Blowing up the Danube: British intrigue in the Balkans during the Second World War

By Bernard O'Connor

After years of economic depression, when Adolph Hitler came to power in the 1930s, he re-armed Germany’s army, navy and air force. French and Polish intelligence requested British assistance in restricting German imports of oil from Romanian oilfields. They wanted help to sabotage the barge ‘tankers’ carrying oil up the River Danube to Austria and then down the River Rhine to Germany’s industrial heartland. Reducing oil reaching German refineries would mean less fuel for their warplanes, their submarines, warships, tanks, trucks and military transport.
The British Ministry of Economic Warfare devised plans for Section D, the sabotage organisation of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), to blow up the cliffs of the Iron Gates gorge, and block the Danube by sinking barges carrying cement and scrap iron.
Bernard O’Connor’s ’Blowing up the Danube’, is a documentary history which includes declassified correspondence between the Foreign Office, SIS, the War Office, Section D, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force operating in the Mediterranean and, from July 1940, the Special Operations Executive (a top secret subversive organisation ordered by Winston Churchill to ‘set Europe ablaze by sabotage.’ It also uses contemporary newspaper reports and post-war historical research, biographies and autobiographies to provide a day-to-day account of the successes and failures of British intrigues in the Balkans during the Second World War.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lulu.com
• Release date: Nov 25, 2022
• ISBN: 9781471016769

Book preview

Blowing up the Danube:

British intrigue in the Balkans during the Second World War

Bernard O’Connor

Copyright © 2022 Bernard O’Connor

All rights reserved.

 Attempts have been made to locate, contact and acknowledge copyright holders of quotes and illustrations used in my work. They have all been credited within the text and/or in the bibliography. Much appreciation is given to those who have agreed that I include their work. Any copyright owners who are not properly identified and acknowledged, get in touch so that I may make any necessary corrections.

 Small parts of this book may be reproduced in similar academic works providing due acknowledgement is given in the introduction and within the text. Any errors or suggested additions can be forwarded to me for future editions. 

 Bernard O’Connor

[e-mail]

ISBN: 978-1-4710-1676-9

Contents

Foreword

Symbols and Abbreviations used by the British Intelligence Services 1939 - 1945

Chapter One: 1939

Chapter Two: 1940

Chapter Three: 1941

Chapter Four: 1942

Chapter Five: 1943

Chapter Six: 1944

Chapter Seven: 1945 - 1950

Appendix

Bibliography

Navigation on the Danube is unrestricted and open to all flags on a footing of complete equality over the whole navigable course of the river, that is to say, between Ulm and the Black Sea, and over all the internationalised river system as defined in the succeeding article, so that no distinction is made, to the detriment of the subjects, goods and flag of any Power, between them and the subjects, goods and flag of the riparian State itself or of the State of which the subjects, goods and flag enjoy the most favoured treatment. (Article 1 of the Convention instituting the definitive statute of the Danube, signed at Paris, 23 July 1921) 

9. During 1937/38 the Germans prepared hidden dumps of food and War materials along the river banks of Bulgaria and Roumania. All the stocks for these dumps were transported by German and Hungarian barges.

10. In order to facilitate the transport of material on the river the Germans formed a merger between their own and Hungarian Shipping Companies. Later, after the occupation of Austria, the Germans seized all these boats and took them into their own Companies, having changed their international flags and names. The presence of a skeleton SOE organisation at this stage would have been invaluable in getting wind of this scheme and would have been able to take steps to sabotage the boats before it was too late.

11. In view of the foregoing, it can be clearly seen that owing to the lack of any such organisation, the Germans were able to make very good use of the river for the War in Europe. In particular she was able to form resistance cells, and keep them supplied, in all important towns adjacent to the river. Thus one of the most important trans-European lines of communications  was prepared for use by the Germans as soon as they gave the signal. These preparations also included all possible measures to ensure that the river personnel would be prepared to keep the flow of barges going even though some of the nations concerned were not an active part of the German War machine. […]

14. This River, as has been so well demonstrated by the Germans, can be used as an extremely important weapon whereby control can be maintained over Austria, Hungary, Northern Yugoslavia, Roumania and Bulgaria. Much underground activity can be carried on with little fear of detection, which could be turned to a good account by any parties taking part in either physical or trade warfare. (The National Archives (TNA) HS5/204, January 1944)

The Danube is one of the great sovereigns of the world. The very fact that the Danube has chosen to direct its course southwards from the Viennews na basin makes it one of the greatest calamities for the ambitions of the Germanic race.

