Way Worse Than Attica: the 1980 Riot at the Penitentiary of New Mexico

By Dirk Cameron Gibson

This book on the 1980 Penitentiary of New Mexico riot is by far the most comprehensive, best-researched and most credible publication on this topic.
It examines the prison administration, the correctional officers and the inmates in great detail. Clues to the impending riot are documented, and the causes of the riot and contributing factors are discussed. The pre-riot, riot and post-riot stages of the event are covered. In addition to providing chapters on the negotiation about and investigation into the insurrection, the significance and consequences of the riot are assessed. Separate chapters discuss the families of the hostage correctional officers, the inmate families, the media and medical first responders. Tours of the prison are discussed, and paranormal aspects of the riot documented. There are ghosts in the prison!
This prison riot differed from most in that no inmates tried to escape. That is because this was not a traditional prison riot but rather one intended to initiate public and media awareness of terrible living conditions and to create public and media dialogue about inmate complaints. In the years immediately prior to the riot ACLU attorneys had submitted two Consent Decrees to federal courts, and the prison administration was forced to promise to address more than 200 inmate grievances. In fact they ignored the decrees and cracked down harder on the inmates. The inevitable result was the death of an unknown but undoubtedly significant number of inmates and countless serious injuries.
The research foundation of this book is the most complete of any book about the riot. All published articles and books and blogs and government reports about the riot are included. Most significantly, interviews with correctional officers and family members provide intimate personal insight into the motives, madness and mutilations of this murderous riot.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse
• Release date: Apr 4, 2022
• ISBN: 9781665533485

Dirk Cameron Gibson

Dirk C. Duran-Gibson is a prolific author. He has published research books on a variety of subjects, including a half-dozen on serial murder and a pair on outer space studies. In addition, one book reports results of a two-volume national study of consumer product recalls, another is about the functional role of communication in legal practice, and his most recent publication is a rhetorical biography of J. Edgar Hoover. Gibson’s Ph D. coursework included two Ph. D-level courses in historiography, the study of history. This education provided him the background to analyze and interpret historic events. In addition his BS, MA and Ph. D in communication facilitated his understanding of the 1980 riot at the Penitentiary of New Mexico as a media event, desperate attempts by inmates to cry for help by communicating their plight at the hands of correctional officers and the prison administration. Gibson’s credentials to write this book were enhanced by in-depth interviews with correctional officers and family members. These interviews provided an invaluable first-hand perspective on one of the two most violent prison riots in American history.

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CHAPTER 1

THE PENITENTIARY OF NEW MEXICO

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Abstract: The history of the Penitentiary of New Mexico was surveyed, and the bad reputation of the institution recounted. The leadership of PNM at the time of the riot was described, as well as its tendency for corruption and managerial incompetence. Nepotism, cliques, political patronage and violence characterized the prison. Escapes were an endemic problem, and inmates were subjected to disproportionate punishment far in excess of what was deserved. PNM was habitually severely overcrowded, staff turnover was significant, and the physical plant was crumbling due to inadequate maintenance and pervasive venal graft during construction. Politics and nepotism led to the creation of too many captain positions, which resulted in capricious, arbitrary and unsafe policies.

Keywords: American Justice Institute, escape, Joliet Correctional Center, Joliet, Illinois, New Mexico, New Mexico Corrections Department, New Mexico State Road 14, New York, Penitentiary of New Mexico, riot, Santa Fe, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Southwest Ghost Hunters Association, Tahash, Ralph, United States Congress, Territorial Legislature of New Mexico, The Santa Fe Reporter, The Travel Channel, Time magazine, U.S. Department of Justice.

INTRODUCTION

The Penitentiary of New Mexico (PNM) has been a controversial and infamous institution for most if not all of its storied history. This initial chapter describes the history of PNM, and the administration of this penal institution. Prominent PNM leaders will be discussed, its reputation described, and noteworthy aspects of the prison will be documented. In all, eighteen aspects of PNM will be discussed; 1) Origins and history, 2) Reputation, 3) Violence, 4) Overcrowding, 5) Severe response to problematic inmate behavior, 6) Escapes, 7) Security system, 8) Administrative personnel, 9) Corruption, 10) Nepotism, 11) Cover-up, 12) Cliques, 13) Politics, 14) Ineffective management, 15) Captains, 16) Turnover, 17) The crumbling prison, and 18) Michael Schmitt’s perspective.

PNM ORIGINS AND HISTORY

PNM was not the first major prison in what became the State of New Mexico. The original New Mexico Penitentiary was authorized by the United States Congress in 1853, nearly six decades before the territory was granted statehood status (Southwest Ghost Hunters Association, 2010, 4).

