The Kosovo War: A Strategy of Transformative Realism

By Heiko Karl Ital

Kosovo is a political entity where different interests of key European actors meet. There is not one common interest of the European Union or of NATO, but a multitude of interests of its key member states involved in the process of nation-building and since 2008, to come up with a new expression, nation parenting in Kosovo. Realism is used as an analytical tool to investigate the Europeanization of Kosovo, as well as relevant patterns of power and influence with Germany at the center. Its explanatory power is being compared to contending theories dealing with the European Union's development. Given that realism is a suitable tool for analyzing the Europeanization of Kosovo, the author assumes that EU member states, including Germany, are mainly guided by security and power considerations in their approach regarding Kosovo.

• Language: English
• Publisher: tredition
• Release date: Apr 27, 2021
• ISBN: 9783347313347

Book preview

1. Introduction: United Germany, European Security and the Western Balkans

1.1 Why Investigate the Puzzle of European Security?

Does it make sense to investigate a particular puzzle of European security policy, with Germany at its center, on the base of realism? It does, when expectations of an ever-closer union which harmoniously integrates Europe and is destined for perpetual peace are left aside and diverging national interests are taken as analytical ground to explain outcomes of interference, integration, transformation and imbalances. Security policy, to be seen as the whole range of policies involving internal, crossborder and external security, defense and the questions of war and peace, highlights the EC’s (renamed EU in 1993) character as a compromise in motion. States have deepened integration when a common stance emerged; however, security matters have been very sensitive and far from a comprehensive project – despite becoming a multifaceted project with integrated areas of security scattered on the security landscape as such. Disagreements have amplified with the substantial expansions (1995, 2004, 2007, 2013), adding a further 16 states to the Union in 21 years. A greater rift between them has emerged, creating bigger gaps among those prioritizing European unity, those favoring the transatlantic link, and those moderate states reconciling both orientations. In contrast, the flaws in the Union’s strategic equation have remained the same because no additional great powers have joined. France holds the far greatest military power and prestige of the Europhiles; Britain grants itself numerous exemptions in non-security matters and rejects any replacement of NATO’s collective defense core by the EU. Germany stands in between and possesses more potential power but for the time being is hindered by treaty obligations like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and by what are consequences of Nazi Germany’s occupation and extermination policies. Its security and reputation remain tied to its multilateral integration, as to a kind of dependence that has to be communicated as accepted voluntarily.

Diverging national interests in the European Union have prevailed for the last 10 to 15 years, following a dynamic decade in the 1990s where major steps were taken: closer rule-based intergovernmental cooperation, a great number of new common institutions, and strengthening of the EU’s supranational bodies (EP, COM, ECJ). Despite the intense warfare in former Yugoslavia, leading to some humiliation of the EU as a paper tiger, it pursued its own development intensely. The groundwork for this is less an outcome of the transformation wave of 1989/90, but of a concept agreed upon at the Luxemburg Intergovernmental Conference in 1985-86. Maastricht, the more visible great leap forward, largely fulfilled the Luxemburg agenda, in time with the Single Market starting in 1993. After Maastricht and during preparation for the Single Currency, the EU was not a collective defense actor but was increasingly capable to pool resources in order to economically stabilize other regions of Europe. It is not predictable if the EU will become an independent security provider in Europe who need not rely on the United States that does the bulk of dirty work, but it looks not unlikely that it will use its chance to rebuild and integrate the whole Western Balkans region. Then there will not be wars which require the United States' intervention, at least for the foreseeable future.

