To the Bitter End: The Final Battles of Army Groups A, North Ukraine, Centre-Eastern Front, 1944-45

By Rolf Hinze

This is a penetrating and detailed account of the climactic battles of the German forces in Slovakia, the Carpathians, parts of Poland, Silesia and Saxony, from autumn 1944 until the end of the war.

The author provides excellent detail on the movements and actions of numerous German units, and the text covers all major actions including the battle for the Vistula bridgeheads, the epic siege of Breslau, and the final desperate actions around Bautzen and Dresden. Appendices include comprehensive orders-of-battle.

A large number of detailed battle maps are also included. Key sales points: Continues Helion's translation of key German texts on the last phase of the war on the Eastern Front. Presents information previously unavailable in English.

A detailed text is accompanied by photos and maps along with extensive orders-of-battle.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Jan 19, 2006
• ISBN: 9781907677281

Rolf Hinze

Rolf Hinze specializes in World War II history.

Book preview

Dedicated to all the members of the Army and the Volkssturm who gave their lives defending the German homeland from the enemy’s grasp.

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Published by Helion & Company 2005

eBook edition 2011

Designed and typeset by Helion & Company Limited, Solihull, West Midlands Cover designed by Bookcraft Limited, Stroud, Gloucestershire Printed by Cromwell Press Ltd, Trowbridge, Wiltshire

This English edition © Helion & Company Limited 2005. Translated with editing and minor revisions and additions by Frederick P. Steinhardt, MS, PhD.

Originally published as: Letztes Aufgebot zur Verteidigung des Reichsgebiets. Kämpfe der Heeresgruppe Nordukraine/A/Mitte. German edition © Verlag Dr Rolf Hinze 1995. All rights reserved.

Checking by: Fritz Brandenburg, Dr Hella Hinze, Gerd Zimmermann.

Maps by Hans-Jürgen Thies

Photographs © History in the Making Archive

Hardcover ISBN 9781874622369

Digital ISBN 9781907677281

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion & Company Limited.

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Contents

List of Maps

Publisher’s Note

Foreword

Part A: 1944

Sources

Bibliography

Orders of Battle

Afterthoughts

List of Maps

Publisher’s Note

The English edition of this book would not have been possible to produce without the help of a number of people.

First and foremost, the publishers would respectfully like to dedicate this book to its translator, Mr Frederick Steinhardt. Fred went well beyond the call of duty in terms of the input and the effort he put into his translation work. He was always available to answer any questions we had. Unfortunately, very shortly before this book went to print, Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans where Fred lived. Fred was safe. However, in the subsequent upheaval he was unable to carry out a final check of the text. Readers should therefore note that any mistakes or errors are the responsibility of Helion, and not the translator.

I would also like to thank Ian Baxter, at History in the Making, who responded at very short notice to our request for photographs. I think readers will agree that the selection he came up with adds a great deal to this book.

Finally, I would like to thank our copy editors, Richard and Gwyneth Fairbank, for their contribution.

Duncan Rogers

Helion & Company Ltd

Foreword

History consists of what has happened. One must not forget that the present is built upon the events of the past. It is acknowledged that unreserved recognition is not always given to negative events, since too many factors affect humanity. Only thus can an explanation be found for the fact that negative phenomena in the history of a people, or a state, are occasionally repeated. Nevertheless, such phenomena permit certain conclusions that are only possible if one has knowledge of the events. Thus, it is necessary to record what happened, so that a conclusion can later be drawn from past events.

The manner of presentation must permit the formation of logical conclusions. It seems obvious that events should be presented as they happened, and as they were perceived at the time. Indeed, one must see what knowledge those participants might have had, at the time, that served as a basis for their action, or their inaction.

