Decision Affirmed

By Clarence Vold

The atomic bombs in 1945 were deadly and destructive in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Were the key to defeating Japan and a legitimate use to end a long and bitterly fought war. Negotiations failed to end Japanese military expansion in East Asia Japanese objectives were totally incompatible with United States objectives. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor to

• Language: English
• Publisher: URLink Print & Media, LLC
• Release date: Nov 19, 2019
• ISBN: 9781643674483

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Decision Affirmed

Copyright © 2019 by Clarence Kip Vold. All rights reserved.

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03.05.19

CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4: The New Year - Post Midway

Chapter 5: 1943

Chapter 6: 1944

Chapter 7: 1945

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Appendix 1: The Potsdam Proclamation

Appendix 2: Emperors Acceptance Address to SWC - Japan’s Longest Day Page 81 - 83

Appendix 3

Appendix 4: Twenty-One Demands

Appendix 5: (Japan’s longest day) general anami’s speech to war ministry

INTRODUCTION

The atomic bombs in 1945 were deadly and destructive in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That use in 1945 was generally accepted as the key to ending the war with Japan. That use was also generally regarded as a legitimate use of a very powerful weapon to hasten the end of a long and bitterly fought war. Since then that use has been increasingly questioned on the basis of morality, legality, and necessity. To answer these questions, it is necessary to start at the beginning by examining the objectives of the major participants, especially Japan and the United States before, during, and ending the war.

This is not intended to be a comprehensive history of the war between Japan and the United States, or a detailed description of the major battles and campaigns. There are many authors that have described in detail the battles with Japan such as: John Toland – The Rising Sun and Chesty Puller – I was There. Emperor Hirohito - Herbert Behr – Hirohito Behind the Myth, Herbert Bix – Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan. Japan’s Longest Day – The Pacific War Research Society, based on statements from the majority of the Japanese government at that time.

It will show the origins of that war followed by a time line of the war to give a sense of the course of the war and the tenacity of the Japanese military. It will conclude with a thorough examination of the alternatives for ending the war and the consequences to those alternatives.

An ancient tradition in Japan was one where the government and people of Japan saw that nation as the one destined to rule the world. The Japanese government in 1931 was essentially controlled by the Army with leaders that began the policies of achieving that world domination. They were faced by a world that through the League of Nations and the United States attempted to use diplomacy to resolve issues, but that was a toothless deterrence essentially ignored by the Japanese Army. When confronted by a superior force they withdrew. When opposed by an inferior force they pushed forward. As they gained strength in relation to their potential foes, they became more aggressive with the Army seeking greater and greater expansion until the Pacific and Asia were engulfed by war. The United States did attempt to negotiate its differences with Japan to no avail. In the end the objectives of Japan were totally incompatible with the objectives of the United States and the United States then reluctantly increasing its military capability, first for defensive purposes, but later to go on the offensive.

That war can be described in phases starting with its origins in Manchuria and China. The next phase was the Japanese start of their expansion South along with their attempt to neutralize the United States capability to interfere with their plans. Once that counter-attack capability was severely limited – at least temporarily – their expansion went forward seemingly unstoppable. While they did cripple the United States military they did not land a knock-out blow and the United States had started to rebuild what would become a much more formidable foe than the Japanese initially faced. Even during the initial Japanese onslaught, the American fighting men demonstrated that they could be tenacious and a formidable opponent. The blows struck at Pearl Harbor made reinforcing or withdrawing the Marines on Wake Island an extremely dangerous operation and the decision was made let Wake Island fall to the Japanese. Those Marines and civilian construction workers held out longer than expected, certainly longer than the Japanese expected but were worn down by superior numbers and outgunned. The soldiers in the Philippines demonstrated that they could hold out, even when outnumbered and severely handicapped by a lack of food, ammunition, and equipment and eventually they too were overrun.

As the United States industrial might came into play, the Japanese advances were slowed and then halted. With its military strength increasing as American industries produced increasing numbers of superior weapons systems the tide turned and Japan was forced on the defensive. The American effort was widespread with the Japanese being defeated on the field of battle, but also strategic efforts that more and more prevented Japan from replacing destroyed equipment or skilled personnel. One of the reasons for Japan’s expansion – extremely limited natural resource within the home islands – did in ways become an Achilles heel for Japan.

The United States military did not engage in a direct frontal assault on every objective and large numbers of Japanese were simply isolated and left with no one to fight. This continued with the Japanese driven back, battle after battle until the Philippines had been recaptured, and Iwo Jima and Okinawa were conquered and the home islands still standing. The home islands were the final objective and the question for the American and Allied leaders was how to end the war with Japan. The decision by President Truman was made to use the newly developed atomic bombs with the primary purpose to reduce American casualties. At the time there was no certainty this would succeed, but within days after two atomic bomb attacks, Emperor Hirohito intervened, and the Japanese accepted the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation that ended the war.

