Lessons From The Arctic: The Role of Regional Governments in International Affairs

By Mosaic Press

Lessons from the Arctic: The Role of Regional Government in International Affairs is a collection of articles written by twenty-six leading and emerging scholars from across the circumpolar region. Each author assesses and explores the processes of regional governance in the Arctic from an interdisciplinary perspective. The topics include Indigenous internationalism, paradiplomacy, federalism, global institution-building, and more.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Mosaic Press
• Release date: Aug 6, 2020
• ISBN: 9781771614900

Book preview

1. Introduction

Sara French

The Arctic is gaining the attention of national governments around the world. Indeed, countries as diverse as Switzerland, Mongolia, and Turkey have sought observer status at the Arctic Council as one expression of their Arctic interests. Much of the dialogue about circumpolar governance over the last few years has been focusing on how these non-Arctic voices will shape, change, or contribute to the Arctic agenda. Perhaps, this focus has led us to miss something – what is the role of the regional governments from within the Arctic in shaping the international Arctic agenda?

With the advent of globalization that has brought urban and international issues closer together than ever before, an opportunity arises for local governments across borders to work with each other to tackle some of these problems. So, what role do regional governments play in international affairs? What lessons can be learned from regional governance and co-operation from different parts of the world and the Arctic that address similar issues such as the environment and economics? How can these lessons be applied to the circumpolar Arctic region?

At the front lines of the decisions made for the Arctic regions are municipalities, territorial and state governments, and Indigenous organizations and governments. How do these subnational actors and governments from within the Arctic participate in international diplomacy which could result in outcomes that affect them? With no formal role on the Arctic Council, which is often regarded as the main platform for international Arctic diplomacy, how do these regional governments engage in international affairs in the Arctic? What does the future of the Arctic look like, and how will these subnational and regional governments be involved?

On September 18, 2015, the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History and The Gordon Foundation hosted a one-day conference to explore these questions. The Role of Regional Governments in International Affairs: Lessons from the Arctic, attracted speakers from across the circumpolar Arctic and sparked a conversation that has endured since: how can, should, and are sub-state actors engaging in circumpolar affairs? This volume seeks to build on this conversation by providing both the arguments for greater sub-state involvement (Penikett, Stepien and Koivurova, Sabin, and Loukacheva), as well as background on what is currently underway at the sub-national level (MacKay, Holm-Olsen, Lagutina, Sergunin), the institutions that support sub-national engagement in international Arctic affairs (Myers, Andreassen, Pogodaev, Hiratsuka, Ovretveit and Medby), the unique role that Indigenous peoples are playing in this dialogue (Coates, French and Coppes), and how cooperation is playing out in specific issue areas (Chatwood et al.)

More than providing background, we also seek to integrate what it is happening in the Arctic into larger regional, circumpolar, and global conversations. These linkages are summed up by Steven Toope, President of the Munk School of Global Affairs, who observed on that early fall day:

I must say that when I looked at the program and the overall description of what would be discussed today, it really struck me as a crucial addition to a discussion that’s taking place in many different ways with many different regions. It is intriguing to me, as I look around the world, that the whole question of global cities, urban agglomerations and sub-national governments is preoccupying people in Asia. It is preoccupying people in North America for different reasons but many that overlap with the reasons that we should be exploring these issues, it seems to me, in relation to the Arctic.

So, if you think about climate change and the need for environmental protection; if you think about resource stewardship and sustainable exploitation; if you think about social and cultural development, these are all areas that actually require robust, regional, sub-national and city engagement. And if you look at failures to act at the national level on questions like climate change, it is in fact only at the provincial and regional and global cities level that we often see the kind of action that is required.

To bring these connections forward, this volume will also offer an introduction into five major themes that intersect with the academic literature in areas that we believe are of crucial importance to understanding what is transpiring in the Arctic today: paradiplomacy, Indigenous internationalism, federalism, and global institution-building. These short vignettes will provide an overview of the theory, how it is being applied, and how it can help us to analyze the chapters that follow.

The Arctic is increasingly no longer a region apart. It has never been a terra nullis. It is, in our opinion, time to both recognize what is happening that is unique in the region, but also to situate the region more closely in global dialogues. We hope that this volume is a small contribution towards that goal.

