Iraq After ISIS: The Challenges of Post-War Recovery

By Jacob Eriksson

This book explores the challenges of creating a secure and stable Iraq in the wake of the military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Analyzing the impact of the fight against ISIS, the collection provides answers to questions relating to both political and humanitarian considerations in Iraqi post-war recovery. In their analysis, the editors and authors develop policy recommendations for the international and Iraqi political communities. It is essential reading for those interested in politics, international relations, post-war recovery, counter-terrorism, Middle Eastern studies and Iraqi studies scholars.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Release date: Nov 28, 2018
• ISBN: 9783030009557

Book preview

© The Author(s) 2019

Jacob Eriksson and Ahmed Khaleel (eds.)Iraq After ISIS https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00955-7_1

1. Introduction

Jacob Eriksson¹   and Ahmed Khaleel²  

(1)

Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK

(2)

Department of Language and Linguistic Science, University of York, York, UK

Jacob Eriksson (Corresponding author)

Email: [e-mail]

Ahmed Khaleel

Email: [e-mail]

Abstract

The political, social, economic, and physical recovery following armed conflict is an enormous challenge for any state, but particularly for Iraq, given its extensive history of authoritarianism, failed state-building, and conflict. While the territorial defeat of ISIS presents an opportunity to alter this violent course and address the root causes of violence, it will be a difficult process. This introductory chapter presents the main themes of the book, such as governance, inter- and intra-communal conflict, security, transitional justice, and elaborates on the contributions within it.

Keywords

Armed conflictPost-war recoveryIraqISIS

There can be little doubt that armed conflict is a destructive phenomenon. As evidenced by the World Bank, the economic costs incurred take a serious toll on development. ¹ In modern urbanised conflict environments, vital infrastructure is often badly damaged and reconstruction is a slow and expensive process. Although less easily quantifiable, the effect on social relations is just as damaging, creating grievances between individuals and whole communities. These add a fresh layer to pre-existing narratives which are central to precipitating conflict. This is also likely to occur in multi-ethnic societies where grievances such as deprivation, inequality, and neglect are waiting to be triggered for violent political purposes.

Rather than acting as an institutional form of conflict resolution, post-war politics often accentuate and perpetuate divisions. Incentives for magnanimous behaviour and moderation are not always clear. Armed conflict alters power dynamics and enables certain stakeholders to rise to prominence and consolidate gains at the expense of others. When longstanding structures engraved in the collective mind for decades are dismantled, such sudden change can bring unexpected and disastrous consequences by ushering in new conflicts. How to engage effectively with different communities affected by the impact of sudden change to long-cultivated structures is perhaps the greatest challenge post-war strategies face.

However, post-war contexts also present opportunities for positive change. Rather than simply recreating the conditions that created conflict, if stakeholders are willing to think critically about the causes of conflict and address grievances on all sides, then there is the possibility to create a more durable, peaceful political and social order. Violence perpetrated without limits can be replaced by the rule of law and institutions that protect the rights of all citizens. This is a challenging task which involves addressing multiple different, often conflicting and seemingly incompatible, interests.

In the wake of the military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Iraq is at a critical juncture. This book aims to analyse the political, economic, and social challenges that the Iraqi state now faces, and how these need to be addressed in order to avoid the resurgence of extremism, renewed radicalization, and repeated armed conflict. Together, the different contributions seek to learn from the past and look to the future by considering the complex interests of local, regional, and international actors, and where they overlap, intersect, and diverge. Perspectives are provided on each of the three main communities in Iraq: the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds. How, if at all, does each community see its future as part of a unified Iraqi state? What are the key issues that affect them? What are the intra-group dynamics, debates, and conflicts that are most salient for understanding these communities? As history has shown, Iraq is also a focal point for regional and international security. While the global challenge of jihadist extremism will, as Burke argues, remain, the comprehensive defeat of ISIS in Iraq and the construction of something positive on its ruins can contribute substantially to the tarnishing of the wider brand and its appeal. ²

The book begins by considering the legacy of post-2003 Iraq, as the emergence of ISIS was rooted in the failure of state-building following the fall of Saddam Hussein. A legacy of authoritarianism, wars with Iran (1980–1988) and an international coalition (1991), followed by thirteen years of crippling sanctions and economic mismanagement left a profoundly difficult base to build from. Nonetheless, the implementation of key decisions by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Shia-dominated Iraqi state which emerged complicated the task even further. Collective punishment of the Sunni community through processes like de-Ba’athification created disenfranchisement and dislocation from the Iraqi state, which opened the door for the more extremist voices of first al-Qaeda in Iraq and then ISIS to be heard.