This work analyzes the security policy of the European Union, focused on the Western Balkans region. It specifically investigates the European Union’s role in pacifying and transforming this region, particularly with regard to Kosovo. The reason for choosing Kosovo as the pivot of this investigation is its decisive role in transforming the Western Balkans. First, Serbia’s transformation is linked to its relation to Kosovo. Its acceptance of territorial loss and perception of having rightly lost at least in the view of all other nations except perhaps Russia and China are decisive factors causing the Balkans to leave behind nationalism combined with imperialism. In all other regions of Europe, many states had digested loss of empire and territory, like Irish independence at the expense of the UK, Sweden’s consecutive losses of Finland and Norway in 1807 and 1912, respectively, Italy’s loss of the Northern Dalmatian coast, Hungary’s reduction to a third of its former size, and so on. Furthermore, all European states lost their colonial empires, tiny remnants notwithstanding. Serbia is the last state to date that tried to shift its borders by force, but in today’s Europe west of Russia, violent border conflicts in Belarus and Ukraine look remote at present.

Additionally, Kosovo is a political entity where different interests of key participants meet. There is not one common interest of the European Union but a multitude of interests of its key member states involved in the process of nation-building and since 2008, to invent a new expression, nation parenting in Kosovo. The United States has gradually reduced its engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo, remaining in the background as a helper of last resort should tensions and threat of renewed armed conflict arise again, but this prospect looks more and more distant. This work asks if the United States is leaving Kosovo and the other Western Balkans states deliberately for nation parenting under German leadership, to some extent together with Italy as a junior partner and former imperial power on the Adriatic Eastern coast. If Serbia is transformed peacefully and integrated into the EU and perhaps even NATO, then it will cease to be Russia’s asset for creating instability in Europe. Developments in Southeastern Europe such as the refugee crisis and organized crime, with connections to higher echelons of politics, show that a substantial reform agenda has to be fulfilled in this region. However, these are tasks that the European Union is capable of achieving, in contrast to waging war, which went beyond the capacities and resolve of European states during the Kosovo crisis. Realism is used as analytical tool to investigate this process, as well as relevant patterns of power and influence with Germany at the center. Its explanatory power is being compared to contending theories dealing with the European Union’s development.

1.2 Europeanization or Germanization of the Western Balkans?

Adoption of EU standards is Europeanization in its true sense, not a strengthening of the EU in economic or military respects. Europeanization as a steady state means that political entities have an internal order conforming to standards of EU member states, as well in their foreign policy (precisely, as they should be, stipulated by the Treaty). Europeanization is both a process and an end, when a candidate country accedes the Union. Accordingly, the backbone of Europeanization is gradually adopting the EU Acquis, made up by its norms set by the Treaty on European Union, and constantly respecting these norms since accession. Ongoing quarrels between East European member states and the Union's institutions, backed by the EU-15 (states having acceded prior to 2004) have shown that Europeanization is not unidirectional; defective behavior becomes rampant and threatens the Union's cohesion from within, while an exit of those states having acceded since 2004 has become a real possibility. The Union's credibility has already been damaged, and current candidate countries could begin to view Europeanization as a tactical effort to obtain membership and then becoming quarrelsome members, too.

However, the term Germanization appears misguided. Germany's influence heavily depends on its EU and NATO partners' support. More to the point is Europeanization with a significant German design. The German governments have drawn lessons from their erratic approach in the early 1990s and are keen not to let their contribution appear as a bid for mastery in this sub-region.

There is a sort of Germanization which could better be labeled Northernization as to the economic and fiscal norms dominating the EU. Austerity, competition and welfare on a means-tested benefits base are promoted not only by Germany but by the Netherlands, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Finland (and exiting Britain) as well – and by others to some extent. There is unease about this among France in particular and the EU southern flank. As was mentioned with respect to French economic interests and the relative/absolute gains problem, there is competition between the different types of welfare states inside the Union. This competition extends to membership-hopefuls because the economic order and welfare system they bring into the Union change the respective models' influence. So far, the Northern, Anglo-Saxon or Third Way model, representing all versions of Neo-Liberalism, has carried the day. All new members acceding since 2004 adhere to this model that puts free markets first and welfare second, without discarding the latter altogether. Germany's shift in 2004 from non-means-tested benefits to a workfare model expressively designed to make it uncomfortable not to seek employment certainly corroborated the liberalist attitude.

