A New Way of Ideas

By Richard John Kosciejew

Ideas, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centurieswhatever, in the same manner and result is the act known, that the immediate regard of change is considered before the mind as a worthy recognition and reciprocal reaction as the interpretive responses that to acknowledge within a responsive measure of enabling one to think. The inherent function for being to think, particularly taken in the broadest sense to include perception, memory, imagination, as thinking can be narrowly construed.

In continuous connection with perception, ideas were often thought, but not alwaysBerkeley is the exception, holding to be representational, i.e., images of somethingin other contexts, ideas were taken to be concepts, such as the concept of a horse or of an infinite quantity, though concepts of these sorts certainly do not appear to be images.

An innate idea was either a concept or a general truth, such as Equals added to equals yield equals. That was allegedly not learned but was in some sense always in the mind. Sometimes, as in Descartes, innate ideas were taken to be cognitive capacities rather than concepts or general truths, but these capacities, too, were held to be inborn.

An adventitious idea, either an image or a concept, was as idea accompanied by a judgment concerning the nonmental cause of that idea, so a visual image was an adventitious idea provided one judged of that idea that it was caused by something outside ones mind, presumably by the object being seen.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse
• Release date: Dec 23, 2017
• ISBN: 9781546220619

Richard John Kosciejew

Richard john Kosciejew, a German-born Canadian who now takes residence in Toronto Ontario. Richard, received his public school training at the Alexander Muir Public School, then attended the secondary level of education at Central Technical School. As gathering opportunities came, he studied at the Centennial College, he also attended the University of Toronto, and his graduate studies at the University of Western Ontario, situated in London. His academia of study rested upon his analytical prowess and completed ‘The Designing Theory of Transference.’ His other books are ‘Mental Illness’ and ‘The Phenomenon of Transference,’ among others.

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Published by AuthorHouse 12/22/2017

ISBN: 978-1-5462-2062-6 (sc)

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A NEW WAY OF IDEAS

RICHARD JOHN KOSCIEJEW

Ideas, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - whatever, in the same manner and result is the act known, that the immediate regard of change is considered before the mind as a worthy recognition and reciprocal reaction as the interpretive responses that to acknowledge within a responsive measure of enabling one to think. The inherent function for being to think, particularly taken in the broadest sense to include perception, memory, imagination, as thinking can be narrowly construed.

In continuous connection with perception, ideas were often thought, but not always - Berkeley is the exception, holding to be representational, i.e., images of something - in other contexts, ideas were taken to be concepts, such as the concept of a horse or of an infinite quantity, though concepts of these sorts certainly do not appear to be images.

An innate idea was either a concept or a general truth, such as Equals added to equals’ yield equals, that was allegedly not learned but was in some sense always in the mind. Sometimes, as in Descartes, innate ideas were taken to be cognitive capacities rather than concepts or general truths, but these capacities ss, too, were held to be inborn,

An adventitious idea, either an image or a concept, was as idea accompanied by a judgment concerning the non-mental cause of that idea, so, a visual image was an adventitious idea provided one judged of that idea that it was caused by something outside one’s mind, presumably by the object being seen.

A NEW WAY OF IDEAS

RICHARD JOHN KOSCIEJEW

Thoughts differ from all else that is said to be, among the contents of the mind in being wholly communicable: It is of the essence of thought that I can convey to you the very thought that I have, as opposed to being able to tell you merely something about what my thought is like. It is of the essence of thought not merely to be communicable, but to be communicably communicable, without the residue, by means of language. In order to understand thought, it is necessary, therefore, to understand the means by which thought is expressed.

We communicate thought by means of language because we have an implicit understanding of the workings of language, that is, of the principles governing the use of language. These principles, which have been related to the clustering spatiality of celestial coordinators that open upon our viewing of mind, other that through the medium of language do we furnish the phraseology of sentence structures, in which endow our sentences with the sense, that they put into effect the hierarchical ordering of analytical thought, is therefore, a necessity to make explicitly of these principles, regulating our use of language, in of which we already implicitly cling to.

As objects of awareness they are as directly open to our investigation as anything could possibly be. So, as to, let it be as merely simple and cast aside the irritable and annoying repetitious questions, in the case that progress with what we are so well equipped to carry out an investigation.

Our lived-in-World forms a whole new approach to philosophy, as devoted to the examination of consciousness and its objects. It was a systematic analysis of experience that became known as ‘phenomenology’ because a treatment of everything was as ‘phenomena’. What appears to be fundamental constituents of this whole order of things, are precisely those mentioned material objects existing in a space-time framework, moving in ways that causally interconnect? It is to be stressed as of the utmost importance that what these fundamentals characterized is the world of experience. All these things are features of how we function as experiencing subjects, being in the world. But they are characteristics of experience, not characteristics of things as they exist in themselves independently of being experienced.

Something such as a ‘thought’ or ‘conception’ that potentially can be, but not yet, in existence, for having possibilities, capability or power, as the inherent ability, or capacity for growth, development, or coming into being, in such a simply unadorned way is in a plain way a matter attributing of a specific entity, an idea, or a quality perceived as known or thought to have its own excessive existence: A thing that exists, or the fact or state of continued being in life, in that of our brief existence on Earth. The processes of thinking of a product of thinking, as itself, such as a thought or conception that potentially or actually existed in the mind as a product of mental activity. However, the act or practice of one that thinks, has thought, a way of reasoning, judgement within the possibility to consider or be considered are conceivable plans that were not even thinkable. From, time to time possessing the amiable stability, as existing in the mind, something, such as an object an idea, as existing as the totality of all things that exist, is thought to exist, or represented as existing. A thing that exists as an entity, in that of a mood or manner of all existence, exists in the mind as a product of mental activity. Such that an open conviction or principle has some peculiar political ideas? A plan, scheme, or method of a specific situation, the significance or notion as fancy is, by notions as belief, that, is to say, that the mental act, condition, or habit of placing trust or confidence in another. Mental acceptance of and conviction in the truth or actuality, or validating something as believed or accepted as true, especially a particular tenet of a body of tenets accepting as true by a group of persons. As in a fanciful impulse, as, when, having fully cast of lexically been meaning that one wishes to convey, especially by language of meaning as expressive or intended in a specific manner as sometimes used in combination to a well-meaning intention. Even so, it is distinguished from relatedness, as to have been meaning as distinguished from relational meaning. The word, is notional in relational. The concerning and as reference or importance, and found through the conceptualism from which philosophy embarks upon the doctrine, intermediately between nominalism and realism, and that universals exist only within the mind and have no external orientations, such that any substantiated quality or verified in being actual or true. Reality finds that which exists of all things in actuality, or an event that is actual, wherefore, the totality with which of possessing actuality existence, or the intrinsic or indispensable properties that serve to characterize or identity that most crucial of times is of the essence, as that which exists objectively, and in fact, concepts or mental conception, be that of a mental conception: Conceptional discoursing, which antedated developments of the new product, as concluding to conventionalism as the forming of concept or concepts of, and especially to interpretation in a conceptual way.