Construction of a stone building near the federal courthouse in Santa Fe began in 1854, but was discontinued in 1857 because of inadequate funding and strident objections from local residents (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 1). The construction of this prison was necessitated by the fact that it cost $30,000 annually to house territorial prisoners in penal institutions located elsewhere, so in 1884 the Territorial Legislature set aside $150,000 for a centre building and one cellhouse wing (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 1; Morris, 1983, 31). The 104-cell prison was completed on August 17, 1885 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 1). This institution was modeled on two existing prisons, the Sing Sing Correctional Facility in New York and the Joliet Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois (Southwest Ghost Hunters Association, 2010, 4). This prison focused on inmates being subjected to hard labor, and Warden H.C. Burnett declared that, Hard labor is a positive kindness of the court (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 1). A brick manufacturing plant was constructed near the prison in 1893, and in 1903 prisoners were employed in highway construction, the first western state to use inmates for this purpose (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 1; Southwest Ghost Hunters Association, 2010, 4). By 1897 so many inmates were incarcerated that a significant number of inmates were housed in a second cellhouse wing, but construction was delayed because the bricks produced by prisoners were diverted to build the territorial capital building, and the expansion project was not finished until 1909 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 1).

Towards the end of 1948 an inmate disturbance was caused by unsavory and substandard food. Another similar incident occurred about six months later. An escape attempt in November 1950 resulted in inmates injuring several correctional officers. An attempted escape in June of 1952 was foiled, but a correctional officer was killed, and a general inmate strike ensued resulting in the resignation of the warden. A half-year later inmates broke into a supposedly secure vault, took several guns and almost escaped. An altercation between rival prison gangs resulted in numerous stabbings and the murder of an inmate (Morris, 1983, 33).

A riot in the prison on June 15, 1953, resulted in approximately 30 inmates seizing control and capturing 21 correctional staff members, including Deputy Warden Ralph Tahash. The New Mexico State Police managed to slip a .30-.30 carbine rifle to Tahash, who shot and killed the two inmate leaders of the riot. This was the fourth major violent incident at the correctional facility that year, and a grand jury urged the immediate construction of a new prison, which was completed in 1956 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September, 1980, 2). One account of the new prison suggested that it opened in 1954 (Mullin, 2015). According to Colvin, this new institution was built in 1956 (June 1982, 16). It is located approximately ten miles south of Santa Fe, just off of State Road 14. The PNM was opened in 1956 by the New Mexico Corrections Department (New Mexico Corrections Department, 2013, 1). This new prison was built for a total of eight million dollars, constructed with inmate labor. It was described as a shoddily built prison (Morris, 1983, 33-34).

The history of PNM has been problematic. Inconsistency has characterized the administration of the facility. The Report of the Attorney General on the 1980 riot conceded, The history of the penitentiary reveals periodic shifts in emphasis between custody and rehabilitation with no clear philosophy as to the proper balance. The stability and security which comes from achieving a reasonable balance is hard to translate into policy (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 38).

THE PNM REPUTATION

PNM did not enjoy a positive reputation. The American Justice Institute observed the PNM track record, and claimed that it was, one of the most poorly administered prisons in the country (Hirliman, 2005, 13). A study by the U.S. Department of Justice found that PNM was one of the harshest, most punitive prison environments in the nation (Morris, 1983, 111). Time magazine observed that, The object of all this apprehension is the New Mexico State penitentiary, surely the nation’s most notorious prison (Magnuson, October 26, 1981, 17). The Travel Channel referred to Sante Fe’s abandoned infamous New Mexico State Penitentiary (The Dead Files, 2017, 1).

Other observers suggested similar perceptions. PrisonPro.com, a correctional industry trade journal, noted that, Penitentiary of New Mexico has seen some of the most violent prison riots in correctional history (2015, 1). The Santa Fe Reporter declared in 1981 that, Behind the massive walls of the Santa Fe Prison was a nightmare world of murder, torture, blackmail, extortion and graft (September 3, 1981, 1). The Report of the Attorney General on the 1980 riot decided that, Throughout its history, the Penitentiary of New Mexico has suffered from neglect. The New Mexico prison has always waited at the end of the line for public money, and elected officials have turned their attention to the ugly problems of the penitentiary only when the institution has erupted in violence and destruction. Lack of space, inadequate programs and understaffing have all been part of the prison’s problems (Part II, September 1980, 1) We conclude this section on the PNM reputation with an apocryphal contribution. A former New Mexico prison psychologist posed a question, Do you know why it’s so hard to treat the mentally disturbed prisoners of the state? His answer was, Because it’s the institution that has a character disorder (Hirliman, 2005, 67).