That use of nuclear weapons has become more controversial over time with more and more people questioning that decision by President Truman. There were other alternatives to the atomic bombs. Each has its own costs and consequences to achieve a desirable conclusion and will be considered in terms of morality, legality, and necessity. The conclusion will be to examine how that use of nuclear weapons should be used in the context of nuclear disarmament. The conclusions reached are admittedly speculation, but so are the conclusions of the critics. The same information is available, our conclusions are different. The USSBS may have had direct access to information not available to most, but their conclusions as also based on speculation.

CHAPTER 1

The ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and resulting casualties vividly demonstrated the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Decades later as time passes more people are questioning whether the use of the atomic bombs was justified and claiming that the war would have ended successfully without such weapons. The majority of those questioning that use are making claims quite often based on facts taken out of context. They are doing so from the relatively peaceful perspective of those decades later, not the situation that existed in 1945 or the consequences of the alternative options for ending the war with Japan. In 1945 a world war that over its course would kill more than twenty million people was still being waged and the United States government was searching for the best way to end that war with Japan being the final foe. The objective of the United States leaders, especially senior military leaders, was not just to end the war, but to remove from power the kind of government that started the war and replace it with a government that would use trade and diplomacy to interact in the world community rather than intimidation and military force. To fully understand and discuss the use of atomic bombs against Japan, it is necessary to review the origins and conduct of the war between Japan and the United States.

The war in the Pacific has its basic origins in the following conditions. Limited natural resources within Japan. Availability of those resources in China, Manchuria, and other Asian countries. The policies followed by the government of Japan to acquire those resources that were increasingly determined by the militarists driven by their ambition to make a reality of hakko ichiu, eight corners of the world under Japanese control, i.e., Japanese imperialism and ancient tradition.

Japan’s role as an ally in the first world war permitted this island nation to expand its influence in Asia and its territorial holdings in the Pacific. Japan had become one of the great military and industrial powers of the world and was recognized as one of the Big Five on the new international order. It had joined the League of Nations and received a mandate over the Marshall, Carolines, and Marianas Islands located north of the equator and formerly held by Germany. The conditions of the mandate were that no fortifications would be made and open access guaranteed to other nations and these almost immediately violated by the Japanese government. It had also gained from its war with Russia in a situation that fluctuated, but eventually Japan replaced Russian interests in Manchuria and the Japanese constructed the South Manchurian Railway for transporting goods and raw materials. Japan, in the Taisho era, was moving towards a democratic system of government. But it was still a fledgling democracy and its parliamentary government had not developed traditions strong enough to withstand the economic and political pressures of the 1930s based in the traditions of ancient Japan. In that time period the military leaders became increasingly influential and ultimately all vestiges of democracy were totally banished.

Manchuria did not have a strong central government maintaining law and order. To protect Japanese citizens and financial interests, Japan had stationed the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. This force also had a secondary purpose, to serve as a buffer against the Russian forces stationed in that area. Japan, as a nation benefited from its operations in Manchuria. The raw materials provided goods and products for sale and trade in Europe and also within Manchuria, important to Japan and Japanese interests, and as an economic venture by Japan accepted by the world nations. Certainly prior to their military action there had been no complaints or contemplated disciplinary action against Japan by the League of Nations. The situation in China was somewhat different. Here, Japan had through the threat of force imposed its Twenty-One Demands on China. The Demands severely undermined the sovereignty of China and can be described as virtually making China a subsidiary of Japan and were imposed on China in 1915 when Japan took advantage of the world preoccupied in Europe. The leading nations did object and Japan was forced to relinquish the Demands in conjunction with the 1921 treaty to curtail the naval arms race. Clearly in China Japan had demonstrated that it would not hesitate to use force to dominate a weaker nation, but also that it would back down from what it thought was a superior force. In simple terms, it apparently followed the philosophy of might makes right.

That philosophy can be further described through the principles of Hakko Ichiu and Kodo described in an Imperial Rescript issued by the first Emperor, Jimmu Tenno. This rescript, like all other Imperial Rescripts was the expressed wish of an emperor, described principles of conduct. Hakko Ichiu meant bringing together the corners of the world under one ruler, or the world as one family and destined ultimately to pervade the whole universe. Kodo was a contraction of an ancient phrase meaning literally The oneness of the Imperial Way. Hakko Ichiu was the moral goal; and loyalty to the Emperor was the road which led to it. These two ideas were again associated with the Imperial dynasty after the Meiji Restoration. That Emperor proclaimed them in an Imperial Rescript issued in 1871. They then represented a constitutional rallying point, and an appeal to the patriotism of the Japanese people. In the decade before 1930, those Japanese who urged territorial expansion did so in the name of these two ideas. Again, and again throughout the years that followed, measures of military aggression were advocated in the names of Hakko Ichiu and Kodo which eventually became symbols for world domination through military force and certainly Japanese domination of Asia.