An area of terrific power of this great highway, the river Danube, may be formed by the fact that the quantity of water which flows at high-water level amounts to 15,000m3 /sec. or 900,000t /min! 

However, this mighty giant has certain definite weak spots which make regular navigation very precarious and difficult even in peace time. In the case of war these weak spots have a great significance inasmuch as they might be chosen to block up the course of the water and interrupt temporarily or even definitely navigation of this river.

In order to prevent such a calamity and guard against it one must know exactly these weak spots, explain how they might be utilised in blocking up the course of the water thus causing the break up in traffic and navigation on the Danube. (TNA HS5/204, September 1939)

Blue Danube May Play Important Part in War. By E. R. YARHAM, F.R.G.S. EUROPE'S second great river, the Danube, is likely to play just as important a part economically in this war as the Rhine will most certainly do militarily. Cut off from the sea, the Danube is now the Nazis' most important link with the outside world. At the present time, they are striving desperately in the Balkans to bring about barter agreements which will enable them to ship agricultural produce and - most valuable of all — Rumanian oil to Germany before navigation on the river is hampered by the ice of winter. (Blyth News, Thursday 21 December 1939)

The Danube River, being an international waterway of paramount importance to both great and small European powers, will always give rise to contention over the question of its control. […] This River, as has been so well demonstrated by the Germans, can be used as an extremely important weapon whereby control can be maintained over Austria, Hungary, Northern Yugoslavia, Roumania and Bulgaria. Much underground activity can be carried on with little fear of detection, which could be turned to a good account by any parties taking part in either physical or trade warfare. (TNA HS5/204, 25 January 1944)

The navigable DANUBE remains, more than ever one of the enemy’s main supply lines along which petroleum, grain and other traffic, including trade with TURKEY, moved between Germany and the SOUTH EAST of EUROPE.

But in addition to this the DANUBE is now acquiring significance as an eventual, and essential, route which will have to be used by the UNITED NATIONS whether for military or for relief purposes, when German ARMIES are forced to abandon the BALKANS. (TNA HS5/204, 18 February 1944)

Foreword

Having researched British sabotage operations in Western Europe during the Second World War I found a number of folders in the National Archives in Kew containing correspondence between British intelligence agencies, diplomats and government and military officials which relate to plans to sabotage the River Danube between 1939 and 1944. What follows is very much a documentary history including letters, memoranda of face-to-face meetings and telephone conversations, reports and telegrams, many stamped TOP SECRET or MOST SECRET, newspaper articles from British and foreign newspapers, extracts from academic journals, history books, biographies and websites.

‘Blowing up the Danube’ tells very much a human and largely untold story of the day-to-day work of intelligence officers, secret agents, officials at the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economic Warfare {MEW), the Political Warfare Board (PWB), the Admiralty, ambassadors and embassy staff in Belgrade, Budapest, Cairo, Istanbul and Sofia and members of the British and American military forces in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It provides an account of the Second World War in the Balkans, admittedly through a British filter, which focuses on attempts to sabotage a major European communication link for the Germans during the war and to protect it from sabotage towards the end of the war. It is a story that reveals inter-service rivalry, national and international diplomacy, personal and political disagreements, nationalism, racism, sexism, intrigue and deception.