As the decades have passed, people have constantly gained new knowledge and new viewpoints. Therefore it is clearly extremely difficult to present events objectively, without tinting them through a personally motivated world view, or by becoming judgmental. Those difficulties apply especially to World War II, since the victorious powers released a counter-wave of propaganda, specifically through their re-education programme in their efforts to erase the Nazis’ propaganda. In turn, that was based on the necessarily subjective propaganda put out during the war. The various hostile sides in a war almost inevitably develop their own propaganda.

Re-educationtook place in all areas of educationin Germany, particularly in the schools, the education of teachers, and in the media. It seemed as if the German people would have to wear hair-shirts for decades, even though the individual might bear no personal guilt. There was much talk of collective moral guilt.

If that were to be applied to all peoples, then today the citizens of the former USSR would have to bear the moral guilt for the destruction of millions of people in the forced labour camps of the Soviet Gulag. Guilt would be assigned in exactly the same way as for the mass killings in the German concentration camps, some might say much more so, because of their extent. The citizens of the former USSR knew what happened to their family members in the various Stalinist purges. It cannot be asserted to the same extent regarding what German citizens knew of the horrors of the concentration camps.

In addition came the many trials at the hands of the victors, such as the Nuremberg Trials. They were to provide the basis for future judgement, by international law, of measures occurring within and between states, even with retroactive effect. Such a basis could have had a positive effect for the future development of relationships between nations. Later, it could have been applied to all peoples, and all statesmen and military personnel. Consider, however, that since 1945 there have already been more than 150 wars, and never has anyone been held responsible for their origins.

Basic principles that are only applied to a very specifically defined group of people, but not to all, cannot provide the basis for fundamental principles of law, but necessarily give the impression of measures of revenge, taken by the victors, under the cloak of justice. The phrase Vae victis, i.e. woe to the vanquished, ruled the process of law in Europe after the Second World War. One has only to look at the camps in which German civilians were confined in the Soviet zone of occupation, and the forced labour camps in which German prisoners of war were confined after the surrender. The British and Americans delivered people to the Russians, with subsequent 10 or 11 year terms of forced labour, and massive loss of life. Further back, one thinks of the time of the Russian Revolution, and the serial shootings of former emigrants, of members of the Vlassov Army, of Cossacks, Turkestanis and other peoples of the USSR who were repatriated to Russia by the British.

For decades, nothing was said of the atrocities perpetrated by the Red Army and Soviet partisans, upon German wounded especially, and workers in the rear areas. The highest courts and authorities of Britain, including Churchill and Eden, took the position that one had to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union because of the terms of the future peace. After the First World War, in contrast with their previous motivation of commitment of invasion forces to fight against the Red Army, they then professed to see the USSR as a constitutional state, and Stalin turning into a democrat.

Yet at the same time, there were reports of British officers being present when people were turned over to the Soviets. The reports indicated that some people were selected and shot by members of the Red Army or KGB. Regardless, the British delivered large numbers of former citizens of the USSR to the Red Army. Soviet prisoners of war, who had previously been in German hands, included those who had fought on the German side, or had worked in the Organisation Todt, even those of the Ostarbeiter, i.e. residents of conquered eastern territory who had been conscripted for labour.

Those people greatly feared penal action upon repatriation to their former homeland. Regardless of that, British officials allowed into the camp Soviet repatriation commissions that registered all persons unwilling to be repatriated. In accordance with the demands of the Soviet officers, the British immediately transferred all such people to separate camps. They were the first to be turned over to the Russians. Their fate was known from the reports of British officers regarding delivery of former Soviet citizens in Murmansk and Odessa. That did not prevent the British from sending many other former Soviet citizens, who did not wish to be repatriated, to the same fate.

Among the actions that were prosecuted, and subsequently resulted in convictions at the Nuremberg proceedings, were not only the conduct of a war of aggression, but also the delivery of peoples to forced labour. After 1945, the British in particular returned many thousands of former citizens to the USSR, for which they were never called to account.