In January 1931, a plot was instigated to overthrow the liberalism controlling Japan. Liberalism and democracy were strongly opposed by the radical element of the army, especially young army officers. This became known as the March Incident and was a conspiracy engineered to create an insurrection which would justify the proclamation of martial law, leading to the installation of a military cabinet. It had the support of the Army General Staff and the conspirators abetted by the Chief of the Military Affairs bureau. It failed when the newly appointed Minister of War became fully aware of the situation and ordered the army leaders involved to end the scheme.

The Manchurian Incident, also known the Mudken Incident, ended the status quo on September 18, 1931. Late in the evening a short stretch of railroad track belonging to the South Manchurian Railway Company was blown up by Chinese dissidents, or so it seemed. In reality, the track was blown up by officers assigned to the Kwangtung Army, and their actions gave the Kwantung Army an excuse for retaliation, based on its authority to respond to emergencies without waiting for approval from higher headquarters. The following day, the Japanese Government had decided to minimize the incident and gave corresponding orders to the Kwantung Army. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East presented evidence after the war that by September 14, 1931 the Army’s schemes in Mongolia and Manchuria were known in Tokyo and the War Minister warned by Emperor Hirohito to end these schemes. A letter ordering the Kwantung Army to abandon the plot was dispatched, but the messenger was a senior army officer who supported that plot. He conveniently allowed himself to be distracted and did not present the letter until after the Mukden Incident – certainly a strong indication that this was an intentional delay to ensure the incident took place. The day after the alleged attack, the action of the Kwantung Army was characterized by the War Minister as an act of righteous self-defense. The Kwantung Army defied orders to cease its operations and proceeded to rapidly expand its long the South Manchurian Railway, by moving up the rail line, taking virtually every city along its 693 miles, and occupying several cities.

On September 19, 1931, the 39th Mixed Brigade was formed in Korea and departed, without authorization from the emperor, to Manchuria. The same day, the Kwantung Army requested Tokyo to send three more divisions from Japan. Then, in slightly under a week, the Japanese advanced towards Korea and secured rail communications to Korea. The Emperor ordered the army chief of staff to prevent the expansion of the Manchurian Incident, but was informed by his Prime Minister it was too late to stop and the cabinet had no choice but to approve the transfer because it had already begun. In respect to the prime minister, the emperor gave his approval with the caveat that the Kwantung Army must exercise the utmost restraint. This move was supported in the press and a large portion of the public with public rallies and money donated for building aircraft. Weeks later the emperor was angered by the Kwantung Army commander’s stated intention of pacifying all of Manchuria and Mongolia. The emperor’s younger brother, Prince Chichibu recommended that Hirohito take control of the government and suspend the Constitution if needed. Emperor Hirohito said he could never do anything that would besmirch the honor of his ancestors. The result was that the army continued its expansion actions despite Emperor Hirohito’s opposition and in retrospect this questions the motivation and sincerity of Emperor Hirohito’s opposition to that expansion.

The Prime Minister had ordered that the situation be controlled and expressed concern at the Army’s failure to carry out the policy of the government and on September 24, 1931, the cabinet passed a formal resolution denying that Japan had any territorial aims in Manchuria. The Army was indignant that the emperor had been induced to support the Cabinet’s Manchurian policy. A week after the Cabinet’s resolution was passed, the Chief of the Army Staff warned the Prime Minister that the Kwantung Army might be compelled to advance further into the Yangtze area; and that it would brook no outside interference with its prerogatives. In October, a new conspiracy was planned with the purpose of establishing a new country in Manchuria founded on the Kingly War, and to resolve the political situation in Japan, but when exposed was abandoned on the orders of the War Minister. During October and November 1931, military activity continued in Manchuria in direct violation of Cabinet policy, with rumors circulating that if the Cabinet continued to withhold cooperation, the Kwantung Army would declare its independence.

This threat broke the resistance of the moderate elements. The War Minister said the inconsistency between Japanese official assurances and Army actions was unfortunate yet sharply warned that there must be no interference by outsiders in matters of Army discipline. Shortly, the Prime Minister resigned, admitting his Cabinet’s inability to control the Army with the Manchurian Incident continuing to expand and spread despite the Cabinet’s policies. In summation, the Army had achieved its goal of a war of conquest in Manchuria and had shown itself to be more powerful than the Japanese Cabinet. The emperor was unwilling and the cabinet was incapable of controlling the Army’s actions in Manchuria. Time would demonstrate that the world opinion was relegated to meaningless and symbolic protestations. The fate of Manchuria was essentially sealed with the Kwantung Army free to follow its ambitions in Manchuria and would prove to be as difficult to control elsewhere. Manchuria became Manchuko with a puppet government installed by the Japanese.

