The Hourglass: A History of the 7th Infantry Division in World War II

By Edmund G. Love

Originally published in 1950 by Infantry Journal Press as the official unit history for the 7th Infantry Division in World War II. Details on the unit as follows. Activated: 1 July 1940. Overseas: 24 April 1943. Campaigns: Aleutian Islands, Leyte, Eastern Mandates, Ryukyus. Days of combat: 208. Elements of the 7th Infantry Division first saw combat in the amphibious assault on Attu, western-most Japanese entrenchment in the Aleutian chain. Elements landed, 11 May 1943, and fought a bitter battle over freezing tundra against fanatically resisting Japanese, finally defeating the Japanese at Chichagof Harbor...With the Aleutians secured, the Division moved to Hawaii, where it trained in amphibious landing technique and in jungle warfare. On 31 January 1944 the Division landed on islands in the Kwajalein Atoll in conjunction with the 4th Marine Division, and in a week of heavy fighting, wrested them from the Japanese. Elements took part in the capture of Engebi in the Eniwetok Atoll, 18 Feb. 1944. The Division then moved to Oahu, T. H., remaining there until mid-Sep. when it sailed to join the assault on the Philippines. On 20 Oct. 1944, the Division made an assault landing at Dulag, Leyte, and after heavy fighting secured airstrips at Dulag, San Pablo, and Buri. The troops moved north to take Dagami, 29 Oct., and then shifted to the west coast of Leyte, 26 November, and attacked north toward Ormoc, securing Valencia, 25 Dec.. An amphibious landing by the 77th Infantry Division effected the capture of Ormoc, 11 Dec. 1944, and the 7th joined in its occupation. Mopping up operations continued until early February 1945. Next D-day for the Division was 1 Apr. 1945, when it made an assault landing on Okinawa. It drove from the west to the east coast on the first day and engaged in a savage 51-day battle in the hills of southern Okinawa. Shoulder patch: Red circular patch bearing black hour glass which is formed by inverted "7" and superimposed "7".—Print ed.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Barakaldo Books
• Release date: May 8, 2020
• ISBN: 9781839744716

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

The Hourglass

A HISTORY OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

BY

EDMUND G. LOVE

Table of Contents

Contents

Table of Contents 6

H-hour Prayer 7

Historian’s Note 8

Maps 9

PART 1 — Before Attu 10

A Fighting Division 10

PART 2 — Attu 13

Planning for Attu 13

Operations at Red Beach 22

Landings at Massacre Bay 26

The Battle for Jarmin Pass 29

The Capture of Holtz Bay 35

Reduction of Clevesy Pass 42

The Drive to Chichagof 50

The Attack on Fish Hook 54

Buffalo Ridge and Point Four 70

The Counterattack 74

Kiska 84

PART 3 — Kwajalein 87

Preparing for Flintlock 87

The Channel and Artillery Islands 94

First Day on Kwajalein 102

The Attack of 2 February 102

The Third Day 102

Kwajalein Island Secured 102

The Capture of Adjacent Island 102

PART 4 — Leyte 102

The Island of Leyte 102

Planning for King II 102

Establishment of the Beachhead 102

Expansion of the Beachhead 102

The Battle of the Stone Bridge 102

The Capture of Dagami 102

The Capture of Buri Airfield 102

The Move to the West Coast 102

The Battle of Shoestring Ridge 102

The Battle of the Ridge Lines 102

PART 5 — Okinawa and Victory 102

Planning for Iceberg 102

The Landing on Okinawa 102

Outposts of the Shuri Defenses 102

The First Assault on Shuri 102

The Second Assault on Shuri 102

Chimney Crag and the Salad Bowl 102

Still Inch by Inch 102

The Counterattack 102

Envelopment and Conquest of Shuri 102

Night Attack and Expansion 102

South of Conical at Last 102

The Enemy’s Last Stand 102

The Battle for the Coral Heads 102

Okinawa Secured 102

PART 6 — Appendix 102

Medal of Honor Awards 102

Distinguished Unit Citations 102

Division Organization 102

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 102

H-hour Prayer

O Lord, I ask Thee not that Thou forgive me,

I ask Thee not for everlasting life.

I thanked Thee not when Thou gave peace and plenty.

I’ll ask Thee not to spare me through the strife.

I only ask if this day be the last day

I go to meet my Maker as a man.

And though the hand of fear may grip me tightly,

О Lord, please help me do the best I can.

SAMUEL STEPHENS

1st Battalion, 17th Infantry

Historian’s Note

A HISTORIAN, NO MATTER WHAT HIS SUBJECT, SUFFERS FROM having to limit his account to the past—recalling what has gone before. He cannot be concerned with the vivid actions of the present or bright hopes of the future. Minds grow hazy on old circumstances and memories distort facts. Innumerable incidents of human interest, stories of great personalities, tales of personal or small group exploits must be omitted from a chronicle of the activities of a division, because they necessarily would be colored and even prejudiced. There are too many happenings that the historian cannot know—small, but important; many events, tales, incidents that are personal property of the small group affected.

Therefore, this history of the 7th Infantry Division is an attempt at cold facts. Official files and records have been the principal source of its material. It is believed this is the best way, allowing each man who has been a member of this unit to put into these pages—read between the lines—his own memories, secrets, problems, fun—his own personal life with the 7th Infantry Division.

This narrative was prepared from official records of the 7th Infantry Division, from interviews with members of the 7th Infantry Division in the field, and from personal observation of the Division in action. The author wishes to thank Col. S. L. A. Marshall for his help many years ago in teaching him how to write the combat history of a division in action and for use of material in this book. The author also wishes to thank Capt. Russell A. Gugeler for allowing the use of portions of his work, The 7th Division on Okinawa, in the preparation of this history. Without Captain Gugeler’s excellent monograph it would have been impossible to tell of the eighty-two days the Division spent in the line in that last battle. The author wishes to thank Brig.-Gen. Wayne C. Zimmerman, Col. John M. Finn, Lt.-Col. Robert Fergusson, and all the others who gave their time and help in reviewing the manuscript.