I need to acknowledge the assistance of Special Operation Executive (SOE) historian Steven Kippax and the staff of the National Archives for providing access to the SOE files. As much of wartime correspondence was secret, most secret or top secret, for security reasons symbols were used for intelligence officers and important personnel. Fred Judge, the senior archivist at Chicksands Intelligence Museum, Bedfordshire,  compiled an exhaustive list of these symbols which has been enormously helpful in allowing me to identify the names of virtually all the intelligence officers and groups referred to in the documents. Those unidentified, I have added a question mark in brackets. Should a reader be able to identify them, contact the author who will update his account.

Steve Tyas, another SOE historian, provided valuable help with individuals and organisations. Vince Fazio and the Australian Naval Historical Society of Australia, Inc, allowed me to include extracts of an article on Operation HUSH HUSH.  Malcolm Atkin provided details of some of the personalities employed by Section D, a subversive organisation within the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Others whose research needs to be acknowledged include ‘‘Jules’ Tennant for his Juleswings Militaria website which investigated two SOE operations in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the historian Edward Thompson for his biographies of his younger brother who was executed in Bulgaria and Alan Ogden for his research into SOE operations in the Balkans.

Text in quotations in square brackets is my explanatory information. Should there be non-English readers, I have added explanations of contemporary English idioms. Occasionally telegrams contain such terms as ‘gp mut’, ‘gp undec’ or ‘gps omit’. These were comments made by the decoders of transcribed wireless transmissions who were unable to understand certain groups of numbers used in the messages, either because of the wireless operator’s typographical error, poor atmospheric conditions produced mutilated or missing numbers which made the message undecipherable.

There were different spellings used by contemporary writers for example Roumania, Rumania and Romania. Where I have identified errors, I have drawn attention to them using [sic]. I found relevant articles on the British Newspaper Archive and Trove websites. As the scans of articles produced a number of typographical errors like lv for k, cl for d and c for e, I have endeavoured to correct such mistakes. People’s names and place names are as they were found in the documents. I have to admit that, to save space, I did not use paragraphs in the newspaper articles. I also need to apologise as not all the accents used in Balkan languages have been used in the text. In many cases the writer of the correspondence or the newspaper reporter did not use them.

There will be a degree of repetition in places where different people give their accounts of the same incidents and also chronological errors where, for example, on some days there was a glut of correspondence which may not have been filed in the order that it was received. Any errors identified, please send me details and page numbers so that, in the interest of historical accuracy, I can correct the text for a future edition.

Whilst I have made comments in places, you, the reader, will realise that the correspondence sometimes refers to telegrams, memos, reports, maps and appendices which were not included in the file. One is therefore left to make assumptions, inferences, deductions, identify allusions and come to your own conclusions that help give you a better picture of the successes and failures of Britain’s sabotage and anti-sabotage of the Danube.

Symbols and Abbreviations used by the British Intelligence Services 1939 - 1945

11-land      Bulgaria

12-land      Germany

14-land      Romania

15-land      Hungary

35-land      Yugoslavia

38-land      Serbia

AA      Air Attaché

ACASI

A/CD      Air Commodore Robert ‘Archie’ Boyle, SOE’s Director of Security, Intelligence and Personnel

ACSS

AD6      Godfrey Phillips

AD/E      Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman, Head of SOE’s London Group

AD/P      Commander John Senter, SOE’s Head of Security

AEAF       Allied Expeditionary Air Force

AFHQ      Allied Forces HQ

AH 1      Josef Radziminski

AH 31       General Draza Mihailovic

AH 90       ?Tranthov

AH 191       ?Boyan Danovski

A/HA      Julian Amery

A/HM       Jacob Altmeyer

ALO      Air Liaison Office

Amm      Ammunition

AMX      Captain E.H. Sherren, London liaison officer with Massingham, SOE’s base near Algiers

ANCXF       Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force

ATF      Air Transport Form

B.1      Jugoslavia

B.2      Bulgaria

B.3.      Rumania

B.4      Hungary (part of MP – Poland)

B.5      Crete

B.6      Greece

B.7      unallotted

B.8      Albania

B.9

BAF      ?British Air Force

BANU      Bulgarian Agrarian National Union

BCRA      Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action – France’s intelligence service

