Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I

By M. Fried

The conquest of Serbia was only one of the goals of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the First World War; beyond this lay the desire to control much of South-East Europe. Employing previously unseen sources, Marvin Fried provides the first complete analysis of the Monarchy's war aims in the Balkans and tells the story of its imperialist ambitions.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Release date: Jul 1, 2014
• ISBN: 9781137359018

Book preview

Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I

Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I

Marvin Benjamin Fried

Department of International History, London School of Economics

© Marvin Fried 2014

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2014 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978–1–137–35900–1

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

Dedicated to my family

Contents

List of Illustrations

Preface

Acknowledgements

List of Principal Characters

Glossary and Abbreviations

Map of the Balkans, 1914

1   Introduction

2   War Aims and Decision-Making in Austria-Hungary

Decision-Making in Austria-Hungary

Austria-Hungary and War-Aims Research

3   July 1914–December 1914

Introduction

Western Balkans

Eastern Balkans

Conclusion

4   January 1915–September 1915

Introduction

Western Balkans

Eastern Balkans

Conclusion

5   October 1915–June 1916

Introduction

The Effects of Victory in the Balkans

Austro–German Disputes in Serbia

Austro-Hungarian Internal Debates Prior to the GMR

The Common Ministerial Council of January 7, 1916

Continuing Uncertainty about Montenegro and Albania

The Austro–Bulgarian Clash

Tisza Fights AOK Annexationism in Serbia

Burián Fights AOK Annexationism in Albania

Conclusion

6   June 1916–May 1917

Introduction

From Consolidation to Decline: June 1916–January 1917

Reevaluation: New Leaders and the Quest for Peace – January 1917–May 1917

Conclusion

7   May 1917–November 1918

Czernin’s Offensive Aims Despite Peace Policy

Karl’s Meddling Undermines Czernin’s Secretive Approach

AOK and Hungarian Territorial Aims

Burián and Final AOK Annexationism

Final War Aims and Collapse

8   Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

List of Illustrations

Figure

2.1   Drivers and influences on the war-aims setting process

Extended Illustration Section (pp. 17–22)

1   Austrian Emperor and Apostolic King of Hungary Franz Joseph I

2   Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtold

3   Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron (later Count) István Burián

4   Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin

5   Hungarian Prime Minister Count István Tisza

6   Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf

7   Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff Arthur Arz von Straussenburg

8   German High Command

9   German Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn

10   German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg

11   German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow

12   Bulgarian King (or Tsar) Ferdinand I

13   Bulgarian Foreign Minister Vasil Radoslavov

Preface

Despite renewed scholarly interest in war aims during World War I, those of Austria-Hungary have so far been neglected. This book examines the efforts of the Monarchy’s decision-making elite to establish and achieve their war aims in the Balkans. It covers the entirety of the war but focuses particularly on the leadership of Foreign Minister István Burián (1915–16) and the forces that affected his decision-making.

The book demonstrates that Austria-Hungary’s most vital political, economic, and military interests principally lay in the Balkans, where the Monarchy’s war aims were most aggressive and expansionist. Despite facing enormous pressure for radicalization from the annexationist General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf and interference from the mostly non-annexationist Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, the Foreign Ministry retained overarching decision-making authority in the war aims question. This stands in stark contrast to Germany, where military influence became predominant. Burián pursued coherent and consistent war aims designed to expand Austro-Hungarian power, prestige, influence, and territory in the Balkans. By emphasizing Austria-Hungary’s pre-eminence there, its leaders incurred serious German and Bulgarian opposition.

Despite facing grave military setbacks and the risk of slipping into vassalage to Germany, throughout the war the Monarchy’s highest echelons refused to seriously entertain peace options until their Balkan war aims had been met. As this book demonstrates, their preoccupation with expansion in the Balkans persisted right up to the closing stages of the war, and was an important factor prolonging – eventually with fatal consequences for the Monarchy itself – the world conflagration.

The book addresses one of the most significant gaps in the literature on Austria-Hungary, and draws on formerly secret Austrian and Hungarian materials in Budapest, and on national and military archives in Austria, Hungary, Germany, the UK, and the United States.

Acknowledgements

The completion of this book would not have been possible without the kind and patient assistance of a number of people, and it is a pleasure to thank them here. First and foremost I wish to offer my heartfelt thanks to my doctoral supervisor at the LSE, Professor David Stevenson, for his encouragement, support, and indeed tireless efforts to help me formulate and realize this project. Without his wisdom, guidance, and extraordinary patience, my efforts would not have reached this point. I am also grateful to Drs Antony Best and Alan Sked for their support, insight, and suggestions. I would also like to thank my mentors at Boston University, Professors Erik Goldstein, Cathal Nolan, William Keylor, Michael Corgan, and Vivien Schmidt for encouraging me to pursue this project.

