The Retreat of Western Liberalism
By Edward Luce
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About this ebook
In his widely acclaimed book Time to Start Thinking, Financial Times columnist Edward Luce charted the course of America’s economic and geopolitical decline, proving to be a prescient voice on the state of the nation.
In The Retreat of Western Liberalism, Luce makes a larger statement about the weakening of western hegemony and the crisis of democratic liberalism—of which Donald Trump and his European counterparts are not the cause, but a symptom. Luce argues that we are on a menacing trajectory brought about by ignorance of what it took to build the West, arrogance toward society’s economic losers, and complacency about our system’s durability—attitudes that have been emerging since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unless the West can rekindle an economy that produces gains for the majority of its people, its political liberties may be doomed.
Combining on-the-ground reporting with economic analysis, Luce offers a detailed projection of the consequences of the Trump administration and a forward-thinking analysis of what those who believe in enlightenment values must do to protect them.
Edward Luce
Edward Luce was a speech writer for the Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers and now works as the chief U.S. columnist for the Financial Times. He is the author of the national best seller In Spite of the Gods, and lives in Washington, D.C.
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Reviews for The Retreat of Western Liberalism
52 ratings3 reviews
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Not exactly sure what I learned from this book, or how it might have changed me, but I liked it. Basically a centrist rant about the current social situation, but well-written and brief.
- Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Retreat of Western Liberalism (2017) is more of a long essay. The page count is over 200 but probably due to font or margins, it's really about a 125-150 page book. It makes a good case that what we're seeing with Trump and elsewhere is part of a bigger trend and there is probably worse to come. Nothing new there but insightful.
- Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Luce focuses primarily on the decline of American power, economic influence and standing but also reviews the falling fortunes of Western European countries including Britain, Germany and France. The election of Donald Trump has further weakened our democracy and and trust by our allies. Trump has candidly said that he will put America first. Our allies may not be able to count on America for military or economic support. The analysis from this book is not exactly shocking if one watches or reads the news. But Luce does connect the dots and envisions that the Chinese will soon be the predominant power in the world.
Listed below are some of the sections that I highlighted from the book:
"Economists are notorious for getting the future wrong (just as they are peerless at
explaining the past). The joke is that they have predicted ten out of the last five recessions. In recent years, during what is now called the age of hyperglobalisation, bad forecasting has erred in the opposite direction. Economists have consistently predicted growth where none has materialised.
It was an Atlantic recession. In 2009, China’s economy grew by almost 10 per cent, and India’s by almost 8 percent.
Today, the US median income is still below where it was at the beginning of this century. Clearly what the typical American understands by growth differs greatly from that of macroeconomists.
To be clear: the West’s souring mood is about the psychology of dashed expectations rather than the decline in material comforts.
There is now a higher share of French males in fulltime jobs than Americans – a statistic that reflects poorly on America, rather than well on France.
Having hundreds of Facebook friends is no substitute for seeing people.
The fastest growing units in the big Western companies are the legal and public relations departments. Big companies devote the bulk of their earnings to buying back shares and boosting dividend payments. They no longer invest anything like what they used to in research and development.
America, in particular, which had traditionally shown the highest-class mobility of any Western country, now has the lowest. Today it is rarer for a poor American to become rich than a poor Briton, which means the American dream is less likely to be realized in America.
Little wonder the tone of our politics has shifted so markedly from hope to nostalgia.
Similarly, every single one of America’s 493 wealthiest counties, almost all of them urban, voted for Hillary Clinton. The remaining 2623 counties, most of them suburban or small town,
went for Donald Trump.
A third of Americans who graduated in STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and maths) are in jobs that do not require any such qualification.
Almost three quarters of independent workers in the US report serious difficulties in chasing up what they are owed.
The world now has twenty-five fewer democracies than it did at the turn of the century.
To put it more bluntly: when inequality is high, the rich fear the mob. In early 2016 I had an eye-popping conversation with a very big name from New York. He argued that there should be a general knowledge test for voters to screen out all the ‘low information voters’. He estimated the franchise test would cut the electorate in half.
The UFC is to popular culture what Trump is to politics – a brutal and unforgiving breed of show business.
During the campaign, one journalist summarized the gap between the heartland view of Trump, and that of the liberal elites as follows: ‘the press take him literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.”
As Western democracy has come into question, so too has its global power. America’s loss has been relative: its share of world GDP has declined. It has also devalued its global credibility by prosecuting reckless wars in the false name of democracy.