E. G. L.

Maps

Aleutian Islands

Operations on Attu

Kwajalein Atoll (Carillon)

Gea Island (Carter)

Gehh Island (Chauncey)

Kwajalein Island (Porcelain)

Ebeye Island (Burton)

Philippine Islands

Leyte Island

Shoestring Ridge

Island of Okinawa

Tenth Army Advance

The Drive to the South

The Pinnacle

Skyline Ridge

Closing in on Shuri

Last Stand on Okinawa

PART 1 — Before Attu

A Fighting Division

THERE ARE SOME THINGS THAT A MAN CAN ATTEST TO FROM LONG and intimate observation. There are other things of which he can write only from hearsay. In going back over the period of the 7th Infantry Division’s existence between the time of its activation on 6 July 1940 and the day it sailed for the Aleutians in April 1943, T find much that should be told, but little that I can visualize. I find early attempts at a Division history referring to the Hourglass as the California Division. I find constant references to the long period in the Mojave Desert in 1942. There is much talk of Fort Ord. I suppose these things are as much a part of the 7th Division as Attu, Kwajalein, Leyte, or Okinawa, but I find it hard to believe.

The 7th Division may still refer to itself as the California Division. Certainly a large proportion of its men came from California, and up until the time it sailed from San Francisco almost its entire existence had been spent in the great states on the Pacific, but by the time it finished at Hill 89 I don’t think anyone had mentioned that title for a long time. After eighty-two days on the line between the Hagushi beaches and Mabuni it was simply The Division. Everyone on the island of Okinawa took pride in the 7th, including the Marines. The truth is that the 7th Division was a fighting outfit that had proven itself long since. The qualities that made it such a splendid machine didn’t come from California particularly. They came from the United States as a whole. They came from Vinegar Joe Stilwell, from Wayne Zimmerman, from Graydon Kickul, from Archie Arnold, from Johnny Bosworth, from Pappy Wallace, and Deini, the one-man army.

You can say that the 7th Division was activated at Ford Ord, California, on 6 July 1940. Its infantry regiments in those days were the 17th, the 32nd and the 63rd. You can say that the first division commander was Maj.-Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell. He was a tough man in those days, too, and when he finished with the 7th it was a crack outfit. It was perfectly conditioned. It was a fighting division already. You can say that in the summer of 1941 the 7th Division left California for its first and only time. It moved up to the State of Washington for Fourth Army maneuvers. It stayed there until September and then came back to Fort Ord. It was only three months before Pearl Harbor and there were changes to be made. Many of the men were nearly through with their one year. They had to be mustered out and new men had to be trained to replace them. The biggest loss of all during this period was Uncle Joe Stilwell who moved on, campaign hat and all, to better things. The next time the 7th saw Vinegar Joe in the flesh was down on southern Okinawa after it was all over. He was still wearing the campaign hat, but he had four stars. The Division Band played the 7th Division march for him and he had no trouble recognizing it, even though the band was a little the worse for wear. There weren’t many of the old band left around that played the piece back in 1940 and 1941. The band had a peculiar habit of getting tapped for duty as litter bearers in the intervening years and some of them just weren’t available any more.

General Stilwell was succeeded in September 1941 by Brig.-Gen. Charles H. White. General White had been the first Assistant Division Commander and now returned to take command. General White presided at the time of Pearl Harbor and he saw the Division strung out up and down the Pacific Coast on guard duty. He moved the Division to Camp San Luis Obispo and saw two full division cadres taken from the ranks. One of these cadres came back home on Leyte in the form of the 96th Infantry Division. The father and the son, so to speak, fought side by side at Dulag, at Hill 178, and at Conical Hill. General White took the Division to the Mojave Desert in April 1942. He marched it up and down the dirt and sand, teaching it how a motorized division should act. This was the day of Rommel and the Blitzkrieg and it didn’t take two guesses to know where the 7th was going to fight its war. The more rambunctious Rommel became, the more men packed their bags to get ready for the move to the great Egyptian desert. Those days on the desert seem funny now. The Mojave was the last desert the 7th Division ever saw. For a motorized division, it fought in some extremely strange places. On Attu the crust wouldn’t hold up even the wheels of a jeep. On Kwajalein there wasn’t even room for the few vehicles that were brought along. On Leyte there were few vehicles available. On Okinawa the only time it was possible to move more than a foot a day, it rained. It rained so hard that for a long time even supplies were ferried by boat. Yet the months on desert maneuvers had their effect on the Division and for the rest of its career, somehow or other, people referred to it as a motorized division and more than one person seemed to expect that any day it would take off for a large sandy area.

The end of the long period of desert training saw two important changes. Once more a new Division Commander took control. This time it was Maj.-Gen. Albert E. Brown. General Brown had joined the Division as Assistant Division Commander early in July while it was in the midst of desert maneuvers. His assumption of command almost coincided with the change in emphasis from desert warfare of the Rommel type. The North Africa landings of November 1942 were already in the planning phase and it was evident that this desert phase of the war in that theater would soon be over. The 7th Division was no longer to be a motorized unit. It was to revert to a line infantry type outfit. This meant that there would be one major change. The 53rd Infantry was permanently dropped from the Division. Its place was taken by the 159th Infantry, a regiment of the California National Guard. The 7th Division wearily packed up to go back to Fort Ord and begin another phase of its training.

Thus briefly have I covered almost two and a half years of the history of the 7th Division. Let me tell you why. I saw the 7th Division in action. I was not an official member of the Division, but I wished more than once that I was. I was attached on three different occasions and I came away each time feeling that here was an outfit that had what it took. I am still proud to say that I knew a few men in the 7th and I know that the respect every man in the Pacific felt for the Division was genuine and was based on something real. The 7th Division was not the California Division. It was the fighting Division. The 7th Division was not a desert division. It was a division that could and did do everything and well. The traditions of the 7th Division did not come from the one brief magnificent attack made on the last day of World War I. The traditions of the 7th Division were not born at Fort Ord, or San Luis Obispo, or in the desert. The first tradition was established in the fog at Attu when the first 7th Division man set foot on that miserable shore. The reputation of the Division was enhanced when it landed at Kwajalein. It was a desert division? Nonsense. It was an amphibian division that day, and a magnificent one. It executed the most perfect landing ever carried out until that time and there have been very few to match it since. At Leyte it proved its adaptability. After it was already afloat its plans were changed. In spite of this it executed another perfect landing and fought for more than sixty days on terrain and in weather for which it had not even been briefed. And Okinawa? Okinawa stands as a monument to the 7th Division. Eighty-two solid days in the line where gains were measured by feet, not miles.

