The Three Battles of El Alamein: Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives

By Jon Diamond

The 80th Anniversary of the historic final Battle of El Alamein is the ideal time to study the events leading up to General Bernard Montgomery’s famous victory over Field Marshal Rommel’s Panzerarmee Africa in Autumn 1942.

Four months earlier after the loss of Tobruk , Rommel’s forces were in the ascendancy. Prime Minister Winston Churchill removed General Auchinleck from Command of Eighth Army and appointed Bernard Montgomery in his place. After the successful defense of Alam El Halfa Ridge in late August and early September ended Rommel’s inexorable advance, Montgomery set in train plans for the set piece offensive campaign at El Alamein which took place between 23 October and 4 November 1942.

The stakes could not have been higher. Had Rommel broken through the Allied defenses in Summer 1942 or Montgomery’s forces not overwhelmed the German and Italian armies at El Alamein, Egypt and the Suez Canal would have fallen to the Nazis.

Instead, the victory at El Alamein proved to be the turning point of the War against Hitler and led to the victory in North Africa

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pen and Sword
• Release date: Jan 5, 2023
• ISBN: 9781399072069

Jon Diamond

Jon Diamond is a practising physician who has had a life-long interest in military history. A graduate of Cornell University, Jon has been on the faculties of Harvard Medical School and Pennsylvania State University. He has served as a civilian attendee to the United States Army War College National Security Seminar in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and has written a significant number of articles and papers including over fifteen for Military Heritage Presents WWII History. He has just completed a book on David Low's Cartoons and the British Policy of Appeasement. He resides in Hershey, Pennsylvania.

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Chapter One

Desert Combat in Egypt and Cyrenaica 1940–1942

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke, needed to engage the Axis forces somewhere; however, both refrained from another expedition to the European Continent or Scandinavia after the disasters in France and Norway in the spring of 1940. Benito Mussolini’s fascist Italy gave the British War Cabinet its entrée into a land battle against the junior Axis partner across Egypt and Cyrenaica’s Western Desert (see Map 1 ) bordering the North African littoral and in rugged and remote East Africa. On 11 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and a vanquished France.

The Italian Advance under Graziani, 13–16 September 1940

After initial skirmishes along the Libyan-Egyptian frontier during the summer of 1940, Mussolini’s Italian XXI (Metropolitan) Corps advanced 60 miles into Egypt on 13 September 1940. At Sidi Barrani, situated between the ports of Bardia and Mersa Matruh, the Italians stopped to fortify makeshift camps to the south. The halt at Sidi Barrani was due to a shortage of supplies and a desire not to extend LOC from Libyan bases. Elements of the British Western Desert Force, led by Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor, steadily withdrew to Mersa Matruh, where the British 7th Armoured Division had been since August 1939, to avoid confronting the larger Italian force. Mersa Matruh is about 150 miles west of Alexandria and because of it being a terminus of a railway was relatively easy to supply. Nonetheless, O’Connor left a thin screen of three infantry battalions supported by two regiments of motorized RHA covering a 20-mile front to retard the Italian advance. Light Vickers Mk VI tanks of the 7th Hussars and armoured cars of the 11th Hussars along with two motor battalions of the 60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade harassed the Italian advance to Sidi Barrani. The Italians suffered 3,500 casualties and 700 became PoWs, while British casualties were 160 of all types.

Map 1. The Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, 1940–1943.

Allied and Axis supply lines, stretching across the entire Mediterranean for the disparate and myriad battlefields of the Middle East and North African littoral, are demonstrated here. A complete rout of the Italian Tenth Army and capture of their principal port garrisons at Bardia, Tobruk and Benghazi was achieved by British and Allied units of the Western Desert Force (designated British XIII Corps on 1 January 1941) during Operation COMPASS from 10 December 1940 to 5 February 1941. Following that Allied victory against Italy’s fascist troops, a ‘seesaw’ set of desert battles, including the siege, relief and ultimate Axis capture of Tobruk, was waged across Cyrenaica across the Egyptian frontier to El Alamein from late February 1941 to November 1942. The combatants were the Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK), commander General Erwin Rommel, and the multinational British Eighth Army led successively by Generals Claude Auchinleck and Bernard Montgomery. The British Eighth Army’s victory over Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika at El Alamein from 23 October to 4 November 1942 served as a strategic prelude to Operation TORCH and its principal amphibious landings across North-West Africa at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers on 8 November 1942. The TORCH landings and capitulation of Vichy French forces in Morocco and Algeria started a six-month campaign of bitter combat throughout Tunisia between Allied forces and a newly-created Axis 5th Panzer Army built up in Tunis and Bizerte. The westward retreat of Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika with the pursuit by Montgomery’s Eighth Army across Tripolitania and southern Tunisia during the initial months of 1943 culminated in a final Allied victory over the Axis in North Africa in May 1943. (Meridian Mapping)

Despite the thin British line, O’Connor’s reconnaissance forces noted that the enemy ‘ran out of energy’. Mussolini tried to goad Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, governor general of Libya, to move on Cairo; however, Il Duce suspected that Graziani’s troops would fortify their supplies at Sidi Barrani, so he attacked Greece with Italian troops occupying Albania.