For the time being, the German question covers a far broader range of issues than the task of transforming the last troublesome region of Europe outside Russia's reach, to be added cautiously from a realist viewpoint. This German question is rooted in Europe's history as such, with the Western Balkans as only one important aspect. It has been one of the driving forces of European history for centuries – suffice it to mention here The Holy Roman Empire, the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War and Germany's transformation during the era of nationalism in 19th century Europe. Regardless of the fact that the term German question has even been severely tarnished and become associated with revisionism, neo-imperialism, or worse, this question exists, alongside a Russian question. A Hungarian question and a Belgian one exists as well, as well as a Serbian and a Croatian question. These national questions always exist when nations do not comprise all the people clinging to it because their territories were stripped of their nation-state by forces outside of the latter's control. Even if Germany is relieved from this problem that plagued it during the short-lived Weimar Republic, its utter denial would be unhistorical, albeit understandable, given that engaging in public discussion of this issue is hazardous. The German question will extend into the future as long as the system of nation-states in Europe prevails and certainly even after a group of European states, including Germany, has set up a federation, super-state and the like.

Thus, ascribing the Western Balkans a capacity for solving the German question is like making a lorry out of a passenger car. Therefore, a more modest approach seems smarter; what is within reach is a Europeanization of the Western Balkans and Kosovo in particular. This could make an important contribution to pacifying Germany, a great power that is occupied with tasks yielding both absolute and relative gains. The Europeanization of the Western Balkans provides Germany, alongside with Austria and to a lesser extent Italy, with important incentives to invest more than the other EU-15 states. Germany will gain more influence, but all EU member states gain from slowly pacifying and transforming the Western Balkans states because war will not return to this region for decades to come.

1.3 Key Aspects of the Puzzle to Be Solved

Kosovo is a political entity where different interests of key European actors meet. There is not one common interest of the European Union or of NATO, but a multitude of interests of its key member states involved in the process of nation-building and since 2008, to come up with a new expression, nation parenting in Kosovo. The United States has gradually reduced its engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo, remaining in the background as a helper of last resort should tensions and threat of renewed armed conflict arise again. However, this prospect appears more and more distant. This work asks if the United States is leaving Kosovo and the other Western Balkans states deliberately for nation parenting under German leadership, to some extent together with Italy as a junior partner and former imperial power on the Adriatic Eastern coast. If Serbia is transformed peacefully and integrated into the EU and perhaps even NATO, then it will cease to be Russia’s asset for creating instability in Europe. Developments in Southeastern Europe such as the refugee crisis and organized crime, with connections to higher echelons of politics, show that a substantial reform agenda has yet to be implemented in this region. Are these tasks that the European Union is capable of achieving alone contrary to waging war? It is argued that they exceed the EU’s capacities and demand both steady NATO involvement and a stronger role for principal outside actors in the Western Balkans. Realism is used as an analytical tool to investigate this process, as well as relevant patterns of power and influence with Germany at the center. Its explanatory power is being compared to contending theories dealing with the European Union’s development. Against this background, the problem setting can be delineated by the following six statements:

1) The European Union has taken charge of Kosovo’s stabilization and nation-building since 2005 when American troops pulled out and the EULEX mission began. Therefore, European security policy is a major contribution to nationbuilding and stabilization in Kosovo.

2) The European Union is contributing substantially to transformation in Kosovo and the Western Balkans in general, albeit not without running the risk of backlash.

3) Germany plays an important role in this context. Its specific history in general and toward the Western Balkans region bear upon this role. However, Germany has managed to emerge as a relevant actor who gives in to decisive impulses to Europeanization of the Western Balkans and Kosovo in particular.

4) Germany wishes to play a leading role in stabilizing Kosovo and the surrounding countries. However, it promotes a way of German-style Europeanizing, meaning a German, and to some extent a German-Austrian sphere of influence with nonviolent means.