A plan, scheme, or method of a specific situation, the significance or notion as fancy is, by notions as belief, that, is to say, that the mental act, condition, or habit of placing trust or confidence in another. Mental acceptance of and conviction in the truth or actuality, or validating something as believed or accepted as true, especially a particular tenet of a body of tenets accepting as true by a group of persons. As in a fanciful impulse, as, when, having fully cast of lexical meaning that one wishes to convey, especially by language of meaning as expressive or intended in a specific manner as sometimes used in combination to well-meanings of intention. Even so, it is distinguished from relatedness, as to have been meaning as distinguished from relational meaning. The word, is notional in through the conceptualism from which philosophy embarks upon the doctrine, intermediately between nominalism and realism, and that universals exist only within the mind and have no external orientations, such that any substantiated quality or verified for being actual or true. An authentic or real event as seen in the mind, for having existence or actuality of a real event and representing the true or the actual reason as accorded with actual facts rather than ideals, feelings, and so on, regarding or pertaining to the concerns that abstract concepts have objective existence, and are more real than concrete objects as opposed to nominalism, in that things have reality apart from the conscious perceptions of them.

The fact, state, or quality of being real or genuine, that of which is real or an actual thing finds in the situation or event the absolute or ultimate, as in the contrasts with the apparent. Reality finds that which exists of all things in actuality, or an event that is actual. Wherefore, the totality with which of possessing actuality in its existence, or the intrinistic or indispensable properties that serve to characterize or identity, in that most crucial of times is of the essence. The essencity in that which exists objectively, and in fact, concepts or mental conception are to form concepts or an idea or the commencement of a concept ascertaining of an idea, plan, or design. It’s pertaining conception or concept, for that which of a mental conception or the importance of some generalized ideas that form in combination, the elements or the effecting occupation that situations or the mental involvements, in so, that the antedated developments that incite to action and prompt of the new product, as concluding to conventionalism as the forming of concept or concepts of, and especially to interpretations tending to the notion or opinion as conceived in the mind.

In whatever way or manner, it has become apparent, that something such as a mind is a product of mental activity as reprehensibly the collective state of characteristics, by which is definitely recognizable in both technically or publically. Characterized by which an individual or recognizable for being known, is that this usage derives or gainfully, is, with without the reflective, but when introduced, in the sense to have become even more conventional than the reflective construction, from psychoanalytic writings, it has a specific technical meaning, but like other terms that held are particular.

Some critics sieged upon th fact that, in this case, however, intuited of an identifying with which the reflective have become standard. Where it was widely regarded as jargons, as w hen introduced into wider and broadening use. In particular the philosophy of Plato, an archetypical corresponding of mental reality is an important aspect set for having or the potential of the act of behavioural or personal characteristics which of an individual duality recognizable as a member of a group. Further, in the philosophy of Kant, a concept of reason is that of Hegels’ absolute truth of something that seems as a remembered idea, though distinctly intellectual and stresses contemplation and reasoning. The quality or condition of being the same as a subsisting entity, the individuality of which mathematics and education regarded as to satisfy any number, that replaces the letter for which the equation is defined, whereas, the identity elements as essential for being, and identifying repeatedly from them, all and all, the idea is to finish the project under budget. Existing in the mind is of itself to be an ‘idea’. Human history is in essence a history of ideas, as thoughts are distinctly intellectual and stresses contemplation and reasoning. Justly as language is the dress of thought. Ideas, as eternal, mind-independent forms, or prototypical archetypes of the things in the material world. Neoplatonism made thoughts in the mind of God who created the world. The much criticized ‘new way of ideas,’ so much a part of seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophy, began with Descartes’ (1596-1650), the conscionable extension of ideas to cover whatever is in human minds an extension, of which, Locke (1632-1704) made much use. But are they like mental images, of things outside the mind, or non-representational, like sensations? If representational, are they mental objects, standing between the mind and what they represent, or are they mental acts and modifications of a mind perceiving the world directly? Finally, are they neither objects nor mental acts, but dispositions? Malebranche (1632-1715) and Arnauld (1612-94), and then Leibniz, famously disagreed about how ‘ideas’ should be understood, and recent scholars disagree about how Arnauld, Descartes’, Locke and Malebranche in fact understood them.

Although ideas give rise to many problems of interpretation, but between them they define the space of philosophical problems. Ideas are that with which we think, or in Locke’s term, ‘Whatever the mind may be employed about in thinking,’ looked at that way, they seem to be inherently transient, fleeting, and unstable private presences. Ideas provided the way in which objective knowledge can be expressed. They are the essential components of understanding, and any intelligible proposition that is true must be capable of being understood. Plato’s theory of ‘forms’ is a launching celebration of the objective and timeless existence of ideas as concepts, and reified to the point where they make up the only real world, of separate and perfect models of which the empirical world is only a poor cousin. This doctrine, notably in the ‘Timaeus’, opened the way for the Neoplatonic notion of ideas as the thoughts of God. The concept gradually lost this other worldly aspect, until after Descartes’ ideas became assimilated to whatever it is that lies of conveys to the mind is ascertained by any thinking being.

