive and hence not amenable to any kind of change. It also raises the possibility that two previously unattached objects may become attracted rather than remain neutral or be repelled: that is, that while mutual attraction and repulsion may indicate something different at the level of pleasure, it is clear this will not hold good at the level of pain. At the level of pain mutual repulsion will give way to mutual attraction, if we bear in mind that something which is porous can absorb something which is not,

24. Pleasure and pain ultimately fixed in their outward expression.

It has sometimes been maintained and in a somewhat disconsolate vein, that our goal in life should not be the attainment of happiness but rather the deliverance from pain, and that since pleasure is not real our overriding concern should be to remove the one rather than seek an attenuated form of the other. This raises a variety of questions. In the first place, does the positive nature of pain really make its removal any the less a burden on our soul? And secondly, if we are to realize our aim of removing pain, then in the absence of pleasure what remains of the affective part of our being? In other words which does one prefer: neither pleasure nor pain or both pleasure and pain? One wonders if it is possible to derive any wisdom from the fact that people do, as the matter stands, resist and abhor the presence of pain.