Throughout this work, I have relied on the love and support of my family, to which this book is also dedicated. I am profoundly grateful to my mother and father, Stella and Tomy Fried, for helping me reach my goals through their boundless and unconditional love, support, advice, and assistance. I also wish to thank my grandmother, Gyöngyi Fried, for her constant loving support.

Of those who have supported me here in London, I am exceptionally indebted to Karen Blunden, whose encouragement, patience, and optimism helped make this work a reality. I would also like to thank all my friends and colleagues at the LSE, particularly Drs Robert Barnes and Jan Lemnitzer, for their gracious help and encouragement.

I also would like to thank those institutions that offered me the financial support necessary to complete this book. I am grateful for the generous grants from the LSE Department of International History Research Studentship Scheme, the Department’s Travel Bursary, the LSE Postgraduate Travel Fund, the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), and the University of London Central Research Fund (CRF). I am also grateful to the friendly assistance of the archivists throughout Europe and the United States who have offered me guidance and support during my research, particularly those in Budapest and Vienna.

Finally, I wish to thank the editors and staff at Palgrave Macmillan for their help in making this book possible.

Marvin B. Fried

List of Principal Characters

Glossary and Abbreviations

Map of the Balkans, 1914

© Marvin Benjamin Fried, 2014. Note that black capital letters are used for bodies of water and capital cities, black letters for cities, grey for rivers, parentheses for regions. The symbol refers to the Majdanpek mines near Negotin. Location names follow contemporary Austro-Hungarian usage throughout the book.

1

Introduction

In the minds of many historians, students, and the general public, Austria-Hungary’s role in World War I has been relegated to that of a mere ‘corpse,’ shackled to its powerful German ally and entirely dependent on it for survival. True, the Great War ended the Dual Monarchy’s existence, but only after more than four years of war, a front line stretching over two-thirds of its borders, and conflict with five of its seven neighbors. Moreover, Austria-Hungary was the second strongest member of the Quadruple Alliance, the vital land link to Germany’s oriental allies Turkey and Bulgaria, and the only reason why Germany did not face the combined might of the three Entente powers entirely alone, against which she would have succumbed much sooner.

Military historians can argue about the Monarchy’s failings on the battlefield, or whether it was indeed as useless as many Germans considered it. What this book concerns itself with is why, if the war was going so poorly, did Austria-Hungary not sign a separate peace, lose some territory, but survive the war essentially intact? Its officials later claimed not exiting the war was due to the unacceptable terms offered by the Entente, or the threat of a German invasion if the Monarchy abandoned its treaty obligations. In the interwar years these arguments appealed to many who sought to punish those leaders who had started the devastating war, and those who had let it continue until ten million lay dead and much of Europe was impoverished and in ruins. But to post-World War II generations, a more disturbing explanation for Austria-Hungary’s continued involvement seems more plausible. Using previously unseen sources, this book argues that the Monarchy fought on during the Great War right up to its dissolution because it weighed its options and chose to fight on.

This is a point seldom appreciated regarding Austria-Hungary, whose continued involvement in the Great War is rarely questioned. Why did the country fight on in what even its civilian leaders realized after the first few months was a near-hopeless battle against overwhelming odds? In part it was for the same reasons that had led some people in Vienna to advocate war in the first place: to achieve political, territorial, and economic dominance in the Balkans. Initially, Austria-Hungary’s goals – termed war aims – were limited to just its original opponent Serbia, but when the localized conflict became a world conflagration, so too the stakes rose. Austria-Hungary had to justify its losses just like the other belligerents. Thus, the Monarchy embarked on a policy of expansion against its adversaries which was greater during victorious phases and lesser after battlefield setbacks.

At the center of this policy stood the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, charged with the task of coordinating the Monarchy’s complex domestic decision-making structure and formulating a coherent policy with its allies. He wrestled on the one hand with the Army, which sought near-boundless annexations against the Monarchy’s adversaries, and on the other hand against the Hungarians, who sought either no annexations or changes favoring only themselves. Eventually it fell to the Foreign Minister to take charge of the process, overrule the other decision-making factors, and propel forward a policy that ultimately failed to satisfy any individual party but which was made in the interest of the Monarchy as a whole. This policy, however, brought the Monarchy into direct conflict with its allies, Germany and Bulgaria.

