The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1939–1941

By Bob Carruthers

First in the trilogy that covers WWII submarine warfare in the Atlantic from the German perspective—edited by the Emmy Award-winning historian and author.
 
The U-Boat war is a unique visual record of Hitler’s infamous submarine fleet and a grim account of those that lived, worked and risked their lives stalking the depths of the Atlantic and Mediterranean seas. This book analyzes the development of the U-boat, the recruitment and training, and reveals how the crews tried to destroy essential Allied supplies across the Atlantic and bring Britain to its knees.
 
Using some 250 rare and unpublished photographs together with detailed captions and accompanying text, the book provides an outstanding insight into the various operations and the claustrophobic existence of the crew, where they lived in cramped and often deplorable conditions. It depicts how this potent force became one of the most dominant German fighting units during World War Two and became such a worry to Allied shipping that even Winston Churchill himself claimed that the “U-boat peril” was the only thing that ever really frightened him during the war. On their defeat hung the outcome of the war, and through courageous and determined resistance against overwhelming odds, the Allies eventually inflicted such catastrophic damage on the U-boats that the losses were too great to continue. Of the 38,000 men that went to sea onboard these deadly vessels, only 8,000 were to survive to tell the tale.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 18, 2013
• ISBN: 9781473846517

Bob Carruthers

Bob Carruthers is an Emmy Award winning author and historian, who has written extensively on the Great War. A graduate of Edinburgh University, Bob is the author of a number of military history titles including the Amazon best seller The Wehrmacht in Russia.

Book preview

-        CHAPTER 1        -

OPERATIONS DURING THE FIRST YEAR

MOBILISATION

1. U-boat Strength and State of Readiness

At noon on 15th August, 1939, the Naval Staff Operations Division in Berlin called the office of S.O. U-boats in the tender Hecht at Kiel and announced that an officers’ reunion for U-boat officers was to take place on Saturday, 19th August.

This message was a cover for commencing certain U-boat preparations to meet the deteriorating international situation. U-boats fit for Atlantic operations on 19th August were to proceed to waiting positions in the area west of England and the Iberian Peninsula.

In Fall Weiss (the sudden and effective destruction of the Polish Armed Forces) the German Navy’s task was to cut off the Polish naval forces, to control the merchant shipping and to carry out unobtrusive reconnaissance and defensive operations to prevent enemy forces from penetrating into the Baltic and the Kattegat. The part to be played by the U-boats was defined in a directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and included the following tasks;

Baltic: Minelaying and patrols off Hela, reconnaissance outside the Gulf of Finland, the Gotland area, the Irben Strait and the Kattegat-by 16 boats (Types II and VII).

North Sea: Seven boats (Type II) to occupy waiting positions east of the English Channel, constituting an unobtrusive defence against possible intervention by the Western Powers. In the event of war these boats were to lay mines off the French and British Channel ports.

Atlantic: All available Atlantic U-boats (Types I, VII and IX) were to proceed to waiting positions west of England and the Iberian Peninsula. In the event of war with the Western Powers they were to operate against merchant shipping in accordance with the new Prize Regulations, until the danger areas were announced.

All operational orders for these tasks had been formulated by S.O. U-boats between the end of July and 12th August, and by the 15th August, 56 commissioned boats were available, while another was expected to be commissioned by the end of the month. The distribution of the various types and their state of readiness are shown in the following table:

By including the training boats U.1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 36 which would shortly be ready for operations and by curtailing the training of U.56-59, ten more Type II boats and one Type VII boat would be conditionally ready for operational service. Thus by the end of August a total of 46 boats, of which 22 were capable of operating in the Atlantic, was ready. They comprised twenty-four Type II, sixteen Type VII and six Types I and IX. The proportion of 46 operational boats out of a total of 56 was exceptionally high. The emergency coincided with a high state of readiness of both boats and crews, with very few boats undergoing training (1)¹.

