History of the Campaign of 1866 in Italy

By Alexander Hold

This is a translation of the 1867 work by Alexander Hold, Geschichte der Feldzugs in Italien 1866, which describes in detail the campaign of the previous year, fought between the armed forces of the Austrian empire and the kingdom of Italy in the Austrian province of Venetia and the southern Tyrol and on the Adriatic Sea.

The author served in the Engineers during the Campaign of 1859, and during the Campaign of 1866 was a Captain present with the Austrian headquarters throughout the Custoza campaign. As such he was ideally placed to provide a detailed account of his countrymen's efforts - he was a firsthand observer and would have taken part in discussions of Austrian strategic planning before and during it. Moreover, since he was on the staff he would have immediate knowledge of the other aspects of Austrian staff work of the period, the administration of the railways and telegraphs and the collection of intelligence. As a result, Hold's views about the forces of the participants, his comments on the terrain of the theater of war and his assessment of the correct and incorrect decisions made by the Austrian and Italian high commands are of considerable interest because they shed informed light on what is the often forgotten part of the 1866 war, and a close study of his figures and assessments will repay all students of this campaign. Naturally, Hold gives the Austrian point of view, one which occasionally is a bit partisan, but because of the subject this is only natural. His own countrymen received the work well, and it has been called the first objective and learned treatment of the Italian campaign of 1866.

This new translation by Stuart Sutherland, who also supplies extensive explanatory notes, is an important contribution to the literature available for this most interesting and important 19th Century campaign, providing a very detailed account not only of the principal Battle of Custoza, but also the Campaign in the Tyrol, and the naval war in the Adriatic that culminated in the Battle of Lissa.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Jul 19, 2010
• ISBN: 9781908916372

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New introduction

The following is a translation of the 1867 work by Alexander Hold, Geschichte der Feldzugs in Italien 1866 (Vienna), which describes in detail the campaign of the previous year, fought between the armed forces of the Austrian empire and the kingdom of Italy in the Austrian province of Venetia and the southern Tyrol and on the Adriatic Sea.

Alexander Hold was born on 26 February 1838 in Oedenburg, Hungary, and in 1855 he entered the Engineering Academy of the Austrian army, at Kloster Bruck near Znaim (Znojmo, Czech Republic). After studying there for about four years, on 14 April 1859 Hold was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the independent 3rd Engineer Battalion. Almost immediately he was thrust into the business of a campaign, because Austria was on the brink of war with France and the Italian state of Piedmont. As part of his duties, during that conflict Hold constructed fortified bridgeheads, carried out demolitions and other tasks. After the campaign he attended the Military Academy, established in the Austrian capital of Vienna to give young and suitable officers further education so as to fit them for general staff employment. Hold left the academy in 1864 as a senior lieutenant and transferred to the general staff, going to the headquarters of the Austrian army in Italy in Verona. He was still there when the campaign of 1866 opened, and as a captain he was present at Austrian headquarters on 24 June 1866, when the imperial forces fought and won a decisive victory over one of the two main Italian armies in the battle of Custoza, southwest of Verona.

Unfortunately for Austria, the victory of Custoza could not be exploited, and indeed the imperial forces had to be concentrated around the capital to protect it from Prussian armies, which had defeated the Austrian army in the northern theatre and were closing on Vienna. Hold apparently attended the headquarters of the Italian army there, and once the campaign was over he returned to the peacetime duties of a general staff officer. These included military mapping in the Balkans, surveying in Transylvania, and office duty with the staff; he also put in a spell in the field. In 1873 Hold was promoted major, and he returned to the Military Academy the following year to teach a course on the duties of the general staff. He was promoted lieutenant colonel during this service, which ended in 1878, and then in 1879 he was made colonel and transferred to the War Ministry in Vienna. There Hold worked on plans for the reorganization of the army, and his services were recognized to the extent that he was decorated in 1883 for them. Hold was then transferred to the central bureau of the War Ministry, where he remained until 1890, by which time he had been promoted major general (1885) and lieutenant general (1890) and was a section head. Hold’s career then turned from administration to field command, for he was given the leadership of the 13th Division, which had its headquarters in Vienna, and then in 1895 he was made commander of 14th Corps, its command centre in Innsbruck. A general of infantry (full general) from the same year, Hold continued as corps commander until 1900, when he retired on a pension. Over the years his talents had been recognized by the bestowal of several awards, as well as his raising to the dignity of a knight (1879), and then to Freiherr Hold von Ferneck (1899), and by his being named honorary colonel in chief of the 61st Infantry Regiment (1897). He died on 18 November 1901 in Innsbruck. He had married, and with his wife had one daughter and two sons.

