Peirce's Cosmology

By Peter T Turley

A critical sketch of Charles Sanders Peirce’s beliefs on the origin of the universe and its evolutionary development.

Charles Sanders Peirce was a nineteenth-century American philosopher and logician known as the father of pragmatism. He devoted much attention to the subject of cosmology, or the origin and development of the universe, but he did not produce substantial work on the subject. In this text, Peter T. Turley collects and analyzes Peirce’s writings on what he called “physical metaphysics.” Peirce’s Cosmology offers a view of nature that may seem commonplace today, but in his time, it represented a break with traditional theories of philosophy and science. His trailblazing writings and Turley’s analysis are sure to be of interest to readers of many schools of thought.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Philosophical Library Open Road
• Release date: Jun 7, 2022
• ISBN: 9781504075916

Book preview

Peirce’s Cosmology

Peter T. Turley

In memory

Of my parents

Contents

Preface

    I. The law of Nature

  II. Scholastic Realism

 III. Cosmogony

IV. Chance

Notes

Preface

This study is intended as a critical sketch of the cosmology of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), one of the founders of pragmatism and now generally regarded as America’s most original philosopher. Though he devoted much attention to this part of philosophy, which he called physical metaphysics, Peirce did not produce any work of substance which gives us an organized account of his cosmological views; rather, he presents them in diverse philosophical and scientific contexts. I have organized these views around Peirce’s conception of the law of nature, a conception of the first importance not only in his cosmology but in his philosophical thought as a whole.

Thanks are due to the copyright holders for permission to reproduce material from the following publications:

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vols. I-VI, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Vols. VII-VIII, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1931-58). Vol. I © 1931, 1959, Vol. II © 1932, 1960, Vols. III and IV © 1933, 1961, Vol. V © 1934, 1962, Vol. VI © 1935, 1963, Vols. VII and VIII © 1958, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

The Charles S. Peirce Papers (Microfilm Edition), Houghton Library, Harvard University (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Philosophy Department, 1963-67).

Papers published by the author in Journal of the History of Ideas, The Modern Schoolman, and Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.

Last but not least is the expression of gratitude to my wife, Harriet, for the help she has given me in completing the study.

Chapter I

The Law of Nature

An acquaintance with Peirce’s categorial system is required if his characterization of law as Thirdness is to be understood. In his derivation and discussion of the categories, Peirce justifies his claim to the title of metaphysician; moreover, he brings to this topic a thorough knowledge of older categorial systems such as those of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. Of these, Kant’s had the greatest influence on his own, although it should be emphasized that for Peirce the categories are not merely forms of the understanding; rather, he conceives them as representing genuine modes of being. One indication of Kant’s influence can be seen in Peirce’s attempt to derive his categories from logic. It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that Peirce justifies his categories solely on the bases of logic and authority; as we shall see, the empirical bent of his mind demanded an appeal to experience as the primary substantiation.

THE CATEGORIES

Before examining the empirical or phenomenological treatment of the categories, it would be well to say something of his attempt to derive them from logic. That Peirce seeks a logical derivation should come as no surprise since he was, and considered himself to be, primarily a logician; moreover, his early and deep acquaintance with the Critique of Pure Reason must have made such a treatment seem indispensable. The logical derivation of the categories was set forth in the 1860’s, whereas the phenomenological treatment came three decades later.

The Logical Derivation

In 1898 Peirce reminisces about the earlier logical treatment:

Even without Kant’s categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some fundamental conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. This search resulted in what I call my categories (4.3).¹

In another context, Peirce proceeds to identify these fundamental conceptions which the study of logic reveals:

Three conceptions are perpetually turning up at every point in every theory of logic, and in the most rounded systems they occur in connection with one another. They are conceptions so very broad and consequently indefinite that they are hard to seize and may be easily overlooked. I call them the conceptions of First, Second, Third. First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into relation (6.32).

The familiar term, proposition, and syllogism of traditional logic can be used to illustrate this point (see 1.369): the term is what it is independent of anything else and is therefore a First; the proposition, on the other hand, is a Second because its being consists in the relating of subject and predicate; the syllogism is a Third in that it is the mediation of major and minor terms by a middle.

