Cosmology and Controversy: The Historical Development of Two Theories of the Universe

By Helge Kragh

For over three millennia, most people could understand the universe only in terms of myth, religion, and philosophy. Between 1920 and 1970, cosmology transformed into a branch of physics. With this remarkably rapid change came a theory that would finally lend empirical support to many long-held beliefs about the origins and development of the entire universe: the theory of the big bang. In this book, Helge Kragh presents the development of scientific cosmology for the first time as a historical event, one that embroiled many famous scientists in a controversy over the very notion of an evolving universe with a beginning in time. In rich detail he examines how the big-bang theory drew inspiration from and eventually triumphed over rival views, mainly the steady-state theory and its concept of a stationary universe of infinite age.


In the 1920s, Alexander Friedmann and Georges Lemaître showed that Einstein's general relativity equations possessed solutions for a universe expanding in time. Kragh follows the story from here, showing how the big-bang theory evolved, from Edwin Hubble's observation that most galaxies are receding from us, to the discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation. Sir Fred Hoyle proposed instead the steady-state theory, a model of dynamic equilibrium involving the continuous creation of matter throughout the universe. Although today it is generally accepted that the universe started some ten billion years ago in a big bang, many readers may not fully realize that this standard view owed much of its formation to the steady-state theory. By exploring the similarities and tensions between the theories, Kragh provides the reader with indispensable background for understanding much of today's commentary about our universe.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Release date: Mar 9, 2021
• ISBN: 9780691227719

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Cosmology and Controversy

Cosmology and Controversy

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF

TWO THEORIES OF THE UNIVERSE

HELGE KRAGH

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright © 1996 by Princeton University Press

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex

All Rights Reserved

Second printing, and first paperback printing, 1999

Paperback ISBN 0-691-00546-X

The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition of this book as follows

Kragh, Helge, 1944-

Cosmology and controversy : the historical development of

two theories of the universe / Helge Kragh.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-691-02623-8 (cloth : alk. paper)

eISBN 978-0-691-22771-9

1. Cosmology—History. I.Title.

QB981.K73 1996 523.1—dc20 96-5612 CIP

http://pup.princeton.edu

R0

TO MIKKEL AND LINE, AND THE MEMORY OF PJEVS

Cosmologists are often in error, but never in doubt.

(L. Landau)

The less one knows about the universe, the easier it is to explain.

(L. Brunschvicg)

CONTENTS

PREFACE  ix

CHAPTER ONE

Background: From Einstein to Hubble  3

CHAPTER TWO

Lemaître’s Fireworks Universe  22

2.1 The Discovery of the Expanding Universe  22

2.2 The Primeval Atom  39

2.3 Cosmythologies  61

2.4 The Time Scale Difficulty  73

CHAPTER THREE

Gamow’s Big Bang  80

3.1 Nuclear Physics and Stellar Energy  81

3.2 The Ultimate Nuclear Oven  101

3.3 Cosmology as a Branch of Physics  123

CHAPTER FOUR

The Steady-State Alternative  142

4.1 Stationary Universes and Creation of Matter  143

4.2 A Cambridge Trio  162

4.3 Emergence of the Steady-State Theory  173

4.4 Two Steady-State Papers  179

4.5 Elaboration and Initial Response  186

CHAPTER FIVE

Creation and Controversy  202

5.1 Developments and Modifications of Steady-State Theory  202

5.2 Is Cosmology a Science?  219

5.3 Religion, Politics, and the Universe  251

CHAPTER SIX

The Universe Observed  269

6.1 Observational Challenges  271

6.2 Galaxies and Atomic Nuclei  288

6.3 Implications of Radio Astronomy  305

CHAPTER SEVEN

From Controversy to Marginalization  318

7.1 New Observations, New Debates  319

7.2 Relics from the Birth of the Universe  338

7.3 Hoyle’s Many Alternatives  358

7.4 The Termination of the Controversy  373

CHAPTER EIGHT

Epilogue: Dynamics of a Controversy  389

APPENDIX I

A Cosmological Chronology, 1917-1971  397

APPENDIX II

Technical Glossary  400

NOTES  403

BIBLIOGRAPHY  447

INDEX  487

PREFACE

AS AN OBJECT of speculation and philosophical thought, often integrated with religious and mythical ideas, cosmology is as old as humankind. The practice of this kind of cosmology—dealing with the view of the world in the widest possible sense—may even be said to be so thoroughly integrated wih the basic mental characteristics of the human race that it defines us as being human. However, it is not this kind of cosmology with which the present work is concerned. Although the scientific study of the universe cannot perhaps be entirely separated from the other sense of cosmology—with the vague meaning of world view—it is important to be aware of the dual meaning of the term cosmology and the differences between the two meanings. The present work is concerned solely with cosmology in the sense of the scientific study of the universe at large. This scientific cosmology, which deals not only with what happens to be the observed part of the universe, but with the hypothetical world as a whole, is distinctly a modern branch of knowledge. In the relatively brief period from about 1920 to 1970, cosmology changed dramatically, first of all as a result of the insight gained from Einstein’s general theory of relativity. The subject became established as a science, not only removing itself from religion and philosophy (although not completely), but also developing from a predominantly mathematical to a physical science.

In spite of cosmology’s amazing development in this century and the strong scientific and public interest in the new science of the universe, only very little is known of how this development took place. Since the days of Eddington and Jeans, cosmology has been a favorite area of popularization, a branch of science literature that has exploded during the last ten to twenty years. Most of this literature, usually written by astronomers, physicists, and science journalists, concentrates on the most recent developments and has very little historical perspective. To the extent it includes a historical perspective, it is often distorted and unreliable. The perspective of many astronomers and physicists is encapsulated by the two Russian astrophysicists Yakov Zel’dovich and Igor Novikov, who in the introduction to their Structure and Evolution of the Universe (English edition of 1983) wrote that the history of the Universe is infinitely more interesting than the history of the study of the Universe. Needless to say, perhaps, this is not the view of the present work. It is undoubtedly a view shared by many scientists, but it is also a thoroughly unhistorical statement which fails to recognize the fundamental difference between the physical history of the universe and the human history of the ways in which the knowledge of the universe has developed. I find the latter kind of history at least as interesting as the first kind. Furthermore, I find it difficult to separate the scientific quasi history of the universe from the real kind of history, which deals with the ideas, theories, and observations that changed our world view.