The aggression by Japan was widely condemned, including criticism from the United States, and China turned to the League of Nations for help. Japan’s military action violated both a League of Nations mandate, it was a member, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, a pact it was a party to. In January 1932, the United States indicated its support for the League of Nations when it notified Japan that it would withhold recognition of any territory taken by actions that violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Japan rationalized by claiming it was not making war, but conducting police actions. This attempt at rationalization was totally rejected and on October 24, 1931 the League passed a resolution demanding that Japan withdraw from conquered areas. Japan voted against the resolution and considered it not binding because the vote was not unanimous. The Japanese advances continued through November and December in the face of ineffectual Chinese military opposition. In December, the Prime Minister resigned with his party in shambles for insufficient support of the military, and a new government formed by a party with strong ties and support for any military action.

The situation in Shanghai was becoming very tense. Attacks were made on Japanese individuals by increasingly hostile Chinese citizens resulted in many deaths that were protested by the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai and brought Japanese naval forces to Shanghai. Initially the international community welcomed the Japanese force in enforcing law and order, but that changed to shock when the methods employed by the Japanese navy became brutalities and atrocities. Emperor Hirohito expressed concern about Western Powers intervention and ordered not an end to military action, but a speedy conclusion to fighting around Shanghai. This is a clear implication indicating a lack of concern about the actions of his army in China.

In February 1932, the Japanese Government did turn to the United States to find a solution to ending the hostilities. The United States forwarded a proposal that was also made to Japan and China and was followed by very similar proposals from the British, French, and Italian Governments. The United States proposals contained the following points: (1) cessation of all acts of violence on both sides; (2) no further preparation for hostilities; (3) withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese combatants in the Shanghai area; (4) protection of the International Settlement at Shanghai by the establishment of neutral ones; (5) and upon acceptance of the foregoing, prompt negotiation to settle all outstanding controversies between Japan and China with the aid of neutral observers or participants. The Chinese Government immediately accepted the proposal. The Japanese Government was selective with its acceptance, but flatly rejected the second and fifth points. Obviously, the proposal came to naught and this is but one example of the Japanese Government mentality and practices in negotiations. That mentality can be described as one of no concessions granted to other nations, but concessions from other nations accepted.

The militaristic attitudes of Japan and explicitly in the military were rapidly increasing and were viewed with alarm by the United States. On August 13, 1932, the United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, reported to Secretary of State Stimson the growing dangers in the situation of that time. Ambassador Grew said that in Japan the deliberate building up of public animosity against foreign nationals in general and the United States in particular, was doubtless for the purpose of strengthening the hand of the military in its Manchuria venture in the face of foreign opposition. He stated that the Japanese military machine had been built for war, felt prepared for war, and would welcome war, that it had never yet been beaten and possessed unlimited self-confidence.

There were conversations between the U.S. and Japanese officials regarding the situation in Asia and Japan’s military activities. Ambassador Grew was reassured that Japan did not seek special privileges in China, to encroach on the territorial or administrative integrity of China, restrict the trade of other nations in China, or take actions threatening other nations. Ambassador Grew pointed out that the government and people of the United States would be more impressed by concrete evidence rather than rhetoric. Secretary of State Hull tried to convince the Japanese Ambassador that their best interests lay in following policies of peace; that Japan and the United States, for self-preservation and world responsibility should exhibit a wide breadth of view and practice statesmanship. In a later conversation with Secretary of State Hull, the Japanese Ambassador insisted that Japan had a superior and special function about the preservation of peace in eastern Asia. Secretary Hull stated the clear implications of this was that Japan intended to exercise an absolute rule over other nations and asked if that were true, and was told that was not the meaning intended. Secretary Hull referred to the increasing concern around the world about escalating armaments with Japan and Germany primarily responsible for such concerns, and that while the Japanese diplomats were trying to ease the concerns of the world’s nations, those words were being betrayed by the actions of the Japanese military that did not ease anyone’s concerns. The United States Military Attache in Berlin reported of increasing evidence indicating unusually close relations between Japan and Germany – perhaps to the extent of a possible secret alliance – with the Germans only furthering these relations to the extent it was to their advantage and maintaining racial superiority to the Japanese.