Together with a general bias toward the sensory, so that what lies in the mind may be thought of as something like images, and a belief that thinking is well explained as the manipulation having no real existence but existing in fancied imagination. It is not reason but ‘the imagination’ that is found to be responsible for our making the empirical inferences that we do. There are certain general ‘principles of the imagination’ according to which ideas naturally come and go in the mind under certain conditions. It is the task of the ‘science of human nature’ to discover such principles, but without itself going beyond experience. For example, an observed correlation between things of two kinds can be seen to produce in everyone a propensity to expect a thing to the second sort given an experience of a thing of the first sort. We get a feeling, or an ‘impression’, when the mind makes such a transition and that is what led us to ascribing the necessary relation between things of the two kinds, there is no necessity in the relations between things that happen in the world, but, given our experience and the way our minds naturally work, we cannot help thinking that there is.

A similar appeal to certain ‘principles of the imagination’ is what explains our belief in a world of enduring objects. Experience alone cannot produce that belief, everything we directly perceive is ‘momentary and fleeting’. And whatever our experience is like, no reasoning could assure us of the existence of something as autonomous of our impression which continues to exist when they cease. The series of constantly changing sense impressions presents us with observable features which Hume calls ‘constancy’ and ‘coherence’, and these naturally operate on the mind in such a way as eventually to produce ‘the opinion of a continued and distinct existence’. The explanation is complicated, but it is meant to appeal only to psychological mechanisms which can be discovered by ‘careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which results form [the mind’s] different circumstances and situations’.

We believe not only in bodies, but also in persons, or selves, which continue to exist through time, and this belief too can be explained only by the operation of certain ‘principles of the imagination’. We never directly perceive anything we call ourselves: The most we can be aware of in ourselves are our constantly changing momentary perceptions, not the mind or self which has them. For Hume, there is nothing that really binds the different perceptions together, we are led into the ‘fiction’ that they form a unity only because of the way in which the thought of such series of perceptions works upon the mind: ‘The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, … there is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different: Whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitutes the mind.

The appending presumptions that are based on the fundamental principles whose assertive assumptions presented in the surmising constrainment to the one-to-one correspondence as having to exist between every element and elements of psychological reality and physical theory, this may serve to bridge the gap between mind and world for those who use physical theories. But, it also suggests that the Cartesian division is inseparably integrated and structurally real, that is to say, as impregnably formidable for physical reality as it is based on ordinary language that explains in not a small part why the radical separation between mind and world as sanctioned by classical physics and formalized by Descartes’ persists, as philosophical postmodernism attests, one of the most persuasive features of Western intellectual life.

Surpassing other examples of its kind, extraordinary descriptions gave an account to description in speech or writing or by means of images, this narrative or frame tale that served to legitimate and rationalize the categorical oppositions and terms of relations between the myriad number of constructs in the symbolic universe of modern humans were attributively minded in religion. The use of religious thought for that which of these purposes is quite apparent in the artifacts found in the excavated fossils, in the corpses of times generations nobly remaining of people living in France and Spain forty thousand years ago. These artifactual evidences that are inevitably evident to the forming or affecting part of something fundamental, and in what is apparently a possibility, in that, of its prevailing consistencies in the developed language system and most generally had given deliverance to the contemporaries, an instance like an administrator or a diplomat, or an avid student of an intricate and complex social order.

The appending presumption that sometimes that is taken for granted as fact, however, its decisions are based on the fundamental principles whose assumptions are based on or upon the nature of which were presented the surmise contained of the one-to-one correspondence having to exist between every element of physical reality and physical theory. But it also suggests that the Cartesian division is inseparably integrated and structurally real, least of mention, as impregnably formidable for physical reality as it is based on ordinary language, that explains in no small part why the radical separation between mind and world sanctioned by classical physics and formalized by Descartes remains, as philosophical postmodernism attests, one of the most pervasive features of Western intellectual life.

The history of science reveals that scientific knowledge and method did not spring from a fully-blooming blossom for which the minds of the ancient Greeks did any more than language and culture emerged fully formed in the minds of Homo sapient. Scientific knowledge is an extension of ordinary language into greater levels of abstraction and precision through reliance upon geometric and numerical relationships. We speculate that the seeds of the scientific imagination were planted in ancient Greece, as opposed to Chinese or Babylonian culture, partly because the social, political, and an economic climate in Greece was more open to the pursuit of knowledge with marginal cultural utility. Another important factor was that the special character of Homeric religion allowed the Greeks to invent a conceptual framework that would prove useful in future scientific investigation. However, it was only after the inherent perceptivity that Greek philosophy was wedded to some essential features of Judeo-Christian beliefs about the origin of the cosmos that the paradigm for classical physics emerged.

The Greek philosophers that we now acknowledged and recognized as the originators of scientific thought were mystics who probably perceived their world as replete with spiritual agencies and forces. The legendary mystification or mysteries for which, in some way are prescribed by whose ancestral heritage has been lost, as the variousness of Greek myths in lacking a factual basis or historical validity. The Greek religious heritage has made it possible for these thinkers to coordinate in the attemptive efforts to coordinate diverse physical events within a framework of immaterial and unifying ideas. The action toward one’s actual existence but cannot be confuted for servicing practicability, might that of assembling some equalities that state of its quality or state for being accidentally vicinitized to a closer pretension. Such that, presuppositional foundations are taken by or based on succeeding self realizations - might that, deferential submissiveness is taken to be of something that is taken for granted or as some true existent, especially as a basis for action or reasoning. Nonetheless, these of the affirming of fact, in that of something that is taken for granted or advanced as fact, e.g., decisions based on assumption about the nature of society, generate the conjecture that there is a persuasively influential underlying substance out for which everything emerges and into which everything returns, are attributive to Thales of Miletos, as something that is done. Thales, was apparently led to this conclusion out of the belief that the world was full of gods, and his unifying substance, water, was similarly charged with spiritual presence. Religion in this instance served the interests of science because it allowed the Greek philosophers to view ‘essences’ underlying and unifying physical reality as if they were ‘substances’.