It is up to the historians of science to provide a more detailed and critical account of the development of cosmology, but this rich area has been subjected to historical scrutiny in only a few cases, and then mostly for the period before 1940. For reasons that are unclear, postwar cosmology has been almost ignored by modern historians of science (as well as by historians of modern science, should there be any difference). This neglect is all the more puzzling because of the fact that cosmology—in the older, more restricted sense—has traditionally been a central part of the history of the physical sciences. Hundreds or thousands of scholarly works have been devoted to ancient cosmology, to Dante’s poetic vision, to Copernicus’s revolution, and to Kepler’s cosmological work. The result is that we know far more of how the heliocentric system of the world came into existence than of the emergence of the big-bang idea in modern cosmology. And yet it would be difficult to argue that the twentieth-century picture of the evolution of the universe is less of an intellectual achievement, or is less revolutionary, than the pictures constructed by Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Kepler. It serves no purpose, and has little meaning, to compare the importance of Copernicus with that of Lemaître, or to compare Tycho Brahe with Fred Hoyle, but it seems to me that the difference in the amount of historical scholarship devoted to the two periods in no way reflects their relative importance.

The present work does not pretend to be a complete history of the development of modern cosmology. To write such a work would be a formidable task, possibly beyond the power of a single author and certainly beyond mine. The reason is that the development of modern cosmology is exceedingly complex and difficult, both technically and conceptually. A proper understanding would require constant attention to areas outside scientific cosmology, such as its philosophical and religious contexts (but also contexts of politics, ideology, and technology); but even within the more narrow scientific limits, the development has been characterized by a confusing variety of approaches and competing theories. Many of these were based on the theory of general relativity, or modifications thereof, but there have also been important developments unrelated or opposed to relativistic cosmology. Since this book is not an attempt to give a comprehensive review of the history of cosmology, many of the less important theories are either ignored or only briefly mentioned. On the other hand, I refer to a substantial part of the papers published in cosmology in the period 1940-65, and it is my hope that the present work, in spite of its obvious weaknesses and lack of completeness, may serve as a starting point for further, more detailed, and more scholarly works in modern cosmology. Should this catalyzing aim be fulfilled, the book has served an important purpose.

I have written the book with a diverse audience in mind. One group of readers I hope to attract are astronomers, physicists, and other scientists working with, or teaching, topics related to cosmology. Maybe I will be able to convince them that the study of the universe has a history which is as rich and interesting as that of the universe. However, this is not a history mainly aimed at scientists. I believe I have something new to tell and that the book will interest also historians of science and ideas. Last but not least I have endeavored to shape the book in a way that makes it attractive to the general reader interested in how the world picture of modern science has emerged. Although not particularly popular, and at times quite demanding, it is my hope that the book will not circulate in academic circles only. I can do no better than quote Dennis Sciama, who in an interview of 1978 said: None of us can understand why there is a Universe at all, why anything should exist; that’s the ultimate question. But while we cannot answer that question, we can at least make progress with the next simpler one, of what the Universe as a whole is like. Everybody must care about that one way or another, more or less. A few of us devote our time to find out, supported financially and spiritually by the whole community. Therefore it’s a responsibility to report back to the community the results of our findings or our musings. Much the same can be said about the historians and philosophers who are able to devote their time to finding out what the scientists do.

The plan of the book is built around two grand and persistent themes in post-1920 cosmology, namely, the stationary and the evolutionary universe; or rather, a universe of infinite age and a universe with a beginning in time. These two themes can be followed far back in time, but my concern is only with the modern development where they have been discussed as scientific hypotheses. That this was at all possible was the result of, on the one hand, Einstein’s theory of general relativity, and, on the other, progress in observational astronomy. This background is introduced in chapter 1. After the expansion of the universe had been recognized in 1930, most astronomers and physicists accepted that the entire universe is evolving in time, and at the end of that decade the evolution was often interpreted as having started from a superdense state of matter that somehow exploded. Chapter 2 examines how this idea of a big-bang universe came into existence, first of all through the work of Georges Lemaître. His version of relativistic big-bang cosmology did not attract much interest, however, and it was only after George Gamow had developed it further, along his own lines, that the foundation of modern big-bang cosmology was laid. The development in the United States in the period 1940-53, which is the subject of chapter 3, differed in many respects from the kind of cosmology traditionally cultivated; in particular, Gamow and his coworkers considered the early universe a huge nuclear-physical laboratory and in this way provided cosmology with a valuable content of physics. This turn of cosmology from a mathematical to a physical science is a leading theme in the book. Physical cosmology is often seen as a characteristic feature of post-1965 development, but in fact both the program and its partial realization go much farther back in time.

The attempt to present cosmology in terms of physics and not merely mathematics (in conjunction with astronomical data) was not restricted to the big bang evolution program of Gamow and coworkers. It also played a leading role in an entirely different tradition in prewar cosmology, where the universe was considered to be stationary and with a perpetual exchange of energy between matter and radiation. This kind of nonmathematical cosmology, cultivated in particular by William MacMillan and Walther Nernst, is not well known. It is detailed in section 4.1 and there presented as an early version of steady-state cosmology. The emergence of the postwar steady-state theory of Fred Hoyle, Hermann Bondi, and Tommy Gold is the subject of the remainder of chapter 4. A considerable part of the book is concerned with this theory, which is followed from its birth to its death some thirty years later. The reason for devoting so much space to this wrong theory is twofold: first, it is an interesting theory, which is not well known and is often misrepresented in later literature; second, it was of great importance in advancing cosmological knowledge in general and in the process which led to the later, standard big-bang theory. Indeed, the historical development of our present world view cannot be understood without understanding the steady-state theory and the role this theory played in the controversy in the 1950s and 1960s.