PNM VIOLENCE

Perhaps surprisingly, violence has not always been endemic at PNM. While prisons tend to be relatively violent institutions, PNM has not been consistently violent. First we will examine the violent aspects of the prison, then the nonviolent nature of this institution will be considered.

There was violent racial conflict at PNM in the 1970s. The throwing of aluminum food trays led to fist fights between Chicano and Black inmates (Colvin, June 1982, 17). Previous violent altercations at PNM had occurred in 1922 and 1953 (AR15.com, 2017, 1). One source suggested that the 1922 violent incident was a protest against overcrowding and correctional officer use of excessive force against inmates. The correctional officers in the guard towers shot at inmates who refused to return to their cells, resulting in one inmate death and five injured men (Southwest Ghost Hunters Association, 2010, 4). Another account referred to the 1922 and 1953 riots (Myvoyagethroughtime, 2017, 1). The June 1953 riot at the penitentiary has already been documented, but it is worth recalling that there were three other violent in incidents in 1953 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 2).

It is possible, however, to perceive a less violent PNM. Colvin observed that the penitentiary was not particularly violent prior to 1975 (June 1982, 1). In fact, violence was relatively rare at the time of the revolt at Attica Prison in New York (Colvin, June 1982, 2). PNM inmates staged a sympathy strike to express solidarity for the Attica inmates, causing extensive damage to the prison but not involving any acts of violence (Colvin, June 1982, 2). The 1960s were described as, a period of relative stability in guard and inmate relationships (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 13).

The early 1970s was a time of relative order at the Penitentiary of New Mexico, according to the Report of the Attorney General (Part II, September 1980, 5). The same report noted that the early 1970s was a peaceful time at PNM, followed by the violence in the late 1970s (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 4).

OVERCROWDING

Overcrowded conditions have been prevalent in New Mexico penal institutions since before New Mexico became a state. The Report of the Attorney General into the 1980 PNM riot noted, A pattern of crowding, leading to limited expansion, followed by more crowding continued at the old penitentiary through the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 2). The New Mexico Corrections Department observed in 2013 that, By the late 1970s, the facility was overcrowded, underfunded and on a path to disaster (2013, 2). The consequences of overcrowded conditions were explained by Colvin, who noted that inmates at PNM were crammed so tightly into cells until some slept on the floor, with their feet forced against the bars and their heads against the toilet (1983, 47). Much more about crowded PNM conditions will be presented in the chapter on the causes of the 1980 PNM riot.

SEVERE RESPONSE TO PROBLEMATIC INMATE BEHAVIOR

In 1976 inmates organized and executed a work strike as a response to the PNM administration’s increased use of coercive tactics to control the prison population. Huspek referred to the severity of their response by PNM officials (May 2000, 152). What was the PNM reaction that was considered so severe?

First the PNM prisoners were gassed. Then the inmates were ordered to remove all of their clothes. After that they were forced to run a gauntlet of nearly a hundred yards in length. Correctional officers armed with axe handles lined both sides of the central corridor, beating the inmates with their weapons. The prisoners were each interviewed individually by the PNM administration to ascertain the leaders of the action. Subsequently the alleged ringleaders of the work strike were either placed in solitary confinement, transferred to out-of-state prisons, or both (Huspek, May 2000, 152-3).

ESCAPES

One way to measure the effectiveness of a prison’s administration and the adequacy of security and inmate confinement systems is to determine the prevalence of escape attempts. In the case of PNM, data on inmate escape attempts quantifies a radical change in prison administration and correctional philosophies.

In the period between 1970 and 1975, PNM inmate control procedures were characterized by relatively informal and noncoercive policies. A system of inmate rewards were instituted, such as inmate leadership of rehabilitative programs and the allowance of various privileges. Because prisoners desired these perks, they behaved according to PNM regulations, for fear of having the privileges revoked. In fact, an inmate culture or society was established whereby inmate leaders were created, who assisted in keeping the other prisoners in line and compliant with prison policies (Colvin, June 1982, 3).

In the time frame from 1970 to 1975, there was a total of three over-the-fence escape attempts. In the next five years, there were 36 such successful escapes, and 18 unsuccessful attempted escapes (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 5).

PNM SECURITY SYSTEMS

Penal institutions, by the very nature of their purpose, must be very secure and controlled environments. Inmate mobility must be limited and their freedom of movement curtailed for the safety of the prison administration and correctional officers, other inmates, and the population surrounding the facility. Prison security systems are therefore of paramount importance to effective correctional institutions.