A Note about Terminology

The Arctic often differs as much as it is similar and nowhere is this truer than in the structures of the eight states: some are unitary, some are federations, some are kingdoms, some constitutional democracies, and others republics. There is a smorgasbord of terminologies used to describe their constituent units: krays, territories, states, oblasts, municipalities, regions, etc. To simply terminology, we have tried to simplify the many structures into two broad categories – national governments and sub-national governments. In the usage in this volume, sub-national governments encompass anything below the national state. In the case of Canada, for example, this means that Canada is the national state and municipalities, territories/provinces, and others are sub-national.

2. Public Opinion, Public Policy & the Arctic:

Findings of the 2015 Public Opinion Survey in Arctic Countries

Thomas S. Axworthy and Emily Tsui

The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.¹ – Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion.

For much of its history the Arctic has been on the periphery, but in the early years of the twenty-first century, it is coming into its own. The Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change and as the atmosphere warms, ice and permafrost melt, sea levels rise and coastal communities from Alaska to New York to Bangladesh are potentially threatened.² Brian Fagan, the noted archaeologist, calls this the phenomenon of the attacking ocean.³ The Arctic now matters more than ever, not only to the citizens who live there, but to the whole world. As a result, the public policies of the eight states who are the stewards of the northern part of our planet and the effectiveness of the Arctic Council – the international body which convenes and co-ordinates the decision-makers of those eight states – matters as never before.

But what do the publics that influence these crucial policies think? Public policy is influenced by the framework of public opinion. Lippmann recognized as early as 1922 that it is important to know what citizens think about an issue (in our case, the Arctic), what they prioritize, where they disagree, and where there is consensus.

A large part of circumpolar collaboration focuses on best practices and gathering previously unavailable or inaccessible information for decision-makers to consider. Increasingly, there is an emphasis on generating data for decision-makers with summaries for policymakers intended to directly inform decision-making processes. One area of data that Arctic decision-makers have had less access to than their southern counterparts is public opinion data. While it is true that many northern representatives have deeper and more personal ways of testing how the community feels, it is sometimes difficult to convey these with the empiricism that their often-skeptical counterparts in federal bureaucracies or in academia demand. Public opinion research has its limits – it is inherently just a snapshot in time, rather than a nuanced discussion of how people feel – but, it is at the same time a powerful tool in simplifying complex issues and being able to point to a constituency that supports one’s ideas.

How does this tool help us to understand how the public in the Arctic feels about different policy issues? And how does public opinion in and about the Arctic compare to larger global trends? Situating the Arctic in this way, will, it is hoped, help to situate the discussion about how, when, and where Arctic policy discussions are unfolding in the chapters that follow in this volume.

Rethinking the Top of the World

Public opinion surveys of Arctic populations and Arctic issues are limited compared to other policy areas, but they do exist. Seminal among these works are the 2010 and 2015, Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey.⁴ These studies were commissioned by The Gordon Foundation, an independent Canadian philanthropic foundation, and produced by EKOS Research Associates in Canada. The initial study in 2010 was the first empirical study in the world that compares public opinion from multiple states on a variety of Arctic issues. These issues ranged in foreign policy issues, such as a proposal for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (AWNFZ), to domestic issues, such as rating the standard of living in a public’s respective region. The reason that the surveys were commissioned was to assist the discourse on the Arctic by providing the public, stakeholders, and policy makers with empirical data on how various Arctic issues are perceived by the public.

Since the first study in 2010, public opinion polling on the Arctic has expanded to both single country and multi-country analyses. Studies such as the 2016 Alaska Survey Research’s public opinion poll on the Arctic Council in Alaska, and 2013 Institute of the North’s Survey of Alaskans’ Opinions on the Arctic, and the 2009 Canadian Department of National Defence’s Canadian Public Opinion on Arctic Sovereignty and the North report are examples of single state and single country surveys of public opinions on the Arctic. On the other end of the spectrum, the 2014 Greenpeace Arctic Survey gathered results from thirty Arctic and non-Arctic states. Despite differences in methodology, sample populations and target populations, all these surveys are part of a global movement towards greater data collection for comparing the result of public opinion surveys, which assist academic research, public policy design, and ultimately, political decision making.⁵

The 2015 study is discussed in further detail below, and though the survey results are dated, they are nonetheless the most recent poll to survey residents on a large group of Arctic states on Arctic security issues. It is hoped that this analysis of the survey results will provide an important context for federal and sub-national governments to consider.