This controversy is the book’s central topic. The general aspects of the controversy are discussed in considerable detail in chapter 5, which deals mostly with the extrascientific parts of it (philosophical and religious aspects), and not least with the heated debate about continual creation of matter. The attempts to settle the matter by means of observations are discussed in chapter 6. In spite of the very different views of scientists connected with the steady-state program and those favoring an evolutionary big bang world, all involved scientists agreed that the controversy would have to be decided by ordinary scientific methods, namely, comparison of theory with observation. Until about 1960 no clear verdict resulted from the observational tests, but in the following years the picture changed drastically and five years later the relativistic big-bang theory emerged as the victor in the controversy, if not undisputably. At that time the steady-state theory was dying, but not dead. It continued to be developed by Hoyle and a few other astronomers, but in versions that differed from the earlier theory and that failed to attract much interest. The decline of the steady-state theory is the subject of chapter 7, which also contains a brief outline of some of the later developments. However, I have made no attempt to cover the development after the late 1960s. Much information about the last three decades of cosmology can be found in the popular literature and in scientific review articles. To include this development also would require a new and rather different book, as well as an author with a better knowledge of modern cosmology than I have.

The present work has little to say about observational techniques and astronomical instruments, although it can be argued that it was in fact advances in technology that led to the termination of the cosmological controversy. Like all historical works, mine is selective, and I have given high priority to theory rather than experiment. My excuse is that most of the debate took place within a theoretical or conceptual context. The importance of observations was always admitted, but the role played by the technical details of instruments was subordinate to that of theory. I am fully aware that I might have put more emphasis on the observational and instrumental aspects, and that such a change in emphasis might have led to a picture of the cosmological controversy somewhat different from the one presented here. Future scholarship will show how different.

I began to think of this work several years ago, when I was asked by Norriss Hetherington to write a couple of historical review articles for the Encyclopedia of Cosmology. It was only then that I realized the sad state of affairs in the historiography of modern cosmology, a state that compares most unfavorably with the situation in, for example, quantum theory and theoretical physics in general. During the early phase of the work I was supported by the Danish Research Council of Humanities in a project dealing with a very different subject (namely, the history of Danish technology). Part of the later work was done at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, where I spent the fall term of 1994 and was offered excellent working conditions. I acknowledge a traveling grant from the American Institute of Physics, which allowed me to study taped interviews and other sources at the Center for History of Physics. I am grateful also to a number of people who have commented on parts of the manuscript, provided me with materials, or otherwise discussed the development of modern cosmology with me. They include Sylvan S. Schweber, Christian Klixbüll Jørgensen, Robert Corby Hovis, Benjamin Martin, Manuel Doncel, Jes Madsen, Norriss Hetherington, and Ernan McMullin. Trevor Lipscombe of Princeton University Press has been not only a source of constant encouragement, but also of great help in the production of the final version of the manuscript. I appreciate his kindness and competence. I am particularly grateful to the scientists who have been actively involved in the development I analyze and who have responded to my letters with information I could not otherwise have obtained. My thanks to Ralph Alpher, Hermann Bondi, Tommy Gold, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Felix Pirani, William Davidson, Robert Herman, William Bonnor, Martin Harwit, Jayant Narlikar, Roger Tayler, Wolfgang Rindler, Igor Novikov, Jim Peebles, Fred Hoyle, and the late Karl Popper for their kind cooperation.

Some of the sections rely upon, or are extended versions of, earlier published articles. I am grateful to the publishers of the relevant journals (Centaurus and the Journal for the History of Astronomy) for permission to use the material. For permission to quote from archival material I thank the American Institute of Physics (Sources for History of Modern Astrophysics), the Jewish National and University Library (Albert Einstein Archives), the Harvard University Archives (Shapley correspondence), and the Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen (Archive for History of Quantum Physics). Other permissions to quote material or reprint illustrations have kindly been granted by F. Hoyle, J. Peebles, T. Gold, R. A. Alpher, and M. Harwit.

Helge Kragh

Oslo, Norway, 1995

Cosmology and Controversy

CHAPTER ONE

Background: From Einstein to Hubble

Before Einstein

Cosmology is not, of course, a child of the twentieth century. Concern with the structure and evolution of the world as a whole goes back to time immemorial in the form of mythical and religious conceptions. With the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century the field became the object of natural philosophers, who tried to understand the universe in terms of the new mechanical world picture associated with the great Newton. But the universe was at that time a much more limited concept than it became later on, and so-called cosmology (or cosmogony) often dealt with the solar system alone. There were exceptions, however, one of them being the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who in 1755 offered a prophetic and brilliantly argued model of the entire world. In his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, Kant conjectured the existence of other subuniverses outside the Milky Way. Kant’s universe was hierarchic and infinite in size as well as time, a conclusion he characteristically obtained from philosophical and theological arguments. A good example of his reasoning is this:

We come no nearer the infinitude of the creative power of God, if we enclose the space of its revelation within a sphere described with the radius of the Milky Way, than if we were to limit it to a ball an inch in diameter. All that is finite, whatever has limits and a definite relation to unity, is equally far removed from the infinite. Now, it would be absurd to represent the Deity as passing into action with an infinitely small part of His potency, and to think of His Infinite Power—the storehouse of a true immensity of natures and worlds—as inactive, and as shut up eternally in a state not being exercised. . . . For this reason the field of the revelation of the Divine attributes is as infinite as these attributes themselves. Eternity is not sufficient to embrace the manifestations of the Supreme Being, if it is not combined with the infinitude of space.¹

The argument may sound terribly old fashioned and unscientific, but, as we shall see in later chapters, arguments of an essentially similar kind could also be found in cosmology two hundred years later. Kant believed that the universe, although stable (which is the mark of the choice of God), was also in continual evolution on a large scale. Worlds of the size of our Milky Way would decay and disappear, but elsewhere in the infinite universe creation would go on and restore a grand equilibrium. Nature, wrote Kant, even in the region where it decays and grows old, advances unexhausted through new scenes, and, at the other boundary of creation in the space of the unformed crude matter, moves on with steady steps, carrying out the plan of the Divine revelation, in order to fill eternity, as well as all the regions of space, with her wonders.²