These internal debates about the Balkans were not trivial. Discussions of whether to annex all or just parts of Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, and Italy went to the core of how Austria-Hungary perceived its future role and what it hoped to achieve in this war. The book argues that it was in these regions that the policy-makers sought restitution for a war that risked its very existence and had cost so much. While control of Poland caused an ongoing debate between Vienna and Berlin, for Austria-Hungary the Balkans were non-negotiable. Only when the military and domestic food situation became truly disastrous were the officials prepared to abandon some (though not all) of their territorial goals there.

This book analyzes the development of Austro-Hungarian war aims and peace conditions in the Balkans during World War I. Though millions marched in 1914 across national frontiers, one of the heaviest burdens was borne by Austria-Hungary, which faced the crushing might of the Russian army in Galicia. It is not surprising that the majority of Austria-Hungary’s casualties during the war were sustained in its northern campaigns, and it is furthermore logical that significant Austro-Hungarian diplomatic and military efforts should have been focused on diminishing the existential threat to the Monarchy emanating from Russia. Yet, it is the first argument of this book that Austria-Hungary’s northern campaign (1914–17), followed by its south-western campaign against Italy (1915–18), were essentially distractions from Austria-Hungary’s principal military, political, and economic objectives, which lay in the Balkans and were fueled by hope for a victorious peace. The ultimately successful campaigns of the Central Powers against Serbia and Montenegro (1914–16) and against Rumania (1916), by contrast, brought the Austro-Hungarians closer than they had ever been to their dream of Balkan domination.

Decision-making and elaboration of war aims were split between a variety of forces within Austria-Hungary, namely the Emperor, his Foreign Minister, his Common Ministerial Council (and with it the Austrian and Hungarian national government leaders), and his Military High Command (Armeeoberkommando or AOK). Each had an important role to play in wartime. The military decisions were reached exclusively by the General Staff. The Foreign Ministry (Ministerium des Äussern, abbreviated MdÄ), on the other hand, had to compete with additional interests when formulating its foreign political and economic policy. Focusing on the struggle between the AOK and the MdÄ, the second argument of this book is that the Foreign Ministry generally retained control of Imperial foreign policy and overall managed to implement its conception of Austro-Hungarian aims in the Balkans. Although it is argued that the AOK had a serious and radicalizing effect on the MdÄ, especially in times of military success, its role never matched that of the German High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL), which managed to usurp control over foreign policy decision-making in Germany and forced draconian peace treaties against the defeated adversaries. The third argument of this book is that the MdÄ’s foreign policy remained surprisingly consistent across foreign ministers and military events, fluctuating only in degree and not undergoing wholesale alteration and expansion as was the case in Germany. While some historians have argued that the Austro-Hungarian moderate line, especially when compared with the AOK and OHL positions, was the result of confusion and the lack of clear goals, it is argued here that the MdÄ’s core war aims, as elucidated by the Foreign Minister, were on the whole both coherent and consistent.

This consistency and the difference between the OHL and the AOK notwithstanding, Austro-Hungarian war aims were not as limited as some have thought, and it was in fact only military defeats and, in the latter half of the war, hunger that forced the Foreign Ministry to adopt a more conciliatory line in its conception of the Monarchy’s vital interests and war aims. Even so, the more conciliatory line it adopted in 1917 was not enough to make peace possible, due to its consistently offensive war aims in the Balkans, the pursuit of which helped lead to the eventual destruction of the Empire. It is therefore the fourth argument of this book that the Great War was prolonged as a direct result of Austria-Hungary’s aims in the Balkans and its unwillingness to conclude anything but a general peace that would have maintained its staunch alliance with Germany. Thus, if Austria-Hungary’s willingness to stand by its German ally until the end kept Germany in the war by allowing it to fight on without encirclement, Vienna’s Balkan aspirations had kept Austria-Hungary in the war in the first place.

The purpose of this book is to ask the most fundamental of all questions when a country goes to war, which is, What are they fighting for? To answer this question, the book looks at elite decision-making within Austria-Hungary on matters of desired post-war territorial, economic, or political adjustments. It is, at its core, an analysis of the intense debate that arose between the different institutions and leaders of the Monarchy on the vital question of why continued conflict was necessary. For this reason, the book analyzes first and foremost the perspective of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Recognizing that other factors played a role in influencing this decision, the book also includes the role of foreign allies on the domestic war-aims debate and setting.