Public Opinion Theory

Walter Lippmann’s important analysis Public Opinion was written in 1922 just as the age of modern communications emerged with cinema and radio joining newspapers as influencers of public opinion. Edward L. Bernays, nephew of Sigmund Freud and an advisor to Woodrow Wilson, created propaganda films as a member of the Committee on Public Information to support American entry into World War I. He went on to found the industry of public relations based on the principle of The Engineering of Consent.⁶ Bernays advocated for the application of scientific practices and tried practices in the task of getting people to support ideas and programs.⁷ Like Bernays’ Committee on Public Information, Lippmann advocated for creating intelligence sections of industry and politics to use these modern techniques. The communication methods of Bernays were complemented by the invention of surveying and data collection techniques which could provide a snapshot of what citizens felt about products and issues. The Communication Revolution was complete: polling would reveal what people felt and thought and public relations would find a way to appeal to their emotions.

George Gallup, the founder of modern polling, wrote in 1965: "In my opinion, modern polls are the chief hope of lifting government to a higher level, by showing that the public supports the reforms that will make this possible, by providing a modus operandi for testing new ideas."⁸ Supporting Gallup in advocating the importance of public opinion in setting a framework for public policy, Martin Goldfarb and Thomas Axworthy in Marching to a Different Drummer argued further that polls provide an instant means for the individual to identify himself on the scale of public opinion.⁹ George Gallup’s work in creating the foundation for surveying the public was instrumental in bridging the gap between public opinion and public policy. In areas where policies existed, polls became an important tool for the public to express its support or opposition. On new topics where no policies exist, polls are instructive for policymakers to guide them in a new direction. In the last century, the emergence of scientifically- founded polling allowed politicians to gauge support for existing and proposed policies, but also provided the public with an instrument to see where they stood in relation to others. In many cases, the information that results from the poll presents an opportunity for reflection, deliberation, and action.

Eminent political scientist V.O. Key Jr. quipped that, to speak with precision about public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.¹⁰ Indeed, scholarly literature on the relationship between public opinion and its relationship with public policy is extensive.¹¹ Debates on what public opinion is, how it should be used in democracies, how it forms, and how to measure it, has been the subject of debate in political science, sociology, and psychology since the ancient Greeks.¹²

Public opinion is popularly referred to as the voice of the people¹³ on issues which governments find it prudent to heed.¹⁴ Most modern definitions embody the belief that all citizens have a voice that should be heard equally and public opinion represents the aggregation of individual opinions on specific issues.¹⁵ Emerging from these central themes is public opinion’s intimate relationship with representative democracy.¹⁶ A two way relationship exists: in one direction, public opinion reacts to and is shaped by public policies; in the other, public policy responds to and is influenced by public opinion.¹⁷ Democratic representation is dependent on how responsive both sides are to the actions and opinion of the other.¹⁸ In fact, this relationship is fundamentally related to democracy. Publics, in expressing their opinion through voting, can shape politics. As Irving Crespi rightly notes, "In a democracy, the free expression of collective opinion¹⁹ is the accepted source of legitimately organized political authority."²⁰ With this political authority, representatives introduce policies of various sorts, and therefore often find it prudent to be aware of what the public thinks. To assist policymakers in being attuned to the sentiments of the public, polling was developed as a tool.

Public opinion surveys conducted using a rigorous methodology can provide an accurate reading of what a public thinks.²¹ Eric Nielson defines a scientific, nonbiased public opinion poll, like Rethinking the Top of the World, as a type of survey or inquiry designed to measure the public’s views regarding a particular topic or series of topics.²² Indeed, neutrality in polling is critical to its accuracy. Through aggregating the preferences of randomly selected individuals, a representational view of the preferences of the public at large is generated. Scott Althaus praises surveys for their ability to serve as a communication medium linking citizens to representatives: they allow the individual members of a polity to speak in a collective voice as a public on important issues of the day,²³ and conclude that opinion surveys may be the mass public’s clearest and most influential voice in the routine conduct of democratic politics that occurs between infrequent elections.²⁴ Criticism of public opinion polling as not able to be truly representative is largely directed at how the data is collected with some concerns about how representative online/opt-in surveys are compared to more randomly based techniques, such as phone. Subtle changes in wording, samples, the order of questions, the environment which the interviewee was exposed to, and the method in which the data was collected can all impact how the questions are answered.²⁵ There is also a tendency for respondents to say that they have heard of a particular issue as few people want to admit they are uninformed.²⁶ Giving due considerations to margin of error, public opinion polls are widely accepted as being representative of public opinion at large.²⁷