In their chapter, Simon Mabon and Ana Maria Kumarasamy analyse this period through Agamben’s theoretical framework of bare life, examining how this marginalisation occurred and its disastrous effects. As someone involved in the transitional justice system which played a key role in this, Mohammed Ihsan offers his critical assessment of these processes and how they contributed to these negative dynamics. Ahmed Khaleel also reflects on the difficult position of Iraqi Sunnis during this period. Many have been trapped between Sunni extremists and the state (and associated militias), forced to make difficult decisions to ensure survival. While the militias of the Hashd al-Sha’bi or Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) are celebrated by the Iraqi government as a force fighting ISIS (many call them The Holy PMU), the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening) tribal militia known as the Sons of Iraq that fought al-Qaeda and expelled them from Anbar province in 2007 were not afforded the same acceptance or status. They were eventually left to face the retaliation of ISIS , where hundreds of them were killed. ³ Now, division is rife at the political level, with widespread disillusionment about senior Sunni politicians and their ability to serve the interests of the people.

As Iraqis now attempt to rebuild yet again, the challenges are formidable. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that roughly 6 million Iraqis have been displaced since 2014, and at the time of writing, around 2.6 million Iraqis remain displaced and 8.7 million continue to be in need of humanitarian assistance. ⁴ In her chapter based on her work on the ground in Iraq with Amnesty International, Razaw Salihy analyses the devastating impact the war against ISIS has had on Iraqi civilians. For many, conditions remain dire amidst an ongoing humanitarian crisis, worsened by continuing security concerns and revenge attacks. Even after the initial defeat of ISIS forces in liberated areas, the destruction and killing did not necessarily cease. When it took control of Tikrit in June 2014, ISIS systematically executed hundreds of Shia army recruits stationed at Camp Speicher. In return, in Amerli and Tikrit, the PMUs destroyed hundreds of Sunni residential buildings and abducted many Sunni civilians in acts of revenge against perceived sympathisers. ⁵ While some local Sunni militias also participated in such acts, the predominantly sectarian agenda of the Shia militias has profoundly damaging implications for inter-communal relations.

Hayder al-Khoei analyses the situation of the ascendant Iraqi Shia, considering in particular the Shia-dominated PMU, intra-Shia politics, and the influence of Iran. Mobilised by the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani to defend the Iraqi people from ISIS , the Iranian-backed PMUs have risen to prominence and played a key military role at the expense of the weak Iraqi army. To many Iraqis, they are the saviours of the nation who stood up to fight when needed; to others, they are overtly sectarian militias who exact violent revenge against innocent Iraqis with impunity. While the PMUs have been recognised by law as an extra-ministerial body responsible directly to the Prime Minister, their role within the future Iraqi security sector is an open question.

While the Kurdish peshmerga defended their people from ISIS advances and halted their progress, they have also contributed to the suffering of civilians. Peshmerga have destroyed the homes of Sunni Arabs in areas that they wish to incorporate into a future Kurdish state and have denied displaced Sunnis the opportunity to return. ⁶ In his chapter, Amjed Rasheed considers the position of the Kurds, analysing the history of the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad, and its ambiguous future. Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed autonomy from Baghdad since 1991, but their prominent role in the post-2003 Iraqi government and the role of the peshmerga in the fight against ISIS has raised hopes of fulfilling long held dreams of an independent Kurdish state.

In a referendum on 25 September 2017, Kurds voted overwhelmingly for independence from Iraq, but this has been vehemently rejected by Baghdad. In an ongoing conflict between the KRG and the central government, a tense standoff in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk (the spiritual home of Iraqi Kurds) was temporarily resolved by a Kurdish decision to withdraw from practically all of the disputed territories it had captured in the face of advancing PMU and Iraqi security forces. ⁷ Initially poised to make considerable political and territorial gains from the war against ISIS , Kurdish fortunes appear to be in decline, with old intra-Kurdish divisions coming to the fore once again. Violence in Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu , and elsewhere in Kirkuk province has also seen Kurdish property looted and destroyed by PMU, displacing thousands. ⁸ Fresh cycles of revenge and violence add to existing grievances after years of civil war, making peaceful coexistence even more difficult to envisage.

While the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that over 2 million displaced people have been able to return, conditions in heavily damaged cities like Ramadi and Mosul mean that this process will take time. Local officials in Ramadi have estimated that 80% of the city was destroyed, including over 3000 homes, with significant damage to key infrastructure like electricity, sewage, and water systems, and bridges, hospitals, and government buildings. ⁹ Damage in eastern Mosul was less extensive, but the western half where ISIS fighters dug in has been described by the UN as the worst damage of the conflict, incomparable to anything else. ¹⁰ The manager of Nineveh governorate’s reconstruction committee has estimated that 75% of roads, practically all bridges, and 65% of the electrical network in Mosul have been destroyed. ¹¹ Before withdrawing, ISIS forces also rigged urban centres with explosives that need to be cleared before reconstruction and return can take place.