Nor did anyone speak of the carpet-bombing of German cities that was directed against non-combatants. The provisions of the Hague Convention for the Conduct of Land Warfare expressly protected non-combatants. The silence regarding such operations that are contrary to international law, i.e. war crimes by the Western Powers, results in a totally distorted picture of the norms of behaviour in war.

1 Position of Heeresgruppe Mitte, 20 June 1944

This is particularly true with regard to the strict internal discipline of the Wehrmacht, which hardly anyone doubts. However, that has been overshadowed by the destruction of humanity in the concentration camps. That did not involve international measures. They were to be judged by the principles of international law, particularly those of the Hague Convention for the Conduct of Land Warfare.

The purpose of re-education was mainly to justify the compulsory measures taken against the German people. Those were the confiscation of areas of German territory, reparations, and the general trainloads of plunder in the form of dismantled factories. There was the punishment of those who resisted such dismantling by restriction of their necessities of life. There were countless other restrictions. A large part of the media, and many writers, followed up those restrictions.

Today, it is difficult to gain an objective picture of events, and conduct of the members of the various armies involved in the war. In any case, the endeavour for objective presentation of events can only move on to a time when the generation of the participants is smaller in number, and they no longer play a part in presenting an account of what actually happened. In addition, it is inescapable that members of later generations will naturally find it difficult to put themselves into the minds of those who actually took part in such historic events. Yet, without such a way of imagining, it seems that it will not be possible to write objective history.

Germany’s prospects for victory collapsed with the fall of Stalingrad, and with them, the nimbus, i.e. the aura, of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht. That collapse strengthened the self-confidence of the soldiers of the Red Army. In addition, the combat theatres multiplied. It was not just a matter of combating the partisans in White Russia who seriously affected the removal of wounded, and the supply of personnel and materiel. There was then the battle against partisans in Yugoslavia, who were supported by Britain, the African Front, and later the Italian Front, and subsequently the Invasion Front.

The German homeland could not meet the demands of supplying personnel and materiel to all those fronts. In all sectors the troops felt that they were inadequately supported. There were shortages of medical supplies, weapons, ammunition and above all, fuel. It was necessary to be economical with everything. The Eastern Front especially, suffered from that enforced economy. The Red soldiers, on the other hand, had no concerns about fuel supplies and were, in addition, constantly reinforced. The USSR had an apparently inexhaustible reservoir of manpower. There were also Stalin’s hobby-horses, i.e. the armoured forces and the artillery. Both of those received great support from the Western Powers, particularly by provision of tanks, shells and trucks. With such mobility and equipment the Red Army continued to forge ahead, following the horse-drawn German infantry.

Germany attempted to make good the shortage of combat formations by activating new formations, such as the Galician 14th Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (ukrainische Nr. 1). It consisted of young Ukrainians from eastern Poland who came of military age during the German occupation. With totally inadequate military training, they were thrown into the battle near Brody, where they could not meet the expectations demanded of them. Hitler refused to employ other units based on foreign peoples, even though, in the meantime, a Vlassov-Army came into being with several fully equipped divisions. On the other hand a Cossack division and a Turkomen division fought well on the German side, the latter initially in Yugoslavia, and later on the Italian front. The Galician division was used in Slovakia, later in the South Ukraine and then in the Steiermark.

At the start of the Soviet summer offensive, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine had to give up formations to Heeresgruppe Mitte. They were then lacking in adequate defence when, some time later, the Soviet offensive started against the Heeresgruppe. Heeresgruppe Mitte then had to attempt to prepare for the Soviet assault by painstaking construction of positions, careful reconnaissance and the movement of troops. The shortage of formations became repeatedly evident in the later defensive fighting, where their lack of mobility was particularly critical. In addition, there were shortages in the supply of fuel, weapons and ammunition. Again and again individual elements were separated from their divisions and committed in other locations to fill the gaps. Finally, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine was forced to restrict its activities to preventing the Soviets from advancing too far to the west, into the Generalgouvernement. The Generalgouvernement was the administrative region established in the occupied section of Poland in 1939. The German effort was to build bridgeheads, employing the joint action of armour available from various Panzer-Divisionen, and the concentrated fire of the Divisions’ artillery batteries.