2. Organisation of the U-boat Command

To meet possible developments with Poland the U-boats were mainly concentrated in the Baltic, and an organisation, previously devised by the Naval Staff for this eventuality, came into force on 18th August, whereby Commodore Dönitz and his staff were embarked in the parent ship Erich Wasmer at Kiel, and the ship proceeded to Swinemiinde on 22nd August. At this time the Commodore was a member of the German Naval Staff, and also in operational control of the U-boats in the Baltic (S.O., U-boats, East) and of the U-boats assembling for Atlantic duties. The operational command of U-boats in the West was vested in Lieut.-Comdr. Ibbecken at Wilhelmshaven. He was then in command of the 2nd U-boat Flotilla, which together with the 1st U-boat Flotilla was assigned to operations in the North Sea and the English Channel.

This organisation remained in force until it became clear that the conflict would not be confined to Poland. Should the situation in the West deteriorate, Dönitz was to proceed to Wilhelmshaven, where he was to take charge of all U-boat operations outside the Baltic.

This change actually occurred on 31st August, when the commitments of the Baltic U-boats had decreased, owing to Germany’s non-aggression pact with Russia and because in the meantime the three Polish destroyers had escaped to the West.

By now political relations with the Western Powers had reached a crisis. When Dönitz arrived at Wilhelmshaven he took over as S.O. U-boats (West), leaving Commander Schomburg at Swinemiinde, in charge of Baltic operations.

3. Disposition of the Boats during the Emergency Period

The shifting of concentration to the West can be seen from the following table of dispositions during the emergency period:

Disposition On 21st August, 1939

After the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia on 23rd August, seven boats (Type II), hitherto employed on reconnaissance duties in the Baltic, were released to the North Sea.

Disposition On 23rd August, 1939

After the three Polish destroyers had broken out from the Baltic, the three Type VII boats there left for Wilhelmshaven. The four training boats (three Type II, one Type VII) arrived in the North Sea on 30th August.

Disposition On 31st August, 1939

4. Mobilisation

On receipt of the warning on 15th August, Commodore Dönitz was on leave in Bad Gastein and returned the following day. The necessary action was taken by Captain Friedeburg, the Chief of Staff, who stopped all training exercises and recalled all boats to their bases to be equipped for war. The Third U-boat Flotilla and the U-boat Training Flotilla were allowed to continue training until 19th and 26th August respectively. As had been expected, the manning and fitting out of the boats and other preparations went according to plan. Difficulties were caused by inadequate stocks of war torpedoes. Prior to 1939 S.O. U-boats had more than once drawn attention to this deficiency.

The excessive number of orders and code-words in the various offices proved a disadvantage. The preparatory plans had foreseen all eventualities, but in the execution these code-words were occasionally disregarded, thereby causing confusion. The change-over from peace to war communications also caused some inaccuracies and delays in transmitting information. For example, a vital order to S.O. U-boats to be ready for action on the evening of 22nd August was received 24 hours late, and then only verbally. It should be recorded that eager as the U-boat crews were to give battle, they felt that the Government would do everything possible to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. An entry in the War Diary of S.O. U-boats for 21st August states:

The particularly confident attitude of the crews deserves mention. In my opinion it is a sign of the great trust which the majority place in the Government’s policy (2).

PROBLEMS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

5. Survey of the Situation by S.O. U-Boats

When war with Britain and France broke out on 3rd September, the situation could be summed up as follows (3):

"It is evident from the political situation and from Britain’s inherent tenacity that this will be a long war.

"Britain is completely dependent on her sea trade for food and raw materials, and above all for building up her military strength. The German Navy’s task therefore is to attack the merchant ships carrying these supplies and, if possible, to disrupt them. This means that despite the unfavourable strategic position of our Navy and its considerable inferiority in strength, the battle must be actively waged from the first day.

"No effort on the part of Germany could enable her to catch up with Britain’s immense lead in naval construction. Germany cannot hope to compete for naval supremacy. Her only course is to launch a direct attack on enemy sea communications. Apart from the few surface ships fit for long-range operations, only the U-boats are available for this purpose. They alone are capable of penetrating to the main British trade routes in face of the British superiority in surface forces.