5) Germany does have a strategic concept with good chances for success, but also with perils involved. This concept is directed at EU enlargement, entailing adoption of the written und – hopefully – unwritten rules of governance by the Western Balkans states. This is what Europeanization is about.

6) Germany is not only a troubleshooter but also a troublemaker. It has shown a penchant for solitary action several times in the last 25 years, the most recent being its unilateralism during the refugee crisis of 2015. Reunited Germany proves to be a mediocre crisis manager when it gets heavily involved in a crisis itself.

European Security Policy, precisely the joint Security Policy of the European Union and a number of partners of different degrees, was chosen because it is an emerging policy area of high relevance from a realist viewpoint that both deepens and widens the Union’s agency – as the Union gains experience and acts in ever-changing environments. European security policy makes analyzing the EU as a whole particularly accessible from a Realist viewpoint. It helps avoid dealing with non-political matters that, however, have become issues of integration (particularly common legislation). Comprehensive transformation is regarded as the European Union’s general strategy in both enlarging and making the continent more secure. It includes pacifying, stabilizing, rebuilding, transforming and integrating.

Given that realism is an appropriate tool for analyzing European security policy, the author assumes that EU member states including Germany are mainly guided by security and power considerations in their approach toward the Western Balkans. Among European key actors, there is competition for influence in this region, with Germany having the edge, especially since the United States has pulled out, while France and Great Britain remain distracted by different issues. Governments of EU member states, Germany in particular (plus Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Greece; outside EU: Turkey) is aware that providing security may increasingly fall on them should the United States shift strategic priorities away from Europe. Other Central and Eastern European states may face an aggressive Russia in a Post-NATO constellation as well, but their preparedness for common defense looks limited. This rationale is behind the comprehensive efforts to ‘Europeanize’ the Western Balkans. This is worth the pain; more precisely, the costs.

It is doubtful that the EU as a whole has a strategy, as different key member states have different interests regarding the Western Balkans’ incorporation. Who is leading this process, what kind of leadership does it have, and how quality is it? Also, is the EU seeking emancipation from the United States and selfreassurance?¹ Furthermore, can the European Union act as a comprehensive agent of transformation equaling the United States in Western Europe after the Second World War?²

Regarding these questions, the puzzle to be solved begins with the impressive success achieved so far. The Western Balkans region has been pacified, stabilized, and institutionally transformed (including Serbia’s change of orientation). Integration of the whole region toward the EU is underway and has been spearheaded by Croatia. Is this an achievement of the EU, an outcome of favorable circumstances, a net gain for the EU, NATO, and particular EU and NATO member states? Is it an achievement at all, instead of a Pyrrhic victory contributing to the EU’s demise? The completed puzzle consists of the relevant actors in this particular problem setting. These are nation states; the EU is only with its central institutions acting purposefully, not as a default actor for everything done under the EU’s flag. The completed puzzle shows which changes in the distribution of power and security will probably result from the realignment of the Western Balkans under EU’s and particularly Germany’s leadership. Germany, alongside with Austria, may be laying the foundation for a future hegemony in Southeastern Europe, without being aware of the results of their actions today.

1.4 Research Questions and Research Hypotheses

In order to analyze Germany's role in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans, it is necessary to focus on a specific case. The Kosovo War is such a case that is marked by a policy shift from respecting the sovereignty of a nation state to protecting human rights, precisely to prevent genocide through mass murder, mass expulsion, and comparable crimes against humanity. This was achieved by military intervention and subsequent stabilization in the shape of robust peacekeeping plus the rebuilding of civil-administrative institutions. Therefore, Kosovo is a test case for Germany's ability as well as the EU's as a whole. Kosovo embodies the promise given toward an emergent nation whose protectors sincerely desire its existence and are prepared to support its transformation. Can the EU and Germany establish and maintain a role as meaningful security providers? Can security be provided amidst a plethora of internal differences and several factions competing with each other? To investigate this unique problem setting a case study on Kosovo between 1990 and 2016 seems most suitable.