During the nineteenth century the static clockwork universe of Newtonian mechanics was replaced with an evolutionary worldview. It now became accepted that the world has not always been the same, but is the result of a natural evolution from some previous state probably very different from the present one. Because of the evolution of the world, the future is different from the past—the universe acquired a history. The evolutionary worldview was greatly stimulated by Darwinism, but even before Darwin it was suggested as a consequence of the nebular hypothesis of Laplace and William Herschel. According to this hypothesis some of the observed nebulae were protostellar clouds that would eventually condense and form stars and planets. Although the credibility of the nebular hypothesis diminished with the resolution into separate stars of some of the nebulae thought to be clouds of hot gas, the hypothesis continued to enjoy general respect. The Victorian conception of the universe was, in a sense, evolutionary, but the evolution was restricted to the constituents of the universe and did not, as in the world models of the twentieth century, cover the universe in its entirety.³

There was, in fact, much uncertainty about the meaning of the term universe and the possibility of obtaining scientific knowledge of its constituent bodies. To many scientists, cosmology continued to be confined to the solar system. They received philosophical support from Auguste Comte, the French founder of positivism, who about 1840 concluded that As for those innumerable stars scattered in the sky, they have scarcely any interest for astronomy other than as markers in our observations. Comte believed that, whereas positive, empirical knowledge could be attained with regard to the solar system, the nature of the stars would forever be beyond scientific insight. Two decades before Bunsen and Kirchhoff started the spectroscopic revolution, Comte claimed confidently that we can never by any means investigate their [the stars’] chemical composition or mineralogical structure.⁴ Fortunately the astronomers, chemists, and physicists declined to let their scientific imagination be limited by Comte’s argument.

Another important stimulus for nineteenth-century cosmological thought was the new science of thermodynamics, which from its very beginning was discussed in a cosmological context. William Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, was one of the pioneers of thermodynamics and in many ways representative of the widespread tendency to extrapolate the new laws of physics far beyond the realm of the laboratory. At the Liverpool meeting of the British Association of the Advancement of Science in 1854 he gave a sweeping survey of his cosmological ideas. Inviting his listeners to trace backward in time the actions of the laws of physics, he reasoned that, since the dissipation of energy means a universal change from potential to kinetic and thermal energy, we find that a time must have been when the earth, with no sun to illuminate it, the other bodies known to us as planets, and the other countless smaller planetary masses at present seen as the zodiacal light, must have been indefinitely remote from one another and from all other solids in space. Thomson further speculated that the source of the mechanical energy in the universe might be sought in some finite epoch [with] a state of matter derivable from no antecedent by natural laws. However, such an origin of matter and motion, mechanically unexplainable and different from any known process, contradicted Thomson’s sense of both causality and uniformitarianism. Although we can conceive of such a state of all matter, he wrote, yet we have no indications whatever of natural instances of it, and in the present state of science we may look for mechanical antecedents to every natural state of matter which we either know or can conceive at any past epoch however remote.⁵ A century later the same kind of question of the legitimacy of assuming a state of matter derivable from no antecedent by natural laws was to be heatedly discussed in the controversy between the big-bang and the steady-state theories of the universe.

In spite of spirited attempts such as those of Kant and Thomson, a scientific study of the universe became a possibility only with the advances in observational astronomy in the nineteenth century. The great telescopes revealed the existence of numerous nebulous stellar systems scattered around and provided, together with advances in spectroscopic studies, a new picture of the universe. It was a grand and exciting picture, but one which was not easily understood in terms of physical theory. Although thermodynamics occasionally entered cosmological discussions, the theoretical framework of the astronomers built on Newtonian gravitation theory, if sometimes modified in order to make better sense of the astronomical data. At the time of the First World War there existed a mathematically sophisticated Newtonian theory of the universe, and fundamental problems—such as whether the universe is finite or infinite—were discussed among some astronomers and physicists. However, not only were the observations hopelessly inadequate for deciding such problems, so was the theoretical framework. Key terms such as cosmology and universe still had a narrow meaning, in most cases referring to the objects making up the Milky Way. Whether the other nebulae were located inside or outside the Milky Way was a matter of some debate, but the general view was that everything visible in the heavens belonged to our galaxy. As far as the material content of the world was concerned, it was assumed to be limited to the area occupied by the Milky Way system. Writing in 1890, the English astronomer Agnes Clerke summed up the prevailing view as follows:

No competent thinker, with the whole of the available evidence before him, can now, it is safe to say, maintain any single nebula to be a star system of coordinate rank with the Milky Way. A practical certainty has been attained that the entire contents, stellar and nebular, of the sphere belong to one mighty aggregation, and stand in ordered mutual relations within the limits of one all-embracing scheme—all-embracing, that is to say, so far as our capacities of knowledge extend. With the infinite possibilities beyond, science has no concern.⁶

The concern of twentieth-century cosmology was, of course, exactly with the infinite possibilities beyond. We cannot in the present context do justice to pre-Einsteinian cosmology, and it must suffice to note that although scientific cosmology existed well before 1917, it was a kind of cosmology substantially different from the one that emerged in the 1920s.⁷

Albert Einstein did not invent cosmology, but he put it on an entirely new and, as it turned out, extremely fruitful basis. It is generally agreed that the seeds of a revolution in theoretical cosmology were planted when Einstein completed his general theory of relativity in the fall of 1915. On 25 November he read to the Prussian Academy of Sciences the final communication, which contained a consistent set of gravitational equations. One and a half years later, in a paper announced on 8 February 1917, Einstein took the revolutionary step of exploring the consequences of his new theory for no less than the entire universe.⁸ The new, relativistic theory of the universe had conceptual roots far back in time, especially in problems discussed by Newton in a famous correspondence with the Reverend Richard Bentley in 1692-93.⁹ Newton considered the universe as an infinite container with an infinite number of stars, but in that case it seemed impossible to define the gravitational force acting upon a body in a definite way. Later scientists sought to resolve the dilemma by keeping to Newton’s idea of an infinite space, but including a modification of his law of gravitation. In the mid-1890s two German theoreticians, Carl von Neumann and Hugo Seeliger, suggested independently that the amount of matter in the spatially infinite universe was finite. Although this led to a well-defined gravitational force, it also led to a universe which would seem to collapse under the influence of gravitation (as realized by Newton). To avoid this consequence Neumann and Seeliger proposed to change Newton’s law of gravitation, which states that the attractive force between two mass points is proportional to their masses and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Instead of the familiar F = Gmm′/r², where G is Newton’s constant of gravitation, they suggested the modified law F = (Gmm′/r²) exp(-Λr), where the extra factor is close to 1 (Ar 0) for distances not extremely large. Incidentally, the suggested law of force is of the same kind as the law of nuclear forces proposed in Hideki Yukawa’s meson theory in 1935. The Neumann-Seeliger proposal amounted to changing Poisson’s equation for the gravitational potential φ from Δφ=4πGρ to Δφ-Λφ=4πGρ. Here ρ is the mass density and the symbol A denotes the Laplace differential operator. If the mass density is known as a function of the space coordinates, the gravitational potential can be calculated. Seeliger, an accomplished mathematician, studied the statistics of star counts and concluded in 1911 that the density of stars decreased rapidly to zero at a distance of about 8000 light years from the earth. This kind of limited sidereal universe received strong support from the Dutch astronomer Jacobus C. Kapteyn, who from a series of works in the 1910s was led to believe that the visible universe was essentially identical with the Milky Way. The Kapteyn universe was ellipsoidal, with the density of stars decreasing gradually with the distance from the center and with the major axis measuring about 16 kpc or 50 000 light years. A universe of the kind pictured by Kapteyn enjoyed widespread acceptance in the 1910s. Although Einstein did not endorse it explicitly, the model formed the background for his work of 1917.