Hold’s long and successful career was marked by more than his undoubted talent for command and administration, for he also found time to write a number of works besides the 1867 history, including monographs on wartime provisions magazines, contraband and methods of marching, a history of the 48th Infantry Regiment and a discussion of aeronautical matters, continuing after his retirement. But the history of the 1866 war is his first and most important work, for he was a first-hand observer and would have taken part in discussions of Austrian strategic planning before and during it. Moreover, since he was on the staff he would have immediate knowledge of the other aspects of Austrian staff work of the period, the administration of the railways and telegraphs and the collection of intelligence.

As a result, Hold’s views about the forces of the participants, his comments on the terrain of the theatre of war and his assessment of the correct and incorrect decisions made by the Austrian and Italian high commands are of considerable interest because they shed informed light on what is the often forgotten part of the 1866 war, and a close study of his figures and assessments will repay all students of this campaign. Naturally, Hold gives the Austrian point of view, one which occasionally is a bit partisan, but because of the subject this is only natural. His own countrymen received the work well, and it has been called the first objective and learned treatment of the Italian campaign of 1866.

But in the first section, Principal causes of the war, Hold overdoes himself consistently. There he discusses in very general terms the rise of antagonism between Austria and Prussia prior to the war, which is not strictly relevant to an account of the conflict between Austria and Italy. He then goes into great length about his abhorrence of the principle of nationality and the policy of natural frontiers, both prominent factors in 19th-century Europe, and like a dutiful officer of a multinational empire sees only greed, violence and chaos attending the desire for national liberation. None of his strictures and sarcasms are germane to the preparations for and the outbreak of the war, and I have therefore begun the account with the second section, Immediate cause of the war.

Some weights and measurements follow the usages of the 19th century. The Austrian pound (Pfund) was the equivalent of 560.1g or 1.6 lbs, and it consisted of 32 Loth, each of 17.6g or .6oz. The Centner (Zentner), a bulk measurement, was 50kg or 110lbs; the Viennese Eimer, a liquid measurement, was 1.8 hectolitres or 38.7 gallons. The Austrian geographic mile (Meile) appears very frequently; it is equal to 8.1km or 5 miles. Also much in evidence is the pace (Schritt), whose usually accepted measurement is 75cm or 2.5ft, and the Viennese Klafter (sometimes incorrectly termed fathom) is 1.9m or 6.2ft. This last is often designated in the text by an º.

Stuart Sutherland

1

Immediate cause of the war

The outbreak of diplomatic hostilities

This account does not mean to trace all phases of the Austro-Prussian conflict; instead, it will show the reader the main points of the disagreement with Prussia which led to war. After Villafranca,¹ Austria and Italy had no diplomatic relations for seven years, until the unilateral declaration of war by the Italian government brought the silence to an end.

Prussia had for a long time looked askance at the agitation in Holstein for the Duke of Augustenburg. Count Bismarck referred to it in despatches sent on 20 and 21 January 1866 and threatened that if he received a negative answer he would consider himself released from all obligations to Austria. The Austrian reply of 7 February stressed that Prussia was interfering in the internal administration of Holstein, and the Prussian response was the well-known penal law of 11 March, whose provoking and inimical tone and very hostile character caused a great deal of displeasure and embitterment. There followed a lively exchange of despatches between Austria and Prussia, a completely unecessary and unproductive quarrel over the question of which of them had started arming first. Finally, Bismarck sent a personal despatch of 1 May to the Prussian ambassador in Vienna, Baron Werther, which was addressed to Count Mensdorff, minister for foreign affairs. His purpose was clearly shown in a note of 7 May in which he proposed to compensate Austria financially in return for her allowing Prussia to acquire Schleswig-Holstein. Austria did not agree and on 1 June surrendered her right to Holstein to the Germanic Confederation, allowing this body to decide the duchy’s fate. Prussia advanced her troops into Holstein on the 7th. Austria in reply asked on 11 June for a federal execution against Prussia, which question was on 14 June carried by nine to six votes.² The federal execution was the cue for Prussia to move its already extensive mobilization to war. In contrast, Italy was calm but continuing to arm with feverish heat.