The last remaining feature of what would become the paradigm for the first scientific revolution in the seventeenth-century is attributed to Pythagoras. Like Parmenides, Pythagoras also held that the perceived world is illusory and that there is an exact correspondence between ideas and aspects of external reality. Pythagoras, however, had a different conception of the character of the idea that showed this correspondence. The truth about the fundamental character of the unified and unifying substance, which could be uncovered through reason and contemplation, is, claimed, mathematical in form.

Pythagoras established and was the central figure in a school of philosophy, religion, and mathematics: Pythagoras was apparently viewed by his followers as semi-divine. For his followers the regular solids (symmetrical three-dimensional forms in which all sides’ have aligned themselves as by their use in the same regular polygon) and whole numbers became revered essences or sacred ideas. In contrast with ordinary language, the language of mathematical and geometric forms seemed closed, precise, and pure. Providing one understood the axioms and notations. The meaning conveyed was invariant from one mind to another. The Pythagoreans felt that the language empowered the mind to leap beyond the confusion of sense experience into the realm of immutable and eternal essences. This mystical insight made Pythagoras the figure from antiquity most revered by the creators of classical physics, and it continues to have great appeal for contemporary physicists as they struggle with the epistemological implications of the quantum mechanical description of nature.

Progress was made in mathematics, and to a lesser extent in physics, from the time of classical Greek philosophy to the seventeenth-century in Europe. In Baghdad, for example, from about AD. 750 to AD. 1000, substantial advancement was made in medicine and chemistry, and the relics of Greek science were translated into Arabic, digested, and preserved. Eventually these relics reentered Europe via the Arabic kingdom of Spain and Sicily, and the work of figures like Aristotle and Ptolemy reached the budding universities of France, Italy, and England during the Middle Ages.

For much of this period the Church provided the institutions, like the teaching orders, needed for the rehabilitation of philosophy. Nevertheless, the social, political, and an intellectual climate in Europe was not ripe for a revolution in scientific thought until the seventeenth-century. The continuative progressive succession had entered into the nineteenth century. The works of the new class of intellectuals we call scientists were more avocations than vocation, and the word scientist did not appear in the English until around 1840.

Copernicus would have been described economics and classical literature, and, most notably, a highly honoured and placed church dignitary. Although we named a revolution after him, this conservative man did not set out to create one. The placement of the Sun at the centre of the universe, which seemed right and necessary to Copernicus, was not a result of making careful astronomical observations. In fact, he made very few observations while developing his theory, and then only to ascertain in his prior conclusions seemed correct. The Copernican system was also not any more useful in making astronomical calculations than the accepted model and was, in some ways, much more difficult to implement, What, then, was his motivation for creating the model and his reasons for presuming that the model was correct?

Copernicus felt that the placement of the Sun at the centre of the universe made sense because he viewed the Sun as the symbol of the presence of a supremely intelligent and intelligible God in a man-centred world. He was apparently led to this conclusion in part because the Pythagoreans identified this fire with the fireball of the Sun. The only positive support to favour activity in the face of opposition was to supply what is needed for sustenance and maintain to hold in position by the serving as a foundation or base for that which Copernicus could offer for the greater efficacy of his model was that it represented a simpler and more mathematically harmonious model of the sort than the Creator would obviously prefer.

The belief that the mind of God as Divine Architect permeates the workings of nature was the principle of the scientific thought of Johannes Kepler. Consequently, most modern physicists would probably feel some discomfort in reading Kepler’s original manuscripts. Physics and metaphysics, astronomy and astrology, geometry and theology commingle with an intensity that might offend those who practice science in the modern sense of what word. Physical laws, wrote Kepler, ‘lie within the power of understanding of the human mind. God wanted us to perceive them when he created ‘us’ in his image so that we may take part in his own thoughts … Our knowledge of numbers and quantities are the same as that of God’s, at least insofar as we understand something of it in this mortal life’.

Believing, like Newton after him, in the literal truth of the word of the Bible, Kepler concluded that the word of God is also transcribed in the immediacy of observable nature. Kepler’s discovery that the planets around the Sun were elliptical, as opposed perfecting circles, may have made the universe seem a less perfect creation of God in ordinary language. For Kepler, however, the new model placed the Sun, which he also viewed as the emblem of a divine agency, more at the centre of a mathematically harmonious universe than the Copernican system allowed. Communing with the perfect mind of God requires, as Kepler put it, ‘knowledge on numbers and quantity’.

Since Galileo did not use, or even refer to, the planetary laws of Kepler when those laws would have made his defence of the heliocentric universe more credible, his attachment to the godlike circle was probably a more deeply rooted aesthetic and religious ideal. Nonetheless, it was Galileo, more than Newton, who was responsible for formulating the scientific idealism to establish the identity of quantum mechanics, is now forcing ‘us’ to abandon. Within the Dialogue Concerning the Two Great Systems of the World, Galileo said the following about the followers of Pythagoras:

I know perfectly well that the Pythagoreans had the highest esteem for the science of number and that Plato himself admired the human intellect and believed that it participates in divinity solely because it has the functional distributed contributions that follow the dynamic abilities that understand the nature of numbers. I myself am inclined to make the same judgement.