The Einstein World

When Einstein attacked the cosmological problem, he was much aware of the Newtonian anomaly and earlier attempts to solve it, such as that of Neumann and Seeliger. He wrote: I shall conduct the reader over the road that I have myself travelled, rather a rough and winding road, because otherwise I cannot hope that he will take much interest in the result at the end of the journey. The conclusion I shall arrive at is that the field equations of gravitation which I have championed hitherto still need a slight modification, so that on the basis of the general theory of relativity those fundamental difficulties may be avoided ... as confronting the Newtonian theory.¹⁰

That the road to the cosmological theory had been rough and winding, an intellectual tour de force, was also what Einstein wrote to his friend, the Dutch physicist Paul Ehrenfest. In early February 1917 Einstein told him that the work had exposed him to the danger of being confined in a madhouse.¹¹ The conceptual problem which Einstein faced was essentially the same as that Newton had struggled with, namely, to formulate boundary conditions for an infinite space. In December 1916 he argued in a letter to his friend Michele Besso that a homogeneous, symmetrical distribution of matter throughout all of infinite space would not be sufficient to produce the stable universe that both he and Besso presupposed. Only the closedness of the universe can get rid of this dilemma, he wrote, and added that his new idea was one of great scientific significance [and] not a product of my imagination.¹² Einstein’s solution was to circumvent the problem, which he could do by conceiving the universe as a spatially closed continuum in accordance with his general theory of relativity: "If it were possible to regard the universe as a continuum which is finite (closed) with respect to its spatial dimension, we should have no need at all of any such boundary conditions. We shall proceed to show that both the general postulate of relativity and the fact of the small stellar velocities are compatible with the hypothesis of a spatially finite universe; though certainly, in order to carry through this idea, we need a generalizing modification of the field equations of gravitation.¹³ Einstein thus assumed the universe to be a spatially closed continuum, spherical in four dimensions. This model is also referred to as Einstein’s cylinder world: with two of the spatial dimensions suppressed, the model universe can be pictured as a cylinder where the radius represents the space and the axis the time coordinate. Einstein was also, and naturally so, guided by the available empirical evidence. This suggested that the universe was indeed spatially finite, that it was static, and that it contained a finite amount of matter. In order to keep to what he and most astronomers considered convincing observational evidence, Einstein was led to the following picture: The curvature of space is variable in time and place, according to the distribution of matter, but we may roughly approximate to it by means of a spherical space. At any rate, this view is logically consistent, and from the standpoint of the general theory of relativity lies nearest at hand; whether, from the standpoint of present astronomical knowledge, it is tenable, will not here be discussed."¹⁴

Apart from being influenced by the existing discussion of Newtonian cosmology, Einstein was also motivated by the ideas of the famous Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach. According to Mach’s principle (proposed in the 1880s), the laws of mechanics, including the law of inertia, should be seen as purely relational, namely, relative to the universe as a whole. Einstein’s version of the principle was rather different; he tended to understand it in the sense that the space-time metric is determined by the masses of the universe, and thus that the local dynamics is conditioned by the universe at large.¹⁵ In general, Mach’s principle is interpreted as the assumption that local inertial frames are determined by some average of the motion of the distant celestial objects. Originally Einstein believed that his relativistic theory of cosmology embodied Mach’s principle, but in his later years he concluded that the principle could not be harmonized with the general theory of relativity.

In his 1917 paper, Kosmologische Betrachtungen zur allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie (cosmological considerations concerning the general theory of relativity), Einstein dressed the ideas mentioned above in mathematical formulas. He began with the gravitational field equations that he had derived in 1915, namely,

Mathematically, the quantities with double indices are tensors, and, since the indices refer to the four coordinates of space-time, the tensor equation comprises ten second-order differential equations (Rmn = Rnm, etc.; n, m = 0,1,2,3). The physical meaning of this equation is that it relates the geometry of spacetime (left side) to its physical content (right side). The quantity Rmn denotes the Ricci curvature tensor, and R is a curvature invariant derived from Rmn. The components of the metric fundamental tensor gmn are functions of the coordinates in the sense that they specify the geometry, the invariant distance ds between two neighboring points in space-time being ds² = gmndxmdxn, where there is a summation over the values of the indices m and n. In general, the expression for ds² thus consists of ten quadratic terms. With a particular set of values for the g coefficients it reduces to the Minkowski line element of special relativity, ds² = c²dt² - (dx² + dy² + dz²) where the space part is the ordinary Euclidean space. The constant κis a quantity that is related to the Newtonian constant of gravitation G by c²κ = 8πG/c², where c is the velocity of light.¹⁶ Finally, Tmn is the energy-momentum (or energy-stress) tensor, which represents various sources of energy and momentum, including pressure and electrical charges. Conservation of energy and momentum is guaranteed by the zero divergence of the left-hand side of equation (1.1).