The PNM security system started at a traffic control checkpoint at State Road 14. Visitors obtained permission to continue to the PNM compound, which was surrounded by a double chain link fence topped by concertina barbed wire around the perimeter of the prison. Four guard towers provided elevated observation points of the entire penitentiary. A gatehouse located near Tower 1 received radio signals from the parking lot, and an armory was located on the ground floor of that tower. Permission to enter the prison was given from the gatehouse, where a control panel controlled the electronic gates leading to and from the holding area. The main gate was controlled from Tower 1.

The main building was constructed according to the ‘telephone pole’ layout, with three main sections—a South Wing, a Central Administration Area, and a North Wing. This spatial arrangement was intended to minimize inmate access to other parts of the penitentiary. A Control Center constituted the main security area of the building, and five grill gates limited freedom of movement within the prison, and where keys to the entire facility were located. A central corridor extended the entire length of PNM. Riot control grills separate the interior of the prison, and were intended to prevent the spread of any security threat by sealing off each dormitory, cellblock and cellhouse (Report of the Attorney General, Part 1, June 1980, 1-3). The design of the entire penitentiary was intended to maximize security and minimize the number of correctional officers needed to staff the facility (Morris, 1983, 34).

Cellblock Three contained the most violent, escape-prone inmates in the penitentiary. Cellblock Four was used to provide protective segregation for those inmates who would be endangered by exposure to the inmate general population. Cellblock Five housed maximum security prisoners (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, 8-10).

PNM ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL

A number of individuals played prominent roles in the administration of PNM. In this section we will discuss Felix Rodriguez, Robert Montoya, Manuel Koroneos, Jerry Griffin, Adelaido Martinez, Jose Lujan, Steve Dillon, Larry Flood, Marc Orner, and Jerry Baker.

Felix Rodriguez was perhaps the most prominent figure at PNM. He reportedly tried to reassert administrative control over PNM inmates after the previous warden, J.E. Baker, had loosened it (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 13). It was widely reported that Rodriguez was popular with inmates, but that may have stemmed from his alleged involvement in heroin trafficking at PNM (Hirliman, 2005, 51). Rodriguez was acting warden of PNM in 1967, and warden between 1970 and 1975 and again in 1980 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, D-1). He dropped out of St. Michael’s High School in the eleventh grade and later earned his GED certificate. He was a tall man who reportedly intimidated other Hispanic men because of his large size. After serving in the army for two years, he was employed at the forerunner of PNM, rising rapidly through the ranks.

Robert Montoya was a controversial figure at PNM. He served under Warden Jerry Griffin as Deputy Warden for Prisons, and his responsibilities included directing the day-to-day custodial and rehabilitation activities of PNM. Montoya held a bachelor’s degree in psychology from Northern Arizona University (Morris, 1983, 43). He had prior correctional experience at a juvenile facility in Arizona, and as a supervisor in the Arizona correctional system (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-1). Montoya was said to be hated by correctional officers and inmates alike (Hirliman, 2005, 15, 62). It is widely believed that Montoya chose not to save the inmates in Cellblock Four during the riot, although he could have done so (Hirliman, 2005, 70). It was claimed that Montoya was the most hated administrator at PNM (Hirliman, 2005, 15).

Montoya was inadvertently struck in the leg by a board during a skirmish with prisoners in the aftermath of the prison riot. He stepped in front of a line of prisoners reentering the prison, and slapped an inmate, Billy Battenfield, in the face twice. According to New Mexico State Police Sergeant Billy Holder, Montoya screamed at Battenfield that he would teach him not to hit an officer. He ordered the removal of Battenfield’s shoes, then stomped on the handcuffed man’s feet, stating that, Does that hurt? I’m going to make sure you do the rest of your time in lock-up. This incident was also witnessed by a former New Mexico State Policeman, Kenneth Thompson, who remarked that, Both this incident and another one or two I witnessed involving Bobby Montoya is kind of typical of his attitude toward the prisoners (Hirliman, 2005, 119). Montoya was fired from his position as Deputy Warden after an investigation by the Attorney General’s office (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 45).

Manuel Koroneos was the PNM Superintendent of Correctional Security. A 17-year veteran of PNM, his duties involved supervision of all security procedures and personnel (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-3). He was a high school dropout whose previous employment history included being a truck driver and a roofer. He wrote on his state personnel form that his reason for wanting a corrections career was, I want a steady job (Morris, 1983, 42).