But I believe that protecting society’s weakest from arbitrary misfortune is the ultimate test of our civilizational worth. It seems blindingly obvious that universal healthcare ought to be a basic shield against the vicissitudes of an increasingly volatile labour market.
Book preview
The Retreat of Western Liberalism - Edward Luce
ALSO BY EDWARD LUCE
In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India
Time to Start Thinking: America and the Spectre of Decline
IllustrationCopyright © 2017 by Edward Luce
Jacket design by Duncan Spilling - L,BBG
Fig. 1, The Elephant Chart
, printed with the permission of Branko Milanovic.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review. Scanning, uploading, and electronic distribution of this book or the facilitation of such without the permission of the publisher is prohibited. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions, and do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated. Any member of educational institutions wishing to photocopy part or all of the work for classroom use, or anthology, should send inquiries to Grove Atlantic, 154 West 14th Street, New York, NY 10011 or permissions@groveatlantic.com
First published in Great Britain in 2017 by Little, Brown
Published simultaneously in Canada
Printed in the United States of America
First Grove Atlantic hardcover edition: June 2017
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication data available for this title.
ISBN 978-0-8021-2739-6
eISBN 978-0-8021-8886-1
Atlantic Monthly Press
an imprint of Grove Atlantic
154 West 14th Street
New York, NY 10011
Distributed by Publishers Group West
groveatlantic.com
CONTENTS
Preface
1 Fusion
2 Reaction
3 Fallout
4 Half Life
Notes
Acknowledgements
Index
PREFACE
We learn from history that we do not learn from history.
FRIEDRICH HEGEL
Agaggle of students are driving at high speed to Berlin. ‘Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very heaven,’ wrote Wordsworth about the French Revolution. The poet’s sentiments captured our mood. The year was 1989. Having grown up under the Cold War’s nuclear shadow, the temptation to catch a glimpse of its physical demise was irresistible. Being students, we did not inform anyone of our absence. The instant we heard East Germany had opened Checkpoint Charlie, uniting Berlin, we were on our way. Four hours later we had boarded a ferry from Dover to Zeebrugge. Within eighteen hours we too – three boys and two girls – were chipping at that wall alongside tens of thousands of others, young and old, German and foreign. With chisels and pickaxes we made our tiny contributions to this orgy of historic vandalism. Friendships were forged with people whom we had never met, nor would again. One group of West Berliners hugged us and shared their bottle of champagne. Could there have been a more fitting way to toast the new era than with champagne from strangers? Two days later we returned to England, chronically hungover, astonished to have avoided any speeding tickets, carrying a small chunk of the wall apiece. I have since mislaid my souvenir. But my tutor, who had noted my absence, was mollified by my excuse. ‘I suppose it’s better than the alternatives,’ he said when I showed him my bit of the wall. ‘Did you have fun?’
We were infected with optimism. As a student of Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford University, I imagined that I possessed the key to the historic significance of the moment. PPE’s detractors called it a Pretty Poor Education. They may have had a point. But in that moment, all the late-night essay crises seemed to come together. A less derogatory phrase for PPE is Modern Greats, in reference to Oxford’s venerable Greats degree in classics. In content, there is little comparison: Sophocles’ tragedies bear scant relation to the desiccated logic of Oxford economics. But they share a conceit about the primacy of Western thought. On this, if little else, there is no quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. We called it progress, or rather Progress – belief in which is the closest thing the modern West has to a religion. In 1989 its schism was healed. By unifying its booming western wing with the shrivelled post-Stalinist eastern one, there was no longer any quarrel between the present and the present.
Shortly before the Berlin Wall fell, Francis Fukuyama published his famous essay, ‘The End of History?’. ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War . . . but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,’ he wrote.1 Though I did not subscribe to Fukuyama’s view of the ideal society I shared his relief. A monumental roadblock had been cleared from our future. No longer would nuclear-armed ideological camps face each other across the twentieth-century bloodlands of central Europe. That riven continent, from which Britain no longer stood aloof, would unify. Democracies would take the place of the Warsaw Pact, whose regimes were falling like dominoes to peaceful demonstrators. It was not just autocracy that was dying but nationalism. Borders were opening up. Global horizons beckoned. A unipolar world was dawning. At a stroke, and without a shot being fired, our generation was staging the funeral rites for the twin scourges of Western modernity, communism and fascism. As the historian Eric Hobsbawm was to write, the short and genocidal twentieth century, which began with the Russian revolution in 1917, came to an end in 1989.2 Though still alive, history was smiling. The human species had proved it could learn from its mistakes. It was a good year to turn twenty-one.