Secretary of State Hull was certainly aware of the world situation. In speeches on this subject he told of dictatorships springing up and replacing democracies; nations frantically arming and taxing their citizens beyond their ability to pay – often placing their nation on the verge of bankruptcy. He considered it a mistake for civilized nation to continue to fail to not take note of dangerous tendencies around the world. He saw reason for the gravest apprehension, with armaments rapidly increasing and nations abandoning the concept that nations like individuals, should live as neighbors and friends. He said that the United States was committed to stress to the utmost to contribute to the maintenance of peace and civilization. The reports of Ambassador Grew confirmed that picture in Japan. He reported of claims, written and spoken, that it was Japan’s destiny to subjugate and rule the world. That the intent of military factions, patriotic societies and nationalism was to obtain trade control and predominate political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok. They would achieve this one step at a time as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing to consolidate then continue as intervening obstacles were overcome either by diplomacy of force. With such dreams seen as a reality and a Japanese military capable of acting on their own to achieve such dreams, Ambassador Grew warned it would be a mistake to rely on the security of treaty restraints or international conformity to safeguard our own interests. He emphasized that there was no great body of liberal thought lying just beneath the surface strong enough, with foreign encouragement, to assume control. That thought did exist but was inarticulate and impotent in the face of the militarist domination of the government and media and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Secretary Hull spoke of a world unable to escape from a relentless circle if it continued its extravagant military expenditures that if continued would lead to another great war.

In Japan, the extreme right was debating the role of the emperor in government and targeted a leading academic on constitutional law at Tokyo Imperial University and a member of the House of Peers, Tatsukichi Minobe. He was, among Japan’s academic elite, the leading opponent of the military expanding into government. The Rightists, including the Japan’s Military Reserve Association and its Army Officers’ Association opposed that view as supporting democracy and committing treason with the divinity of the emperor at stake. They turned the debate into an attack on moderates in general, with Emperor Hirohito quietly trying to support Minobe’s position but doing nothing to influence the public or the military by demonstrating support for Minobe. Those in power were identified by a popular song as swollen with pride, with the rich flaunting their wealth and caring nothing for the welfare of Japan. This song told of "brave warriors united in justice, cherry blossoms and a day when their swords would gleam with the blood of purification. The Rightists despised parliamentary democracy and in Elections were called by the new prime minister, another retired admiral, Keisuke Okada, lost seats. This was viewed with great danger and at least some of them decided that it was time to act to save Japan.

A Japanese attempt to promote an alleged autonomy movement in North China, intending to detach the northern provinces from the rest of China and bringing them under Japanese domination, was publicly responded to by Secretary of State Hull in a statement on December 5, 1935. He pointed out the interests of the United States in that area and the treaty rights and obligations of the several powers there. This statement was a declaration that the United States respected all treaties to which it was a party and called for all nations to respect the treaties to which they were parties. President Roosevelt, in an Armistice Day address, made the following points. In foreign policy, the primary purpose of the United States was to avoid being drawn into war. That we sought also in every practicable way to promote peace and to discourage war. That aggression on the part of the United States was an impossibility and that defense against aggression by others was our accepted policy with the measure of defense solely the amount necessary to safeguard the United States against the armaments of others. In conclusion, he said that the more quickly and greatly others decreased their armaments, the more quickly and we would decrease our armaments.

The efforts of the world, the United States and League of Nations to rectify the situation in Manchuria failed. The Japanese ignored the recommendations of the United States and reacted to the condemnation of the League of Nations by ignoring it and resigning from the League. There was also political turmoil in Japan with attempted coups and groups whose method of influencing the government was assassination of officials. Quite often those involved in a coup, plot, or assassination were tried in public and allowed to make inflammatory speeches to justify their criminal acts and often succeeded. Those sentenced, if at all, quite often received lenient sentences and rarely was the entire sentence served.

The attempted coup in February 1936 that became known as the 2/26 incident, was different in a number of ways. There were no show trials with flamboyant lawyers or defendants, with the punishments imposed by secret court martial proceedings and carried out as ordered. This time there were a large number of participants including about 1500 soldiers, with the vast majority of these following orders of superior officers and unaware of the true purpose of their actions. Emperor Hirohito was enraged by this rebellion and became personally involved for one of the few times in his reign, even to the point of threatening to personally lead the Imperial Guard Division to end the rebellion and issuing orders that had the potential of turning the navy against the army. He rejected the advice of his senior army leaders that the rebels were activists acting for the good of the nations and called the rebels brutal criminals. It appears that once the emperor had demonstrated to his family and the military that he could exercise authority, he reverted to his normal method of operation. His view apparently was that once he had chastised the military, he should demonstrate that he could be kind to them also, and that essentially was to let them continue their policies of expansion.

