The Sinking of INS Khukri: Survivor's Stories

By Major General Ian Cardozo

9 December 1971. 8.45 p.m. Torpedoed by a Pakistani submarine, the INS Khukri sank within minutes. Along with the ship, 178 sailors and 18 officers made the supreme sacrifice. Last seen calmly puffing on his cigarette, Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla, captain of the Khukri, chose to go down with his ship. This defining moment of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan is the basis of Major General Ian Cardozo's attempt to understand what happened that day and why. Major General Cardozo brings fresh insight into the hellish ordeal by including the heartfelt accounts of the survivors and of the members of their families. These accounts transform the stereotypical understanding of the incident; they also supplement it. We glimpse fear, trauma and death at first hand. In the annals of war writing, General Cardozo humanizes this cataclysmic event as never before.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Roli Books
• Release date: Dec 1, 2006
• ISBN: 9789351940999

Book preview

Preface

This book attempts to tell the story of the sinking of INS Khukri during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. The difference between this narrative and the others is that it embodies personal accounts and stories of the survivors of the ships that were sunk on both sides.

Tracking down the survivors of the Khukri took sometime for the whereabouts of all the survivors were at first not readily available. I was ultimately able to trace some of them and to interview them personally, through e-mail, the telephone and written correspondence. The trail was a complicated one and went across several countries because some of them had settled abroad and some had joined the merchant navy and were, therefore, not easily accessible.

Pakistani accounts of the 1971 war have been gleaned from Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972 compiled by the Pakistan Naval History Section and Bubbles of Water, an anthology of naval stories that gives anecdotal accounts of life in the Pakistan Navy in war and peace. In this work I was happily surprised to find interesting anecdotes about Commander David Raffiudin, PN, with whom I grew up many years ago at Rafi Manzil, Colaba, Bombay (now Mumbai), at a time before Partition, when India and the navy were undivided.

This narrative has had no access whatsoever to classified official documents and is based entirely on published material, historical records, accounts of survivors and interviews of some of their family members and of naval personnel, who retired long ago. During the course of my research, I found that in addition to bold planning, great leadership and good jointmanship, acquisition of intelligence and modern technology played a very important part in our victory at sea. Despite all this, the loss of the Khukri is a sad tale.

The book initially started off as a story of the Khukri survivors; however, as their stories unfolded, fascinating new dimensions of what happened in the war were revealed. Those who took part in the war had much to contribute and bits and pieces of interesting information and anecdotes lay tucked away in books, papers, magazines and the Internet. I thought it best to link them all together so that they would be available at one place, not only to facilitate reader accessibility but also because the linking together of all these pieces of information helped to make the story total and complete.

I have attempted to look at the story from the viewpoints of both India and Pakistan, to the extent possible, and in doing so, I feel I have been able to put together what really happened at sea in 1971 and in the sinking of PNS Ghazi and INS Khukri and the Pakistani warships that were destroyed and sunk off Karachi. Some strategic and tactical aspects of naval warfare and the application of the principles of war also surfaced. Although my experience in war has been basically on land. I find that the principles of war, whether on land or at sea, generally remain the same.

The navy did an exceptional job, both in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and showcased its mastery of these seas during this war. The innovative use of our missile boats in the attack on Karachi highlights how imaginative and bold use of weapons can lead to outstanding results in war. The chapter ‘What Happened in 1971’ highlights the stories beyond the story, the importance of technology in war, the criticality of underwater warfare, the relevance of surprise and how important it is to be proficient beneath the sea if our navy is to establish primacy over, on and under the waves of the Indian Ocean and help India become a true maritime power.