This article of faith -mathematical and geometrical ideas mirror the most basic, significance and indispensable elements, is our understanding that there be of an end-all and the good nor evil’s essencity of physical reality. Galileo’s faith is illustrated by the fact that the first mathematical law of his new science, a constant describing the acceleration of bodies in free fall, could not be confirmed by experiment. The experiments conducted by Galileo in which balls of different sizes and weights were rolled simultaneously down a declining plane did not, as he frankly admitted, yield precise results. Since the vacuum pumps had not yet been invented, yield precise results. Vacuum pumps had not yet been invented, in that respect Galileo could not integrate of any free-falling objects, but subject to his laws were obligingly rigorous experimental proofs sustained within the seventeenth-century. Galileo believed in the absolute validity of this law in the absence of experimental proof because he also believed that movement could be subjected absolutely to the law of number. What Galileo asserted, as the French historian of science Alexander Koyré put it, was ‘that the real are in its essence, geometrical and, consequently, subject to rigorous determination and measurement.

By the later part of the nineteenth-century attempts to develop a logically consistent basis for number and arithmetic not only threatened to undermine the efficacy of the classical view of correspondence debates before the advent of quantum physics. They also occasioned a debate about epistemological foundations of mathematical physics that resulted in an attempt by Edmund Husserl to eliminate or obviate the correspondence problem by grounding this physics in human subjective reality. Since, to that place is a direct line as dissenting from Husserl to existentialism to structuralism to constructionism, the linkage between philosophical postmodernism and the debate over the foundations of scientific epistemology is more direct than we had previously imagined.

A complete history of the debate over the epistemological foundations of mathematical physics should probably begin with the discovery of irrational numbers by the followers of Pythagoras, the paradoxes of Zeno and Gottfried Leibniz. Both since we are more concerned with the epistemological crisis of the later nineteenth-century, beginning with the set theory developed by the German mathematician and logician Georg Cantor. From 1878 to 1897, Cantor created a theory of abstract sets of entities that eventually became a mathematical discipline. A set, as he defined it, is a collection of definite and distinguishable objects in thought or perception conceived as a whole.

Cantors attempted to prove that the process of counting and the definition of integers could be placed on a solid mathematical foundation. His method was repeatedly to place the element in one set into ‘one-to-one’ correspondence with those in another. In the apparent realization of integers, Cantor showed that each integer (1, 2, 3, … n) could be paired with an even integer (2, 4, 6, … n), and, therefore, that the set of all integers was equal to the set of all even numbers.

Amazingly, Cantor discovered that some infinite sets were larger than others and that infinite set formed a hierarchy of ever greater infinities. After this failed the attempt to save the classical view of logical foundations and internal consistency of mathematical systems, a major crack had obviously appeared in the seemingly solid foundations of number and mathematics. Meanwhile, many mathematicians began to see that everything from functional analysis to the theory of real numbers depended on the problematic character of number itself.

In 1886, Nietzsche was delighted to learn the classical view of mathematics as a logically consistent and self-contained system that could prove it might be undermined. His immediate and unwarranted conclusion was that all logic and wholes of mathematics were nothing more than fictions perpetuated by those who exercised their will to power. With his characteristic sense of certainty, Nietzsche derisively proclaimed, ‘Without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world to the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live’.

The conditional relation, for which our conceptions of the ‘way things are’ given the implications of this discovery extended beyond the domain of the physical sciences, and the best efforts of many some thoughtful people will be required to understand them.

Perhaps, the most startling and potentially revolutionary of these implications in human terms is a new view of the relationship between mind and world that is utterly different from that sanctioned by classical physics. René Descartes, came to realize that in positing knowledgeable considerations that support something open to question gave sensible reasons for the proposed change or changes. That for which was to realize that mind or consciousness in the mechanistic world-view of classical physics is seemingly to exist, that in the realm of separate distinction was closed away from nature. Soon, there after, Descartes formalized his distinction in his famous dualist. Artists and intellectuals in the Western world were increasingly obliged to confront a terrible prospect. The prospect was that the realm of the mental is a self-contained and self-referential island universe with no real or necessary connection with the universe itself.

The first scientific revolution of the seventeenth-century freed Western civilization from the paralysing and demeaning the fields in forces of superstition, laid the foundations for rational understanding and control of the processes of nature, and ushered in an era of technological innovation and progress that provided the distinction between heaven and earth and united the universe in a shared and communicable frame of knowledge, it presented ‘us’ with a view of physical reality. That was totally alien from the world of everyday life.

Descartes, the father of modern philosophy quickly realized that on that point was nothing in this view of nature that could explain or provide a foundation for the mental, or for all that we know from direct experience as to be distinctly human. In a mechanistic universe, he said, to that place is no single privilege or function for mind, and the separation between mind and matter is absolute. Descartes was also convinced, however, that the immaterial essences that gave form and structure to this universe were coded in geometric and mathematical ideas, and this led him to invent algebraic geometry.

A scientific understanding of these ideas could be derived, which was said by Descartes, with the aid of precise deduction, and claimed that the contours of physical reality could be laid out in three-dimensional co-ordinates. Following the publication of Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica, in 1687, reductionism and mathematical modelling became the most powerful tools of modern science. The dream that the entire physical world could be known and mastered through the extension and refinement of mathematical theory became the central feature and principle of scientific knowledge.

The radical separation between mind and nature formalized by Descartes served over time to allow scientists to concentrate on developing mathematical descriptions of matter as pure mechanisms in the absence of any concern about its spiritual dimension or ontological foundations. Meanwhile, attempts to rationalize, reconcile, or eliminate Descartes’s stark division between mind and matter became perhaps the most central feature of Western intellectual life.

This is the tragedy of the modern mind which ‘solved the riddle of the universe’, but only to replace it by another riddle: The riddle of itself. The tragedy of the Western mind, is a direct consequence of the stark Cartesian division between mind and world. We discover the ‘certain principles of physical reality’ said Descartes, ‘not by the prejudices of the senses, but by rational analysis, and that which possesses the prodigiousness of its evidence, in that we cannot doubt of their truth’. Since the real, or that which literally exists externally to ourselves, was in his view only that which could be represented in the quantitative terms of mathematics, Descartes concluded that all quantitative aspects of reality could be traced to the deceitfulness of the senses.