1    Translator’s note – the armistice of Villafranca, which ended fighting in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859.

2    Translator’s note – the mobilization of the Confederation army against Prussia, the vote for which was taken in the Confederation parliament.

2

The armed forces

Before going further, it would be completely unpardonable if at least the essential features of the armed forces of the two states which were soon to clash were not given in a general overview. Only then can a judgement be formed of the total strength to hand and ready for battle and a comparison made between the ideal and what really occurred to correctly and thoroughly understand events. From this standpoint, I now examine the strength of the opposing forces.

The Italian armed forces

Out of the approximately 20,000,000 people in the kingdom of Italy, every year there were called up about 210,000 to 220,000 youths in their 21st year, or close to one per cent of the population.

Under the system of universal conscription in effect, all were required to enter the army, but the number of those freed from obligation to military service was always extremely large, and so many were found unfit that the yearly contingent was only between 70,000 and 80,000 recruits. Of these, somewhat more than half was called up, this group being termed the first category. Its strength was as needs dictated each year and was usually from 40,000 to 50,000 men.

The first category has to serve five years with the colours, and as a result the peacetime strength of the Italian army was from 200,000 to 255,000 men. However, the natural wastage in the five classes lowered this figure to from 170,000 to 180,000, the actual peacetime strength. Moreover, this category was liable to six years in the reserve, and as a result the 11 classes of the first category might have raised the wartime strength to more than 400,000 men had not deductions of all sorts so decreased this figure that parts of the second category had to be temporarily called up in order to complete to the planned wartime strength.

The second category of each yearly class consists of the rest of those liable for service once the first category has been taken. The size of the second category is usually more than 30,000 men. An obligation to service exists only in wartime and is for five years. After taking their oaths, the men of this class are drilled for 50 days, and then are sent home on leave.

Not counting the wastage in the yearly classes, the position of the regular Italian army for the war was therefore:

Eleven contingents of the first category, each of about 40,000 men = 400,000 total. Five contingents of the second category, each of about 30,000 men = 150,000. Assuming a 20 per cent reduction in each of the 16 classes, a figure which must approach the truth, the Italian army is therefore 472,000 men strong with the reserves, a figure which must no doubt be considered as the largest possible.

The regular Italian army has therefore approximately 2.3 per cent of the population. Its wartime organization is as follows:

Regulation wartime strength of the Italian army

Infantry:

Eight grenadier and 72 line infantry regiments, each of four battalions of four companies and a depot of two companies = 224,298 combatants, 9,626 non-combatants: total 233,924 available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 12,480. Total strength = 246,604.

Bersaglieri:

One regiment of five battalions of four companies and two depot companies, four regiments of eight battalions of four companies and four depot companies, one regiment of nine battalions of four companies and four depot companies = 24,610 combatants, 1,097: total 25,707 available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 1,415. Total strength = 27,122.

Cavalry:

Nineteen regiments of six field and one depot squadrons = 12,958 horses, 4,009 men and 1,064 horses non-combatants = 17,442 men and 14,022 horses available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 1,406 men. Total strength = 18,848 men, 14,025 horses.

Artillery:

One pontoon regiment of nine technical companies and one depot company = 1,979 non-combatants, 40 horses available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 36 men. Total strength = 2,015 men, 40 horses.

Three fortress artillery regiments, each of 16 companies and two depot companies. Unavailable for field operations = 8,973 men and 150 horses.

One field artillery regiment of two horse, 14 foot batteries and two depot batteries, four field artillery regiments of 16 foot batteries and two depot batteries = 15,686 men and 11,324 horses available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 400 men. Total strength = 16,086 men, 11,324 horses and 480 guns.

Two engineer regiments of 18 technical and two depot companies = 6,572 men and 396 horses non-combatants available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 124 men. Total strength = 6,696 men and 396 horses.

Two transport regiments of 10 transport companies and one depot company = 6,842 men and 8,400 horses non-combatants available for field operations. Unavailable for field operations = 670 men and 840 horses. Total strength = 7,512 men and 9,240 horses.