The field equations (1.1) relate different ontological entities, respectively geometrical and physical. Originally Einstein found this very satisfactory, but he soon changed his mind and came to consider the structure of the field equations a hindrance for the geometrization of physics that he dreamed of. Referring to equation (1.1), he wrote in 1936: It is similar to a building, one wing of which is made of fine marble (left part of the equation), but the other wing of which is built of low grade wood (right side of equation). The phenomenological representation of matter is, in fact, only a crude substitute for a representation which would correspond to all known properties of matter.¹⁷

In order to secure a universe static in time, Einstein was led to an important change in his original equations, the generalizing modification referred to in the quotation above. His change consisted in adding a term proportional to the metrical tensor. The factor of proportionality soon became known as the cosmological constant, and is always denoted by a Greek lambda, either λ or A. With this change, the fundamental equations read

Einstein admitted in his 1917 paper that the introduction of the cosmological constant is not justified by our actual knowledge of gravitation, i.e., that it had an ad hoc character, but he found it necessary for the purpose of making a quasi-static distribution of matter. The value of the cosmological constant was (and still is) unknown, but in order for the equations to agree with planetary motions it had to be very small: the equations Rmn = 0, obtained from equations (1.1) for empty space, were known to agree with observations within the solar system and thus the A term had to be exceedingly small not to spoil the agreement. Furthermore, the dimension of the cosmological constant is that of the inverse square of a distance. It is helpful to think of the constant as a term which introduces a cosmic repulsion proportional to the distance, negligible at small distances but increasingly important at very large distances. In this picture the evolution of the universe is determined by the competition between the repulsive A force and the attractive force of Newtonian gravitation. In Einstein’s static universe the two forces are in balance. The cosmological constant in Einstein’s theory was essentially the same quantity as that appearing in the earlier Neumann-Seeliger theory, an analogy between classical and relativistic theory admitted by Einstein.

With regard to the cosmological constant, it is important to be aware that the logical structure and principal physical meaning of the field equations remain unchanged. Equation (1.2) is covariant and satisfies conservation of energy and momentum, just as does equation (1.1). Although the cosmological constant later came to be seen as suspect and ad hoc, it played an important and natural role in Einstein’s cosmological theory.¹⁸ He saw it as justified in particular by its connection to the mean density of matter in the closed universe. In a letter to Besso of August 1918, Einstein explained:

Either the universe has a centre, has a vanishing density everywhere, empty at infinity where all the thermal energy is gradually lost as radiation; or, all the points are equivalent on the average, and the mean density is everywhere the same. In either case, one needs a hypothetical constant A, which specifies the particular mean density of matter consistent with equilibrium. One perceives at once that the second possibility is more satisfactory, especially since it implies a finite size for the universe. Since the universe is unique, there is no essential difference between considering A as a constant which is peculiar to a law of nature or as a constant of integration.¹⁹

The cosmological constant was introduced in order to maintain a static universe in accordance with observationally based belief, but this does not necessarily mean that it blocked Einstein from predicting the dynamic universe inherent in his theory. The lack of recognition of dynamic solutions, i.e., solutions where the radius of curvature varies with time, was not caused by the presence of the cosmological constant. This is illustrated by the fact that both the first models of the expanding universe, due to Friedmann and Lemaître, arose from considerations operating with a nonzero cosmological constant. Although not necessarily ad hoc, the A term certainly makes the field equations a bit more complicated and a bit less appealing. It was such aesthetic considerations that at an early stage made Einstein doubt if the cosmological constant could be justified. In 1919 he described the introduction of the constant as gravely detrimental to the formal beauty of the theory.²⁰ However, at that time he could see no alternative, and it was twelve years before he decided that the introduction of the cosmological constant had been a mistake.

The model of the universe derived by Einstein, and, he believed, the only one consonant with his equations, was homogeneously filled with dilute matter and could thus be ascribed a definite mass. He found the cosmological constant to be related to the density (ρ), volume, and mass of his closed universe by the relations

The first of these relations reflects the key message of relativistic cosmology, that the density of matter determines the radius of curvature of the universe. We also notice that although the field equations do not specify the sign of the cosmological constant, in the Einstein world it is necessarily positive. As to the numerical values of these quantities, claimed to follow from fundamental physical theory, Einstein was understandably cautious. In his letter to Besso of December 1916 he erroneously suggested that R ≈ 10⁷ light years, based on the much too high estimate of ρ ≈ 10-22 g ·cm-3, and he believed that the most distant visible stars were some 10⁴ light years away from the earth.²¹ In a letter to de Sitter of 12 March 1917 he repeated the suggestion, but he wisely decided not to publish it.²² What mattered was that the universe, according to Einstein, had a constant positive curvature and thus was spatially closed. Temporally it was infinite, the radius R having the same value at all time.

Non-Static Universes

Einstein’s cosmological theory appeared in the midst of the Great War and was therefore unknown to most scientists outside Germany. But Einstein was in contact with the eminent Dutch astronomer Willem de Sitter, a scientist equally at home with astronomical observations and advanced mathematical analysis (the Netherlands remained neutral during the war). Forty-five years old, de Sitter was at the time professor of astronomy at the University of Leiden and best known for his work in celestial mechanics. As a foreign member of the Royal Astronomical Society, de Sitter undertook to give an account of the new theory which, via Eddington (who was secretary of the society), thus became known to the English-speaking world. In fact, de Sitter did more than that, for he extended Einstein’s analysis by showing that, contrary to Einstein’s contention, the static, matter-filled model was not the only solution to the cosmological field equations.²³ In his third report to the Royal Astronomical Society of 1917, he drew attention to what subsequently became known as the de Sitter solution. (De Sitter modestly termed it solution B, to distinguish it from Einstein’s solution A.) De Sitter’s model was an empty universe, with ρ = 0 and Λ = 3/R², spatially closed in spite of its lack of matter. As in the Einstein model, the pressure was taken to be zero. De Sitter showed that his universe had a peculiar property: if a particle was introduced at a distance r from the origin of a system of coordinates, it would appear as moving away from the observer. It would acquire an outward acceleration Λc²r/3, corresponding to the repulsive Λ force in the Newtonian analogy. De Sitter summarized the difference betwen the two models as follows: In A there is a world-matter, with which the whole world is filled, and this can be in a state of equilibrium without any internal stresses or pressures if it is entirely homogeneous and at rest. In B there may, or may not, be matter, but if there is more than one material particle these cannot be at rest, and if the whole world were filled homogeneously with matter this could not be at rest without internal pressure or stress.²⁴ Most interestingly, de Sitter’s model indicated that, as a result of the metric, clocks would appear to run more slowly the farther away they were from the observer. Since frequencies are inverse time-intervals, light would therefore be expected to be received with a smaller frequency, being more redshifted the larger the distance between source and observer. As de Sitter wrote: The lines in the spectra of very distant stars or nebulae must therefore be systematically displaced towards the red, giving rise to a spurious positive radial velocity. Notice that de Sitter described the velocity as spurious: it was not a real velocity caused by the expansion of space, but an effect of the particular space-time metric describing this kind of universe. In spite of the redshift built into de Sitter’s model, it was, like Einstein’s, a static model.