The debate on whether opinion can influence policy has been mostly resolved: it does. However, how much public opinion can influence policy and the level of policy responsiveness remains open to discussion. Sociologist Paul Burstein found that 75% of the studies concluded that policy is indeed responsive to public opinion.²⁸ However, he also found that the frequency and extent to which this occurs is dependent on the salience of the issue.²⁹ Salience - the importance a party ascribes to an issue - is highly variable and fluctuates according to political considerations. Blumer adds to this argument by noting that the majority of the public minimally or do not affect policy, and that this is because of the political weight given to interest groups.³⁰ Issues that attract individuals or groups that are high profile, heavily committed to an issue, are adept at organizing the masses in support, or expressing their opinions openly and deftly, can be granted more political weight than would be ascribed to them from a single or a few votes in an election.

Alternatively, the degree to which public opinion should influence policy has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. This includes the Lippmann-Dewey debate, which sees eminent journalist Walter Lippmann and philosopher John Dewey disagreed on the extent to which the public can manage political life in democracies. Writing in 1922, Walter Lippmann’s pioneering study on public opinion opened up the debate on the utility of public opinion in democracies.³¹ In Public Opinion, he focused on the challenges to effectively apply public opinion to policy challenges, lamenting that democracy placed too heavy of a responsibility of the average citizen to be informed in its opinion judgments and that media was unable to help citizens achieve minimal competence.³² His writings expressed his belief that the relationship between the average citizen and democracy, in which the citizen reigns in theory, but does not govern.³³ Instead, he argued in favour of informed experts to manage political life.³⁴ In contrast, philosopher John Dewey argued that publics have a fundamental role in governance and democracy. Through interacting with other citizens and the policies formed from government, citizens develop their own preferences, which Dewey argued is healthy for democracy as it tests the extent to which [the governing system] can withstand contrary arguments, reasons, and experiences.³⁵ This feedback allows for policies to be tested, refined, and improved. generated from the public allows for policies to be tested, refined, and improved. Although this summary only scratches the surface of the debate, it highlights the differences in viewpoints that are still held by officials on both sides. This paper notes the utility behind the arguments made by both Lippmann and Dewey, and recognizes the value of public education on Arctic issues.

What does the public say about Arctic issues?

Given the importance of public opinion for shaping public policy, what are citizens in Arctic countries saying to their decision-makers? The results of Rethinking the Top of the World illustrate that on most issues surveyed publics across the Circumpolar Arctic generally shared the same perspective, though there are regional differences on specific policy initiatives. This section first looks at the results from Rethinking the Top of the World as to where there are regional similarities, before moving on to demonstrate some areas where public opinion is varied. In addition, some analysis of what these numbers mean for decision-makers is offered.

Awareness of Arctic Council

Publics were asked if they have ever heard of an intergovernmental forum or group called the Arctic Council that is made up of eight countries with Arctic regions, and were given the choice to select between if they have clearly heard about the Council, if they heard of the Council, or if they have not heard of the Council. Less than half of the respondents in each state claim³⁶ to have a clear understanding of what the Arctic Council is.

The percentage of respondents who indicated that they were clearly aware or vaguely aware of the Arctic Council follows an unexpected regional trend, suggesting that awareness of the Arctic Council has less to do with geography than other factors. The most aware group of people resided in to Iceland and Denmark, with 70% and 57% respectively of the populations claiming to be aware of the forum. Russia sat alongside these countries with 54% of its population aware, which fared better than the rest of the Nordic population’s awareness of 46%, 44%, and 39% for Norway, Finland, and Sweden respectively. The lowest levels of awareness occurred in North America, where the United States South, Alaska, and the South of Canada had response rates of 35%, 34%, and 32% respectively. Despite these dismal numbers in North America, it is notable to include that residents in the Canadian North were an anomaly among its regional group, with 59% of the population claiming to have at least vaguely heard of the Council. With the notable exception of Iceland, this raises questions about the ability of the Arctic Council and its member states to engage the public at large on circumpolar policy issues.

Awareness of the Arctic Council among respondents in Arctic countries is important for policy-making, because it serves as an indicator of broader public literacy on Arctic issues in general. Moreover, receiving public support for the Council assists in its in achieving its mandate of being inclusive of traditional knowledge and local communities. Consequently, who knows about the Arctic Council is perhaps of more consequence than the total volume of respondents answering yes for the areas of Arctic countries outside the region. For instance, in focus groups with students from Nunavut Sivuniksavut, concern was expressed that the Arctic Council sufficiently engage with the communities and the groups that their policies are supposed to assist or effect. Better engagement with the people of the Arctic through awareness building can strengthen the existing capacity of the Council.