Total: 362 battalions, 114 squadrons, 19 depot squadrons; 45 technical companies, 48 fortress artillery companies, 20 transport companies, 193 depot companies; two horse, 78 foot batteries, 10 depot batteries. Available for field operations = 248,908 men, 12,958 horses combatants; 45,811 men, 21,214 horses non-combatants = total 308,152 men and 34,182 horses. Unavailable for field operations = 25,504 men and 990 horses. Total strength = 333,656 men, 35,175 horses and 480 guns.

Note: The following do not seem to be included: the army staff, carabinieri, the administrative personnel in the military establishments and instructional institutes. This results in a field army of 248,908 foot troop combatants, 12,958 horses for cavalry and 480 guns.

Some men remain in the 16 yearly classes after this figure has been reached and can therefore be used to raise fifth battalions (and in fact in the last campaign 40 were raised). Moreover, since the recruitment of the 1866 class was a fact, and because the men of the first category of the 1865 class whose term of service had ended had been dismissed, there were 70,000 to 80,000 men in the depots, from whom a very useable reserve could be formed in two months.

Besides the regular land army, there is the National Guard. This is divided into a field and a garrison force, formed in infantry battalions and drilled like the line troops. The Guard assumes garrison and fortress duties or even (as in the Valtellina in the last campaign) fights in the open field, and as a result it raises the armed forces considerably and augments the field troops. The number of battalions which can be prepared for field operations is at most 220 (100,000 men); during the last campaign 50 were called to the colours.

It stands to reason that the Italian government gave way to the demands of the people to increase greatly its armed forces by means of volunteers, but it was only after much hesitation by the war minister that but 42 battalions of volunteers were raised successively, which in the end attained a (authorized strength) force of 35,000 men.

At the start of January 1866 there were in the army 312,907 men of the first category; however, this figure includes the staffs and administrative personnel. This meant there was not enough strength to raise the wartime size to 330,000, so 31,106 men from the second category were included, and as a result the force climbed to 344,013 men. There remained 106,472 unincorporated men in the second category.

If a recruitment was then ordered, the official strength would be, without a simultaneous discharge from the first category:

In the army: 344,013

Second category remaining: 106,472

Levy of 1866: 80,000 (approximately)

Total: 530,000 (approximately)

In fact, at the start of 1866 some 208,900 men were under arms. Possibly with a view to holding larger exercises as early as the end of March, the callup of the second category of the 1865 levy (30,000) now occurred, then the enrolment of the first category of the 1866 levy (45,000), and finally the callup of the second category of the 1864 levy (30,000). The army therefore rose about 105,000, i.e., to 314,000, at which figure it was (if the 30,000 non-combatant carabinieri and administrative personnel are deducted) only about 50,000 below the full wartime strength, whose adoption could be ordered at any time and would be realized in at most 14 days by recalling those who had been drilled and were on leave, of whom 29,000 were in the first category and 31,000 in the second category. As can be seen, this would more than cover the needs.

On this basis the reader can understand the full scope of the measures which the Italian war ministry carried out, and which will be returned to in the chapter on preparations.

Like that of most states, the Italian army in peacetime is organized on a territorial basis; the kingdom is split into seven military department commands, under which are divisional commands.

In wartime the divisions are the major tactical formations of the army. The organization of a division is as follows:

Overview of the planned wartime strength of a field division

Four infantry regiments = 12,284 men, 104 horses and mules, 56 wagons; two bersaglieri battalions = 1,254 men, 10 horses and mules, 8 wagons; of whom 12,392 combatants Three 8-pounder batteries = 580 men, 423 horses, 46 wagons; of which 18 guns combatants

One engineer company = 179 men, 11 horses and mules, 3 wagons; transport = 102 men, 160 horses and mules, 45 wagons; ambulance = 12 men, 223 horses and mules, 10 wagons

Total = 14,415 men, 938 horses and mules, 170 wagons; of which 12,392 men and 18 guns combatants

Such a division is divided into two brigades of two infantry regiments, or eight battalions. The bersaglieri, artillery and engineers are under the direct command of the divisional commander. In wartime, two to four divisions are grouped into an army corps. The corps also receives a cavalry regiment or a cavalry brigade and a fairly well-stocked ammunition reserve, plus a bridge train. On campaign, if needed the corps forms a reserve, of the second bersaglieri battalion of the divisions, part or all the corps cavalry and the third batteries of the divisions.

