Wellington Against Massena: The Third Invasion of Portugal, 1810–1811

By David Buttery

Wellington's clash with Massena was one of the most remarkable contests between two commanders in the Peninsular War. These two formidable generals carried on a campaign of maneuver, battle and attrition across Spain and Portugal in 1810 and 1811 which had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. Wellington's reputation was enhanced, Massena's was ruined.David Buttery's close analysis of this extraordinary encounter offers a penetrating insight into the personalities of these two outstanding soldiers. Using a variety of sources, in particular eyewitness accounts from both sides, he reassesses the famous confrontations at Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Busaco, the lines of Torres Vedras and the final bitterly fought battle at Fuentes de Ooro.He sheds new light on this pivotal episode in the Napoleonic Wars and his account corrects the one-sided view of the campaign that has survived to the present day. In particular he reconsiders the true cost of the scorched earth policy that was employed against the French

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jul 19, 2007
• ISBN: 9781781597156

David Buttery

David Buttery has established a reputation as a leading historian of nineteenth-century British military history and he has made a particular study of the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars.He has worked as a tour guide for several companies and has led tours of the Waterloo campaign battlefields.

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First published in Great Britain in 2007 by

Pen & Sword Military

An imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

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Copyright © David Buttery, 2007

ISBN 1 84415 484 X

Digital Edition ISBN: 978 1 84468 361 1

The right of David Buttery to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

List of plates

List of maps

Chronology

Preface

Chapter 1   THE PENINSULAR WAR

Chapter 2   SON OF THE ARISTOCRACY

Chapter 3   CHILD OF VICTORY

Chapter 4   THE KEY TO PORTUGAL

Chapter 5   THE THIRD INVASION

Chapter 6   BUSAÇO RIDGE

Chapter 7   QUE DIABLE!

Chapter 8   THE RETREAT

Chapter 9   A LAST CHANCE

Chapter 10   THE MOST DANGEROUS HOUR OF THE WAR

Chapter 11   THE END OF THE OLD FOX

Chapter 12   TOURING THE PENINSULA

Notes

Bibliography

List of plates

(between pages 112 and 113)

1. Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington.

2. Marshal André Massena.

3. The Convent at Mafra.

4. A typical view of the border region.

5. The western side of Ciudad Rodrigo.

6. Ciudad Rodrigo’s impressive defences.

7. A French storming party ascends the breach at Ciudad Rodrigo.

8. The gorge of the River Côa.

9. The bridge over the River Côa.

10. The devastation of the land by the Allies.

11,12 & 14. Resistance in Iberia led to a cycle of atrocity and reprisal during French occupation.

13. The French encounter difficulties maintaining lines of communication.

15. The gateway of São Francisco.

16. Marshal Michel Ney.

17. Craufurd’s Rock above Sula village.

18. Portugal’s monument to the slain at Busaço.

19. Massena’s narrow escape at the Lines of Torres Vedras.

20. A typical redoubt in the Lines of Torres Vedras.

21. Fort St. Julien.

22. The house where Wellington maintained his headquarters to monitor the Lines of Torres Vedras.

23. The Portuguese Hercules monument commemorating the lines that saved Lisbon.

24. Napoleon hears of Massena’s difficulties from General Foy.

25. A footbridge over the Dos Casas at Fuentes de Oñoro.

26. The old village of Fuentes de Oñoro.

27. The church of Fuentes de Oñoro.

28. Massena’s withdrawal from Portugal.

29. Craufurd and Houston conducted a masterful retreat across the plain.

List of maps

1. The Iberian Peninsula 1808–1814.

2. The Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

3. The Combat on the Côa.

4. The Siege of Almeida.

5. Reynier’s Attack at Busaço.

6. Ney’s Attack at Busaço.

7. The Lines of Torres Vedras.

8. The Combat at Sabugal.

9. Fuentes de Oñoro, 4 May 1811.

10. Fuentes de Oñoro, 5 May 1811.

Map symbols

INFANTRY

    British

    French

    Portuguese

CAVALRY

    British

    French

    Portuguese

ARTILLERY

Chronology

Preface

The Third Invasion of Portugal marked a turning point in the Peninsular War, a struggle that played a crucial part in the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte and his Empire. Fought in an isolated and hostile region, it witnessed the clash of two of Europe’s finest generals, with neither gaining the upper hand until the end of the campaign. Though Wellington’s past is well known, this work examines the background of André Massena in some detail, whose origins and character are somewhat mysterious and controversial. It also examines their clash at Fuentes de Oñoro, the relevance of which is often overlooked, being one of the closest of Wellington’s career. With the current level of interest in the Peninsular War, I feel that there is a place for a reexamination of this fascinating campaign, which played such a key role in the long Iberian conflict.