What is perhaps most stunning about comparing the polls in 2015 with 2010 is that in the case of both the Canadian North and South, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, awareness of the Arctic Council has actually decreased over the intervening five years. This is especially puzzling since media coverage of the Arctic Council increased in the period between 2010 and 2015, with the most amount of media coverage on the Council occurring in 2013 during the year of the Kiruna ministerial.³⁷ There are two possible explanations for this result. One, that since 2010, several alternative fora for discussion on Arctic issues have begun to emerge. This includes the creation of the European Union Arctic Forum in 2010, the Arctic Circle in 2013, and the Arctic Economic Council in 2015. A second possible hypothesis is that the Arctic Council’s activities are conducted by mostly by its working groups, where the meetings are invitation only and at times even accredited observers have been restricted from taking the floor.³⁸ Public engagement, though explicitly expressed in the Council’s communications strategy and work plan, limits its ambition to communicating the results of these meetings and studies, and have not been designed to solicit direct engagement in a deliberative process.³⁹

Taken as an indicator of the level of public literacy on Arctic issues, this finding highlights one of the key challenges to the Arctic Council going forward: increasing awareness about of its own existence and the critical importance to the entire global community of the issues that it discusses.

One hypothesis for Iceland’s high degree of political engagement with Arctic issues is that interest on this topic permeates the leadership of the country. With Iceland’s entire territory located in or near the Arctic Circle, commitment to Arctic issues and Arctic co-operation is a central area in Iceland’s foreign policy. Iceland consistently objects to being excluded from meetings of the Arctic Five coastal states. This has perhaps led it to focus on the forums where it is included – the Arctic Council being principle among them. In March 28, 2011, its parliament passed a resolution on the country’s Arctic policy.⁴⁰ The first principle of the resolution was to promote and strengthen the Arctic Council, and the final principle of the document concludes with the need to increase domestic consultation and co-operation on Arctic issues. Iceland’s declaration has been followed through with action. On the first principle, Iceland has continued to support its work in the Council through its work co-leading the second Arctic Human Development Report and the project on Gender Equality in the Arctic.⁴¹ On the final principle, President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson has brought Arctic co-operation in a broader sense to Icelanders directly through the formation of the Arctic Circle in 2013. With high profile politicians, business leaders, and activists brought to conference meetings which are occasionally held in Reykjavík, media attention has increased on not only Arctic issues, but for viewing the Arctic as a zone of co-operation.

Notably as well is the government supported creation of the Icelandic Arctic Co-operation Network (IACN), a non-governmental organization, in February 2013, which was established with the explicit goal of increasing the visibility and understanding of Arctic issues and create a link between the institutes and organizations working on those issues in Iceland.⁴² Furthermore, IACN is at an advantage as it works closely with the Arctic Council working groups that are hosted in Iceland, which are CAFF and PAME, giving researchers and the public direct experience with the Council’s activities.⁴³ As parts of the Council’s activities are located directly in Iceland, some of the abstract notion of an Arctic Council is perhaps absent in Icelanders’ minds. As well, having a small population which almost all members have access to internet conceivably assists in spreading the word about the Council. Perhaps, the level of knowledge of the Icelandic public on the Arctic Council could therefore signal the success of undertaking a concerted political campaign to get in engaged in the Arctic.

Russia Looms Large

The data for the second volume of Rethinking the Top of the World, was collected in the heat of the crisis over Crimea. When asked about who they are most comfortable in working with in the Arctic, Russia did not appear on the list, rather Scandinavia was the favoured answer of 34% the 10,212 respondents from across the eight Arctic states. This is followed by, depends on the issue (17%), Canada (8%), and USA (8%). Russia did, however, appear on the top of the list of countries that respondents were least comfortable working with on Arctic issues, being cited by 31% of respondents. This was followed by China (16%), depends on the issue (14%). Interestingly, the U.S.A. took fourth place at the same rate for both most and least favoured (8% and 9% respectively).