The loss of the Khukri emphasizes the importance of technology and the need to have the best equipment; not only what money can buy but also what we can make indigenously. Pakistan continues to forge ahead with the manufacture of the most modern conventional submarines available in the world whereas our country has allowed our expertise in this field to whither away. This imbalance needs to be set right. ‘The powers that be’, we are told, are taking steps to redeem the situation and redress the imbalance but the redressal will take time. The question that needs to be asked and answered is why has this been allowed to happen and why did it take so long for the right thing to be done? Even now, as this book is being written, we find the ‘Scorpene’ deal has been doing somersaults inside and outside of Parliament. This agreement with France gives us the much-needed opportunity to make submarines and so rectify the imbalance in underwater capability between Pakistan and India. Do the persons concerned not understand that in sorting out each other on such issues they do so at the cost of our national interest? I understand from the retired naval community that both the Chief of Naval Staff and the government in power are doing their utmost to modernize the navy in its three dimensional aspects. This is heartening and reassuring.

Last but not the least, it is the character of Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla that comes shining through the narrative. There is much that we can learn from the example he set, in the manner in which he lived and died. He is a role model that many in the armed forces and in ‘civvy street’ could follow with benefit.

The aim of writing this book is to bring the armed forces closer to the public. The man in the street needs to know more about the defence forces that protect him, so that he understands he too has a stake in the defence of the nation and that his security, the security of his family and of society also depends on how well the defence forces are managed, equipped and trained.

I was fortunate to meet and interact with some of those who led the attacks on Karachi and experts in the area of antisubmarine warfare. Their advice and guidance helped ensure balance and put the story in what I think is the right perspective. The final views, comments and narrative, however, are my own, for which I accept full responsibility.

In writing this book, I have learnt a lot more about our navy and how important it is to have a strong and well-equipped navy, if our national interest is to be served. The controversies of the sinking of the Ghazi and the Khukri also needed to be set at rest. If I have been able to cover these aspects and place before the reader a simple and readable account of war and survival at sea, the importance of the navy and the ocean that surrounds us, then the book would have achieved its purpose.

Introduction

INS Khukri was sunk midway through the Indo-Pak war of 1971, after the Indian Navy had taken the war right to Karachi, destroying Pakistani warships in harbour and setting the port on fire.

The sinking of INS Khukri was unfortunate because its destruction need not have happened. The euphoria in India over the brilliant success of the Indian Navy on the east and west coasts of the subcontinent evaporated somewhat with the news of her sinking. However, we needed to move on to a scintillating victory and so we did.

Tales of the survivors, as recorded in this narrative, provide different cameos of the event which, when put together, help in reconstructing the overall picture of what really happened. These narratives also give the reader an insight into the last moments of the Khukri and its crew – moments that separated death from life on that fateful night thirty-five years ago, at 8.45 p.m., on 9 December 1971.

The war between India and Pakistan during 1971 provides the backdrop to the war at sea and the story of the Khukri. This background is essential to give the reader the right perspective on events as they unfolded, leading to the war at sea and the showdown between the Khukri and the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor. The background of the war is given in detail, but not too much, because the focus of this book is the story of the Khukri and ‘What Happened in 1971’ – not too little, because that would leave gaps in the story – but just enough to provide the historical perspective.

The narratives in this book also bring to center stage the part played by submarines. The sinking of the Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi and the sinking of INS Khukri underscore the importance of underwater warfare, military intelligence and technology. How and why did the Khukri get destroyed and what can we learn from this and other events of the war at sea in 1971? The answers are provided by the actors in this life and death drama that was played out on the high seas. This story owes much to the narratives of the survivors, to the voices of those who took part in the 1971 war and to submariners of the past. What they say needs to be considered. Past events cast their shadow on the future and it is necessary to ensure we learn from history.

Anti-submarine warfare is as difficult or as easy as modern technology can make it. In this, sonar plays an important part. Sonars of surface warships probe and search the ocean depths for lurking enemy submarines. Detection of a target by a submarine or a surface warship and its recognition as an ‘enemy’ sets in motion a series of actions for the destruction of the target. Much depends on the quality of both the human as well as the material resources to achieve success. We have the technological expertise to make the best underwater detection devices the world can produce. Reliance on the West can only lead us once again to a situation where our armed forces may be compromised with material that may not be the best. This must not be allowed to be repeated. However, the feedback from the users of all three wings of the armed forces is that the performance of our Defence Research & Development Organisation in some areas leaves much to be desired and that perhaps joint-venture production may be the best option.

The Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz said that war is an outcome of politics. If we accept this, then it follows our decision makers need to accept the important part the navy plays in safeguarding our national interests and to understand what needs to be done to ensure that it plays its rightful part in the oceans that surround us. Good leaders ensure wars do not take place but this can only be ensured if we are strong. Nature abhors a vacuum and if we do not fill that vacuum, then someone else will!

Readers will note that this book tells us mostly about the war in the Arabian Sea and very little about the navy’s exploits in the Bay of Bengal, which were equally outstanding. The reason is that this book focuses on the story of the Khukri and the submarine that destroyed it. The navy’s exploits in the Bay of Bengal will have to be told in another book.

Lastly, the book takes a brief look at the future. Newspaper reports that claim to articulate the views of the navy are projecting shortages that are likely to occur if the Scorpene project is delayed. The navy and the government need to be supported so that the project takes off in time. The sooner the better.

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The Indian Navy at War

‘

There are risks and costs to a programme of action. But they are far less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction. – John F Kennedy

’

The Indo-Pak war of 1965

The non-participation of the Indian Navy in the Indo-Pak war of 1965 has to be placed in proper perspective. Hence a bit of the backdrop is necessary. This is the story of what actually happened.

Pakistan’s obsession to take Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) by force tempted her, early in 1965, to repeat the attempt of 1947-48. India, in 1965, was yet to recover from the political, economic and military effects of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Pakistan had, on the other hand, joined the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and received substantial economic assistance and massive military aid from the United States of America, amounting to over 1.5 billion dollars. From the US and the UK she acquired five destroyers, including two modern Battle Class destroyers, eight minesweepers and huge amounts of financial aid to improve naval infrastructure. For the army, the aid included 200 M-45 Patton tanks and supporting arms, ammunition and equipment. The Pakistan Air Force received one squadron of M-104 Starfighter aircraft, four squadrons of F-86 Sabre jet aircraft and two squadrons of B-75 fighter-bombers. The relative strength between the two countries had, therefore, changed drastically and dramatically in favour of Pakistan.¹ Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had passed away by this time and the diminutive Lal Bahadur Shastri did not seem to impress the Pakistanis. General Ayub Khan, who had come to power through a military coup, apparently felt this was the best opportunity to once again attempt to take J&K by force as such a favourable opportunity might never come again. Before embarking on her plan for the offensive to annex J&K, Pakistan decided to take her measure of India by launching a limited offensive in the desert area of the Rann of Kutch. She felt this would give her an opportunity to check the calibre of the equipment she had received from the US and also to ascertain the will and resolve of the Government of India under the leadership of Lal Bahadur Shastri.² Published Pakistani sources and memoirs reveal a detailed and ambitious plan to wrest J&K by force. The plan consisted of three major operations named Operation Desert Hawk, Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam.

Operation Desert Hawk, to be launched in April 1965, was to be a probing encounter to establish claim to territory in the Rann of Kutch, where the boundary had not yet been demarcated. This operation had four specific purposes. First, to assess India’s response – political and military – to the use of force. Second, to draw India’s military forces southwards towards Kutch to make J&K and Punjab more vulnerable to future planned military action. Third, to give Pakistan military forces a dress rehearsal for a full-scale invasion of India later in the year. Fourth, to test how serious America was in enforcing its ban on the use of American supplied Patton tanks and other arms and equipment for an attack on India.³

India had protested strongly against this excessive military aid by the US to Pakistan and expressed her apprehensions that the aid would really be used against India and that the Cold War between the two superpowers of that time was being forced into the subcontinent. Subsequent events proved this to be true despite an assurance in writing from the Pakistani prime minister, Muhammed Ali, to Jawaharlal Nehru that American arms would not be used against India. The American President, General Eisenhower, also sent a message to Nehru dated 24 February 1954 that stated:

… and I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and is directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.⁴