Another indication of the three categories in logic can be found in Peirce’s division of signs into icons, indices, and symbols (general signs). An icon, he says, is a sign in virtue of its own characteristics (Firstness); thus, any picture is an iconic sign of its object. It is true that every sign requires an object, but the icon would retain that which renders it significant were its object non-existent; and it is this which distinguishes it from the other kinds of sign. The index is a sign in virtue of being really related to its object (Secondness). The act of pointing at a certain picture is an indexical sign; the act is significant only because of the actual connection of the pointer’s finger and the object. Finally, the symbol is sign of a particular object in virtue of its interpretant (Thirdness); the word picture signifies the reality on the wall only because of the conception with which it is connected. The difference, then, between the index and the symbol is that the symbol would lose its sign character if there were no interpretant, whereas the index would not (2.304).

Peirce found still another indication of the categories in his analysis of the syllogism. In every syllogism, he points out, the premises constitute a sign of the conclusion; when, however, we examine the three kinds of syllogism, abductive, inductive, and deductive, we find that their premises are respectively icons, indices, and symbols of the conclusions (1.559). Inasmuch as these different kinds of sign suggest the categories, it must follow that the different kinds of syllogism do so as well. The following syllogisms illustrate Peirce’s point:

1. All the beans from this bag are white.

These beans are white.

These beans are from this bag.

This is what Peirce calls the abductive syllogism, the conclusion of which is a tentative explanation of some phenomenon. The premises of this syllogism constitute a likeness or icon of the conclusion in that the first premise is showing what a bean must be like in order to be from the designated bag.

2. These beans are from this bag.

These beans are white.

All the beans from this bag are white.

This is an inductive syllogism. Here, the first premise is saying that the particular beans selected constitute an index of all the beans in the bag; thus, the premises constitute an index of the conclusion (which is concerned with the character of all the beans).

3. All the beans from this bag are white.

These beans are from this bag.

These beans are white.

This is a deduction. The first premise in this case is a general proposition under which the specific conclusion falls; the premises, therefore, may be regarded as a general sign or symbol of the conclusion. (Peirce later changed his mind and came to regard induction as symbolic, deduction as indexical [2.96].)

The foregoing examples, to which others could be added, help us understand why Peirce regarded logic as justifying his doctrine of the categories. Yet, he did not stop here; for in the 1890’s, thirty years after the logical derivation, a new observational approach makes its appearance in his writings.

The Phenomenological Treatment

That the phenomenological treatment of the categories was more important in Peirce’s estimate can be inferred from the greater amount of attention paid to it in his papers; that he should so consider it is consistent with his view that phenomenology is basic to logic. Phenomenology (or phaneroscopy), according to Peirce, is that science which concerns itself with the kinds of element which are universally present in the phenomenon (or phaneron), meaning by the latter whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way (1.186). This discipline, he says, makes no distinction between realities and figments; it simply contemplates what is given in phenomena (5.37). The actual practice of this science, however, is not as easy as may first appear. Peirce recognizes that it calls for a submissiveness to the given on the part of the phenomenologist which is uncommon even among those who pride themselves on their empiricism. Moreover, an unusual perceptiveness is required if the universal elements are to be discerned in their many guises. Finally, there is demanded the ability to express what is seen so as to do justice to its essence (5.42).

The phenomenologist concludes that there are three universal elements or categories, the same as the ones derived from logic. Peirce feels that each of these categories is recognizable in every phenomenon: Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that is not accompanied by Thirdness (5.90). Moreover, beyond these categories there are no others (1.347); this is because any additional element which might be suggested can be portrayed as a complex of Thirds and would not be an indecomposable element.² The categories themselves, however, are indecomposable; a Third cannot be visualized as a mere complex of dyadic relations, nor can a Second be regarded as a sum of monads (6.323). It thus turns out that the number of universal elements is not less than three; at the same time, however, Peirce feels confident that all the variety of the universe can be accounted for in terms of triadic combinations.

We must now turn our attention to these elements which phenomenology discovers in every phenomenon.

Firstness

Firstness is "the Idea of that which is such as it is regardless of anything else. That is to say it is a Quality of Feeling (5.66). Peirce lists a number of examples of Firstness, but he seems to single out color quality as best for this purpose: take the quality of redness, he suggests, and abstract from the fact of its being either perceived or remembered; this is an instance of Firstness. As such, redness is neither vivid nor dim; such qualifications attach to the psychological grasp of redness but not to the quality itself. And not only is redness itself to be dissociated from the subject, but also from the object which embodies it: It is simply a peculiar positive possibility regardless of anything else (8.329). Thus conceived, the quality of redness is such as it is within itself, without any elements or relations" (4.157); for if the quality involved elements or relations, it would be what it is in virtue of