Jose Lujan served as Deputy Warden for Operations, and he supervised the prison budget and renovations. He worked at PNM for 24 years, with a previous assignment as the PNM Business Manager (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-3).

Adelaido Martinez was the PNM Associate Warden for Inmate Management. He was a 23-year veteran employee of the prison who chaired the Disciplinary Committee and the Segregation Committee (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-1). He dropped out of a mission high school after three years (Morris 1983, 42).

Jerry Griffin was the Warden of PNM at time of the 1980 riot. His previous correctional experience included being the Superintendent of the Roswell Correctional Center, a probation and parole supervisor, and serving as an Administrative Aide to Felix Rodriguez (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-1). He managed the prison and gave administrative assistance to all PNM operations. He reorganized the PNM organizational chart shortly before the 1980 riot because he was typically uninformed about prison operations. Department directors said that Griffin was not sufficiently informed about daily matters and that memos did not seem to reach him (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-1). He was criticized for making assignments based on political patronage (Morris, 1983, 43).

Steve Dillon was the Chief Classification Officer at PNM. He had held that position since 1977. He had previous experience in the Ohio Correctional system as a Corrections Planner and Chief Classification Officer. His duties included making all program and job placement decisions, developing parole plans, and writing post-sentence reports (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-1).

Larry Flood was the Acting PNM Intelligence Officer. He gathered and evaluated information about the safety and security of the penitentiary. He was a 23-year military veteran. Flood was named to this position two weeks before the 1980 riot (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, D-1, D-3).

Marc Orner was the PNM Director of Psychological Services. He was distrusted by many inmates, but protected by others (Morris, 1983, 16). He was considered to be a prominent player in the PNM snitch system (Hirliman 2005, 64-5). He put mentally ill inmates in full body casts, in what was termed, one of the most bizarre procedures in prison history (Hirliman, 2005, 66-7). The staff at the Las Vegas, New Mexico, State Hospital declared that prisoners arriving from PNM were frequently in a catatonic state, and that they had obviously received substandard care or no care at all at PNM (Hirliman, 2005, 66). Orner reportedly declared that he would resign from his position if a psychiatrist was hired at the penitentiary (Hirliman, 2005, 65).

J.E. Baker served as Warden at PNM from 1968 until 1970 (Report of the Attorney General, Part I, June 1980, C-1). He abolished the use of administrative segregation thereby earning the enmity of many correctional officers (Hirliman, 2005, 51). He was considered to be a progressive warden who was popular with the inmates, and was forced out by the New Mexico State Legislature (Morris, 1983, 40).

CORRUPTION

PNM was a relatively corrupt institution. Former New Mexico Attorney General Tony Anaya declared that the flow of drugs into PNM was so pervasive that it was obvious that correctional officers were involved. He added that PNM officials had to be aware of and condone the drug trafficking if they were not actually involved in it themselves (Hirliman, 2005, 56).

That prison was the most corrupted place in Earth, declared a former aide in the warden’s office (Morris, 1983, 143). A plethora of types of corruption plagued PNM. These included administrators who helped themselves to food intended for inmates, sometimes backing their pick-up trucks to the kitchen’s loading docks and driving off with sides of beef. In fact entire truckloads of livestock and meat disappeared regularly. A counterfeit money printing operation operated in the PNM printing shop. Administrators and correctional officers supplied liquor and other items of contraband to inmates with alcohol going for $25 to $30 per bottle. Prison supplies, including firearms, furniture and motor vehicles amounting to millions of dollars, inexplicably vanished. Cash disappeared, too, as did prescription drugs from the PNM pharmacy (Morris, 1983, 143-7).

Corruption flourished before the 1980 riot, and continued afterwards. The New York Times reported in 1991 that one top PNM official was believed to have pilfered prison food and claimed that it was part of his take-home pay, while another was convicted of embezzlement (Rawls, December 15, 1981, 1).

The Citizens Advisory Panel arrived at a similar conclusion, The investigation that has begun of wrongdoing by Penitentiary staff and administrators should be concluded soon. The air must be cleared so that a new warden and a new Secretary of the Department will not inherit elements that could jeopardize needed changes. The Department must conduct its functions in a professional manner and be recognized for doing so (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 7).

NEPOTISM

PNM has been characterized as an institution beset by nepotism. On January 18, 1980, a grand jury sharply criticized PNM officials for nepotism in hiring and promoting correctional officers. Morris referred to PNM as a fount for bureaucratic nepotism, and a bastion of entrenched nepotism (1983, 38). Nepotism frustrated efforts to maximize security at the prison, as careless or incompetent correctional officers could not be fired because of their family connections (Morris, 1983, 39).