It was this logical sequence that led Descartes to posit the existence of two categorically different domains of existence for immaterial ideas-the res’ extensa and the res cognisant, or the ‘extended substance’ and the ‘thinking substance’. Descartes defined the extended substance as the realm of physical reality within which primary mathematical and geometrical forms reside and the thinking substance as the realm of human subjective reality. Descartes distrusted the information from the senses to the point of doubting the perceived results of repeatable scientific experiments, how this, he concludes that our knowledge of the mathematical ideas residing only in mind or in human subjectivity was accurate, much less the absolute truth? If, on that point, that in the existing state of mental, which is to say, in that of or relating to the mind, e.g., the mental aspects of the problem, are those of which some physical experiences is to communicate with directly (as through participation or observations) or the action that it preserves, that of any real or necessary correspondence between non-mathematical ideas in subjective reality and the external physical reality. How do we know that the earth in which we take to breathe, experience life and eventually deceasing, that does factually exist? Descartes resolution of this dilemma took the form of an exercise. He asked ‘us’ to direct our attention inward and to divest our consciousness of all awareness of external physical reality. If we do so, he concluded, the real existence of human subjective reality could be confirmed.

The present time is clearly a time of a major paradigm shift, but consider the last great paradigm shift, the one that resulted in the Newtonian framework. This previous paradigm shift was profoundly problematic for the human spirit. It led to the conviction that we are strangers, freaks of nature, conscious beings in a universe that is almost entirely unconscious, and that, since the universe is strictly deterministic, even the free will we feel considerations of concern, in feeling of deferential approval and liking to the account on mindful or thoughtful attention, as to the apparent movement of our bodies is an illusion. Yet going through the acceptance of such a paradigm was probably necessary for the Western mind.

The present, however, has no duration, it is merely the demarcation line between past and future. And yet we do have an awareness of periods through the intermittent intervals of time: We have an awareness of something taking a long time, and something else taking only a short time. How is such awareness possible? If that which exists, namely, the present, has no duration, how can we be aware of ‘a long time’? How can we be aware of something that does not exist? St. Augustine’s response to the question is an insight into the nature of time. As we experience ‘a long time’, he writes, ‘It is not future time that is long but a long future is a long expectation of the future, the past time is not long, but a long past is a long remembrance of the past’. St. Augustine concludes: It is in my own mind, then, that I measure time, I must not allow my mind to insist that time be something objective’.

Meanwhile, the most fundamental aspect of the Western intellectual tradition is the assumption that there is a fundamental division between the material and immaterial world or between the realm of matter and the realm of pure mind or spirit. The metaphysical framework based on this assumption is known as ontological dualism. As the word dual implies, the framework is predicated of ontology or a conception of the nature of God or Being, that assumes reality has two distinct and separate dimensions, nonetheless, in the sense of acceptations and the intendment as proven significantly understood, as for reasons to its explanation and the accounting justification for which holds a point or points that support something open to question, in of which the power of the mind by which man attains truth or knowledge. We all must use reason to resolve this problem? However, to having no illusions and facing reality squarely and make of a realistic appraisal of such realistic changes for advancement, finally, we must accede to the assenting qualities, but, the extenuating reality is to having the facts of when authenticity cannot be confuted, as in the quality of being actual. Wherein the realm of fact is distinct from fancy, but holding the stubborn facts that become the eventual enigma in that enlightening emancipation for what is called phenomenons. The concept of Being as continuous, immutable, and having a previous date as present is to its past, this accordance within a separate existence gratified from the celebrations that launched a world of change, now this dates from the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides. The same qualities were associated with God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and they were considerably amplified by the role played in Theology by Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

Leibniz held, in opposition to Descartes, that adult humans can have experience’s of which they are unaware: Experiences of which in effect, what they do, but which are not brought to self-consciousness. Yet there are creatures, such as animals and babies, which completely lack the ability to reflect of their experiences, and to become aware of them as experiences of theirs. The unity of a subject’s experience, which stems from his capacity to recognize all his experience as his, was dubbed by Kant ‘the transcendental unity of an apperception - Leibniz’s term for inner awareness or self-consciousness, that is to say, in contrast with ‘perception’ or outer awareness -, is, however, this apprehension of unity that is transcendental, than it is empirical, because it is presupposed within the experience and cannot be derived from it. Kant, rather than of ‘wanting’, was that of something being in absence of, for having, duties of inadequacy especially, for being uncomplete or without such as the insufficiency to complete, nonetheless, ‘need’ as used to necessitate the provided obligations or the requirement that the need for this unity is rather than of ‘wanting,’ of which is the basis of his attempted refutation of scepticism about the external world. He argued that prevailing experiences could only be united in self-consciousness, if, at least, in that some of them were experiences of a law-governing world of objects in space. In meaning, that outer experience is thus, a necessary condition of inner awareness.

Here we seem to have a clear case of ‘introspection’, derived from the Latin ‘intro’ (within) + ‘specere’ (to look), introspection is the attention the mind gives to itself or to its own operations and occurrences. I can know there is a fat hairy spider in my bath by looking there and seeing it. But how do I know that I am seeing it rather than smelling it, or that my attitude to it is one of disgust than delight? One possible answer could be of a subsequent introspective act of ‘looking within’ and go in the accompaniment to its psychological state - my seeing the spider. Introspection, thus, is a mental occurrence, as having admission into the psychological realm of its object, when some other psychological state like perceiving, desiring, willing, feeling, and so on. In being a distinct awareness-episode, it is, to a greater extent more difficult than only of being generalized then ‘self-consciousness,’ which is readily characterized in all or some of our mental histories.

The awareness generated by an introspective act can have varying degrees of complexity. It might be a simple knowledge of (mental) things’ - such that it seems as a particular perception-episode, or it might be the more complex knowledge of truths about one’s own doings of the mind. In this latter full-blown judgement form, introspection is usually the self-ascription of psychological properties and, when linguistically expressed, results in statements like ‘I am watching the spider’ or ‘I am repulsed’.