So with all due respect to the 7th Division of Ord, and the 1941 maneuvers, and the desert, I have deliberately written the history of the Division as it is best known, a fighting Division.

PART 2 — Attu

Planning for Attu

ATTU IS THE TRADE MARK OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION, ALTHOUGH the Division was at Kwajalein, Leyte and Okinawa, the men who fought in the first campaign were always proud, in the way fighting men are proud, of the fact that they had been on Attu. The memories of the cold little island at the end of the Aleutians chain were bitter and indelible. If a man was an Attu man, he’d been through something.

In 1942 the Division was at Camp San Luis Obispo, and in January would move to Fort Ord for further training, presumably for North Africa. Word came the day before Christmas that instead of fighting in the heat of the camel country, the Division was to fight in the cold of the frozen North. Kiska was the target.

The men, of course, didn’t know on Christmas Day about Kiska. Nor did they know in January 1943. It wasn’t until they were aboard ship in the last week of April that they found out where they were going. By that time it was Attu instead of Kiska.

The emergency which prompted the new mission of the Division had been a long time growing. Early in June 1942, a powerful Japanese task force had ventured east of the Marshall Islands heading for Midway. On 3-4 June this fleet was shattered at the great battle of Midway. Its remnants turned tail and fled for safety. While the attention of the world was centered on events in the Central Pacific, however, a smaller enemy force had sortied from Paramushiro, in the Kurile Islands, north of Japan. This convoy was to capture Dutch Harbor, the American outpost in the Aleutians. After making a half-hearted feint at its target, it received word of the defeat in the south and turned back along the long chain of islands. On 8 June 1942, Japanese troops landed on Kiska and Attu, at the extreme western end of the chain. They were not discovered until three days later. There had been no trouble in the occupation. At Kiska the enemy had to conquer a Navy officer and ten enlisted men who manned a weather station. At Attu they had to overcome an American schoolteacher and his wife. Fifty per cent of this latter force was ineffective because the schoolteacher committed suicide during the landing. The sixty Aleuts who ran a fox farm on the island were no trouble at all and were eventually shipped off to Hokkaido to sit out the war.

The Japanese intentions were plain: they were headed for Alaska and the west coast of the United States, and Kiska was to be a main offensive base in their drive. They immediately began building an airfield and making other improvements on Kiska, but there was some doubt in Japanese minds as to the exact role that Attu was to play. After establishing a camp with strong defensive installations in the Holtz Bay area, they vacillated and eventually withdrew the garrison in September, leaving the island deserted. A month later the enemy had another change of mind. On October 29 he landed a sizable force and in January and February 1943 followed it up with more soldiers, bringing the total strength of the garrison to about 2,500 men. The winter weather kept activity to a minimum, but by the end of January the island had been completely surveyed for defense and an airfield laid out. Work was begun early in February.

Neither the Japanese nor the Americans seemed greatly concerned about Attu. It was Kiska on which the enemy lavished the bulk of his attention, and it was Kiska which worried the Americans. Kiska was the larger island, its natural attributes offered much more in the way of facilities for an offensive base, and work there seemed to be much farther along. It promised to be a real threat to the remainder of the Aleutians.

Less than a month after the Japanese were discovered on Kiska and Attu, the Alaskan Defense Command was busy trying to checkmate the next enemy move with makeshift forces hastily scraped together. Late in August 1942 those troops landed at Adak, 250 miles from Kiska and 450 miles from Attu. By 11 September an airfield was in operation, and the Eleventh Air Force went to work on the garrison on Kiska. The new base at Adak was the first move in this grim game of chess. On 13 January 1943 American landings were made at Amchitka. Kiska was only a hundred miles away, Attu 275.

Long before the occupation of the base at Amchitka, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington had decided to recapture Kiska. As early as 21 September 1942 the planners had been instructed to look into the possibilities. During October and November two plans were advanced and rejected, but in December a third plan was approved. Preparations were to begin early in January 1943. The 7th Infantry Division was to furnish the landing force. Another combat team, to be furnished by Alaskan Defense Command, was to be held in reserve.

The planning staffs had little knowledge of the islands they were about to attack. The Aleutian Islands had been U.S. possessions since their purchase from Russia in 1867, but there had been no attempt to learn more than a few simple facts about them. Attu, particularly, was an island of mystery. Expeditions had charted the coast line and mapped the harbors and bays, but the interior mass of mountains, ice, and snow was unknown. Furthermore, there was no one to whom the planners could turn for any detailed knowledge. Whatever was to be done would have to be based upon the study of aerial photographs, and aerial photographs were hard to come by, Aleutian weather being what it was.

The expedition was to be a joint one, under Navy command. Rear Adm. F. W. Rockwell was designated commander of Task Force 3. On his staff were Marines, members of the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, and Army officers, principally from Alaskan Defense Command, which had charge of equipping the 7th Division. Also advising the staff were experts sent down from Alaska by ADC. To advise the commanding general of the Division, Maj.-Gen. Eugene M. Landrum was sent to Fort Ord with several other officers. General Landrum had commanded the force which landed on Adak in August 1942. To advise the Division on equipment, Alaskan Defense Command had sent Lt.-Col. Carl Jones, known as an expert on the North. It is significant that no one on the Division staff knew anything about what might be expected in the way of terrain and weather in the Aleutians. The officers who were sent from Alaska to assist were quite familiar with conditions on the Alaska mainland where it was drier and milder, but were caught unprepared by what they eventually found on Attu.

During January and February 1943 the planners concentrated on Kiska. On 20 February it was proposed that Attu be substituted for the original target. Information was so scanty on Kiska that it seemed foolhardy to attempt an attack on the large island. Information was just as scanty on Attu, but it was smaller and supposedly garrisoned by a much smaller force, estimated then at between three and five hundred men. A more cogent reason lay in the shortage of assault shipping. The vessels needed to move the smaller force to take Attu were available. The extra ships for Kiska were nowhere to be had. Furthermore, with air bases on Attu and nearby Shemya, badly needed air support would be more easily available, and preliminary reconnaissance of Kiska could be made. Even more important, Attu in American hands would block Kiska’s communications with Japan. Air and sea support could be substantially cut and all enemy reinforcement of Kiska prevented.