During the riot, inmates insisted that Robert Montoya not be included among the negotiators. One inmate said, You’ve got fucking uncles, you’ve got brothers, and you’ve got cousins working here, and that is bad (Morris 1983, 14). Rodriguez’s brother-in-law was head of PNM prison industries, Eugene Long was married to a cousin of Rodriguez’s, a captain had a brother on the PNM infirmary staff, Martinez’s nephew worked in prison administration, and PNM had a pair of husband and wife employees, a father and his two sons were correctional officers, and three more officials in different offices were from the same family (Morris, 1983, 42). PNM inmate WG Stone suggested that most people in good PNM jobs were either relatives or friends of PNM officials.

COVER-UP

The PNM psychologist Orner had been warned about the impending riot days before it occurred. He mentioned this at a meeting, and was largely ignored. After the riot, he was told by a high-ranking PNM official that, We are one family, and be careful what you say. When Orner was asked what that meant, he replied, Keep your mouth shut (Morris, 1983, 17-8).

CLIQUES

W.G. Stone was an inmate in PNM at the time of the 1980 riot. He recalled that during his time at PNM he had observed the development of a management clique. According to Stone, members of this clique occupied the five most important posts in PNM administration (Hirliman, 2005, 50-1). According to Stone this clique was widely known as the Santa Fe Eleven (Hirliman, 2005, 50).

Attorney General Tony Anaya noted that the members of the Santa Fe Eleven grew up together in Santa Fe, and served in the army during the Korean War together. The eleven friends were hired at PNM in 1953 and 1954, and remained there, protected by their patron, Felix Rodriguez (Hirliman, 2005, 50).

PNM correctional officers wrote an anonymous letter to Governor King and the news media, warning of an impending riot. In the letter they mentioned that the penitentiary is controlled by a large click (sic) (Morris, 1983, 20). An Attorney General’s report referred to factionalism at PNM, and the dangers posed by the existence and domination of this clique (Morris, 1983, 20). Morris noted that this clique survived 25 years of grand jury probes, Attorney General reports, attempts by reformers to oust them, a succession of Correctional Department Secretaries, and several different Governors (1983, 28).

POLITICS

Politics seems to be a way of life in America. The workplace in particular is rife with political considerations that fly in the face of reason and complicate rational policy formulation and decision-making. Prisons in general and specifically PNM are no exception to this fact of life. This reality was recognized by the Report of the Attorney General:

Throughout much of the last five years, personnel changeovers, political maneuverings, and reorganizations within the Corrections Department constantly blurred lines of jurisdiction, authority and therefore accountability. . . Competing camps within the Department prevented any consolidation of management . . . The influence of political pressure sets the stage for reactive management as administrators become unsure if the next crisis will result in the rug being pulled out from under them. The events in the months preceding the riot exemplify the deterioration of the Corrections Department and an indecisive reactive style of management (Part II, September 1980, 5-6).

This same conclusion was reached by the Citizens Advisory Panel created to investigate the 1980 PNM riot, Some means must be established to insulate the Department of Corrections from influences of partisan politics. The department needs to establish and maintain a professional status that rises above the political area. Unless this is done, the Panel sees little hope for consistent policy and long-term success (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 6-7).

The pervasive political pressures afflicting PNM were described by Morris. He noted the ethnic and political functions served by the prison, and the balance of power and rewards operant there. He suggested that there was little incentive for reform when PNM administrators knew much about the politicians and their political support and were confident in their continuation (1983, 39). The Report of the Attorney General concluded that PNM had become a political football (Part II, September 1980, 38). According to The New York Times, The political context was nearly as ugly as the uprising itself. For years the penitentiary had muddled along under corrupt or incompetent administrators, good at intimidating critics and currying the protective favor of politicians (Anderson, February 28, 1984, 1).

INEFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

The management of PNM was quite ineffective at the time of the riot. The Citizens Advisory Panel realized that, The professionalism of corrections management and staff must be improved at all levels and sustained through training (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 11). The Report of the Attorney General concurred, No clear and consistent correctional philosophy was implemented. Bureaucrats, administrators and correctional officials were either consistently unclear of their guidelines or they often made them up as they went along. Without clearly articulated policies and direction, management becomes crisis-oriented. Corrections officials are unable to get beyond ‘putting out the fires,’ largely created by their earlier reactions to crises (Part II, September, 1980, 36).