Although the international community’s track record of post-war statebuilding in Iraq has been marred by failure, Iraq cannot address all of these challenges alone. Jacob Eriksson considers the roles that different international and regional actors can play in the recovery process, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the USA, and how they are pursuing both shared and conflicting interests in Iraq. While some of these interests are likely to perpetuate existing conflicts, others can contribute towards positive peacebuilding, if managed correctly. Given the precarious state of the Iraqi economy, significant international assistance will be required in order to foot the ever-growing reconstruction bill. The deputy governor of Anbar province, which has been the most widely affected, has suggested that the province as a whole will need roughly $22 billion. International aid pledges have only begun to scratch the surface. ¹²

This volume is the product of a workshop held at the University of York in September 2017, co-organised by the Department of Politics, Amnesty International, and York City of Sanctuary, and generously funded by the Department of Politics. It seeks to provide an updated snapshot of the many stimulating presentations and conversations that were had throughout that day. We would like to thank our co-organisers, Ian Buchanan and Paul Wordsworth, our funder, and everyone who attended. We hope that this volume is merely the first instalment of a continuing conversation that unfortunately remains an urgent necessity.

Notes

1.

The World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011).

2.

Rise and Fall of Isis : Its Dream of a Caliphate Is over, so What Now? The Guardian, October 21, 2017, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​world/​2017/​oct/​21/​isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist.

3.

Myriam Benraad, Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall, Middle East Policy Council 18, no. 1, http://​www.​mepc.​org/​iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall.

4.

UNOCHA Iraq, accessed August 2, 2018, http://​www.​unocha.​org/​iraq.

5.

After Liberation Came Destruction: Iraqi Militias and the Aftermath of Amerli , Human Rights Watch, March 18, 2015; Ruinous Aftermath: Militias Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit, Human Rights Watch, September 20, 2015.

6.

Sara Elizabeth Williams, Destroying Homes for Kurdistan, Foreign Policy, July 23, 2015.

7.

David Zucchino, Iraqi Forces Overpower Kurds, but Public Relations Battle Rages, The New York Times, October 22, 2017.

8.

Iraq: Fresh Evidence That Tens of Thousands Forced to Flee Tuz Khurmatu Amid Indiscriminate Attacks, Lootings and Arson, Amnesty International, October 24, 2017, https://​www.​amnesty.​org/​en/​latest/​news/​2017/​10/​iraq-fresh-evidence-that-tens-of-thousands-forced-to-flee-tuz-khurmatu-amid-indiscriminate-attacks-lootings-and-arson/​.

9.

Iraq: 80 Percent of Ramadi in Ruins After Fighting, Al Jazeera, December 31, 2015, http://​www.​aljazeera.​com/​news/​2015/​12/​iraq-80-percent-ramadi-ruins-fighting-151231114030408.​html.

10.

Stephen Kalin, Basic Infrastructure Repair in Mosul Will Cost over $1 Billion: U.N., Reuters, July 5, 2017, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-mideast-crisis-iraq-aid/​basic-infrastructure-repair-in-mosul-will-cost-over-1-billion-u-n-idUSKBN19Q28F.

11.

Igor Kossov, Mosul Is Completely Destroyed, The Atlantic, July 10, 2017, https://​www.​theatlantic.​com/​international/​archive/​2017/​07/​mosul-iraq-abadi-isis-corruption/​533067/​.

12.

Matthew Schweitzer, Beyond a Military Victory: Reconstructing Iraq After ISIS , IPI Global Observatory, January 17, 2017, https://​theglobalobserva​tory.​org/​2017/​01/​isis-iraq-united-nations-reconstruction/​.

© The Author(s) 2019

Jacob Eriksson and Ahmed Khaleel (eds.)Iraq After ISIS https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00955-7_2

2. Da’ish, Stasis and Bare Life in Iraq

Simon Mabon¹   and Ana Maria Kumarasamy¹  

(1)

Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

Simon Mabon (Corresponding author)

Email: [e-mail]

Ana Maria Kumarasamy

Abstract

In recent years work produced on the emergence of ISIS has predominantly focussed upon ideological and tactical dimensions. This chapter takes a different approach to understand the emergence of the group, focussing upon the regulation of life and the concept of sovereignty. Using the theory of Giorgio Agamben, we suggest that Iraq has been existing under a state of exception since 2003 and the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The state of exception, a political-legal term, allows for the suspension of the norm of the law to preserve the law, but in doing so, marginalises people from politics in a situation referred to as bare life. This chapter argues that ISIS was able to cultivate support from disenfranchised Sunni communities residing within these conditions of bare life, as a consequence of the legal structures established by the CPA and ensuing governments. In addition, we must also consider the role played by informal structures—such as religion