"What is the position as regards U-boats? Until the end of 1938 neither the Government nor the Navy had considered Britain as a possible enemy. The Navy had been planned as a homogeneous fleet, and the U-boat arm had been built up within that framework. Thus today at the outbreak of war, the German U-boat tonnage has not even reached the 45 per cent of British tonnage allowed by the Naval Agreement of 1935 (that is, 72 boats) and is far short of the 100 per cent permitted in 1938, which would have given Germany 129 boats of various types, large and small (4). We have today the totally inadequate number of 57 commissioned U-boats, and an inadequate construction programme. Neither the existing forces nor those to be expected from the building programme are sufficient to obtain decisive results against British shipping (see Appendix I).

"Thus three tasks face the U-boat Command:

6. Proposals for a Large-Scale Expansion of the U-boat Arm

On 28th August, during the emergency, S.O. U-boats had submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet-Admiral Boehm - proposals for the expansion of the U-boat arm. The Commander-in-Chief gave these proposals his backing in forwarding them to the Naval Staff (5). Envisaging a war between Germany and Britain, Dönitz had urged the raising of the U-boat strength to at least 300 boats of Type VII and Type IX, with the addition of a number of special large boats. The present U-boat programme was totally inadequate. He wanted to establish within the Naval Staff an organisation with far-reaching powers of priority, responsible only to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for expanding the U-boat arm.

On 4th September, S.O. U-boats explained his memorandum to Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, at Wilhelmshaven. After reading the plan the Commander-in-Chief confirmed that a large-scale programme of U-boat construction was intended, and he wished to make a senior officer responsible for carrying it out. He asked S.O. U-boats for his opinion on the appointment of Rear Admiral U. Arnauld de la Perriere (retired) to the post, adding that he did not wish Dönitz himself to hold it.

The following is quoted from the minutes of the conference in the War Diary of S.O. U-boats, 9th September, 1939:

… I replied that I would give my opinion on the following day, as an appointment of this kind would have far-reaching implications. I hold that this post should be occupied by me. As an active service officer I have directed the training of U-boats from the beginning and am known to the personnel. All efforts will be in vain unless we can rapidly build up our numbers, and this task now becomes the most important of all, which should be under the direction of an officer with expert knowledge of the theory and practice of U-boat warfare.

Raeder, however, decided that Dönitz was indispensable for the control of actual operations, and could not be spared for the task in Berlin. Eventually it was decided on Dönitz’s recommendation to give Captain Siemens the supervision of the building programme, and this officer also became U-boat Staff Officer on the Naval Staff in Berlin. In the course of the first year of war it became apparent that he was merely Head of a Department, without executive authority, and this was disappointing for the U-boat Command.

Raeder’s decision was probably right, for Dönitz was certainly needed to control operations, and his personality was directly responsible for the ultimate achievements of the U-boat War (6).

After consulting S.O. U-boats, the Naval Staff listed their requirements for expansion on 9th September, 1939, and the first wartime building programme was drawn up by the Constructional Office in October.

7. Disposition of U-boats

Type II boats were limited by their radius of action to the North Sea, the east coast of England and the Orkney and Shetland areas. Type VII boats could operate in the area west of England as far as 15° W., including Biscay. Type VIIc boats had sufficient range to operate off the west coast of Spain, as far as Portugal. Type I and Type IX could operate as far as the Azores and Gibraltar and were capable of penetrating into the Mediterranean for short periods.

According to their radius of action, the boats were therefore divided into three groups.

All small Type II boats were to operate in the North Sea and off the English coast, including the Channel. If necessary, Type VII boats could also be sent to this area. This group was under the control of Dönitz, as S.O. U-boats West. In view of their escort duties in the North Sea and on their outward and return journeys, the boats’ movements had to be co-ordinated with the operations of the surface forces in Group West’s command.