The Attorney General concluded that, "The effect of this indecisive, reactive management was felt all the way down to the line, staff and inmate levels of the Department. Ironically, front-line personnel who most directly put policy into action and who bear the brunt of inmate disorders have been the most overlooked in prison planning (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 35-6). Morris referred to the vacuum of management at PNM (1983, 43). This managerial ineffectiveness contributed directly to the 1980 NM riot, The presence of violent inmates in a medium security dormitory reflects mismanagement (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 7). The mismanagement was pervasive, The inability and failure to manage went unabated from 1978 to 1980 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 22).

CAPTAINS

In 1975, the number of captain positions was increased at PNM from one to four. It was suggested by correction officers and inmates that the one-captain system produced a high degree of consistency. The new captains expected the same degree of power and autonomy enjoyed under the old system. It was claimed that administrative inconsistency resulted from the procedural and discipline methods implemented by each captain on his shift (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 13-4).

The policy inconsistency created by multiple captains was exacerbated by the lack of supervision. According to the Attorney General, After 1978, shift captains were virtually unsupervised by the Superintendent of Correctional Security Manuel Koroneos and Deputy Warden Montoya (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 22).

TURNOVER

Administrative turnover plagued PNM at the time of the 1980 riot and the years immediately before the prison takeover. The Report of the Attorney General observed in 1980 that, Throughout much of the last five years, personnel changeovers, political maneuverings and reorganizations within the Corrections Department constantly blurred lines of jurisdiction, authority and therefore accountability. The state had four corrections secretaries, and four wardens over five years (Part II, September 1980, 35). The same report attributed the relative order experienced at PNM in the early 1970s to lack of turnover, The period was also characterized by a single administration with a unified purpose and corrections philosophy (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 5).

Growing inconsistencies in the management of the prison coincided with the general lack of direction in the department as a whole. The stable period of 1970-1975 ended with the arrival of the first of four successive wardens and four successive changes in the top administrator of the department, declared the Report of the Attorney General (Part II, September 1980, 23). These changes in leadership had serious implications for correctional officers and inmates, The lack of clear and consistent direction from the central office only promoted the ineffectiveness and drift of the prison administration . . . demoralization of the guards . . . Consequently, untrained and unsupervised captains ruled their shifts as they wished . . . in the end, management instability escalated the growing confrontation between correctional officers and inmates which culminated in the riot of February, 1980 (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 23). The effect of unstable administration on inmates was significant, The abrupt change in inmate society coincided with administrative and staff upheaval at the penitentiary (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, 6).

THE CRUMBLING PRISON

The physical plant of PNM was in relatively bad shape. In fact, it was dilapidated and an insecure incarceration facility. Morris referred to the, shoddy decaying building (1983, 72). He added that even though the PNM main building was only about 25 years old, it had been, shoddily built and poorly maintained, due to scandalous corruption and graft in construction contracts and subcontracts (Morris, 1983, 15). Former PNM Warden Ralph Aaron recalled that, It is not maintained to the standard of institutions I’ve worked in. Another former warden, Clyde Malley, remarked that the penitentiary smelled and looked rotten (Morris, 1983, 159).

The basic problem with the prison facilities was the graft and corruption so pervasive in the State of New Mexico. According to Morris, construction firms appropriated subcontractor’s property consistently from the contracts, with large sums of money siphoned off for personal use. Detailed records concerning prison construction contracts and work completion stored in the state of New Mexico central files housed in the Property Control Division went missing, because they documented the theft of millions of dollars. Morris also mentioned the fact that hundreds of thousands of dollars was missing in the New Mexico Corrections Department budget, and that there were obvious improprieties if not completely illegal circumstances involved in the awarding of large construction contracts (Morris, 1983, 15, 39, 206-7, 212).

Suboptimal maintenance practices contributed to the substandard condition of the PNM physical plant. A grand jury impaneled on August 24, 1974, concluded that, The grand jury is certain that the citizens of New Mexico through the legislators must make substantial capital improvements for more living space and more space for rehabilitation. Two years later, another grand jury determined that, Portions of the present state penitentiary are in very poor condition and need considerable corrective maintenance and repair work to avoid exorbitant expenditures. On May 31, 1978, a grand jury found that, Major maintenance needs to be regularly scheduled to avoid excessive deterioration of the facilities (Report of the Attorney General, Part II, September 1980, B-12, B-13, B-19).

THE PERSPECTIVE OF MICHAEL SCHMITT

The Administration

The administration, the upper level, we never really saw up front or off the grounds. They really didn’t interact with the officers and since I normally worked swing shift and graveyard we never saw them. It was only the daytime officers who would ever see the warden and assistant warden. They really didn’t interact with us and we didn’t even see them. They didn’t really come inside the institution unless they had to and the officers, we had our jobs to do. They didn’t come down to a dayroom or dormitory and interact with us, they weren’t there for us.