The actions of the Axis Nations were not being ignored in the United States by President Roosevelt, the Congress or the military leaders. In 1935, The Neutrality Act was enacted by congress and signed by President Roosevelt. The basis of this was that on the outbreak or during the progress of war between two or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States to any belligerent country. President Roosevelt was concerned that the act was too inflexible and that it in reality rewards a powerful aggressor nation, but also that the inflexible arms-embargo provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping up out; that no Congress and no Executive could foresee all possible future situations. In February 1936, a joint Congressional resolution strengthen the Neutrality act with an amendment to prohibit persons in the United States from making loans or extending credits to belligerents and was signed by President Roosevelt. With Japan withdrawing from negotiations for a continuing naval limitations treaty when its desires were denied, on March 25, 1936, the United States, Great Britain, and France granted an exception to that treaty that a nation that was menaced could exceed its limits. This can be construed as a recognition that treaties and agreements were becoming inadequate in preserving peace. That was certainly evident in the aggressive activities of the Japanese military in Manchuria. It also should have been evident that Japan was driven by its ambitions and would not be dissuaded by world opinion. In retrospect, the severity of that threat seems obvious. The president and military leaders were becoming aware of the realities, but for Congress and the public, that threat was more hypothetical than real. It is important to remember that there still was an extremely strong isolationist belief in the United States, and overwhelming desire to keep out of war, almost regardless of any consequences.

Japan became closely associated with Germany by their acceptance of the Anti-Comintern Pact whereby the two countries would exchange information on Communist International activities and consult and collaborate on the necessary preventive measures. Signs had been evident for a considerable amount of time that there existed gradual rapprochement between these two nations. This was the first open indication of their common designs in foreign policy and an indication of the parallel policies of aggression in future years that Germany and Japan would follow. Ambassador Grew voiced his concern to the Japanese regarding this agreement and was vehemently assured that there was no agreement or understanding regarding military matters or of Japan as a partner in the Fascist bloc. Ambassador Grew also indicated that the general opinion of the foreign diplomatic representatives was that the Japanese and German General Staffs had in reality concluded a secret military understanding. On the latter subject, in a conversation with Secretary Hull, the Japanese Ambassador said he wanted the people of the United States to understand the growing population of Japan and absolute need for more territory to exist. He sought to reassure the United States that the Japanese had no ill intent towards any nation and especially not the United States. This did not persuade Secretary Hull and his reply was the perception in the United State populace of Japan was a nation seeking economic domination of eastern Asia and of other areas it might wish to dominate and ultimately leading to political and military domination.

In a discussion between The Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, the Ambassador said that the people of the United States should recognize the rapidly growing population of Japan and the absolute necessity for more territory for their existence. He emphatically insisted that there was misunderstanding and misapprehension on the part of the people of the United States concerning Japanese movements in and about China; that Japanese armaments were not intended for war against any particular country, especially not the United States, but that Japanese naval officials were always undertaking to create additional vacancies and additional room for promotion. Secretary Hull was not convinced and again replied that the impression among people in the United States was that Japan sought economic domination, first of eastern Asia, and then of other areas such as it might see fit to dominate; that this would mean political as well as military domination in the end.

On January 3, 1936 President Roosevelt, in an address to Congress, warned of developments in international affairs created a situation with the potential of leading to the tragedy of general war. The reason given for this undesirable situation was nations seeking expansion and who had reverted to belief in the law of the sword based on the fantastic conception that they and they alone were chosen to fulfill a mission and that all other human beings in the world must learn from and be subject to them. He further stated that if world peace continued to be threatened by those who sought selfish power, the United States and the rest of the Americas could play but one role: maintain a well-ordered neutrality that did nothing to encourage war; to prepare an adequate defense to avoid embroilment and attack; and by example and all legitimate encouragement and assistance to persuade other nations to return to the days of peace and goodwill.

The severity of the world situation was certainly apparent to the President and his cabinet, but for the president the will to respond offensively, if needed, seems to have been lacking. But, perhaps that is a symptom of the political climate of that time. The president was fully cogniscent of the situation being faced and led a nation reluctant to accept the consequences of not being prepared for the most serious of challenges. President Roosevelt accepted what he could achieve, but was fully aware that to move too fast in preparing for the virtually certain coming conflagration could lead to stopping or even reversing the level of preparation that had been done if the isolationist and pacifist nature of the country was overly alarmed. It is true that this was a deception on the part of President Roosevelt, but in retrospect this was essential for the United States to survive and prevail in the following decade.

Military action by the Japanese continued in Manchuria. They were hardly in any danger of being driven out militarily, but they were facing increasing resistance of guerrilla type actions against them. Conversations continued between officials from the two governments with United States officials trying to convince the Japanese of the error of their ways, but obviously to no avail. The Japanese perceived no threat of significant consequences in American words. Their violations of agreements and treaties had in realty gone unpunished except for admonishments and condemnations that were basically ignored, and the Japanese apparently saw no reason to expect those conditions to change.