The situation was discussed during the first week in March 1943, and on the 11th recommendations were forwarded to Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. His reply, on 17 March, was that the target would be Attu. The landings would be made on 7 May 1943.

The attention now focussed on Attu revealed nothing more encouraging than had been found out about Kiska. As fast as reconnaissance missions could be flown the results were forwarded to San Francisco where Western Defense Command distributed them to Admiral Rockwell and the 7th Division.

All of these reconnaissances were limited to the island’s coast line. Planes could not penetrate the dense fog over the inland areas. Attu is forty-six miles long and sixteen miles wide. Its coast line is indented with a series of deep bays, and along most of the shore the mountains seem to rise straight up out of the sea to three thousand feet. Most of the time the tops of these mountains are enshrouded in fog and cloud, but it was known that the snow line was at three hundred feet. Attempts to get detailed information about the interior of the island were all but hopeless.

In the days before the Japanese occupation the only settlement on the island had been at Chichagof Harbor, a shallow indentation on the northern side. Back from the little bay lies a valley that rises rapidly into the mountains. The Japanese had occupied Chichagof only a short time after their first landings, eventually moving their installations to Holtz Bay, a much deeper bay a short distance to the west along the northern coast. This offered poorer defensive positions, but an excellent anchorage. Later changes in disposition left the Holtz Bay area strengthened but headquarters moved back to Chichagof. The airfield which was begun in February was located at Holtz Bay.

Two other bays attracted American attention. One, Sarana Bay, is the widest and deepest indentation on the island. It is located at the extreme northeastern tip of Attu. Slightly smaller and about three miles away to the south, over a high hill mass, lies Massacre Bay. The latter was reported to be studded with reefs, however, and was questioned as a suitable harbor. Back from both Sarana and Massacre Bays stretch wide and deep valleys. Sloping gradually uphill from the sea they end in the mountains of the interior. Almost two miles inland Massacre Bay and Sarana Valley are joined by a high pass through the ridge that runs between them. At the upper reaches of Massacre Valley another high mountain pass joins it with the extreme western end of Holtz Bay. Still another pass joins Sarana Valley with Chichagof Harbor.

The Japanese had concentrated their defenses around Holtz Bay, and on Fish Hook Ridge which surrounds Chichagof, but had also established positions at Massacre Bay. Other small installations had been noted at various points along the Attu coast line. Close scrutiny of these installations resulted in an upward revision of Japanese strength on 20 April. Instead of the originally estimated 650 enemy troops, the planners now thought that the defenses were manned by about 1,500.

Five separate plans were drawn up by Division before the convoys sailed for the target on April 24 because of lack of accurate knowledge of landing beaches. Three of them had variations. The one finally chosen was decided upon when the expedition reached Cold Harbor in the Aleutians en route to the target. It called for four landings—two main landings and two subsidiary landings. The main body, known as the Southern Force, was to land on the beach of Massacre Bay. It consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 17th Infantry: the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry; and three batteries of field artillery (105mm) with auxiliary troops all under command of Col. Edward P. Earle, CO of the 17th Infantry. The mission of this force was to advance rapidly up Massacre Valley, seize Jarmin Pass (Massacre-Holtz Pass) and Clevesy Pass (Massacre-Sarana Pass), and move into the Holtz Bay area to join up with the Northern Force. The combined forces were first to hold and finally to destroy the enemy in the Chichagof Harbor area.

The Northern Force was to land on Red Beach, some three miles north of the main Japanese camp at the end of the west arm of Holtz Bay. This force, commanded by Lt.-Col. Albert V. Hartl, consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry and a battery of field artillery, together with auxiliary troops. After landing, the Northern Force was to attack and clear the west arm of Holtz Bay, securing the high ground, later known as Moore Ridge, between the west and east arms of the bay. After effecting a junction with the Southern Force moving north over Jarmin Pass, the Northern Force was to complete the capture of the Holtz Bay area and the valley to the southwest. Two battalions of the 32nd Infantry, the 1st and 3rd, under Col. Frank L. Culin, commanding officer of the regiment, with two batteries of field artillery, were to stay on shipboard in reserve.

A subsidiary landing was to be made at Austin Cove by a provisional battalion consisting of the 7th Scout Company and the 7th Reconnaissance Troop, less one platoon, Capt. William Willoughby commanding. This force, which sailed from Dutch Harbor in a destroyer and two submarines, and arrived at Attu independently of the main convoy, had the mission of moving into the west end of the valley opposite the west arm of Holtz Bay, attacking to the east toward the enemy battery position at the head of the west arm of Holtz Bay, containing the maximum enemy force, and compelling it to fight facing to the west. The Provisional Battalion was to assist the attack of the 1st Battalion, 17th, by fire and to join it as part of the Northern Force as soon as Moore Ridge could be taken and held.

Another subsidiary landing was to be made by one platoon of the 7th Reconnaissance Troop on Alexei Point, east of Massacre Bay. Its mission was to cover the rear of the forces landing at Massacre Bay by establishing an outpost across the peninsula to the north, to reconnoiter to the west and north in the area between Lake Nicholas and Massacre Bay, and thereafter to reconnoiter the peninsula itself, destroying enemy detachments and installations. It was expected that this platoon would promptly pass on any information it obtained to the Landing Force command post, and that it would eventually make contact with the 17th Infantry in Clevesy Pass.

This was the plan finally decided upon as the American task, force converged on Attu and prepared to land on the morning of 11 May 1943. It involved four landings by independent forces with little direct liaison. It proved harder to carry out than was expected. The battle as it developed may for convenience be treated in four principal phases:

(1) The landing at Massacre Bay and the operations of the Southern Force until the capture of Jarmin and Clevesy Passes on 19-20 May cleared Massacre Valley.

(2) The landing at Red Beach and the operations of the Northern Force in the Holtz Bay area, including the operations of the Provisional Battalion.