Viewpoints about Russia in the Arctic appear to be consistent with global trends concerning Russia’s role in the international sphere more generally. As an aggregate, the global populace does not place much confidence in President Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs. A 2017 poll of 40,951 respondents in 37 countries found that 74% of Canadians and Americans, as well as 87% of Swedes do not trust Putin to do the right thing. Observers states in the Arctic Council from Asia and Europe similarly have distrust in the Russian President ranging from the high 80s (Poland) to the 60s (Japan and South Korea).⁴⁴ Similarly, Russians are concerned about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of which half of the Arctic states are a member with 4-in-10 Russians describing it as a major threat.⁴⁵

This state of uneasiness between Russia and the global community also appears to exist in the Arctic, as only 2–10% of respondents from across the Circumpolar Arctic felt that the threat of military conflict in the Arctic had decreased over the following year (2014–2015). This compares to majorities in Iceland (58%), Finland (51%) and Russia (50%), who saw conflict increasing. Sizable numbers of respondents across the board also saw conflict in the Arctic increasing over the previous year: Canadian south (36%), Norway (35%), Alaska (34%), Sweden (33%), Canadian north (30%), Denmark (29%), and Lower 48/U.S. South (24%).

Yet, despite the unease with Russia, only minorities in all countries surveyed by the Rethinking the Top of the World study wanted to see Arctic cooperation with Russia suspended in light of conflict over the situation in Crimea. Those responding in favour of suspending cooperation ranged from a high of 44% in Sweden to a low of 19% in Norway. Indeed, Russian respondents were most adamant about maintaining international cooperation in the Arctic with only 5% of Russian respondents wanting to break it off.⁴⁶

Public opinion on this topic reflects the wisdom of the need for sustained Arctic diplomacy to address the constant and unique security challenges in Arctic that result from its fragile environment, unmapped territory, and growing number of tourists. The Arctic Council has been mostly insulated from these larger geopolitical pressures and there has been no clamoring for Russia’s suspension from the Council, as took place in the Group of Eight (G8).⁴⁷ In 2010, Arctic scholar Michael Byers noted rightly that "Working with the Russian government to resolve potential overlaps in our [Canada’s] extended continental shelf claims, to regulate Arctic shipping and to provide search-and-rescue does not imply approval of that country’s human rights record or of its actions in Chechnya and Georgia."⁴⁸ This argument can, and should be extended to Russia’s recent aggressions in Ukraine.

Of principle importance is the effect of linking of geopolitical issues on the Permanent Participants of the Council. The Arctic Council is a unique international forum in that it directly engages with Indigenous peoples.⁴⁹ However, global geopolitics pushes the priority for co-operation to the side as states focused on the condemning Russia, which is against the spirit of the Arctic Council.⁵⁰ Michael Stickman, International Chair of the Arctic Athabaskan Council argued that, Decision-makers in Washington DC, Ottawa and Moscow, and our Asian and European observers, should understand [that international co-operation in the Arctic is important to those of us who live in the North]. We are not naïve, but this Council and its individual members should shield our co-operation from broader political and geopolitical rivalries.⁵¹ This suggestion is a prudent one to heed.

However, the policies pursued by the national governments were contrary to the public’s opinion on less well-known forums, but heeded on high-profile issues. After the Ukraine crisis erupted in February 2014, the annual meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Arctic Council countries, the only forum for discussing military security in the Arctic, was cancelled.⁵² In April that year, Canada boycotted a meeting of an Arctic Council body that it co-chaired, the Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane, which was held in Russia, citing that Russia’s involvement in Ukraine.⁵³ A US-Russia hazards-reduction workshop was cancelled in early June 2014.⁵⁴ The Arctic Coast Guard Forum was suspended, and the planned Russian-Norway exercises, and the regular Russian-US-Norwegian naval exercises, were not carried out.⁵⁵ However minor these infractions may appear to be, they do highlight how larger geopolitical trends have the ability to overshadow even the most benign and practical engagements.

Partially explaining this may be the response to the question what is the major threat to your nation? While a global median of 31% cite Russia, 61% of respondents are concerned about climate change.⁵⁶ When this question is taken to the Arctic level, trends are the same. When asked about what is the greatest threat facing the Arctic region today, Russia was the response of only 1–4% and the response was not heard in either Canada or the United States. However, environmental issues - such as global warming’ climate change; ice caps melting, melting sea ice and permafrost; environmental damage/degradation; and negative impacts on flora, fauna, pollution, and land; were a concern for 58% of Danes, 56% of Finns, 51% of Swedes, 44% of Icelanders and Russians, and 37% of Norwegians. Consequently, while Russia’s actions in the geopolitical sphere are concerning to many, this concern is outpaced by serious concerns about the environment. This duality appears to create a space for continuing Arctic dialogue, as it is where climate change is happening at the most startling and personal rate.