The Western Balkans region has been pacified, stabilized, and institutionally transformed, including Serbia’s change of orientation. Integration of Western Balkans states is underway. The nation states concerned with this development and exercising influence are the most relevant actors in Europeanizing the Western Balkans. This fact often becomes blurred because the EU designation is used in a random fashion for everything done under the EU's flag. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the EU's member states on the one hand and its intergovernmental and supranational institutions on the other.

Realism is an appropriate tool for analyzing Germany’s role in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans because it assumes that Germany and the EU - to be precise, other EU member states - conduct this process as nations with distinct interests. There is neither an automatism of integration and consolidation; nor is there a unitary actor named The European Union. The European Union does have bodies that are entitled to speak for it, first and foremost the European Council (a semiannual reunion of heads of state and government), the Presidency of the Council and, at least in policy areas fully transferred to the Union level, the European Commission. The European Parliament's role in this respect is contested, as the European Court of Justice exerts great leverage but, like the Parliament, cannot initiate legislation or decisions by itself. In sum, it is obvious that national governments hold sway, particularly in security matters. Against this background, this work sets out to answer the following research questions:

1) Why did Germany acquire a leading role in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans including Kosovo?

- Why did the other EU member states and the United States allow Germany to take a preponderant position given widespread suspicion about Germany's designs for a renewed great power status?

- Why did the other European NATO and EU member states acquiesce in Germany's increasingly preponderant role in guiding Kosovo toward a stable state of independence?

- Why did the Europeanization of the Western Balkans and Kosovo in particular happen?

- Why was it not Americanization, Russianization, or even Germanization?

- How did the Europeanization in Kosovo contribute to the evolvement of a European security policy?

2) How did Germany emerge as a relevant actor accelerating developments toward Europeanization of the Western Balkans and especially Kosovo?

- Why did Germany play a critical role in this context, given its specific history in general and the Western Balkans region in particular?

- Could Germany again play a role in a (yet to come) concert of powers in Europe?

- Why has Germany become increasingly capable to assume stewardship of Kosovo's development toward independence and stabilization, given that (united) Germany's foreign policy eschewed the role of pacifier in war-torn areas, particularly regarding areas occupied by German armed forces during World War II?

3) Can the EU, with Germany performing a leading role, meaningfully fill the power gap in the Western Balkans left by the superpowers?

- Why did Russia retreat from the Western Balkans, particularly abandoning Serbia as a tool for hampering European integration? Why did the United States reduce its engagement in the region to observing and fence-sitting? Is there a clear perspective of security provision, or is the EU just capitalizing on the fact that all parties to the conflict are exhausted at the moment (a moment seen through a historian’s lens can last for decades)? Would Brussels call for U.S. Intervention forces if warfare were to erupt anew?

- Also, does adding the Western Balkans to the EU not make it even harder to forge a common strategic rationale? Given the current bickering between EU member states over how to manage increased migration pressure, is there not another source of discord in the making with the Western Balkans acceding? Does the EU really have sufficient coherence to absorb a sub region where states are not saturated, and are perhaps revisionist or instable constructions from the outset? (There are a multitude of questions regarding the nations in this region, smaller in size than the German question, but much more explosive in the short and medium term).

Hypotheses

Based on the above research questions are the following hypotheses:

1) A bundle of economic incentives and Russia's eastward reorientation helped considerably to open the whole of the Western Balkans for the EU's influence with Germany acting assertively.

2) Conceding Germany a leading role in integrating and Europeanizing the Western Balkans means keeping Germany busy, useful and calculable. This is a self-interested approach fitting into a broadened realist framework.

3) Money is thicker than blood. In other words, a brighter economic outlook diverts the Serbs from their traditional pro-Russian attitudes and pushes them toward Europeanization and even toward NATO.