(3) The advance of the combined forces toward the Chichagof Harbor area after the capture of Clevesy Pass.

(4) The final Japanese counterattack and the mopping up that followed.

Tactical planning was only part of the preparation for the Attu operation. Equally important, because of the climate, was the logistical planning. The 7th Division went to Attu ill-prepared for what they found. Many essential preparations were neglected either because of ignorance or because there was no way to overcome them.

Time was lacking, One month was not enough either to plan the operation or procure the necessary equipment. Most of the amphibious training which the Division underwent during the spring of 1943 took place along the coast of California. In no way could the conditions be made to approach those of the Aleutians. Not a man in the Division could be acclimated to the extreme wet cold which he was later to encounter. Too, many of the essential expedients for living in the field under Aleutian conditions were not impressed on the men’s minds. To further complicate matters all troops were issued high, all-leather boots, and arctic-type field jackets. All of these had been tested on the Alaska mainland and were deemed suitable. They were issued despite the fact that experience of garrison troops on Adak had proven them unsuited. The wet climate demanded that rubber shoepacs, water-repellant jersey-lined trousers, sweaters, mountain jackets, water-repellant sleeping bags and flame tablets be issued to every man, but many of them were unavailable at this early period of the war.

A special issue of the necessary items was later procured by direct action of the Quartermaster General, and then was ordered left behind by Western Defense Command which felt that the extra weight would hamper the troops in the field. Some of this equipment was later flown to Dutch Harbor just as the troops were leaving for Attu, but most of them never received it. They were to face an enemy as exacting as the Japanese—the weather—but were to be poorly equipped for it, so much so that casualties exacted by the wet and cold exceeded those inflicted by the Japanese.

Another problem which had to be met was the terrain, not only ice and snow-capped mountains, but mud. All low ground on Attu, and throughout the Aleutians, is thinly crusted tundra. This soil is a form of peat and partly decayed vegetation, mostly sphagnum moss, which the rain and melting snow turn into a bog. Wheeled vehicles sink down, and become mired because the soil has no bottom short of the rocky backbone of the island.

In order to operate along the valleys special equipment was necessary. The wheeled and tracked vehicles which had been standard equipment in the 7th Division in the desert days were unsuited and had to be discarded. In their stead appeared wide-tracked tractors and trailers. The self-propelled gun mounts of the cannon companies were replaced by light 75mm pack howitzers. There could be no tanks.

The Division that left Camp San Luis Obispo in January was a superbly trained motorized unit. By April it was an amphibian division.

Embarkation was begun on 15 April. That evening the 32nd Regimental Combat Team sailed for Adak, and at the same time the Provisional Battalion, consisting of the 7th Reconnaissance Troop and the 7th Scout Company, left for Dutch Harbor. Nine days later the main assault force moved out of San Francisco for Cold Harbor.

Even prior to the occupation of the advanced base on Amchitka, American planes had made life miserable for the Japanese on Attu and Kiska. During November and December 1942 they had destroyed fifteen enemy planes in their anchorage at Attu, and had sunk seven cargo vessels. With shortened flights possible from Amchitka, the pressure on the two islands became more intense. The last enemy reinforcements to arrive at either base landed on Attu on 15 February 1943. This arrival brought the total strength to 2,500 men. One attempt to build up the garrison further was made as late as 26 March. On that date a large convoy embarked from Paramushiro and started north. Although the components of this force included several heavy cruisers and destroyers, it turned back to Japan after being intercepted by a small American task force midway in the journey. American naval officers fully expected the convoy to return. It never did. From then until 11 May the only supplies and reinforcements to reach Attu came by submarine. These were negligible.

The garrison that awaited the American invasion was composed of the 303rd Independent Infantry Battalion of about 1,200 men; a special engineer unit; three AA batteries armed with fifteen 75mm dual-purpose guns supported by twenty-four caliber .30 heavy machine guns; a company of mountain artillery; and miscellaneous service and labor troops. It was commanded by Col. Yasuyo Yamasaki, who arrived on Attu by submarine in April. He established his headquarters in the old abandoned American mission church at Chichagof Harbor and maintained it there until he was killed leading the breakthrough.

The main U.S. force which was to engage this garrison cleared the Golden Gate at 1300 on 24 April 1943, embarked on five transports. It did not move directly to Attu. Instead, after a cold, rainy voyage of six days, it dropped anchor at Cold Bay on the peninsula that juts out from the Alaska mainland toward the island chain. Meanwhile, the Provisional Battalion had stopped at Dutch Harbor and there embarked on the submarines Narwhal and Nautilus and the destroyer Kane. The reserve force, the 32nd Infantry less one battalion, had gone directly to Adak.

The stop at Cold Harbor was devoted almost exclusively to staff conferences. Of the several different tactical plans worked out before the departure from San Francisco, one had been tentatively chosen. Final decision was to depend upon last-minute intelligence gained since the convoy had moved north. The final plan was chosen on 30 April at a conference aboard Admiral Rockwell’s flagship. Information was immediately forwarded to the submarines at Dutch Harbor.

Then the weather closed in. Instead of leaving for the target as soon as the ships of the attack force had been refueled, the convoy staved in the anchorage. One day went by, then two. Finally on 4 May the ships upped anchor and sailed out of the bay, heading west. A radio message to the submarines, already en route to Attu, postponed the landings until 8 May.

Japanese submarines had not been idle. Upon arrival of the U.S. convoy at Cold Harbor they had informed the garrisons on both Attu and Kiska that an invasion was imminent. Colonel Yamasaki alerted his force and manned his beach positions on 3 May. For six days the Japanese troops slept and ate in their foxholes waiting for the landings. On 10 May the alert was cancelled. The defenders returned to routine garrison duties. The Americans, it seemed, were not coming after all.

Providence had stepped into the picture. On the morning of 8 May the U.S. transports had arrived at prearranged rendezvous areas. At 0300 a message was received from the submarines of the Provisional Battalion, now close inshore, that a south wind of gale proportions was blowing at the island. Admiral Rockwell radioed to the ships of the force that there could be no landings in the face of the heavy seas. D-day would be postponed until 9 May. The transports and their escorts headed north into Bering Sea.