Clashes continued between Chinese and Japanese forces, with the most severe in content and consequences occurring at the Marco Polo bridge. Japan and other nations were granted the right to station military forces in China to maintain open communications between Peiping and the sea. The other countries stationed only enough troops to carry out their duties under the approving protocol while, the Japanese had forces much larger than needed and conducted exercises with these forces that can be described as intimidating, including unannounced night exercises. The Chinese had requested notification from all powers before night exercises were conducted to avoid unduly alarming the residents. All powers including Japan agreed, but the Japanese military continued unannounced night exercises which increased the tensions between residents and the Japanese. On July 7, 1937, during an unannounced night exercise, Japanese military authorities contacted the Chinese authorities with allegations that a Japanese soldier was missing and demanded that Japanese troops be allowed into the city to search for the missing Japanese soldier. The Chinese authorities denied permission, but stated they would conduct the search themselves. The Japanese responded by advancing a battalion armed with artillery and the Chinese military went on alert. Cooler head seemingly prevailed and a joint resolution was attempted and accepted. This effort was short lived and a Japanese battalion attacked the city.

In the morning of the 8 of July the Japanese captured a railroad bridge and that afternoon the Japanese commander sent an ultimatum to the commander of the city of Wanping to surrender by 7PM or face bombardment. The Chinese commander refused and the bombardment began at 7 PM. On July 9, the Japanese notified the Chinese that the missing soldier had been found and asked for a truce under the conditions that: all hostile actions end, both forces return to their original positions, and that the Chinese division facing the Japanese be replaced by a division less hostile to the Japanese. An understanding was reached and a truce agreed to that same day. The Chinese did retreat to their original positions while the Japanese only partially withdrew with forces remaining in place. At about midnight on of July 9 the Japanese forces again fired into the city. From that point on the Japanese troops continued to enter the area and by July 12, there were 20,000 Japanese troops and 100 airplanes in that area. Clashes between the two forces continued on a sporadic basis until July 27 when what can be best described as warfare began.

In Tokyo, the Japanese government attitude vacillated from supporting their military aggression to seeking a negotiated settlement. At one point the Japanese Foreign Office, through its embassy, notified the Chinese government of its intent to resolve the situation locally and warned the central Chinese government against interfering with such an agreement. The Chinese Foreign Minister responded with the demand that the Japanese forces be removed from the trouble spots and that reinforcement from Manchuria be halted. The Japanese responded by asking if the Chinese government intended to oppose agreements that were achieved locally. The Chinese government legitimately insisted that it be part of any agreement reached and again the Chinese government was warned against obstructing local agreements. Essentially the Japanese expected the North Chinese authorities to accept Japanese demands regardless of the opinion of the central Chinese government.

On July 17, 1937, Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a statement giving the position of the United States.

Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore feel warranted in making, in fact, I feel it a duty to make, a statement of this Government’s position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties when need therefore arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate towering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles herein before stated.

The Chinese government in its statements made the point that it expected to have its rights as a sovereign nation respected by all parties – especially Japan. In an ideal world the positions of both the United States and China would have prevailed. But the world of that decade was anything but ideal and Japan was only interested in its own objectives that were based primarily on the ambitions of the Japanese army. China was essentially on its own and with the isolationist bent in the United States its response was virtually limited to ineffective platitudes. The Chinese government indicated that it would accept third party assistance in resolving the situation. The United States government offered its assistance, but the Japanese government basically totally rejected third party intervention. Thus, by the end of July 1937 the situation between Japan and China had deteriorated to the point it was in reality totally beyond peaceful resolution. For almost the next four years China battled Japan alone while receiving virtually only moral support from other nations.

A specific example of the early support China received from the Unites States is typified by a statement issued by the Department of State that the issues and problems which were of concern to the United States in the existing situation in the Pacific area went far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. An urgent appeal was made to the parties involved to refrain from war and stressing to Japan and China the significance of refraining from hostilities while maintaining peace. That the United States was participating constantly in consultation with interested government in resolving the differences between the two nations, and that this government did believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific means the achievement of objectives previously stated by the United States. The United States did later provide China with military supplies, which became another point of contention and considered as aggression by the Japanese.

On September 2nd, 1937, The Secretary of State sent a telegram to Ambassador Grew in Japan in which he summarized the attitude of the United States regarding the conflict between China and Japan. He expressed doubts that those in control of Japanese policies placed any significant values on the friendship of other nations. He expressed a fervent desire for the Japanese Government to understand fully that the United States looked with thorough disapproval upon the current manifestation of Japanese foreign policy and upon the methods employed by the Japanese military in pursuit of that policy. Both of these indicate a United States government concerned and working within the limitations of what diplomacy could actually achieve, but the reality was that the Japanese would not be deterred in the slightest by any exhortations from United States officials.