The Italians built a series of fortified camps on an arc starting at Maktila on the coast and then following a south-westerly course to Sofafi, 40 miles away. Each camp was surrounded by AT obstacles and mines, and was garrisoned by an infantry brigade with tanks and artillery in support. O’Connor noted that the fortified camps were wide apart to be mutually supporting, which he and his staff would exploit with their own offensive, Operation COMPASS, in December 1940.

Origin of the Western Desert Force’s Operation COMPASS

General Sir Archibald Wavell, C-in-C to the new Middle East Command since 2 August 1939, initially had only 30,000 troops stationed in Egypt to face the 150,000 Italians in Cyrenaica alone. Wavell yearned for a quick Western Desert victory over the Italian Tenth Army so that he could deal with the Duke of Aosta’s large Italian field force in Ethiopia and Somaliland. Wavell, along with Lieutenant General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GOC, British Troops Egypt (BTE) and O’Connor, planned a limited four- to five-day offensive, commencing on 9 December 1940, during which the 4th Indian Division, led by the heavier, slower-moving Matilda II Infantry (I) tanks of the 7th RTR, would pass through the gap in the enemy’s defensive line at Bir el Rabia, south of the Italian fortified camps at Nibeiwa and the Tummars, and then move north towards the coast, taking the enemy positions in detail from behind (from the west) on 9 December. A conventional artillery bombardment followed by a combined infantry and armoured advance was avoided so as not to lose the element of surprise.

Wavell was overjoyed with O’Connor’s unorthodox approach; however, a chief architect of this ‘indirect’ or unconventional line of attack on the strengthened Italian camps was Brigadier Eric Dorman-Smith (see Chapter 3), who was on Wavell’s staff responsible for operations. Dorman-Smith was now attached to O’Connor to assist in the planning of the assault. Dorman-Smith noted on aerial photo reconnaissance of the Nibeiwa camp that all vehicle tracks led into the north-west corner of the camp, which suggested that there were no mines there as there were in the front or eastward side of the camp.

At 0700 hrs on 9 December 1940, the Matilda ‘I’ tanks of the 7th RTR assaulted Nibeiwa from the west and crashed through the barbed wire in front of them in the unmined gap with Italian machine-gun and artillery fire ineffective against the British tanks’ 3in of armour. Immediately behind the Matilda tanks were the 4th Indian Division’s Bren carriers of the motorized 11th Indian Infantry Brigade. Italian artillery and infantry, behind lightly protected sandbag emplacements, faced the combined British tank-infantry assault. The enemy positions were neutralized by the British tanks’ 2-pounder turret guns and MGs.

After the victory at Nibeiwa, the other fortified camps of Tummar West and East were defeated in detail, utilizing the same method of attacking from the west or rearward side of the Italian position. During the successful attacks on these enemy camps, the 7th Armoured Division’s 4th Armoured Brigade drove north, forcing the 400-strong Italian garrison at Azzaziya to surrender.

Then on 10 December 1940, an ad hoc 1,800-strong contingent (Selby Force) and the British 16th Brigade, reinforced by Matilda II tanks of the 6th RTR, moved west along the coast road from Mersa Matruh towards Sidi Barrani, meeting considerable resistance from two Libyan and the Italian 4th Blackshirt divisions. With the artillery and Matilda tanks finally free of their delay caused by a sandstorm, along with the 11th Indian Brigade attacking from the east, the Italians surrendered late that afternoon. Some 20,000 Italians surrendered with 180 artillery guns and 60 tanks seized. Thousands more streamed westward towards Italy’s other port garrisons of Bardia and Tobruk.

On 11 December 1940, the 7th Armoured Brigade, which failed to prevent the Italian evacuation of the Sofafi and Rabia camps to the south-west due to a sandstorm, was dispatched in pursuit of these fleeing garrisons to Buq Buq west of Sidi Barrani. In the period 9–11 December, Operation COMPASS netted 38,000 Italian prisoners, 237 guns and 73 light and medium tanks at a cost of 600 killed, wounded or missing.