Operations at Red Beach

THE NORTHERN LANDING FORCE ASSIGNED TO THE RED BEACH operation, and carried aboard U.S.S. Bell, was a battalion combat team—the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry; a field artillery battery; Cannon Company, 17th Infantry, less one platoon; a detachment of Alaskan Scouts; and a small number of supporting troops including an antiaircraft battery, medical, engineer, and communication units. This force was commanded by Lt.-Col. Albert V. Hartl, 17th Infantry. Also present aboard Bell were Col. Frank L. Culin, CO of the 32nd Infantry; Lt.-Col. James Fish, executive officer of the 17th Infantry.

Colonel Culin and Colonel Fish had both been informed personally by the Division Commander that command of and responsibility for the landing operation and the advance to assigned objectives rested with Colonel Hartl. Colonel Culin had been assigned two jobs; first, to decide the suitability of Red Beach for a landing; second, to keep fully informed of the overall progress of the landing in anticipation of being ordered ashore to command a tactical mission. General Brown’s instructions to Colonel Culin had authorized him to select an alternate landing place if Red Beach was unsuitable, or to report the situation if he decided the landing should not be made at all. Colonel Culin prepared to base his decision concerning Red Beach on personal reconnaissance. He obtained permission to take with him on the reconnaissance the detachment of Alaskan Scouts and a company of infantry. The infantry company was to go ashore to cover the landing of later units, but only if the beach were not occupied by enemy. The Division Commander was very positive in his requirement that no troops would be committed piecemeal at Red Beach.

During the night of 10-11 May, in the transport area off Holtz Bay, word was received that the operation would proceed according to plan on the 11th. Accordingly, early on 11 May, the beach reconnaissance party, including Colonel Culin, the Alaskan Scouts commanded by Lieutenant Thompson, a Navy beach party under Lieutenant Rommel, USN, and a radio crew, embarked in two LCVPs, with four plastic boats in tow for Later use by the Scouts. Company A, 17th Infantry, embarked in six additional LCVPs.

As the little landing craft loaded and pulled away from the side of Bell, floating on oily water disturbed only by the long smooth swells remaining from the storms of the past days, they were almost lost to sight in the dense, swirling fog. Several hundred yards away the destroyer Phelps was barely discernible. The small craft converged on her, and were led away from Bell which soon disappeared entirely in the fog. Slowly Phelps led the way in toward the island, which was completely screened from view. At last the destroyer slowed and stopped, and from the bridge a voice hailed Lieutenant Rommel and gave him final instructions: We are 2,000 yards off Red Beach. Proceed on bearing 165 degrees, engine speed 150 revolutions, run for ten minutes. You will be there.

Lieutenant Rommel, in command of Colonel Culin’s boat and senior Navy officer with the convoy of landing craft, gave the necessary instructions to the other boat commanders, and the convoy set off for the island, single file, well closed, Lieutenant Rommel’s boat leading.

Study of air photos had shown very clearly three large, sharp rocks just off the northwestern headland of Holtz Bay and just to the left of Red Beach. The men in the LCVPs strained their eyes to catch sight of land, and watched the hands of their watches to see how the time set from Phelps was passing. Whoever had calculated the run inshore had been correct, because exactly on the dot, to the left of the lead boat, rose a great sharp jagged rock, then another, and another. Red Beach lay just beyond, and to the right were rocks and more rocks. It was not an inviting prospect.

The convoy stopped and Company A was instructed to wait in place. The two lead boats, carrying the Alaskan Scouts, turned west and ran down the coast for about 1,200 yards. There, at a convenient place disclosed by a break in the fog, the Scouts entered their plastic boats and moved to shore, with instructions to land and head east toward Red Beach, to handle the possibility of a small observation group of enemy. The two LCVPs returned to the rendezvous off Red Beach, and then Lieutenant Rommel’s boat went in to the beach alone. As the rocks shut in around the small craft, the noise of her engine seemed shattering, but nothing happened. As her prow rasped to a stop on the sandy beach and no enemy fire greeted the invaders, Colonel Culin and Colonel DeLong silently shook hands. Someone in the boat suddenly muttered a warning, and raised his weapon to firing position—then lowered it; he had seen Lieutenant Thompson and his Scouts approaching the boat on the land side.

There followed a quick reconnaissance of the beach and its seaward approaches. The beach itself was narrow. Three small areas, resembling ferry slips, were formed by rocks jutting out from the beach—these would restrict landings somewhat. But there was ample depth of water close in. Numerous rocks lay offshore, and would have to be avoided by incoming boats, but Lieutenant Rommel had floating buoys to mark a channel, and these were later set in place. These rocks would keep the beach water fairly quiet in case of a blow, acting as a natural breakwater. There seemed no reason from the water side why the beach should not be used.

By this time the fog was thinning considerably, and the mainland of the island was becoming visible. The beach was not very deep. The sand was heavy, and there was a profusion of long heavy grass growing in hummocks. Some two hundred yards in from the shore line the ground rose abruptly—how high could not be seen because of the fog ceiling—but the rise was cliff-like in its steepness. Toward Holtz Bay the beach narrowed and, rounding a sharp corner, continued into the bay as a narrow strip of sand at the base of the steep bluff.

Air photos had disclosed the existence of a fairly broad, shelf-like plateau between the west shore line of Holtz Bay and the mountain wall that closed the bay from the west. At the south end of this shelf, and directly overlooking the beach of the west arm of the bay, was the initial combat objective—Hill X. At first sight, the steepness of the cliff beyond Red Beach gave little promise of access to this shelf, over which the approach to Hill X must be made. But just at this time, the tog thinned and lifted. The crest of the rise was visible, possibly 200 or 250 feet above the beach, and the climb to reach it would be difficult. But to the west a short distance a considerable ravine came down to the beach, and offered an apparently easier ascent. However, it was plain that the terrain immediately behind Red Beach was a serious obstacle.