While the situation in China continued, and China solely bore the brunt of the Japanese military machine, the United States leaders were monitoring the world situation in Europe and Asia. In a number of speeches, President Roosevelt warned of the potential dangers the world and the United States faced. The realities of German and Japanese aggression and arms increases were clear evidence of these dangers. In his Nov. 11, 1935 Armistice Day address, President Roosevelt stated the intentions of the United States to avoid and discourage war and promote peace. He emphasized that aggression on the part of the United States would not be carried out but that we certainly would defend ourselves against aggression by others, and that our defenses would be based on the threat that we faced and would not arm beyond that level. In a January 3, 1936 address to Congress, President Roosevelt warned of circumstances in international affairs that indicated the potential of the situation to lead to the tragedy of general war. He spoke of nations expanding through military force with the attitude that their objectives were superior to all others and should be accepted unconditionally. He emphasized the primary role of United States military action was self-defense although it could also be deduced from his remarks that increases in the United States military capabilities must be made. On September 14, 1937 President Roosevelt made the statements that put the Neutrality Act into effect. This, in part, meant that merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States would not be permitted to transport to China or Japan any arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and that any other merchant vessel flying the American flag which attempted to transport such article to China or Japan would do so at its own risk. This does present a picture of a neutral United States. In reality the effect was very different. It proved to actually be beneficial to Japan and detrimental to China which did need resources from the United States and other nations.

On December 12, 1937, the United States gunboat Panay and three United States merchant vessels on the Yangtze River in China were attacked and destroyed by Japanese aircraft and American lives were lost. The United States government immediately protested this action to the Japanese Government with a request for a formal expression of regret; that steps be taken to insure no further attacks on American nationals, interests and property in China and an end to interference by any Japanese authorities or forces. Within two days the United States Ambassador to Japan received a note from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stating the Japanese Government regretted most profoundly the damage to these vessels and the casualties among the personnel, that it desired to present sincere apologies, that it would make indemnifications for all the losses; that it would deal appropriately with those responsible for the incident, and that it had already issued strict orders to the authorities on the spot with a view to preventing the recurrence of a similar incident. Finally, the Japanese Government expressed the fervent hope that the friendly relations between Japan and the United States would not be affected by this unfortunate affair. The Japanese Government later made full indemnification in accordance with the request of the United States.

This was a clear act of military aggression against the United States by the Japanese military. This is one instance where diplomacy prevailed between the United States and Japan, at least to the extent that it assuaged the American public and resulting in an overwhelming endorsement given by the people of the United States to the manner in which the Panay incident was settled. It demonstrated a deeply felt desire of the American public to keep the United States out of war. There is no reason to doubt that the reaction of the Japanese government was sincere in apologizing and its expressions of regret. But this incident also leads to the question of what lessons were learned by the Japanese military leaders about reactions by the American public to future incidents. How far could they push, how fast could they advance before we responded? At that point in time, the potential threat of United States intervention was still somewhat of a deterrent to Japan, not enough for them to withdraw, but sufficient to keep their future ambitions somewhat in check.

The hard reality in the United States was that the once formidable American military capability of the first world war had in the following years been allowed to degenerate drastically– or as Gen. MacArthur pointed out in 1933 the United States Army ranked seventeenth in the world by size. The need for a larger standing army was seen early on by senior leaders in the War Department – a position not supported by Congress or the American public. There was a belief, perhaps more realistically a wish that with the defeat of Germany in 1918 there would be no more ground wars for the foreseeable future. The greatest factor for most Americans was the deeply ingrained national distrust of foreign alliances or a large standing military. They considered that a military that satisfied the minimum levels for self-defense was acceptable and the minimum that would be accepted. With all the equipment remaining from the Great War, they perceived little reason for more than minimum military expenditures. Changes were made by Congress that established procedures and increased strength levels that went unfunded for many years. Eventually the realities of the threats facing the United States were recognized by Congress and the public and fully met in the end.

A significant early step towards re-arming the United States military took place on July 18, 1935 when the Boeing Model 299, a design that was a make-or-break gamble for Boeing, first flew then won the competition for an advanced bomber for the Army Air Force and became the B-17. The first significant build-up for the Navy was signaled by President Roosevelt’s announcement directing the Navy Department to proceed with the construction of two replacement battleships and was first such construction initiated by the United States since the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. The United States Army was also strengthening by undertaking an expansion program that would increase its enlisted strength from 118,000 in 1935 to 158,000 in 1937. This does not seem like a large increase in numbers, but it did represent a 33% increase. Proportionally it was a substantial increase, but as the Secretary of War stated in his annual report of 1937 that in comparative terms the Army was not keeping pace with the enormous expansions in the military establishments of other leading powers, with Germany and Japan the primary concerns. and called for additional increases. Improvements came in