I have received considerable assistance in the research and production of this book and feel obliged to thank a number of organisations and individuals. The staff of the British Library were very helpful and many of the rare books I have used, particularly from the French side of the conflict, would have been unavailable without access to their collection. The archives of the National Army Museum have also proved useful, providing several primary sources from eyewitnesses. As a former student, the University of Leicester’s library staff were extremely helpful, especially in providing access to newspaper and journal sources. I would particularly like to thank David Charlton, whose help and advice is much appreciated.

I would like to thank my colleagues Christopher Poole and Matt Coote for their advice on computer programmes when I designed the maps to accompany this work. Though I possess a fair knowledge of computers, their suggestions and comments were very useful during a long and occasionally frustrating task.

No thanks can be enough for Stuart Hadaway, a fellow historian whose views and opinions I have always valued and respected. We made a good team during our trip to the Peninsula and without his assistance I could never have found and visited as many sites as I did in what is still a remote and difficult region. His knowledge of the Napoleonic era has been invaluable during our many discussions, and he allowed me access to his personal collection of Peninsular War volumes.

I would like to thank Pauline Buttery for reading through the manuscript and picking up all those little typographical errors that hound every aspiring writer. Having worked in a provincial newspaper for many years, I appreciate the value of good proofreading and still consider such ‘quality control’ to be the most important job in the publishing industry. Even in the days of computerised spelling and grammar checks, no writer can do without a second pair of eyes that might catch embarrassing errors he has overlooked. I would also like to thank her for helping me with French translation, as her grasp of the language is considerably superior to my own.

Finally I would like to thank Rupert Harding and Pen and Sword Books for allowing me the chance to bring my work to a wider readership. After picking up a taste for writing at university it has been my dream to write a book and I am extremely grateful for the opportunity. I hope that all those I have mentioned will look over this work and consider it worthwhile.

David Buttery

June 2006

Chapter 1

The Peninsular War

In 1807 Napoleon Bonaparte had reached the zenith of his power in Europe. Born in relative obscurity on the isle of Corsica, the French Revolution enabled him to rise with stunning rapidity through military talent, political opportunism and unwavering ambition. During the Revolutionary Wars, France fought to maintain her borders and preserve the new republic and, as one of her foremost generals, Bonaparte’s influence increased until he overthrew the Directorate in the coup d’ état of 18 Brumaire 1799. Though initially sharing power, as First Consul he rapidly began to assume the status of a dictator. As his popularity grew, many Frenchmen were persuaded to accept a strong leader, fearing the old monarchies of Europe who despised the young republic and wishing to avoid the terror and corruption that typified the Revolution’s seedy aftermath. By 1804 Napoleon felt confident enough to crown himself Emperor and his coronation took place at N ôtre Dame on 2 December.

France had been in a state of almost continual warfare since 1792, but the wars now took on a different character. Defending French interests alone was no longer enough for the ambitious new Emperor, who wished to make France the dominant European power. He believed that maintaining supremacy was closely inter-linked with imperialism and military success:

My power depends on my glory and my glory on the victories I have won. My power will fall if I do not feed it on new glories and new victories. Conquest has made me what I am and only conquest can enable me to hold my position.¹

With much of Europe opposed to France, Bonaparte had ample opportunity to put this theory to the test. Britain remained an implacable foe of French expansionism, so the invasion and subjugation of England became his first objective. However, the catastrophic defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleets at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 saw this operation postponed indefinitely.

Over the next three years Napoleon demonstrated his military genius by inflicting a series of crushing defeats on the foremost land powers in Europe. In 1805 the French Grande Armée marched from their base at Boulogne, where they were massed for the abortive invasion of England, and brought a new kind of warfare to Europe. Napoleon had restructured the army, dividing it into independent corps capable of rapid movement and yet strong enough to hold their own against considerable numbers until reinforced. His theories of war relied on swift marches and lightning strikes, intended to bring the enemy to a decisive battle as quickly as possible. The Austrians were caught off guard by the speed of French manoeuvres and General Mack was surrounded and forced to surrender with around 27,000 men in a relatively bloodless victory at Ulm in Bavaria.

On 2 December 1805, Napoleon won his greatest victory at Austerlitz, defeating the combined armies of Russia and Austria, who quickly sued for peace. In a tactical triumph, Napoleon lured the Allies into attacking him by abandoning the key strategic position of the Pratzen Heights. His carefully planned counter-attack enabled him to cut off his assailants’ overextended assaults and inflict crippling losses, driving his enemies into headlong retreat. The political will to oppose Bonaparte crumbled, leaving the Third Coalition in tatters. The effect of the French victory was aptly summed up by British Prime Minister William Pitt’s prophetic remark upon seeing a map of Europe: ‘Roll up that map; it will not be wanted these ten years.’² Ten hours of bloodletting at Austerlitz had dashed his hopes of stopping the French and the terrible news reputedly hastened the great statesman’s death.