Obstacles or no, time was passing. There was no immediate sign of the enemy, and at least the initial phase of a landing could be made without opposition. The beach itself and the water approaches were reasonably suitable. Colonel Culin decided to order the landing. Company A was directed to come ashore to establish a beachhead on the crest of the rise above the beach, with a beach security detachment covering the Holtz Bay corner. Radio orders were sent by prearranged code to Colonel Hartl aboard Bell, directing him to start landing the rest of his command at once, and to notify the Division Commander, away on the south side at Massacre Bay, that the Red Beach operation was under way. Colonel Culin and Captain Mathias then returned to Bell.

Lieutenant-Colonel Albert V. Hartl, CO of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, upon receipt of the message, radioed General Brown: Red play feasible. Shall we play with all? The answer was slow in coming. General Brown wanted to be sure that the whole battalion could be transported to the beach. There was to be no small force caught on the narrow landing strip and cut to pieces. After consultation with Navy officers who guaranteed that enough landing craft would be available to get the whole force ashore by nightfall, the General ordered Colonel Haiti’s battalion to land.

Debarkation of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, began immediately upon receipt of General Brown’s message. The first landing craft reached Red Beach at 1530, others continued to arrive there until almost 1800. As fast as the soldiers came ashore they were ordered up over the escarpment. One platoon was given the mission of moving along the narrow beach strip as flank protection for the main advance which would move over the rolling plateau toward Hill X.

Colonel Hartl was ready to begin his advance at 1830. D-day was eleven hours old. Not a single enemy soldier had yet seen the U.S. force at Red Beach, nor had the Americans seen any Japanese. Not a shot had been fired. Not even a foxhole had been found although troops of the 1st Battalion ranged all over the area.

In the long Arctic twilight the 7th Division’s advance toward Hill X began. Two companies led, moving out in two long parallel columns. Climbing over the rough terrain, crossing great patches of snow, they pushed steadily and silently forward. Below them the one platoon moved along the narrow beach strip. An hour after the forward movement began this platoon first met the enemy.

Four Japanese had been manning an outpost of the Holtz Bay beach defenses. Not realizing that a U.S. force had landed on Attu, they were moving about in their position, paying little attention to watching the coast. The platoon scouting along the seashore saw the Japanese first, three hundred yards away. Cautiously it advanced until only 150 yards separated the unwary enemy from the Americans. Then a rifle shot rang out. The platoon opened fire. The Japanese soldiers took one look and sprinted west along the beach. One dropped, then another. Two got away. The platoon pushed ahead rapidly to the two bodies, then moved on. The honeymoon was over, however. Less than an hour later the Japanese let the Americans know that the war was on. Antiaircraft batteries all along Holtz Bay opened fire on the beach strip. There were no U.S. casualties, but the advance of the flanking platoon slowed to a walk.

The enemy did not immediately discover the presence of the main body of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. The fire directed at the low ground had no effect on the troops above, and Colonel Hartl’s men pushed forward. At approximately 2230, 11 May, with the short night rapidly closing down, the two assault companies were only eight hundred yards away from Hill X and still unopposed.

Here the lack of knowledge of the interior of Attu had its first effect. Trying to locate the high ground that had been identified as Hill X, Colonel Hartl discovered that the actual terrain differed substantially from that shown on his operations map. He was unable to orient himself. Fearful that in the darkness he might overshoot the objective entirely or get lost in the hills, the battalion commander halted his advance. The landings on Red Beach had been successful, but the first objective of the landing force remained to be taken.

Landings at Massacre Bay

THE ASSEMBLY OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 17TH INFANTRY, ON RED Beach had preceded the landing of the rest of the Attu force at Massacre Bay by approximately forty minutes. The original H-hour had been scheduled for 0740, but as the transports approached the assembly area twenty thousand yards off the beaches the fog prevented movement of any kind.

However, from the bridges of the transports the white, snow-covered peaks of Attu could be seen clearly above the fog. During the night two destroyers of the covering force had collided in the fog and rather than risk any more mishaps Admiral Rockwell postponed the landings until 1040. Some of the assault waves had already begun to disembark. Those in the small craft were forced to remain there when coxswains were unable to locate their own transports in the fog. As 1040 neared and the weather had not cleared H-hour was again postponed, this time until 1530. Transports sounded their fog horns to check their positions and to guide the landing craft. More men were in the small boats, however, and they were forced to remain in them, tossing on the grey sea and getting wetter and colder by the minute. By the time some of them finally got ashore they had been afloat more than eight hours.

At 1230 Admiral Rockwell radioed Commander Buchanan that he thought the weather would clear shortly and that a landing would be feasible. Buchanan’s landing craft radioed back that the 1530 hour could be met. In the still-dense fog preparations were begun to send the boats ashore on time. Landing waves were assembled and led slowly and cautiously by a radar-equipped destroyer with searchlights on. With this vessel in the lead the small craft felt their way toward shore. Two thousand yards from shore the destroyer stopped and the LCVPs, now strung out in a long column, moving at less than half-speed, nosed their way on through the fog. Many of the small craft were lost, others jockeyed for positions alongside the guiding destroyer. Greetings were shouted to friends on adjacent boats. Fog horns and searchlights added to the regatta-like atmosphere. Preparatory naval gunfire was deemed unnecessary. Waves proceeded in groups, some of them becoming intermingled, others holding back. In this manner the third wave landed before the second. Voices floated back and forth over the water as coxswains argued over proper directions. Now and then the muffled roar of an engine could be heard as a boat spurted ahead through a momentary break in the fog.

The first landing craft to touch the pebble-strewn shore came in at 1620. Others soon followed in increasing numbers. Whole companies scrambled up the slope and assembled a few yards inland. As at Red Beach, not a shot was fired. There was one difference, however. In the haze, men who landed on the extreme left of the Massacre beaches discerned four figures rapidly retreating into the fog-shrouded hills and fired a few shots at them without effect. There was to be no long delay here in the discovery of the landing.

The confusion that had characterized the period before the landings disappeared once the troops were firmly on dry land. Companies assembled rapidly, and by 1730 the advance inland had begun. Flanking units that had become lost in the fog afloat set out overland to accomplish their missions. Battalion commanders quickly provided flank protection.

The assault up Massacre Valley was to be carried by two battalions. The 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry, advanced in the right zone, the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment on the left. The 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, landing in a later wave, was to furnish the Southern Force reserve. Col. Edward P. Earle was in charge.