Type VII and Type VIIc boats were to operate on the North Atlantic trade routes; off the North Channel and in the Irish Sea, the St. George’s Channel, the English Channel, and the Bay of Biscay.

The few Type I and Type IX boats were to take up more distant positions as far as Gibraltar, on the traffic routes between the Mediterranean and Britain, and Capetown-Sierra Leone-Britain.

8. Objectives

During the critical days before the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 there were so few boats that they could not have had any appreciable effect on shipping. If war with England had resulted, they would have operated only against her naval forces, particularly by minelaying off the British naval ports. But in 1939 the Supreme Command’s directive for Fall Weiss stipulated that the first U-boat operations should be against enemy shipping.

Even at that date there were still too few boats to obtain effective results against shipping. The question again arose as to whether in the interest of German surface ship operations it would not pay to use the U-boats against British naval forces. S.O. U-boats answered this question as follows (7):

"Results against the enemy’s warships are only possible if these can be lured from their bases. Our weak surface forces cannot be relied upon to achieve this. The German Air Force could raid Scapa and perhaps succeed in driving the main force of the British Fleet (reported to be there) to the open sea. But at present air attacks are not permitted (Section 55).

In general, U-boat operations against naval forces promise little hope of success. On the surface the U-boat has no margin of speed to haul ahead for attack; enemy escorting aircraft could generally forestall such action. The low underwater speed of the U-boat does not permit attack on fast warships except when the boat is directly in the path of the enemy, and that happens very seldom.

The prospects of Success in support of our own surface forces’ operations were generally not encouraging, and so the Naval Staff decided on 7th September that the few ocean-going boats were to operate against shipping.

9. Operational Distribution

At this time all the 22 boats available for Atlantic operations were at sea, with none in reserve. This high figure would not be reached again within the next few months; probably not even within the next year, for the reduction through losses and damage, and the necessary recall of boats for training, could not be compensated by the new boats, which were being commissioned at the rate of about two a month.

The problem arose as to whether it would be more advantageous to distribute the boats equally over the operational area or to concentrate them temporarily in certain regions. If the boats were distributed equally, about one third of the 22 could be sent to the Atlantic at one time. In other words, the Atlantic boats would spend one third of their time refitting, one third proceeding to and from the operational area, and the remainder in that area. Six to eight boats could normally obtain only chance successes; if these boats operated singly, results would be achieved only until Atlantic shipping could be organised into convoys.

While there are so few boats in the operational area it seems advisable to concentrate them with a view to gaining one major success, such as the destruction of a whole convoy (8).

At that time nobody could prophesy how the operational situation would develop. The number of boats ready for operations would vary according to the dockyard periods, nature of repairs, special duties, and the health of the crews. Any planned concentration against shipping would only be possible by retaining boats in port prior to the operation. This would necessarily involve a period of inactivity for some boats, with immunity to shipping. Further loss of operational time would occur when the boats returned to base. The simultaneous arrival of many boats in the overburdened dockyards would prolong the refit and delay the next operation. Thus concentrated operations could only be justified if they showed a high degree of success.

U-boat operations can follow no clear-cut mathematical formula. They depend on various factors, such as the weather, visibility, enemy traffic, and enemy defences. Every planned concentration of U-boats must involve an element of risk. But in view of the inevitable variations in numerical strength it seemed right to build up U-boat waves for concentrated disposition, by holding back single boats as necessary.

If, however, the strategic objective necessitated the use of a very strong U-boat wave, then the orders would have to be issued in plenty of time and the interim drop in shipping losses would have to be accepted.

10. Mine or Torpedo?

In the ground mine the Navy possessed an extremely effective weapon. According to the German specialists, the enemy would for some time be unable to counter it. For this reason it should be laid suddenly on a large scale, before the enemy had a chance to learn how to deal with it (9).