By 1917 there then existed two general-relativistic models of the universe, Einstein’s and de Sitter’s. Einstein accepted de Sitter’s mathematics, but found the new model objectionable from a physical point of view, among other reasons because it contained a world horizon, a distance from beyond which light signals cannot reach the observer.²⁵ In a letter to de Sitter, Einstein argued that the new solution does not correspond to any physical possibility.²⁶ According to Einstein’s conception of Mach’s principle, the curved space-time (the gmn field) was determined or generated by matter and so de Sitter’s empty universe at first made no sense to him. Although de Sitter’s model, being devoid of matter, may seem very artificial, it soon became a popular foundation for further theoretical work. It was seen as particularly interesting because of its connection with the observations of apparently systematic redshifts which were reported at the time. Its lack of material content certainly did not prevent researchers from investigating it as a possible model of the real universe. As de Sitter suggested, although the universe is indeed filled with matter, it is known to be of very low density, perhaps so low that his model would apply as a zero-density approximation.

Whatever the credibility of the Einstein and de Sitter models as candidates for the real structure of the universe, from the early 1920s there developed a minor industry based on these two models. It was predominantly a mathematical industry, with mathematically minded physicists and astronomers analyzing the properties of the two solutions and proposing their own modifications. Among the more important participants in this tradition of mathematical cosmology were the great British astronomer Arthur Eddington; the German-Swiss mathematician Herman Weyl; a Hungarian-German physicist, Cornelius Lanczos; the Belgian astrophysicist Georges Lemaître; and the Americans Howard Robertson and Richard Tolman. The basic aim of these investigations was to determine which of the two relativistic models of the static universe was the most satisfactory. This was done primarily by examining them mathematically, whereas comparison with the meager observational data played a subordinate role. The discussion concerning the models of Einstein and de Sitter has been described as a controversy, but this is hardly an appropriate name for a restricted scientific debate in which few of the participants were metaphysically committed to either of the views.²⁷ It was, at any rate, a debate of an entirely different kind from the cosmological controversy that raged in the 1950s.

Whether in Einstein’s or de Sitter’s version, the idea of treating the entire world by means of the relativistic field equations constituted a revolution in the age-old conception of the universe. It is not much of an exaggeration to claim that Einstein invented a new concept of the universe with his theory of general relativity. The world or universe had traditionally been thought of as those parts within the limits of observation (dependent on telescope technology as that limit was). It now became everything, the totality of events in space and time—and all this governed by a single tensor equation. In spite of (or because of?) its revolutionary nature, the change was accepted by only a small number of physicists, mathematicians, and astronomers. The significance of the new relativistic cosmology is evident in retrospect, but it is not reflected in the astronomical literature of the 1920s.²⁸ To the majority of astronomers, and of course to most laypersons, Einstein’s reconceptualization of the universe was unknown, irrelevant, unintelligible, or objectionable. The eminent French mathematician Emile Borel described a common objection in these terms: It may seem rather rash indeed to draw conclusions valid for the whole universe from what we can see from the small corner to which we are confined. Who knows that the whole visible universe is not like a drop of water at the surface of the earth? Inhabitants of that drop of water, as small relative to it as we are relative to the Milky Way, could not possibly imagine that beside the drop of water there might be a piece of iron or a living tissue, in which the properties of matter are entirely different.²⁹ This objection (to which Borel did not subscribe) was far from childish and continued to play a role in the cosmological discussion throughout this century. But Einstein, and those who followed him, decided that if cosmology were to progress—become a science—the objection had to be ignored.

During the course of their work to understand and elaborate the two relativistic world models, some scientists proposed solutions that combined features of Einstein’s and de Sitter’s models. However, with two notable exceptions, the framework of the tradition was essentially confined to static world models. Even disregarding these exceptions—due to Friedmann in 1922 and Lemaître in 1927—the tendency toward the end of the 1920s was to conclude that neither of the two classical solutions could represent the actual universe. In a formal sense, a nonstatic world model was discussed by Lanczos in 1922. By an ingenious change of coordinates Lanczos found a model in which the radius varies hyperbolically with time [namely, as R ∼ cosh(ct/R0), where R0 is a length].³⁰ Later contributions were independently made by Lemaître in 1925 and Robertson in 1928. This work did not amount to giving up the static universe in a physical sense, however. What these scientists did was to transform de Sitter’s line element in such a way that it became nonstatic, i.e., so that one or more of the components of depend on the time coordinate. In this case, the metric could be formally written in the form ds² = c²dt² - F(t)dx² + dy² + dz²), where F (t) is some function of the time parameter.