A reserve cavalry division of four line regiments is formed. This is assigned the only two horse batteries (each of eight guns); the combat strength of the division is 2,836 horses. An army artillery reserve and an army bridge train are formed from the batteries and transport not with the divisions.

As far as the individual arms of service are concerned, the foot troops had to pass their first test of fire in the new organization, other than those of them who had learned in no bad school through actions in central and southern Italy, particularly against the brigands in Naples. The greater part of the infantry was newly raised, and most divisions had a brigade from the former Piedmontese army and one from the newly acquired provinces to mix the elements and give firm support to the green regiments.

The bersaglieri (sharpshooter) battalions were regarded as an elite. They received the pick of the recruits and were increased very cautiously. By introducing them, General La Marmora performed a signal service, and he undertook their organization and made them fit for service generally in a superb fashion. The infantry weapon is a rifled Minié gun of large calibre with a bayonet; that of the bersaglieri is a rifled, very long-range carbine with a sword-bayonet.

It is difficult to evaluate the Italian cavalry. The Italians do not have the cavalry spirit of the Hungarians, Poles and Germans, nor does the country possess the material which is the sole source of a good cavalry. In view of these basic considerations and the costliness of the arm, it appears that the Italian high command assigned less importance to having good cavalry. As a result it is not to be wondered that it was very badly led, although its bravery cannot be criticized. It also seems the high command was content to use cavalry only for reconnaissance and security duties. In battle it rarely appeared on its own and was employed to its disadvantage; where possible, infantry was used first in all cases.

The former Piedmontese artillery has a good reputation, and with reason. But now the men and guns were new, and although the military authorities spent a good deal of time and money to give the army a solid base of an efficient artillery, it had yet to fight. Except for two horse batteries of eight guns, the batteries of the five artillery regiments have six guns. The equipment of the Italian field artillery is of three sorts: the so-called 8

cm or 5?-pounder mountain gun, 9 cm or 8-pounder and 12 cm or 16-pounder metal guns for the field artillery. 8-pounders are with the divisions, 16-pounders with the reserve. The Italian 8-pounder shell and its cartridge weigh 9 Zollpfund and is therefore between the Austrian 4- and 8-pounder shells, the first being 7 Pfund 6½ Loth and the second 12 Pfund 19 Loth. The Italian army does not use shrapnel. Shells can be fired to a maximum range of 4,300 paces, canister to 800 paces.

All the guns of the field artillery are rifled and are constructed similarly to the French La Hitte guns. The barrel has six twists, through which the projectile passes by means of 12 zinc studs. Time fuses explode the shells; they are set off by means of friction detonators with removeable rings.

Guns and caissons have six horses; all men ride on the limbers and caissons. If the caissons are separated from the battery, the gunners mount the team horses of the limbers, which are provided with saddles for that purpose. Gunners are trained both as gunners and drivers. In the two horse batteries of the 5th Regiment all gunners are mounted. The solid carriage of the gun, the caissons and all army wagons are painted matt silver-grey; the wooden parts are strong but of as crude a finish as that of the barrels is delicate.

For the coming campaign the Italian high command assembled a field army, whose strength was:

General view of the Italian army in June 1866

Commander in chief: His Majesty King Victor Emmanuel

Chief of general staff: Generale d’Armata Alfonso La Marmora

Adjutant general: Lieutenant General Pettiti

Artillery commander: Lieutenant General Valfré

Engineer commander: Lieutenant General Menabrea

Assistant chief of general staff: Colonel Bariola

I Army Corps

Durando

Chief of general staff: Colonel Lombardini

1st Division (Cerale) – Pisa Brigade (Villarey): 29th, 30th Infantry Regiments; Forli Brigade (Dho): 43rd, 44th Infantry Regiments; 2nd, 18th Bersaglieri Battalions; 10th, 11th, 12th Batteries, 6th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

2nd Division (Pianell) – Siena Brigade (Cadolino): 31st, 32nd Infantry Regiments; Aosta Brigade (Franzini): 5th, 6th Infantry Regiments; 8th, 17th Bersaglieri Battalions; 13th, 14th, 15th Batteries, 6th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

3rd Division (Brignone) – Grenadiers of Sardinia Brigade (Gozzani): 1st, 2nd Grenadier Regiments; Grenadiers of Lombardy Brigade (Prince Amadeo): 3rd, 4th Grenadier Regiments; 13th, 37th Bersaglieri Battalions; 1st, 2nd, 3rd Batteries, 6th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