1.5 Methodology, Sources and Theoretical Contribution

This work pursues two methods of research. It analyzes documents and relies on secondary literature. Documents pertains to statements, speeches, reports and background information provided by official bodies, including both states and multinational organizations. Documents are, as mentioned, often guided by specific interests and thus are not intended to give unbiased information or to criticize the actors issuing these documents. Thus, the challenge is to obtain informative content while at the same time filtering the documents.

Secondary literature concerning the Western Balkans is abundant, but there are large differences in quality and scope. Comprehensive studies are less numerous and focus either on the region as a whole or on one particular country. While the wars of the 1990s and efforts to pacify this region are covered widely by monographs and edited volumes, policies of rebuilding and integrating the Western Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic framework are mainly dealt with in research papers and journal articles. What is missing at present, are analyses focusing on the Western Balkans as an area for outside powers’ involvement and their interests for shaping this region. This applies to Kosovo as a pivotal part of this region as well. So far, the focus has been on the actions of NATO and the EU as collective actors and less on individual states. Thus, there is an incomplete puzzle where some parts are necessarily missing. Germany has been dealt with only superficially, meaning that its specific interests and its distinct situation as foreign policy actor have not been analyzed in detail. In this respect, this work intends to fill a gap in the literature.

The theoretical contribution this work intends to make is a refinement of realism, called transformative realism. It is elaborated in greater detail in section 4.4. Transformative means a realist approach that is more capable to elucidate subtle competitions for influence by states assisting the transformation of other states or regions. Realism, despite being concerned with relative gains and balances of power, often overlooks such competition. This is because it is focused on open competition among states where toolboxes of power politics are used, or at least, explicit language between the competitors is used, which disturbs relations among allies. It is important to uncover such competitions because their outcomes have a substantial impact on balances of power and future great power conflicts. While realism correctly assumes that relative gains are decisive in the long run, its predictive power can be increased by the approach developed here.

¹ There may be a mutatis-mutandis-reasoning, like: 'We are showing that we can transform the Western Balkans, so we are proving our capability to ourselves, which will strengthen centripetal forces inside ‘our’ European Union.'

² The U.S. initiated rebuilding of devastated Western Europe and Greece in roughly the five steps mentioned. Not every step applied to every country, but on the whole it led to a community of collective defense and security. The whole range of steps applied mainly to West Germany, as (part of) the former enemy state, while stabilizing, rebuilding and integrating to European continental states becoming NATO members in 1949 and 1952 (Greece), whereas all but the last step was applied to Austria.

2. Realism as Theoretical Background

2.1 Critical Literature Review

2.1.1 Critique of Realism: A Useful Tool for Analyzing European Integration?

Collard-Wexler (2006) rules out neorealism as a tool for analysis of European integration. In his view, neorealism lacks a theory of integration. Neorealism would constantly predict that states wish to avoid multilateral entanglements, yet their behavior on the ground points in the other direction. Collard-Wexler (2006) claims that European Union member states were especially successful in refuting neorealism, or to sum up his claims: The EU's development is the most powerful evidence against neorealism's core positions on gains and integration.

Legro and Moravcsik (1999) and Collard-Wexler (2006) both take issue with neorealism regarding what are dismissed as auxiliary theories; the former see neoclassical realism not as an attempt for refinement but as diluting a grossly imperfect yet established grand theory of international politics. The latter sees Walt's balance-of-threat theory as a failed approach to circumvent the (for neorealists) intractable problem of integration.

Vazquez (1997) makes a frontal attack on neorealism, claiming that it would fail the Lakatosian test, thus being a degenerative and not a progressive theory. Denying that neorealism is falsifiable, Vazquez even denies realism's role as a meaningful theory at all, purporting that a non-falsifiable theory is a tautology.

Walt (1997) rejects this critique and points to the highly contested nature of Lakatos's classification for theories. Furthermore, Vazquez (1997) had singled out only one trait of realism, Kenneth Waltz's (1979) structural theory, in order to make the case for realism's