War aims are the desired territorial, economic, military, or other benefits expected following successful conclusion of a war. Intangibles, such as prestige or power, can also represent war aims, though often (albeit not always) their achievement is framed within a more tangible context (e.g. conquest restores prestige, annexation increases power, etc.). War aims can be short-term and subject to change, and usually exist along a spectrum between maximum and minimum extremes. At times, war aims were explicitly stated internally or externally in a policy decision, while at other times (as was mainly the case in Austria-Hungary), the war aims were merely discussed but not published, remaining instead in the form of memoranda or instructions. Given their dependence on the military situation, war aims were usually fluid concepts and difficult to define, even for the highest government officials. Hence, this book looks at which war aims were considered among the diplomats and generals, what consensus was reached (or why none was reached), which figures retained most authority during this process, how foreign policy was shaped by war aims, and how events on the ground (usually controlled by the military) differed from the policy decisions of the diplomats and politicians.

Among the Viennese diplomatic elite, ‘positive war aims’ was a phrase referring to tangible outcomes. The fact that this German term exists implies the presence of ‘negative war aims.’ This book differs in an important respect from most previous works on war aims by expanding the traditionally limited definition to include these ‘negative war aims,’ which are defined as the prevention of undesired outcomes. This policy of limiting or eliminating the war aims of another state is included only insofar as it is relevant to achieving other, positive war aims. To demonstrate this distinction, we draw on an example supplied by Holger Afflerbach, who argued that before the war Austria-Hungary was concerned to uphold the status quo in the Balkans, and had a ‘negative interest’ in not allowing Serbia to expand further.¹

The third category of wartime foreign policy goals discussed in this book is that of peace conditions. Peace conditions can be thought of as minimal war aims. If war aims are desired beneficial outcomes, peace conditions are the minimum outcomes, sine quibus non a belligerent state will not conclude peace. An example of such a peace condition is Austria-Hungary’s territorial integrity, which it declared to be non-negotiable. In World War I, there existed a nexus between war aims and peace conditions, in that maximum peace conditions can be thought of as the minimal war aims. After the terrible losses experienced by the belligerent powers, governments felt unable to make peace without tangible benefits to show for such sacrifices, which is why a ‘peace without victory’ as advocated by Woodrow Wilson never materialized. Because peace conditions were easier for the policy-makers to define, they often fluctuated less than war aims and were therefore usually longer-term. Nevertheless, there existed both maximum and minimum peace conditions.

Finally, it is important to state what this book is not trying to do. The book does not concern itself with the Balkan states themselves during World War I, or with the war aims developed by those Balkan states against Austria-Hungary. Nor is it a study of the military history of Balkan operations or occupation regimes, but rather an international history of diplomatic and political decision-making influenced by military developments on the ground.² Although the conflicting Central Power war aims play an important role in the setting of Austro-Hungarian ones, both Entente and other Central Power war aims are taken as givens, and only their influence on Austria-Hungary’s goals is analyzed. Nor does the book attempt to address the influence of public opinion on war-aims formation.

This book fills a void in our understanding of Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans during World War I. While both Entente and German war aims have been extensively researched, the literature often limits Austro-Hungarian involvement to the outbreak of the war and a losing battle to maintain national integrity. The Balkans, which is where the Monarchy’s interests initiated a global conflict, is relegated to a secondary front compared to the enormous major fronts in east and west. What historians have tended to forget is that the continued efforts to resist the enormous onslaught of the Russian army in the north, or defend Austro-Hungarian territory against Italian and Rumanian intervention, had as much to do with the need to maintain the Monarchy’s independence and sovereignty as it had to do with political, territorial, and economic ambitions in the Balkans. The scholarship has so far all but ignored the independent Austro-Hungarian goals, and generally subsumed them within German ones. For this reason, Poland takes an important place in the traditional account of the Monarchy’s ambitions, but does so by obscuring the role of the Balkans (beyond simply Serbia) in the thinking of the Austro-Hungarian policy-makers. A gap therefore exists in our understanding of the reasons why the war needed to be continued beyond simply survival, which could have been secured through a separate peace. This results partly from the types of sources consulted; this book is distinctive in that it consults an unusually broad array of sources in German, Hungarian, and English. Both diplomatic and military sources have been extensively consulted, lending strong support to the arguments made about the Foreign Ministry and AOK’s concern (some would say obsession) with the Balkans in the face of other, seemingly more pressing issues. These findings, which build on the state of research outlined in Chapter 2, compel a reconsideration of the Monarchy’s war aims and its corresponding foreign and security policy during World War I.