In circumpolar discussions it is well-known that climate change is having a significant impact on people today. This seems to be a position that is globally held by publics. A spring 2015 study found that 77% of respondents in Latin America agreed with the statement that, climate change is harming people now, a view shared by Europeans (60%), Africans (52%), Chinese (49%), Asians (48%), and Americans (41%), though less so in the Middle East (26%).⁵⁷

Consequently, both Canadians and Americans in both the North and South support strong policies to combat climate change and prevent pollution and environmental disasters in the Arctic (Canadian North – 86%, Canadian South – 83%, U.S. South – 69%, and Alaska 68%). The global public, as polled in 2017, similarly disapprove at a rate of 71% to President Trump’s policy to withdraw U.S. support for international climate change agreements.⁵⁸

The United States took the decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement following the 2017 Fairbanks Ministerial, and indeed the Fairbanks Declaration makes a reference to Paris, though a weak one.⁵⁹ Consequently, it remains to be seen how the fact that global publics – and generally the governments of the Arctic states – recognize climate change as a primary threat will mix with the United States’ current position on climate issues. But there is no question that publics in the Arctic states are very concerned about the environment in general and climate change in particular. The consensus is overwhelming.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

There are now two generations that have grown up without the omnipresent fear of spectacular nuclear war between the two adversaries on either side of the Iron curtain. For many, it was assumed that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and voluntary reductions in aging and decrepit materials was progressing smoothly. However, the current geopolitical situation that sees North Korea and the United States elevating the spectre of nuclear holocaust casually over Twitter has led to some re-evaluating how they perceived the state of nuclear weapons. The Arctic it seems, was always somewhere, that was seen by the general public as needing to be nuclear free.

After averaging the level of support between Alaska and the rest of the United States, support for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Arctic is well-received by over 50% of the public in each segment surveyed, and in many states, exceeding beyond 70%. Support for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone from every segment of the population surveyed has also increased since 2010. This upward trend exists in certain cases is only 1% (as in the case of Norway), but in others such US South, support has increased by 20%. As trust has deteriorated among Arctic states as a result of Russia’s activities in Ukraine, the threat for the militarization of the Arctic within each state increases. Yet, the public believes that nuclear weapons should not be a factor.⁶⁰ Given the current climate in US-Russia relations, however, the likelihood that the public’s clear desire will be implemented is not great.

Most and Least Preferred Partner in Dealing with Arctic Issue

One of the clearest results that emerge from the Rethinking the Top of the World studies is the preference of all publics to work with Scandinavian countries to deal with Arctic issues. In 2010, all states, except the United States, placed the Scandinavian countries as their top preference for who to work with. The United States respondents placed Canada first, with the Scandinavian countries coming second. In 2015, the Scandinavian choice received more votes than any other option of those who selected an option with the second most popular option was that their phangingred country depends on the issue. Even where Arctic literacy may be low, the general perception of Scandinavian countries as peacemakers, allies, and friends on the world stage seems to persist, versus America and Russia’s more troubled global images, and Canada’s relative inactiveness on international stages in the years proceeding the polls.

Approach to border disputes

The preference of publics on how their country should approach border disputes as expressed through the plurality of votes is clearly expressed along regional lines. North Americans show a tendency to prefer to negotiate a compromise with other countries to resolve border and/or resource sharing disputes in the Arctic. Russian re-spondents exert that it is better for the country to pursue a firm line in defending its sections of Arctic territory regardless of the cost. The European publics prefer to see national disputes over the Arctic are unnecessary and that it should be an international territory like Antarctica. Norway is the only exception in this case as the plurality of votes is equally split between negotiation and international territory.

Policymakers can use the results of this poll to better understand the positions of other states they are dealing with. In Russia, where 43% of the public or a plurality of respondents voted in favour of Russia pursuing a firm line, policy makers should be aware that this may make it difficult for politicians, responding to the demands of its public, to outwardly agree to a deal that might be perceived as pursuing anything less than a firm line in defending its sections of Arctic territory. The implication is that when engaging with Russia, officials should be wary of conducting negotiations in a manner that will make it seem like Russia is making significant concessions. Politicians in Russia will have to answer to the public, and it is critical for Arctic co-operation that even at face value, issues are framed so that they are presented to be in a positive light for Russia.