The mine could be laid in depths up to 25-30 metres; therefore only in coastal waters. It could be used in narrow approach channels, off the entrances to harbours, against shipping or naval forces-where U-boats could not remain long enough for torpedo operations, because of the strong patrols and the difficulties of navigation. The mines could be laid undetected in one quick sortie, and as shipping had to be confined to set channels, results seemed certain. With luck the harbours could even be blocked. There would be no point in laying the mines against shipping along the coast until it could be learned by careful observation what navigational restrictions had been imposed on coastal traffic.

It would be appropriate to increase minelaying activity in winter, when the long nights and unfavourable weather prejudiced the torpedo-carrying U-boats’ chances, and when boats with a small radius of action could not be sure of expending their torpedoes before having to return for fuel. In all minelaying operations it was considered that the boats should also carry a limited number of torpedoes in case of a favourable target. In short, they should combine minelaying with torpedo attacks. But the general principle, even with coastal operations, was that the torpedo remained the main weapon of the U-boat, while mining operations would be ordered from time to time, as occasion arose (10).

11. The Prize Regulations

The German Admiralty’s general directive to U-boats was to operate against enemy shipping, while conforming to the terms of the new Prize Regulations. It should here be explained that each U-boat always carried a copy of these Regulations, which laid down the conditions under which shipping could be attacked, and the exact procedure to be adopted in wartime against various categories of ships. These practical instructions for the use of U-boat commanders had only recently been drafted, and were based on the international regulations agreed upon in 1930 by the principal maritime powers, to which Germany had also become a party in 1936.

When war broke out Germany attached importance to the strict observance of these regulations. The circumstances which led to their abrogation are explained in sections 74 to 84 at the end of this chapter.

THE BALTIC

12. Operations

The Navy’s task was to cut off the Polish Naval forces, to control merchant shipping, to carry out unobtrusive reconnaissance and to prevent enemy forces from penetrating into the Baltic and the Kattegat. The U-boats had little prospect of action against the few Polish ships.

The operational plans were drawn up by the Naval Staff in conjunction with Naval Group East. They did not altogether meet the views of S.O. U-boats, who, although agreeing to reconnaissance in the northern Baltic, thought that U-boats off the Gulf of Danzig were not needed against the insignificant Polish naval forces.

The following were the individual tasks:

•    minelaying with three boats (Type VII) off Hela Peninsula to block the route from the Hela Coast against outward bound Polish forces.

•    continuous patrol off Hela by these boats on completion of the minelaying operation.

•    reconnaissance to locate Polish naval forces including minelayers and minesweepers.

•    reconnaissance patrols in the Baltic by fourteen boats of Type II and Type VII; the areas included the Gulf of Finland, the Irben Strait, Gotland, and Kattegat, in conjunction with aircraft (11).

Should Russian aggression result from our operations against Poland, a red is position of U-boats in the Baltic was planned, and all boats carried a sealed operational order against this eventuality. It ordered a concentration in the immediate vicinity of the Gulf of Finland.

13. The Emergency Period

By the middle of August all the U-boats detailed for the above operations were ready. They had either completed their dockyard periods or were in the Baltic on maneuvers with their flotillas. The large U-boats, intended for the Atlantic, prepared for war, while in the Baltic similar orders were received as follows:

•    on 19th August: by all boats of the Third and Fifth U-boat Flotillas, which were to patrol off the Gulf of Finland, Gotland and Irben Strait;

•    on 21st August: by the three U-boats of the Second U-boat Flotilla (Type VII), which were to operate off Hela (minelaying and patrol);

•    on 22nd August: by the three U-boats from the U-boat School, which were to patrol the Kattegat.

The boats were to assemble in Mecklenburg Bight and Rugen.

Not all of these measures were carried into effect. The slackening of the tension in the Baltic -the result of the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia-caused the cancellation on 23 rd August of the reconnaissance patrols in the Gulf of Finland and the Gotland area, though one boat was left there. Seven Type II boats were transferred to the North Sea under the command of S.O. U-boats West, leaving only ten operational boats in the Baltic. On receipt of the order to prepare for Fall Weiss, these