2

War Aims and Decision-Making in Austria-Hungary

Decision-Making in Austria-Hungary

War-aims formation in Austria-Hungary is closely tied to the intricacies of its internal decision-making structure. Although all states have complex civil–military relations and political hierarchies, Austria-Hungary’s decision-making structure stands apart. This is due to the fact that Austria-Hungary, as its name suggests, was not a unitary nation-state. Rather, it was a multi-ethnic monarchy of 53 million people speaking twelve official languages, the second largest country in Europe by territory and third by population, and united only by the scepter of a Habsburg emperor. The Monarchy was a set of contradictions and tensions as this ancient and deeply conservative royal institution entered into the modern world. The most obvious division was between Austria and Hungary. Following the ‘Compromise’ or more accurately Equalization (Ausgleich-Kiegyezés) in 1867, the Austrian Empire was reorganized into two halves, the self-governing Austrian and Hungarian portions. Until 1918, the state lived two separate political lives based in Vienna and Budapest, with two entirely separate governments, parliaments, prime ministers, and civilian bureaucracies controlling all domestic matters in the two halves of the Monarchy. Some areas, however, remained under the direct control of the Emperor. The Common Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance, as well as the Austro-Hungarian Army and Navy, taken together constituted the core of the central government and in this deeply conservative state were directly appointed by the Emperor.

Foreign policy was directed by the common minister closest to the Emperor, traditionally labeled the Foreign Minister. However, his full title was Minister des k.u.k. Hauses und des Äußern, meaning he was firstly the Minister of the House of Habsburg but also implemented (the Emperor’s) foreign policy, making him the most powerful civilian government official. In the absence of a Prime Minister or Chancellor, the Foreign Minister was the Emperor’s ‘First Minister’ and wielded extraordinary influence. Although as an official who sat above the everyday politics of the Austrian parliament (Reichsrat) or Hungarian parliament (Országgyűlés) the Foreign Minister ‘did not have the duty or the right to take part in their deliberations,’¹ he wielded enough power to retain control of the development of Austro-Hungarian war aims.

The Armee Oberkommando, or AOK, under the operational direction of the Chief of the General Staff and a nominal Habsburg Commander in Chief, was the body directing military operations. Given that it answered only to the Emperor and not to either of the two governments or the common ministers, it also had tremendous political power. The Chief of the General Staff interacted either directly with the Emperor or through the Emperor’s military-bureaucratic arm, the Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät, or Military Chancellery, labeled MKSM. One of the most interesting questions in the Austro-Hungarian decision-making process is why the military was unable to take control of foreign policy-making as the OHL had done in Germany.

The diverging lines of control meant that decision-making was extremely convoluted. The only body specifically tasked with approving foreign policy as conducted by the Foreign Minister was the Gemeinsamer Ministerrat, or Common Ministerial Council, labeled GMR. The participants included the Foreign Minister, the two Prime Ministers, the War and Finance Common Ministers, and at times the Chief of the General Staff. Emperor Franz Joseph traditionally left its direction to his Foreign Minister, while Emperor Karl tended to chair the GMRs himself. Given his role, the Foreign Minister held a position of primus inter pares among the common ministers, and would chair the GMRs if the Emperor was not present. The two most powerful figures after the Foreign Minister were the two prime ministers of Austria and of Hungary, though only the Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza exercised his influence on foreign matters extensively. This was due to Tisza’s interest in foreign relations as a way of benefiting Hungary, a right which was enshrined in the Hungarian Law XII of December 1867 as part of the Compromise.² On matters of great importance such as going to war, feeding the population, or political strategy, the GMR was convened to agree the Monarchy’s policies. Since it did not meet very frequently, however, foreign policy, and with it the setting of war aims, lay mainly in the purview of the MdÄ, though the military’s vaguely defined but historic political role meant that the MdÄ’s primacy would constantly be questioned.

Since war aims were only decided by the highest echelons of power in Austria-Hungary, it is at this level that the book focuses its analysis. At the core of decision-making stood ostensibly the Emperor Franz Joseph. However, given his old age and serious illness,³ he generally did not take effective decisions and instead left his ministers and generals to determine policy. This led to near-endless trilateral conflict between the Foreign Minister and his MdÄ, the AOK Chief of the General Staff, and usually the Hungarian Prime Minister, with involvement by many other parties such as internal and external high ranking government or military officials.