For example, in his work of 1925 Lemaître introduced another division of space and time than that used by de Sitter and was in this way able to derive a model in which the radius of space is constant at any place, but it is variable with time.³¹ The nonstatic feature thus introduced was expressed by the line element

To a modern reader this looks very much like a universe expanding exponentially in time, which is the way in which the de Sitter model is understood today. However, everything depends on the way the geometrical symbols are interpreted physically. The fact is that during the 1920s such transformations were not seen as implying any change in the physical interpretation, i.e., as indicating a world in evolution. As Gerald Whitrow later expressed it: What de Sitter had in fact discovered in 1917 was one of the simplest models of an expanding universe. With a more physically appropriate choice of co-ordinates, as was first shown by G. Lemaître in 1925, and independently by H. P. Robertson in 1928, the metric of the de Sitter universe can be expressed [in the form of] the limiting case of an expanding universe as the mean density everywhere tends to zero. We therefore no longer consider de Sitter’s as a static universe, its apparent changelessness being a mathematical fiction.³²

As early as 1922, Friedmann proved that there are no more static solutions to the field equations than those associated with the names of Einstein and de Sitter (apart from the useless one of special relativity—useless because it does not include gravitation). The proof had no impact, but seven years later Tolman repeated it independently.³³ This, together with the ingrained belief in the static nature of the world, led to a state of crisis in mathematical cosmology. If both the Einstein model and the de Sitter model were inadequate, and if these were the only ones, how could cosmology still be based on general relativity? The alternative of abandoning general relativity and returning to some classical framework was not seriously considered within the relativistic tradition. The obvious solution, to search for evolutionary models, had already been published at the time, but was as unknown to most cosmologists as it was unwelcome. The conceptual climate that governed mathematical cosmology was that of a physically static universe, and the scientists engaged in the field tried hard to avoid breaking with the paradigm.

Early Observational Cosmology

Redshifted light from stars or galaxies was not a new discovery, but the phenomenon attained cosmological significance only in the light of de Sitter’s work. As early as 1912, Vesto Slipher at the Lowell Observatory had found the first Doppler shift for a spiral nebula—a blueshift for the Andromeda galaxy, indicating a motion toward the sun with the amazing velocity of 300 km s-1, the highest velocity for a celestial body known at the time.³⁴ His program soon revealed that Andromeda was probably an exception. There turned out to be a marked preponderance of large redshifts, which Slipher interpreted as the result of recessional velocities, possibly indicating some kind of expansion of the system of nebulae. In 1917 he reported measurements of the radial velocities of twenty-five nebulae of which four were receding with a velocity of more than 1000 km·s-1. Slipher inferred at first that the nebulae receded on the north side of our galaxy and approached on the south side. He therefore suggested a hypothesis of galactic drift according to which the observed radial velocities reflected the motion of the Milky Way relative to the nebulae. Slipher kept to this hypothesis until the early 1920s and did not think of connecting his observations with de Sitter’s cosmological hypothesis, of which he may have been unaware.³⁵

Eight years later, in 1925, Slipher had found Doppler shifts for forty-five nebulae, forty-one of which were redshifts. At that time de Sitter’s prediction of a velocity-distance correlation had disseminated to the community of observational astronomers also. It inspired several astronomers to look for such a correlation, and in general increased interest in de Sitter’s model at the expense of Einstein’s. In the absence of reliable knowledge of the distances of the nebulae, no clear correlation of a universal nature was found at the time, but with the discovery of Cepheid variables in the Andromeda nebula, and later in other spiral nebulae, indications of a redshift-distance relationship gradually became stronger.

Meanwhile, and largely unrelated to the observational results, a few theoreticians had predicted from de Sitter’s theory, or modifications of it, that linear relationships between the redshift and the distance would hold either precisely or as a first approximation. This was first shown, if only indirectly, by Weyl in 1923.³⁶ The following year Ludwik Silberstein, a Polish-born physicist then staying in England, argued explicitly for a relation of the form Δλ/λ = ± r/R, where r is the distance of the source of light and the symbol λ denotes the wavelength.³⁷ As indicated by the double sign, the formula was supposed to be valid for blue- as well as redshifts. Silberstein claimed that his formula was supported by observations of globular clusters, but his claim relied on exclusion of data that did not agree with his prediction. Most astronomers denied that the available data supported a linear relationship of the type suggested by Silberstein. As a consequence his theory was strongly criticized by several leading astronomers, who ridiculed what they called the Silberstein effect. Partly as a result of the negative reaction to Silberstein’s prediction, redshift-distance relations were for a period regarded with skepticism in the astronomical community.

Another theoretical derivation was offered by Lemaître in his work of 1925 where he discussed a nonstatic de Sitter world and—remarkably at the time—linked it to current observations. Our treatment evidences this non-statical character of de Sitter’s world which gives a possible interpretation of the main receding motion of spiral nebulae, he wrote.³⁸ The Belgian astrophysicist found the redshift formula Δλ/λ = r/cT, where r is the distance between the light source and the observer and T the time measured by the observer. Contrary to Silberstein’s result only redshifts followed from his theory. However, in spite of this pleasing result, Lemaître concluded that de Sitter’s solution had to be abandoned. He seems at the time vaguely to have recognized the possibility of a third alternative, the expanding universe, but only discussed this explicitly two years later. A nonstatic line element similar to Lemaître’s was also suggested by Howard Percy Robertson of Princeton University, who in 1928 showed that it yielded a recession of the galaxies in agreement with observed data. Robertson noticed that "t [in equation (1.4)] appears explicitly in the line element, and consequently natural processes are not reversible. He summarized his investigation as follows: Although space is unlimited the observable world is not, and objects at an appreciable fraction of its radius should show a residual motion of recession; assuming that the known excess of recessional velocity of spiral nebulae is due to this cause, the radius of the observable universe is found to be 2 x 10²⁷ cm [about 650 Mpc]."³⁹

The establishment of an empirical relation between redshift and distance became a reality in 1929 through the work of Edwin Powell Hubble, who greatly extended and reinterpreted the research program of Slipher. Born in 1889, Hubble received his Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Chicago in 1910.⁴⁰ After three years in Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, where he studied law and Spanish, he returned to the United States with the intention of practicing law. However, although he passed the bar examination, apparently he never turned his intention into reality. Instead he switched to astronomy, in which field he obtained his Ph.D. in 1917. His astronomical career was interrupted when the United States entered the World War. Three days after having passed his final examination at Yerkes Observatory, Hubble joined the army. With the rank of major he was sent to France in September 1918, but the war ended before he went into combat.

After a stay in England, Hubble joined the staff of the Mount Wilson Observatory and began the series of observations that would make him the best known astronomer of the twentieth century. Determinations of distances to very distant nebulae were crucial to Hubble’s success, and in this respect the so-called Cepheid method played a decisive role. Astronomers’ raw data is the apparent luminosity L, which is a measure of the light energy received on earth per unit area and unit time (and for all wavelengths, in which case L is called the