Nearly three decades later, in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory, I found myself in Moscow. I had been invited to attend a conference on the ‘polycentric world order’, which is Russian for ‘post-American world’. The conference was hosted by the Primakov Institute, named after the man who had been Russia’s foreign minister and prime minister during the 1990s. Yevgeny Primakov was displaced as prime minister in 1999 by Vladimir Putin. While my friends and I had danced on the rubble of the Berlin Wall, a brooding Putin had watched his world crumbling from 130 miles away, at his KGB office in Dresden, a city in what was still East Germany. Later he would describe the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century’. It was Primakov who championed the term multipolarity in what at the time seemed like a vain bid to dampen America’s oceanic post-Cold War triumphalism. Putin picked up the concept and made it his own. As the world’s one indispensable power, Americans never warmed to the idea of multipolarity. Such was Washington’s self-confidence that it even came to disdain the word multilateralism. As Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State in the late 1990s, put it, ‘It has too many syllables and ends with an ism
.’
Now here I was in Moscow at an event attended by the likes of Alexander Bortnikov, head of the FSB (successor to the KGB), and Vladimir Putin himself. Though unsmiling, it was Russia’s turn to celebrate. The institute had sent me its invitation several months earlier and I had promptly forgotten about it. On 9 November, the morning after the US presidential election, as I tried to make sense of the dawning new reality I recalled that invitation. By eerie coincidence, it was twenty-seven years to the day since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The worm had turned. America had just elected a president who was a big fan of walls and a big admirer of Vladimir Putin. While Putin was surveying his wrecked world in 1989, and we were racing down the Autobahn, Donald Trump was launching a board game. It was called Trump: The Game. With its fake paper money and property-based rules, it bore an uncanny resemblance to Monopoly – except that the number six on the dice was replaced with the letter T. Unsurprisingly, it was a flop. There is no record that Trump said anything positive or negative about the fall of the Berlin Wall. At any rate, all that seemed a long time ago. America had just elected a man who admired the way politics was done in Russia. His campaign had even profited from Moscow’s assistance. Would the Russians kindly agree to my belated acceptance? They would indeed.
What followed was a crash course in how to see the world very differently. Still a student of history, though I hope by now a more sceptical one, I was struck by how often our Russian hosts referred admiringly to the Congress of Vienna. That was the 1814–15 conference that sealed the end of the Napoleonic Wars and launched almost a century of stability, which held until the outbreak of the First World War. The new order was underwritten by the Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and, most importantly, Russia. Trump’s victory had opened up the prospect that Russia could return to its historic role as a great power in a polycentric world – one in which each happily forswore doing anything to undermine the internal legitimacy of any other. No more talk of the inevitability of democracy, or the US-led global order. That was what Putin craved. As for Crimea, which Putin annexed in 2014, inviting a spider’s web of US-led sanctions, its absorption back into the motherland was now an irreversible fact. Crimea was only returning to the status it had before 1954, when Moscow, in a fit of administrative generosity, had transferred it to the then Soviet republic of Ukraine. John Kerry, the US Secretary of State under Obama, had condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea from the now-independent Ukraine as a violation of history: ‘You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on [a] completely trumped-up pretext,’ he said. But that is how the world often works. The US had done that to Iraq in the twenty-first century. In Moscow’s view, history is back and nothing is inevitable, least of all liberal democracy. Others, in Beijing, Ankara, Cairo, Caracas, and even Budapest, share Russia’s hostility to Western notions of progress, as do growing numbers of apostates in the West. Are they wrong?
This book is my attempt to answer that question. Let me declare now that nothing is pre-ordained. To a person whose life has coincided with the rise of democracy, the spread of market economics and signs that the world had finally subscribed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (even if much of it is paid only in lip service – hypocrisy, as they say, being the compliment vice pays to virtue), merely to pose the question is troubling enough. Wasn’t that debate settled a long time ago? Isn’t the march of human freedom unstoppable? Doesn’t the whole world crave to be Western? We can no longer have any confidence in that. It was remarkably arrogant to believe the rest of the world would passively adopt our script. Those who still believe in the inevitable triumph of the Western model might ask themselves whether it is faith, rather than facts, that fuels their worldview. We must cast a sceptical eye on what we have learned never to question. Our sanity may be tested in the process.