Japanese reaction was slow. In the first hour and a half after 1730 both battalions of the 17th Infantry pushed rapidly inland for 2,500 yards without encountering any opposition. Then, at almost the same time, the front of both battalions received intense rifle and automatic-weapons fire from the high ground on each flank.

Exploitation of the Massacre Bay beachhead had been rapid after the delay and confusion of the foggy early part of the day. Before 1900, when the first opposition was reported, two batteries of the 48th Field Artillery Battalion had landed. The 105mm guns had been hauled ashore by caterpillar tractors while the assault battalions were moving away from the beach. Seventy-five yards inland the heavy tractors broke through the crust of the tundra and became mired. The artillerymen simply turned the guns around and prepared to fire from where they were. When the forward observers reported from the 3rd Battalion that they were opposed by an enemy entrenched in the high ground, the artillery was able to furnish support at once.

The nature of the Japanese defense on the evening of 11 May was confusing to the men of both battalions. The area through which the advance passed was shaped like a huge amphitheater. On the floor there was no cover and extremely poor observation of the surrounding ridges. Upon the first impact of fire from the heights by an enemy hidden in the fog, both battalions became momentarily disorganized.

Fur an hour, battalion and company commanders sought to return the fire. The 2nd Battalion used supporting weapons of the rifle companies to fire on suspected Japanese positions. The 3rd Battalion used zone artillery concentrations. Neither had any effect; when the leading elements advanced again they were stopped by the same heavy fire. Darkness was rapidly approaching. Only a general knowledge of the enemy positions had been obtained. Colonel Earle, commanding officer of the 17th Infantry, who was acting as Southern Force commander, ordered the two battalions to dig in for the night. Major E. C. Smith, in command of the 2nd Battalion, consolidated his positions for the night along the base of Hogback Ridge, a lateral ridge that bisected Massacre Valley from a few hundred yards inland to a point opposite what was later to be known as Clevesy Pass. The 3rd Battalion chose night positions a few hundred yards ahead of the forward nose of the Hogback.

The two main landings were not the only successful beachheads established by American forces on D-day. The first member of the 7th Division to set foot on the island had been Corporal Muldanado of the 7th Scout Company, part of the Provisional Battalion which paddled ashore in rubber boats from submarines at Austin Cove. The first of these little landing craft had touched shore at 0430. When it was certain that no Japanese installations guarded the beach, light signals were blinked to the submarines and the rest of the battalion came ashore. By 0700 the 7th Scout Company was picking its way in a long file up into the snow-clad mountains of the interior. The 7th Reconnaissance Troop followed at 1230, about a mile and a half behind. There was no opposition from the enemy throughout the first day, but the terrain was treacherous and difficult. There were no trails and no easy way to minimize the tremendous effort of the climb. One by one valuable items of equipment and extra clothing were discarded to lighten the load and speed the advance.

By 1700 the little column had reached a point four miles inland and four miles from Holtz Bay. It had climbed three thousand feet and stood in the midst of a trackless waste of snow fields, jagged peaks, and sharp ridges. By 2100 it had pushed on to within four thousand yards of the Japanese emplacements in the Jarmin (Massacre—Holtz Bay) Pass, and was in position to take those defenses in the rear. It was at this point that the inadequate terrain information had direct bearing on American action for the second time on D-day. Capt. William H. Willoughby, commander of the Provisional Battalion, chose to stop his advance for the night and push ahead in the daylight. His decision was based on the fact that he didn’t know exactly where he was and exactly where to go. Ahead of him ridge lines branched out in all directions with valleys leading anywhere but where he thought he should go. The leading element dug in for the night in the cold, high interior.

The fourth landing of the Attu campaign had been made by one platoon of the 7th Reconnaissance Troop on Alexei Point to the right rear of the main Massacre Bay landings. This platoon encountered no opposition and joined the main force without incident. A fifth scheduled landing, to be made by F Company, 32nd Infantry, several hundred yards to the left of Massacre Beach, was changed by Colonel Earle’s order when the fog caused the coxswains of the landing craft to lose their way. Capt. Robert E. Goodfellow and his men eventually came ashore at Massacre Bay in the third wave and set out overland for Casco Cove, their objective. The company was eventually recalled to Massacre Valley when developments proved their mission impracticable.

The Battle for Jarmin Pass

GENERAL BROWN, ARRIVING ON MASSACRE BEACH AT 2320 ON D-day, had ordered a full-scale assault on Jarmin Pass at 0820 the next morning to join the Southern Force from Massacre Bay with the Northern Force from Holtz Bay. The attack was to be preceded by a forty-minute artillery preparation.

The sight that greeted the men of the 17th Infantry on the morning of 12 May was not pretty. High ground surrounded Massacre Valley on all sides. On the left, enfilading the whole American line, was Henderson Ridge, a jagged, fog-enshrouded line of peaks that contained machinegun emplacements and rifle trenches. To the left front, guarding the entrance to Jarmin Pass, was Black Mountain, a peak honeycombed with Japanese positions. To the right front were Robinson Ridge and Cold Mountain, which reared itself into the fog, performing the double duty of protecting both the Jarmin and Clevesy passes. On the right flank was Gilbert Ridge, covered with patches of snow. Point Able, its northernmost peak, guarded Clevesy Pass and Engineer Hill. The rest of the ridge, stretching toward the Massacre beaches, enfiladed U.S. forces in the valley just as effectively as did those on Henderson Ridge. Further, enemy weapons had been placed along the entrance to Jarmin Pass itself and could fire straight down the middle of any frontal assault.

The valley into which the U.S. landing force had moved was a wide-open stretch of barren plain, devoid of any concealment. The only cover was the three-foot-deep stream beds that wound down to the sea. Foxholes were relatively easy to dig, but hard to lie in.

The artillery preparation on the morning of 12 May was intense and accurate. Suspected sites of enemy positions were thoroughly shelled. When the fire ceased at 0820, however, and the infantrymen rose from their wet foxholes to move forward, they were greeted by all types of fire. Within ten minutes the whole front line of the 3rd Battalion was pinned down, mostly by enemy action from Black Mountain. The left-flank platoon was defiladed to some extent from this fire and kept going only