4th Division (Sirtori) – Brescia Brigade (Villahermosa): 19th, 20th Infantry Regiments; Valtelina Brigade (Lopez): 65th, 66th Infantry Regiments; 3rd, 5th Bersaglieri Battalions; 1st, 2nd, 3rd Batteries, 9th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

At corps headquarters: two artillery park companies and a bridge team; Ghilini Brigade: Aosta Lancers, Lucca Cavalleggeri, Guides (18 squadrons) Combatant strength: 72 battalions with 48,000 men, 18 squadrons with 6,100 horses, 12 batteries with 72 guns

II Army Corps

Cucchiari

Chief of general staff: Colonel Escoffier

4th Division (Duca di Mignano) – Regina Brigade: 9th, 10th Infantry Regiments; Ravenna Brigade: 37th, 38th Infantry Regiments, 1st, 2nd Bersaglieri Battalions, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

6th Division (Cosenz) – Livorno Brigade: 33rd, 34th Infantry Regiments; Acqui Brigade: 17th, 18th Infantry Regiments; 15th, 20th Bersaglieri Battalions, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

10th Division (Angioletti) – Abruzzi Brigade: 53rd, 54th Infantry Regiments; Umbria Brigade: 57th, 58th Infantry Regiments; 24th, 31st Bersaglieri Battalions, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

19th Division (Longoni) – Calabria Brigade: 59th, 60th Infantry Regiments; Palermo Brigade: 67th, 68th Infantry Regiments; 33rd, 40th Bersaglieri Battalions, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

At corps headquarters: two artillery park companies and a bridge team; Barral Brigade: Novara Lancers, Piacenza Hussars (18 squadrons) Combatant strength: 72 battalions with 48,000 men, 18 squadrons with 4,100 men, 12 batteries with 72 guns

Reserve or Line Cavalry Division

De Sonnaz

Chief of general staff: Perrone

Soman Brigade: Savoy and Genoa Cavalry; Cusani Brigade: Nizza and Piedmont Cavalry, forming 24 squadrons and two 8-pounder batteries

Combatant strength: 2,800 horses and 16 guns

III Army Corps

Della Rocca

Chief of general staff: Colonel di Nobilant

7th Division (Bixio) – Ferrara Brigade (Novaro): 47th, 48th Infantry Regiments; del Re Brigade (De Fornari): 1st, 2nd Infantry Regiments; 9th, 19th Bersaglieri Battalions; 1st, 2nd, 3rd Batteries, 5th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

8th Division (Cugia) – Piemonte Brigade (Noaro): 3rd, 4th Infantry Regiments; Cagliari Brigade (Gabet): 63rd, 64th Infantry Regiments; 6th, 30th Bersaglieri Battalions; 7th, 8th, 9th Batteries, 6th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

9th Division (Govone) – Alpi Brigade (Danzini): 51st, 52nd Infantry Regiments; Pistoia Brigade (Bottacco): 35th, 36th Infantry Regiments; 27th, 34th Bersaglieri battalions; 4th,

5th, 6th Batteries, 5th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

16th Division (Prince Umberto) – Parma Brigade (Ferrero): 49th, 50th Infantry Regiments; Mixed Brigade (De Sanger): 8th, 71st Infantry Regiments; 4th, 11th Bersaglieri Battalions; 10th, 11th, 12th Batteries, 5th Regiment, forming 18 battalions and three 8-pounder batteries for 12,000 combatants

At corps headquarters: two artillery park companies and a bridge train; Palermo Brigade: Foggia Lancers, Foggia, Alessandria Cavalleggeri (18 squadrons) Combatant strength: 72 battalions with 48,000 men, 18 squadrons with 2,100 men,

12 batteries with 72 guns

Army artillery reserve under Colonel Balegno – 9 batteries with 54 guns

Total of the Mincio Army: 216 battalions with 144,000 men, 60 squadrons with

8,400 horses, 56 batteries with 286 guns

IV Army Corps

Cialdini

Chief of general staff: Major General Piola Caselli

11th Division (Casanova) – Pinerolo Brigade: 13th, 14th Infantry Regiments; Modena Brigade: 41st, 42nd