Summary of John Winton's Ultra at Sea

By IRB Media

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book. Book Preview:

#1 The problem of how to use Special Intelligence, which was code-named ULTRA, was especially acute at sea, where the Admiralty traditionally exercised only remote control and gave the local Commander-in-Chief all the forces and intelligence he needed. But ULTRA eventually gave the Admiralty an unprecedented overall view of the enemy’s naval operations and intentions.

#2 There were many forms of intelligence available to the Allies in World War II. The Sigint, or Signal Intelligence, Service was responsible for the interception and exploitation of all enemy radio transmissions, which might yield intelligence.

#3 The Admiralty took the strictest precautions to safeguard the ULTRA secret. It was revealed only to certain Flag and Senior Officers, and not more than three other selected members of the cypher staff. The names of these ULTRA-indoctrinated officers had to be communicated to NID.

#4 The British government knew that the German Navy, Army, and Air Force were all using cyphers based on the Enigma machine, which was an electro-mechanical wired encyphering machine with a series of drums or wheels. It was difficult to obtain the correct settings for the drums or wheels, so it was easy for the British to make mistakes when trying to account for Allied forces at the scene.

• Language: English
• Publisher: IRB Media
• Release date: Aug 18, 2022
• ISBN: 9798350016024

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Insights on John Winton's Ultra at Sea

Contents

Insights from Chapter 1

Insights from Chapter 2

Insights from Chapter 3

Insights from Chapter 4

Insights from Chapter 5

Insights from Chapter 6

Insights from Chapter 7

Insights from Chapter 8

Insights from Chapter 9

Insights from Chapter 10

Insights from Chapter 11

Insights from Chapter 12

Insights from Chapter 13

Insights from Chapter 14

Insights from Chapter 15

Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The problem of how to use Special Intelligence, which was code-named ULTRA, was especially acute at sea, where the Admiralty traditionally exercised only remote control and gave the local Commander-in-Chief all the forces and intelligence he needed. But ULTRA eventually gave the Admiralty an unprecedented overall view of the enemy’s naval operations and intentions.

#2

There were many forms of intelligence available to the Allies in World War II. The Sigint, or Signal Intelligence, Service was responsible for the interception and exploitation of all enemy radio transmissions, which might yield intelligence.

#3

The Admiralty took the strictest precautions to safeguard the ULTRA secret. It was revealed only to certain Flag and Senior Officers, and not more than three other selected members of the cypher staff. The names of these ULTRA-indoctrinated officers had to be communicated to NID.

#4

The British government knew that the German Navy, Army, and Air Force were all using cyphers based on the Enigma machine, which was an electro-mechanical wired encyphering machine with a series of drums or wheels. It was difficult to obtain the correct settings for the drums or wheels, so it was easy for the British to make mistakes when trying to account for Allied forces at the scene.

#5

GC CS had broken into one German Air Force Enigma key in May, 1940, and continued to read it until the end of the war. This revealed that Admiral Hipper was to make a reconnaissance sortie into the Barents Sea in September, 1940.

#6

The German Navy Enigma was still inviolate, and there was no further Enigma information when Admiral Hipper sailed for two more sorties late in 1940 and early 1941. The balance of decrypting success lay with the Germans throughout the first eighteen months of the battle of the Atlantic.

#7

In August 1940, Hitler threw off all shackles from the U-boats, and declared a total blockade of the British Isles. The U-boats forsook their previous tactics of attacking at periscope depth by