In psychology this deliberate inward look becomes a scientific method when it is ‘directed toward answering questions of theoretical importance for the advancement of our systematic knowledge of the laws and conditions of mental processes’. In philosophy, introspection (sometimes also called ‘reflection’) remains simply ‘that notice which mind takes of its own operations and has been used to serve the following important functions:

(1) Methodological: Having the accessibility into the specific inter-transmissions or transmitters as carrying of neurons, are utilized by the strength under which the ‘imagination principles’ and the aggregate amount, that the sum in which, once combined into a total is best-known for one’s theoretical speculations, and are given in theorizing speculation, there again, without parameters or restrictive devices. At which time or a quality received, known or thought to have its own existence in space or in time permits of its persistent illogical feelings as a desire or an aversion that has of a past tense and past particles to think. In other words, the faculty of thinking or reasoning which intellectual activity or production of a particular time or group is of its concerning consideration, is with intention or purpose for exhibiting or characterized by careful thought, all of which, in having or showing in needs for the well-being or happiness of others and a propensity for anticipating their needs or wishes. The Ontological Argument, for example, asks us to try to think of the most perfect being as lacking existence and Berkeley’s Master Argument challenges us to conceive of an unseen tree, conceptual results are then drawn from our failure or success. From such experiments to work, we must not only have (or fail to have) the relevant conceptions but also know that we have (or fail to have) them - presumably by introspection.

(2) Metaphysical: The metaphysics of mind need to take cognizance of introspection. One can argue for ‘ghostly’ mental entities for ‘Qualia’, for ‘sense-data’ by claiming introspective awareness of them. First-person psychological reports can have special consequences for the nature of persons and personal identity: Hume, for example, was content to reject the notion of a soul-substance because he failed to find such a thing by ‘looking within’. Moreover, some philosophers argue for the existence of additional perspective facts - the fact, of ‘what it is like’ to be the person I am or to have an experience of such-and-such-a-kind. Introspection as our access to such facts becomes important, when we construct complete metaphysics of the world.

(3) Epistemological: Surprisingly, the most important use made of introspection has been to account for our knowledge of the outside world. According to the foundationalist theory of justification, is that once empirical belief, that is to say, in that of deriving from observation or experiment that such empirical results that supported the hypothesis implicating the verifiable or provable by means of observation or experiment, and the empirical laws as guided by practical experience and not theory, especially in medicine. Also, was the view that experiences of the senses is the only true knowledge of the empirical methods, as in science, such that the empirical conclusion that disregards scientific theory and relies solely on practical experience, but, in finding the mental act, condition, or habit of placing trust or confidence in another: Which is my belief in you is as strong as ever? Mental acceptance of and conviction in the trust, actuality, or validity of something as in the belief in the acceptation is having as true or to have an opinion in what one, has heard or trust in what one has seen? Is either basic and ‘self-justifying’ or the justifications in relation to basic beliefs become a basic belief, therefore, self-justifying beliefs constitute the rock-bottom of all justification and knowledge? Now introspective awareness is said to have a unique epistemological status in it, we are said to achieve the best possibly epistemological position and consequently introspective beliefs and thereby constitute the foundation of all justification.

Coherence is a major player in the theatre of knowledge. There are coherence theories of belief, truth and justification, these combine in various ways to yield theories of knowledge, coherence theories of belief are concerned with the content of beliefs. Consider a belief you now have, the belief that you are reading a page in a book. So what makes that belief the belief that it is? What makes it the belief that you are reading a page in a book than the belief that you have something other of a preoccupation? The same stimuli may produce various beliefs and various beliefs may produce the same action. The role in which a character or part played by a performer and the characteristic and expected social behaviour of an individual, whose purposive function of a word or construction, as in a sentence that gives the belief the content that has the role it plays in a network of relations to other beliefs. The role in inference and implication, for example, I infer different things from believing that I am reading a page in a book than from any other belief, just as I infer that belief from different things than I refer other beliefs that have in themselves, are which they are coming from.

The input of perception and the output of an action supplement the central role of the systematic relations the belief has to other beliefs, but the systematic relations give the belief the special content it has. They are the fundamental source of the content of beliefs. That is how coherence comes to be. A belief that the content that it does because of the away in which it coheres within the system of beliefs, however, weak coherence theories affirm that coherence is one determinant of the content of belief as strong coherence theories on the content of belief affirm that coherence is the sole determinant the content of belief.

Still, the concept of the given-referential immediacy as apprehended of the contents of sense experience is expressed in the first person, and present tense reports of appearances. Apprehension of the given is seen as immediate both in a causal sense, since it lacks the usual causal chain involved in perceiving real qualities of physical objects, and in an epistemic sense, since judgements expressing it are justified independently of all other beliefs and evidence. Some proponents of the idea of the given maintain that its apprehension is absolutely certain: Infallible, incorrigible and indubitable. It has been claimed also that a subject is omniscient with regard to the given - if a property appears, then the subject knows this.

Without some independent indication that some of the beliefs within a coherent system are true, coherence in itself is no indication of truth. Fairy stories can cohere, however, our analysis for justification must indicate to us the probable truth of our beliefs. Hence, within any system of beliefs there must be some privileged class with which others must cohere to be justified. In the case of empirical knowledge, such privileged beliefs must represent the point of contact between subject and world: They must originate within the perceptivity of whatever we justify of our ordinary perceptual beliefs about physical properties by appealing to beliefs about appearances. The latter seem more suitable as foundational, since there is no class of more certain perceptual beliefs to which we appeal for their justification.

The argument that foundations must be certain was offered by Lewis (1946). He held that no proposition can be probable unless some are certain. If the probability of all propositions or beliefs were relative to evidence expressed in others, and if these relations were linear, then any regress would apparently have to terminate in propositions or beliefs that are certain. But Lewis shows neither that such relations must be linear nor that redresses cannot terminate in beliefs that are merely probable or justified in themselves without being certain or infallible.