The following year Napoleon shocked the Continent when he defeated the Prussians at Jena, since their army was thought to be amongst the finest in Europe after Frederick the Great’s reforms. Frederick William III was eventually forced to concede humiliating terms to the French, with the Prussian army virtually destroyed. Russia had once again declared war against France and the costly battle of Eylau, fought in severe winter conditions, proved indecisive. However, the French won a conclusive victory at Friedland in 1807 and Tsar Alexander I made peace at Tilsit between 7–9 July 1807. Meeting on a raft in the middle of the River Niemen, the two monarchs agreed terms that saw France become the dominant power on the Continent. Prussia lost considerable territory and various states were divided between France and her allies. Most importantly, Alexander agreed to reverse his old allegiances and join France in a trade agreement against Britain, known as the Continental System. Britain’s overwhelming naval superiority made a sea-borne invasion unlikely to succeed, so Napoleon hoped to close Continental ports to the British in an attempt to damage their economy.

However, Russia and France were still divided over several important issues and some clauses in the treaty were left deliberately vague. For example, although Napoleon promised some assistance against the Turkish Sultan, he would never allow Russia to seize Constantinople, thereby gaining strategic access to the Mediterranean. From the Russian point of view, French enthusiasm for an independent Poland was anathema to the Tsar, who wished to keep the recalcitrant Poles firmly under Russian control and feared a French client state so far to the east. Thus, despite some common interest, Russia was always a reluctant ally, brought to the negotiating table by force of arms. The longevity of the alliance was very much dependent upon future events. Nevertheless, this treaty made France the foremost state in Europe and only one significant foe remained – Great Britain.

Britain refused to make peace with France until the balance of power had been restored in Europe. Austria, Prussia and Russia had been subdued by the seemingly unstoppable French army and many small countries had become mere vassal states of France, Napoleon’s influence being so great that he could impose members of his family as kings and queens over them.³ Politically it was dangerous for the old order to allow upstarts like the Bonaparte clan to create a new royal dynasty, as it set an alarming precedent. Furthermore, allowing Napoleon to remain as the virtual master of Europe was unthinkable for the British.

In 1807 the two nations had reached a strategic stalemate. With the breadth of the English Channel and the dominance of the Royal Navy at sea, Britain was virtually impregnable. Yet her navy was incapable of defeating a land-based, largely self-sustaining empire by blockade, and the defeat of the formidable French army, totalling nearly a quarter of a million men, could only be achieved through direct military intervention on the Continent. Though the new Continental System would need time to take effect, many countries were hostile or at least ambivalent towards Britain, and her mercantile interests could be severely damaged if the war became a lengthy struggle. Although the French had suffered a crushing defeat at Trafalgar, given time Napoleon could rebuild the fleet and potentially cross the Channel. Prime Minister William Portland realised that the need for a swift conclusion was imperative and the current policy of conducting small sea-borne raids was proving ineffective. Lord Melville’s reminiscences in 1814 are revealing in this regard, when he acknowledged that given sufficient time Napoleon would:

… have sent forth such powerful fleets that our navy must eventually have been destroyed since we could never have kept pace with him in building ships or in equipping numbers sufficient to cope with the tremendous power he could have brought against us.’ ⁴

This fact was well known to Napoleon, despite his general ignorance of naval warfare. Though committed to economic warfare against Great Britain, he never entirely relinquished the idea of crossing the twenty miles of strait between France and England and inflicting a military defeat on his oldest enemy. The British fleet possessed about 104 ships of the line, but many of these were needed on the far side of the Atlantic or in the Indian Ocean, protecting British colonies and interests. If the French possessed odds of three to one, the Royal Navy could be destroyed or at least kept occupied while troops were ferried across the Channel. The combined French and Dutch fleet had around seventy-five battleships in 1807. Allied Spain could contribute a further thirty and Russia potentially had twenty-four to lend. Admittedly, a further 129 warships would be required for total superiority, but, in addition to building further vessels, the Danish possessed seventeen battleships and the Portuguese had ten. One of the secret clauses agreed in the treaty in Tilsit permitted Napoleon to acquire these fleets from their rightful owners.⁵ Britain’s bombardment of neutral Copenhagen in August 1807 and the forcible seizure of the Danish fleet revealed that the British were aware of the threat and made Portugal’s navy even more important.

Therefore, Napoleon had several motives for sending a military expedition to the Peninsula. Portugal openly flouted the commercial agreements France wished to impose on Europe, continuing a thriving trade with Great Britain, and Napoleon coveted her navy. Furthermore, as one of Britain’s oldest Continental allies, the Portuguese might let the English land troops on her shores, enabling them to secure a foothold in Europe. Significantly, the country was already used as a stopping-off point and unofficial base for British naval operations in the Mediterranean. In political and strategic terms, Napoleon viewed Portugal as a British colony in all but name and an invasion would be a direct attack on British interests.

Prince Regent John of Portugal was soon made aware of French designs on his country through the French and Spanish ambassadors, and desperately tried to avert the forthcoming war. The Portuguese royal house of Braganza was in an unenviable position when faced with the threat of French expansionism. The Portuguese army was in a deplorable state and certainly incapable of withstanding an invasion by the foremost army of Europe. However, Portugal