The Soviet offensive against Heeresgruppe Südukraine finally necessitated the transfer of additional formations from Heeresgruppe Nordukraine. They were needed for the fighting in Siebenbürgen and in the Debrecen area, as well as in Slovakia. All of that complicated the mission of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine, namely in preventing the further advance of the Soviets to the west.

In July and August 1944, the Soviets withdrew a series of formations that had faced the central front of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine. Later that became their right wing. In fact the Soviets no longer concerned themselves with the planned breakthrough to the west towards Krakow, merely focusing on improving their jump-off positions for a planned future offensive.

PART A

1944

I

Soviet Offensive Operations against Heeresgruppe Nordukraine Summer 1944

Heeresgruppe Nordukraine

German prospects for success vanished after the loss of the Battle of Stalingrad. Too many battle-worthy formations were missing when it later came to occupying the positions of the front lines. Therefore, during and after that battle, it demanded major efforts to build one line of defence after another. The last outpouring of strength was in the battle between Bjelgorod and Orel, i.e. the Battle of Kursk. Every detail of the German troop strengths and armament had been passed on to the Red Army, well in advance, by the Rote Kapelle i.e. the ‘Red Orchestra’. Hitler turned it into a failure! He responded to the landing of the United States forces on the Italian mainland, from Sicily, by suddenly pulling out the 2nd SS-Panzer-Korps just after the successful armoured battle of Prochorowka. The Soviets immediately advanced through the resulting gap, gaining substantial ground to the west.

In the ensuing battles, at first with small, but later with total success, the Soviets employed the German tactics of breakthroughs, and subsequent pursuit resulting in a envelopment. Based on surprise, those tactics had been used in various campaigns. The Red Army had set as its objective the forcing back of the German forces, to be followed by the liberation of the greater part of the German occupied lands of the Soviet Union. The Battle of Kursk soon brought about the liberation of major areas of the Ukraine. From 22 June 1944, the offensive against Heeresgruppe Mitte then smashed through the major eastward stretching salient in the German front that stretched east of Witebsk, Mogilew and Bobruisk. That brought Soviet forces almost to the Reichs border in East Prussia, and further south to the Vistula.

For their Bagramjan offensive, the Soviets deceived the German command regarding its Schwerpunkt¹ and direction. The German supreme command, i.e. Hitler, deduced that the Soviets would advance from Kowel to the north. Therefore the OKW i.e. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, pulled troops and weapons from the entire Heeresgruppe Mitte sector, and concentrated them in the Kowel sector. However, the offensive against Heeresgruppe Mitte then led to the withdrawal of formations from that sector. Those formations were then lost for days, due to partisans delaying the German rail transport. Unavailable for any combat use, the Heeresgruppe Nordukraine front was thus seriously weakened. In turn, that offered the Soviets a favourable opportunity to also launch an offensive against Heeresgruppe Nordukraine with the concentrated units of their 1st Ukrainian Front.

2 Position of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine, 5 July 1944

The description of the enemy situation makes it clear that the German formations in the front had no available reserves. It was also evident that, thanks to the lend-lease American trucks, the Red Army benefited from an advantage in mobility over the German formations. German infantry had no transport and their weapons were horse-drawn. That encouraged the Soviets to launch a similar thrust in the Heeresgruppe Nordukraine sector, at the precise time that the entire Heeresgruppe Mitte front collapsed. Following the first breakthroughs, the Russians advanced recklessly into the depths of the German defensive sectors.

They used what was by then a well established tactic, of pulling in air forces for short periods from other sectors, and engaging German troop movements, particularly reinforcements, on their way forward. The attack on the Germans opened with an astonishing mass of armour, and above all,