Captains and Lieutenants

In my 3 1/2 years working there the only ones that I dealt with were the captains and lieutenants who were in charge of us. We had to depend on each other. They told us what we needed to do for the day, if there were any special instructions other than our daily routine. We were so understaffed most the time I worked there that we had to have the captains and lieutenants come and help us count and get inmates at 3 o’clock in the morning to go to work. If we had to write a report of an incident they would do the typing for us because they had access to typewriters and stuff and they would do it in the hallway where their office was.

If I was on a swing shift and I would be carried over to the graveyard shift they would put me in a tower because I may have been tired from working eight hours on the line. They would stick me in a tower and they would give us a job where we could sit down and do nothing and we could do another eight hours easily.

The captains and lieutenants on the graveyard shift or on the swing shift were usually in their office, which was in the hallway directly across from the mess hall. They were the ones working the mess hall when the inmates would go to dinner because we couldn’t leave our post to go there. The night of the riot we had one of the captains and a lieutenant down there helping us lock the dayrooms.

The Uncaring Administration

I believe that the administration didn’t really care about the inmates other than to make sure that they weren’t hurt. You know, we were there to control the inmates, we were there to take care of them to make sure that they were not getting beaten up. You know our job was to make sure that they didn’t escape and we were made sure that they weren’t fighting and stuff.

Collective Responsibility

You gotta think of the inmates and the officers and the captains and lieutenants kind of like if you’re driving on the road you have to trust that the guy coming toward you is not gonna hurt you. So the inmates coming toward you were like the cars coming toward you, they gave you your space and everybody went about their business and there were no problems.

The Rotation

The only reason I worked days was because we had rotation every three months or so. I would say that the administration just felt that the inmates were just like the officers and stuff. They didn’t think it made any difference, the inmates and the officers, other than if the inmates made trouble or made waves. I believe the administration didn’t react either way, they had other things they had to think about.

If they wanted the job done they had to come down and help. We cut an awful lot of corners in there, I mean when you have one officer in charge of four units and you have to deliver mail and pass mail out or you have to go get a person to go to work there you couldn’t always get an officer to hold the keys when you went inside to get the inmate. We did not have enough staff.

Post Orders I

We knew what we had to do for the post. The time we were working I can’t remember if I ever saw post orders about this or not. The post orders normally didn’t fall in line with what we had to do as far as counts and everything else. They were not normally followed as the officers and the captains and lieutenants would tell us in the briefing, you’re going to this cellblock or you’re going to this dormitory or you’re going wherever and this happened or this happened and this is what.

Shakedowns

Sometimes if they were gonna shakedown a unit they would let us know that there was to be a shakedown and to kinda watch the unit because all of a sudden they would come down and they would shuffle everybody out of the unit to check the unit for knives or contraband and they would check the inmates. They would have the SWAT team there and the day shift or whatever would come in and they would do a shakedown in a unit. That didn’t happen very often but when it did then it kinda made it hard because now we were in the hallway with 60 to 90 inmates, now our job was to watch the inmates or we would take them to the gymnasium and have to watch them while their belongings were being gone through. Officers would come up with some weapons and money and booze or whatever they would find. I’m in that unit every day and I don’t even have any clue as to what was going on inside that unit. The inmates were quite good at disguising their actions.

Post Orders II

Every once in a while they would bring post orders in and if you had a lull you would sit down there and read them on the swing shift. You normally didn’t have a lull on the graveyard shift. I can’t remember really having post orders and every unit that I worked in was different. When I worked the EU, it was semi-protection so there were certain things that I had to do there. None of those inmates ever got out of their cells except to go to dinner so post orders, I can’t really recall whether they were helpful or not. I would say not. At every post there were general forced orders and every post had specific things for its different things that you would do in a cellblock that you would not do in a dayroom or in a dormitory.

Respect

I think that most officers, as far as the administration was concerned, were not really happy with them. We felt that they didn’t give us credit when credit was due but they were more likely to disagree with what we did or whatever.

I’d say captains and lieutenants were respectful. They depended on us because we were the ones who were holding the post and if we opened up all the doors and let the inmates run wild the captains and lieutenants may not even know. When you run a unit you had to know what inmates belonged in that unit, and if I had 300 inmates I had to know you belonged in that unit or you belonged down the hallway. Inmates would like to visit their buddies in another unit. Inmates are like children, they like to play games, like