Figure 2.1 Drivers and influences on the war-aims setting process. © MBF 2014

Figure 2.1 aims to graphically represent the involvement and influence of the various parties in the setting of Austro-Hungarian war aims. If in this theoretical framework we consider the setting of war aims to be the center nexus, certain elements were ‘closer’ to this than others. In the inner core of decision-making stood, in order of influence were: the Foreign Minister, the AOK, the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza, and finally the Emperor through his MKSM. Three of these four entities owed allegiance to the Monarchy as a whole (Gesamtmonarchie, demonstrated by the Habsburg flag), while the last acted mainly in the interest of Hungary. These four individuals discussed and set Austria-Hungary’s war aims. In doing so, they were influenced extensively by domestic forces (1° box), split between military and political factors. Despite their notional equality with Tisza, the Common War and Finance Ministers and the Austrian Prime Minister never possessed such leverage as their Hungarian colleague, who some authors considered a ‘stumbling block’⁴ in deliberations.

The greatest influence on the Foreign Minister was the bureaucracy that supported him,⁵ in the form of internal MdÄ officials and external MdÄ ambassadors/ministers posted abroad. The line between MdÄ and ‘Ambassadors & Ministers’ therefore indicates the strongest link that informed the most important war-aims policy-maker of the details he needed to know before setting policy. As W.D. Godsey points out, where German–Austrian or Magyar national allegiance could influence war-aims setting by the Austro-Hungarian elite, for the most part the diplomats ‘directed their allegiance, both emotional and political, towards the dynasty and a united monarchy.’⁶ On the military side, despite having no official mandate to set Austro-Hungarian war aims, the AOK used its historic role as protector of the Monarchy⁷ and its influence with the Emperor to become heavily involved, usually in direct confrontation with the MdÄ. The AOK’s occupation administrations mirrored the roles of the MdÄ’s ambassadors in influencing AOK policy.

Despite war-aims setting being an inherently domestic task, the military and political decision-makers in Austria-Hungary were also influenced by their Central Power allies (2° box). The governments of Germany, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire influenced the MdÄ via ambassadors and ministers to alter Austro-Hungarian war aims one way or another. On the military side, it was usually the antagonistic actions of the German High Command (OHL), Bulgarian High Command, and Bulgarian occupation zone in Serbia that influenced the AOK to respond by pressing for a set of war aims usually more expansionist than those of the MdÄ.

Finally, the last and weakest level of influence came from external political and military developments (3° box). For the military, developments on the various relevant fronts dictated to what extent the AOK pursued war aims, while the MdÄ had to contend with the international and neutral press. Under Karl, the role of the Entente governments became increasingly important, as expansionist war aims had to be reined in to conform to the opposing coalition’s willingness to make peace. Yet, although foreign official and public opinion might sometimes influence the Monarchy’s decision-making, the documents reveal that domestic public opinion carried virtually no weight in the minds of the policy-makers, at least until after Franz Joseph’s death.

Austria-Hungary and War-Aims Research

The study of war aims is one of ideas, opinions, and hopes, and their influence on foreign policy. H.W. Gatzke refers to his work on Germany’s war aims as the ‘study of unfulfilled ambitions.’⁸ Indeed, the full scope of a country’s aims during war are generally not put into practice, but the understanding of how much leaders wanted to acquire gives us an idea of how much they compromised prior to peace. Although the literature on Austria-Hungary during the Great War is extensive, only in the 1970s, following the appearance of the Fischer thesis, did war aims specifically become widely discussed in the scholarship.⁹ There has, however, been a surprisingly limited or vague conception of Austria-Hungary’s goals in the Balkans for the years 1914–18. Given that Austria-Hungary was more flexible on Poland than it was on the Balkans, it is curious that no systematic account of the Monarchy’s aims in this region of principal interest has ever been undertaken. This monograph seeks to rectify this omission by analyzing Austria-Hungary’s war aims and the mechanisms employed to achieve them.

In 1961 Fritz Fischer set forth his controversial thesis that Germany had knowingly instigated the war and pursued it with determination in order to obtain continental domination and world-power status at the end. In contrast to his predecessor Gatzke, who believed that Germany had no specific war aims and left the question vague and undecided,¹⁰ Fischer employed the so-called ‘September Program’ memo by the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg to argue that Germany ‘wanted and covered for the Austro–Serbian war’¹¹ and had an aggressive and monolithic policy towards expansion that was continuous from pre-war times. Fischer also argued that dominating Austria-Hungary itself