By 15 December, Sollum and Halfaya were captured by the British and Indian armour and infantry, as well as Fort Capuzzo. The next stage was being set, namely the attack on Bardia as the 7th Armoured Division awaited the arrival of the 6th Australian Infantry Division, which replaced the 4th Indian Division as the latter force was sent to East Africa to fight the Italians. This move deprived O’Connor of much of his artillery and transport.

Westward Allied Advance

On 1 January 1941, O’Connor’s Western Desert Force (now XIII Corps) set its eyes on Benghazi; however, first Bardia, Tobruk and Derna required capture, although there were rumblings of a British expedition to Greece. When Greece declined British military assistance, Churchill informed Wavell that Benghazi was now of the highest priority.

Bardia

After the Australian 6th Division acclimatized with desert training in Palestine and Egypt, they attacked Bardia on 3 January 1941. Lieutenant General Annibale Bergonzoli’s Italian XXIII Corps’ 40,000 defenders faced the British and Australians from within Bardia, which had an 18-mile defensive perimeter including a permanent AT ditch, barbed wire and concrete sangars. Some Italian tanks were present, but only the M13/40s with their 47mm guns were battle-worthy. After breaching the wire and filling in the AT ditch, it took only three days for the Australian infantry and British armour to capture roughly 36,000 prisoners, with Bergonzoli escaping west to Tobruk. Numerous coastal, field and AA gun pieces, armour and vehicles were also seized. Contemporaneously, Churchill took some XIII Corps’ troops and RAF elements for an expedition against the Axis in Greece, although O’Connor received permission to continue his ‘raid’ as far west as Benghazi once Tobruk and Derna were captured.

Tobruk

O’Connor’s Australians and his 4th Armoured Brigade were opposite Tobruk on 6–7 January 1941 with aggressive patrolling against the enemy defences on 9 January. Tobruk, like Bardia, possessed rings of underground concrete posts, barbed-wire entanglements and an AT ditch. The perimeter exceeded 30 miles and the garrison of the Italian XXII Corps numbered 25,000 with 220 guns and 60 light and medium tanks. By 12 January, Tobruk was surrounded with its port facilities required to replenish the British XIII Corps with all items by sea. However, the main attack by the Australians did not occur until the night of 20/21 January. After attacks by all arms, one component of the garrison under General Mannella surrendered approximately twelve hours after the assault began. On the afternoon of 22 January, Brigadier General Vincenzo Della Mura and the remaining 17,000 defenders capitulated. The Italians lost 25,000 killed, wounded and captured. The Australians, by contrast, had only 400 killed, wounded and captured. Abundant stores of food, weapons and other supplies were seized.

As Tobruk fell with the Italians retreating westward, it was decided to have XIII Corps report directly to Wavell, thereby removing Wilson’s BTE in Cairo from the chain of command and giving O’Connor more autonomy.

Derna

O’Connor continued his westward advance towards Derna with the Australian 6th Division, while the 7th Armoured Division was sent south of the Jebel Akhdar (Green Mountain) at the eastern end of the Cyrenaican ‘bulge’. The British 4th Armoured Brigade clashed with Italian armour on the Derna-Mechili track. Armed with the 47mm turret gun in their M13/40 tanks, the Italians were able to destroy some British light and cruiser tanks while losing several of their own. On 25 January 1941, Italian infantry was putting up a determined defence against the Australians at Derna; however, it was captured on 26 January after many uncoordinated actions that destroyed most of the Italian 60th Sabratha Infantry Division. With Derna’s capture, the remaining Italian divisions in eastern Libya retreated south-west to Benghazi along the coast.

The Double Envelopment and Destruction of the Italian Tenth Army at Beda Fomm, 3–7 February 1941

After capturing Derna, O’Connor maintained pursuit of the enemy, intending to destroy the entire Italian Tenth Army. The British 7th Armoured Division moved to the south-west, travelling across desert tracks via Msus and Antelat in order to cut the road below Benghazi and trap the retreating Italians in the Cyrenaican bulge with a double envelopment as the Australian 6th Division quickly pursued the Italians, who were now clinging to the coast road around the north of the Jebel Akhdar.

On 4 February 1941, the 4th Armoured Brigade, led by the 11th Hussars and the King’s Dragoon Guards (KDG), struck out across the desert, with the rough terrain necessitating those armoured car squadrons in the vanguard to intercept the retreating Italian Tenth Army. Following were tanks from the 3rd and 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR, followed by the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, AT guns of the 4th RHA and elements of the 106th RHA with truck-mounted AT 2-pounder guns. This ad hoc formation consisted of about 2,000 men. By 1530 hrs on 4 February, the 11th Hussars’ armoured