At stake is a quasi-religious reading of Western history that stretches back to the Magna Carta, whose octocentennial was celebrated at Runnymede in 2015. By limiting the power of the king, the Magna Carta set a precedent for what would later be known as ‘no taxation without representation’. This short medieval document was lost to the mists for several hundred years – Shakespeare did not even mention it in his play King John. Yet since the seventeenth century, when the Magna Carta was dusted off by opponents of Stuart tyranny in England, then made its way to America’s thirteen colonies, it has morphed into the founding myth of Western liberalism. As Dan Jones, an historian of the Magna Carta, describes it, the year 1215 is today seen as the ‘year zero’ of Western liberalism.3 It was cited as an inspiration by the Founding Fathers, by anti-colonial movements around the world, and is now finally celebrated in Britain itself. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued after the Second World War, Eleanor Roosevelt said that it ‘may well become the international Magna Carta for all men everywhere’. That this covenant between John and his rebellious nobles lasted for only two months, awarded fixed privileges to the aristocracy and limited the rights of women and Jews, should give us some pause. Rather than a springboard to liberty, the Magna Carta was a messy expediency between a temporarily weakened king and his restive nobles. It quickly expired. That it is today so prized – a copy sits next to the Declaration of Independence in the US National Archives – is a measure of our amnesia. If the intellectual basis of Western liberalism is scepticism, we should learn to live up to its meaning.
We should be particularly wary of the siren song of history. George Santayana famously said, ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’. The idea of history as a separate force with a mind of its own is a bedtime story to help us sleep. ‘History as contingency is a prospect that is more than the human spirit can bear,’ said Robert Heilbroner, the late American economist. For centuries, Westerners have taken a linear view of history, in which time is always marching us towards a happier place. The Greeks called it teleology. For Christians, it was the Second Coming of Christ and the Day of Judgement. For Marxists, it was the dictatorship of the proletariat followed by the withering away of the state. For European nationalists, it was seizing control of their Volk destiny. For Georgian and Victorian liberals on both sides of the Atlantic, and their modern heirs across the Western world, it was the progress of human liberty to individual freedom. In 1989 most people believed that last version. The others were either dead or in retreat. Today, only Marxism remains dormant. Belief in an authoritarian version of national destiny is staging a powerful comeback. Western liberalism is under siege.
More to the point, non-Western visions of history, which were overshadowed by colonial rule but never forgotten, are staking their pressing claim to relevance. In very different ways, China and India have traditionally taken a circular view of history. They still do. Material conditions may improve. But humanity’s moral condition is constant. There is no spiritual or political finale towards which history is guiding us. To the rest of the world, which accounts for almost nine-tenths of humanity, most of whom are now finally starting to catch up with the West’s material advantages, humankind’s moral progress is a question that can never be settled. History does not end. It is a timeless repetition of human folly and correction. It follows that there is no single model of how to organise society. Who, barring those of religious faith, can say that view is wrong?
But the most mortal threat to the Western idea of progress comes from within. Donald Trump, and his counterparts in Europe, did not cause the crisis of democratic liberalism. They are a symptom. This may be hard to digest, particularly for American liberals, whose worldview has been shaken by his victory yet who retain faith that things will eventually turn out fine. Many comfort themselves that Trump’s victory was an accident delivered by the dying gasp of America’s white majority – and abetted by Putin. History will resume normal business after a brief interruption. How I wish they were right. I fear they are not. Since the turn of the millennium, and particularly over the last decade, no fewer than twenty-five democracies have failed around the world, three of them in Europe (Russia, Turkey and Hungary). In all but Tunisia, the Arab Spring was swallowed by the summer heat. Is the Western god of liberal democracy failing? ‘It is an open question whether this is a market correction in democracy, or a global depression,’ Francis Fukuyama tells me.4 The backlash of the West’s middle classes, who are the biggest losers in a global economy that has been rapidly converging, but still has decades to go, has been brewing since the early 1990s. In Britain we call them the ‘left-behinds’. In France, they are the ‘couches moyennes’. In America, they are the ‘squeezed middle’. A better term is the ‘precariat’ – those whose lives are dominated by economic insecurity. Their weight of numbers is growing. So, too, is their impatience. Barrington Moore, the American sociologist, famously said, ‘No bourgeoisie, no democracy.’ In the coming years we will find out if he was right.
This book is divided into four parts. The first, Fusion, explains the integration of the global economy and the radical impact that is having on Western economies. By any numerical measure, humanity is becoming rapidly less poor. But between