Arguments against the idea of the given originate with Kant, who argues that percepts without concepts do not yet constitute any form of knowing, however, being non-epistemic, it presumably cannot serve as epistemic foundations, because we recognize that we must apply concepts of properties to appearances and formulate beliefs utilizing those concepts before the appearance can play any epistemic role, thus, it becomes more plausible that such beliefs are fallible. The argument was developed by Wilfrid Sellars (1963) that according to him, the idea of the given involves a confusion between sensing particulars (having sense impressions), which is non-epistemic, and having non-inferential knowledge of propositions referring to appearances. The former may be necessary for acquiring perceptual knowledge, but it is not itself a primitive kind of knowing. Its being non-epistemic renders it immune from error, but also unsuitable for epistemological foundations. The latter, of a non-referential perception of knowledge is fallible, requiring conceptual acquirement, engaged through trained responses to public physical objects.

Contemporary foundationalists willfully refuse to believe and reject the coherentists claim, in that of eschewing that foundations, in the form of the summation in the point of compatibility, that for being in error, and appearances, are infallible. They seek alternative, foundations, liable to mislead, deceive, or disappoint, nonetheless, unacceptable. Although arguments against infallibility are sound, other objections to the idea of foundations are not. That concepts of objective properties are learned prior to concepts of appearances, for example, implied neither that claims about appearances are less certain than claims about objective properties, nor that the latter are prior in changes for justification. That there can be no knowledge prior to the acquirement and consistent application of concepts allow for propositions whose truth requires only consistent application of concepts, and this may be so for some claims about appearances, but, the coherentists would add that such genuine belief’s stand in need of justification and so cannot be the basis for underpinning to such foundational grounds, as for any functional foundation is to be expected, however, the fundamental rules upon forming or affecting the groundwork is to find the constituent components as principles for disallowing the elementary rudiments that fundamentalists take care of.

Coherentists will claim that a subject requires evidence that he applies concepts consistently, which he is able, for example, consistently to distinguish red from other colours that appear. Beliefs about red appearances could not then be justified independently of other beliefs expressing that evidence. To save that part of the doctrine of the given that holds beliefs about appearances to be self-justified, we require an account of how such justification is possible, how some beliefs about appearances can be justified without appeal to evidence. Some foundationalists simply assert such warranting as derivable from experience, but, unlike appeals to certainty by proponents of the given.

It is, nonetheless, an explanation of this capacity that enables its developments as an epistemological corollary to metaphysical dualism. The world of ‘matter’ is known through external/outer sense-perception. So cognitive access to ‘mind’ must be based on a parallel process of introspection, in that with which ‘thought … not sense’, as having nothing to do with external objects: Yet [pit] is much than is similar to it, and might properly enough to be called ‘internal sense’. However, having mind as object, is not sufficient to make a way of knowing ‘inner’ in the relevant sense be because mental facts can be grasped through sources other than introspection. To point, is rather than ‘inner perception,’ provides a kind of access to the mental not obtained otherwise - it is a ‘look within from within’. Stripped of metaphor this indicates the following epistemological features:

1. Only I can introspect my mind.

2. I can introspect t only my mind.

3. Introspective awareness is superior to any other knowledge of contingent facts that I or others might have.

(1) And (2) are grounded in the Cartesian of ‘privacy’ of the mental. Normally, a single object can be perceptually or inferentially grasped by many subjects, just as the same subject can perceive and infer different things. The epistemic peculiarity of introspection is that, is, is exclusive - it gives knowledge only of the mental history of the subject introspecting.

The tenet (2) of the traditional theory is grounded in the Cartesian idea of ‘privileged access’. The epistemic superiority of introspection lies in its being and infallible source of knowledge. First-person psychological statements which are its typical results cannot be mistaken. This claim is sometimes supported by an ‘imaginability test’, e.g., the impossibility of imaging that I believe that I am in pain, while at the same time imaging evidence that I am not in pain. An apparent counterexample to this infallibility claim would be the introspective judgement ‘I am perceiving a dead friend’ when I am really hallucinating. This is taken to by reformulating such introspective reports as ‘I seem to be perceiving a dead friend’. The importance of such privileged access is that introspection becomes a way of knowing immune from the pitfalls of other sources of cognition. The basic asymmetry between first and third persons psychological statements by introspective and non-introspective methods, but even dualists can account for introspective awareness in different ways:

(1) Non-Perpetual consequences, resulting in the effect or product of perceptuality and recognize and interpret of the sensory stimuli as based chiefly on memory, which is to say, in the neurological processes that with such recognition and interpretations are of a particular impression that gives an effect of spaciousness. The appearance of objects in depth and perceived by normally based human qualities or exemplifications, as these relational aspects concerning a course or area of which a subject is to each other and to a whole, a perspective of history need be to view the problem in the proper perspective. The ability to perceive things in their actual relations or comparative importance of representing three-dimensional objects and depth relations on a two-dimensional surface, there is, of insight, intuition, or knowledge gained by perceptual capacities for such insight. Having the ability to perceive as in the discernment as marked by discernment and interpretation, is, nonetheless, the enabling capability of perceiving with a sense or senses that external conditions or stimulations prove disreputable to the attitude, feelings, or circumstances of others. Even so, as a rule or principle prescribing a particular course of action or conduct; as my enduring awareness of an object ‘O’ changes the status of ‘O’. It now acquires the property of ‘being an object of awareness’. On the basis of this or the fact that I am aware of ‘O’, such as the ‘inferential model’ of awareness is to suggest, by the Bhatta Mimamsa school of Indian Epistemology, as this view of introspection does not make sense of it as a direct awareness of mental operations but, interestingly, we will have occasion to refer to persuasive theories where the emphasis on directness itself leads to a non-perceptual, or at least, a non-observational account of introspection.

(2) Reflexive presentation as a model comes by an epistemic access to our minds and need not involve any separate attentive act. Part of the meaning of a conscious state is that I know in that state when I am in that state. Consciousness is here, conceived as ‘phosphorescence’ attached to some mental occurrence and in no need of a subsequent illustration to reveal itself. Of course,