The uncertainty further intensified when Indonesia, soon after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, began to project a pro-China stance. She distanced herself from India and moved closer to Pakistan. An expansion of her naval fleet supported by the (erstwhile) USSR increased the Indonesian Navy’s confidence. Her bellicosity grew and she began to voice claims on some of the Nicobar Islands. Suggestions were also made that the Indian Ocean should be renamed as the Indonesian Ocean. There was an increase in the sightings of unidentified submarines and aircraft around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In response to Pakistan’s request for assistance, the Indonesian Navy sent two submarines and two missile boats to Karachi. The Indonesian Naval Chief even volunteered to distract India by making moves to take over islands in the Nicobars. Indonesian strategy appeared to be to get Pakistan to tie down the Indian Navy on the west coast of India so that Indonesia would have easy access to capturing some of our island territories of the Nicobar chain. As a consequence, the Indian fleet had to be sent to the Bay of Bengal. Air Marshal Ashgar Khan of Pakistan in his memoirs, The First Round, recounts his discussion with President Soekarno and Admiral Martadinata of Indonesia:

President Soekarno said that India’s attack on Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and they were duty bound to give Pakistan all possible assistance. President Soekarno told me to take away whatever would be useful to Pakistan in this emergency. Two Russian supplied submarines and two Russian supplied missile boats were sent to Pakistan post-haste.

Admiral Martadinata asked Air Marshal Asghar Khan:

Don’t you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? A look at the map will show that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are an extension of Sumatra and are in any case between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there? In any case, the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches to these Islands and carry out reconnaissance missions to see what the Indians have there.

Unfortunately for both Pakistan and Indonesia, by the time the Indonesian ships and submarines reached Karachi, the war was wrapped up and over’.⁵

Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk in the Rann of Kutch on 9 April 1965. She attacked Sardar Post, a small police post, with an infantry brigade supported by armour and overran it. India’s reaction was predictably slow. She reinforced the area with regular troops. Pakistan responded by launching a division-sized offensive under Major General Tikka Khan. Her newly acquired Patton tanks supported attacking forces in both these offensives. A spirited resistance by the outnumbered and outgunned Indian soldiers failed to convince a belligerent Pakistan that she had misjudged the calibre and character of the Indian soldier and the resolve of the Indian civil and military leadership, particularly the leadership of the Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. India, meanwhile, protested to America against the use of American arms and equipment and America protested to Pakistan. Nothing further happened. That was as far as the assurance of an American president went that these arms would never be used against India. Pakistan, therefore, carried on with her plans. Having convinced herself that she had the upper hand, she agreed to a ceasefire and status quo ante, at the same time preparing for a much bigger offensive. India remained oblivious of Pakistani plans and intentions.

The ceasefire agreement on cessation of incursions in the Rann of Kutch was brokered by the British and signed by India and Pakistan on 30 June 1965. The agreement was to be followed by arbitration by a three-man tribunal. This apparently convinced India that Pakistan would follow the terms of the ceasefire agreement. India ought to have known better and looked at Pakistan’s legacy of duplicity of the past! While ostensibly agreeing to the ceasefire, she began to initiate a series of violent incidents across the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in preparation for her next offensive. In May, there were 1,345 incidents along the CFL engineered by Pakistan and confirmed by UN observers.

The ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch was followed by the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference at London. An informal meeting took place at this conference between President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and our prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. LK Jha, principal secretary to the prime minister, recalls:

‘In fact I recall, and it might be useful for the record, a meeting between Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub during the Commonwealth Conference session. It was a private meeting and I was there. Ayub said somewhat patronizingly, You know, your chaps tried to commit aggression on our territory, our chaps gave them a few knocks and they began to flee. Then Shastriji said, Mr President, you are a general. I have no military knowledge or experience. But do you think if I had to attack Pakistan, I would choose a terrain where we have no logistic support and you have all the advantages? Do you think I would make such a mistake or any of my generals would allow me to make that mistake? And one could see from the face of President Ayub that this thought startled him. Because quite obviously he had been led to believe, in my judgement by Bhutto, that the Indians had attacked in the Rann of Kutch. And he was firmly of that view until this question was posed by Shastriji. I could see him visibly pause and not pursue the point any further.’⁶

On 5 August 1965, Pakistan launched