This lesson is useful when examining the policy recommendations of de-linking and de-militarizing the Arctic. A strong public support for viewing the Arctic as international territory and negotiating provides additional impetus for states to not pursue a firm line in linking the politics of the south with the north. With addressing how to best implement the suggestions in de-militarizing the Arctic, states should be aware of the Russian public’s preferred stance to pursue a firm line and be careful about how they present these to the public.

The Northwest Passage

Outliers, or states that do not conform to the majority of public opinion, can help to identify opportunities that exist for improvement domestically or in multilateral relations. It is also instructive for understanding how to best go forward with negotiations on de-militarizing the Arctic, as states should be aware of what resistance exists domestically that could hinder this proposal. Rethinking the Top of the World demonstrates an area in which public opinion differs substantially between cohorts of respondents.

With the notable exception of Canada, high rates of non-response or don’t knows on the issue of the Northwest Passage occur in all the other publics. On average, 35% of the populations in these countries selected this response. In comparison, only a small minority (on average 10% of the public) of this same population believe that the Passage exists within Canadian waters. Instead, the largest proportion of peoples among all states (except Iceland) in both 2015 and 2010 responded that the Northwest Passage is an international waterway. Although the percentage of people on average decreased from 2010 in selecting don’t know or those that did not respond, it is also true that people on average preferred to select the alternative options of in dispute and an international water way over the within Canadian waters option.

Even though the question was framed as such that the Northwest Passage was explained to the respondent, high unresponsive/do not know rates persisted. Canadians overwhelmingly selected one of the three options provided whereas only 9% in both the North and the South selected the don’t know option or did not respond, which could represent a high degree of literacy on this topic. It is evident that Canada has a lot of work to do to persuade both foreign decision-makers and the broader international public about the validity of its claims.

Support for Inclusion of Non-Arctic States

The general agreement among publics to keep the Arctic as a unique region that is not linked to other issues is reflected in the level of support for whether non-Arctic states should have a say in Arctic affairs. The 2015 poll findings note that except for Finland, a minority of publics in all states support this notion. Support for inclusion outside Finland varies from 26% to as high as 49%, but the levels of support follow no apparent pattern. Low support from the public may stem from concerns that they are there to pursue economic goals with negative environmental consequences, that non-Arctic states do not adequately understand the geography, climate. and peoples of the region, and that they may be encroaching on claims of sovereignty.

Changes in the level of support seem to follow a regional pattern; however, there are exceptions in almost all cases. Yet it is important to note that the question in 2010 was phrased differently. Rather than inviting non-Arctic states to have a say in Arctic affairs in general, this question asked publics whether they believe China or the EU should be invited to join the Arctic Council and have a say in Arctic affairs. This is different than the 2015 question which asks a broader question of whether non-Arctic states should be engaged in discussions on Arctic affairs. Though a subtle change, including the example of China, which as noted in 2010 was the least preferred partner by almost all states, could have affected the level of support received by publics. Nonetheless in North America, there has been an increase since 2010 from the Canadian North, the Canadian South, and the United States for non-Arctic states to have a say in Arctic affairs. This increase in support was also shared by Finland and Iceland. Support went down in the other European countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, as well as Russia.

Allowing non-Arctic states to have a say on Arctic affairs could improve broader co-operation, but could also strengthen the geopolitical linkage effect from the south and the north. Non-Arctic countries can indeed make positive contributions through working groups and financial contributions through their positions as observers in the Arctic Council. Currently as observers, they cannot directly influence the decisions made at the Council level and their voices are limited. Yet if the mandate of observer states is to increase that would give them a greater voice, they may negatively strengthen linkages.

Expanded Council Mandate

The 2015 poll data showed that support for expanding the Arctic Council mandate to cover areas like military security receives on average support from 57% between the 10 publics. The highest percentage was among the Russian public at 79%. As a result, despite lower support for a nuclear weapons free zone in Russia, there is a majority of the public willing to develop a dialogue on military matters through the Arctic Council’s consensus-based operations.⁶¹

Indeed, the Arctic Council’s mandate should be amended to allow for discussion on issues relating to peace and security, which can fundamentally assist its goal of promoting co-operation in the Arctic region. Currently, coordinating matters that involve the military, such as coast guard co-operation or joint training exercises, are done in separate forums outside the Council.⁶² However, the Arctic Council had a role to play as the search and rescue agreement was signed under its auspices, and could continue its role of facilitating