BBLO      British Liaison Officer

BD      Bomb Disposal

BGS      ?Brigadier General Staff

BLM      British Liaison Mission

BMM      British Military Mission

BMO      British Military Officer

BNLO      British Naval Liaison Officer

BOSC       ?Base Operating Support Contract

C      Special Intelligence Service (SIS)

C      Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of SIS

CD      Sir Frank Nelson, Head of SOE from July 1940 to April 1942

CD      Sir Charles Hambro, Head of SOE from April 1942 to September 1943

CD      Sir Colin Gubbins, Head of SOE from September 1943 to January 1946

CGS       Chief of the General Staff

CID      Commission Internationale du Danube

CLO      ?Chief Logistics Officer

CMF      ?Central Mediterranean Force

COHQ       Combined Operations Headquarters

COS      Chief of Staff

COSSAC  Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command

Coy      Company

CTF       Combined Task Force

CX      Prefix for ‘Ultra’ messages (translations of intercepted enemy communications decoded at Bletchley Park)

D      Section D

D      Laurence Grand, Head of Section D

DA      Delayed Action (detonation)

D/A       Lt Col. D. Courtauld, SOE’s Director of Administration

D/FIN       Group Captain John Venner, Head of SOE’s Finance Section

D/H       SOE’s Balkan Section

D/H      George Taylor

D/H1      George Goodwill (Taylor’s deputy)

D/H2      Col. Bill Bailey

D/H4      Trevor Glanville

D/H5      W. R. Young

D/H6      Alexander Lawrenson

D/H8      Charles Blackley

D/H13      Alfred ‘Chas’ de Chastelain

D/H14        Captain Joseph Peters

D/H18      Basil Davison

D/H19      Robert Head

D/H27      Nigel Westall, controlled arms dump in Alexandria

D/H28      George Lofoglu

D/H29      Norman Davies

D/H42       Alexander Ross, Military Attaché in Sofia

D/H44      William Harris Burland

D/H50      Geoffrey McDermott

D/H70      Lt Col. Peter Boughey

D/H98

D/H109       Capt. T. F. Miller Force 133 supplies

D/H134      William Deakin

D/H170       Major Ernest Last, Head of SOE’s Bulgarian/Yugoslav Section in Cairo

D/H205

D/H207       Lt Col. Anthony Kendall

D/HF            Frederick Wedlake, organised ‘Friends’ network in Romania

D/HL

D/HP      George Pollock

D/HS      Lt Col. Bickham Sweet-Escott

D/HT       Lt Col Talbot-Rice

D/HU

D/HV       Col. Pearson

D/HW

D/HY       Lt Col Thomas Masterson, Head of SOE’s Yugoslavia and Albania Section

D/HX       Major Francis Nixon, Head of SOE’s Middle East and Turkish Section

D/HZ       Duane ‘Bill’ Hudson

D/Navy      Admiralty

DNI      Department of Naval Intelligence (sometimes written NID)

DP      SOE’s Russian Section

DP       Major Harold Seddon, Head of SOE’s Russian Section

D/P 101       George Hill, Head of SOE’s Moscow Mission

DPA

DSO      Division of Special Operations (Cairo)

DSP

DSO.(b).1 ?Defence Security Officer

D/XE       John Dolphin, Head of London Farm Technical Section, later The Frythe, Hertfordshire

ERA       Engine room artificer

EUP      SOE’s Polish Section

FO      Foreign Office

FOLEM       Flag Officer Levant and Eastern Mediterranean

GCCS      Government Code and Cypher School

G/Ops      ?General Operations

GS      General Staff

HE      High Explosive

HE      His Excellency

HMAS      His Majesty’s Australian Ship

HMG      His Majesty’s Government

HMG      Heavy machine gun

HMR      His Majesty’s Representative

HMS      His Majesty’s Ship

HO      Home Office

HQ      Headquarters

ISLD      Inter Services Liaison Department (SIS)

ISRB      Inter Services Research Bureau, cover name of SOE

JANL       Yugoslav Army

JIC      Joint Intelligence Committee

LMG      Light Machine Gun

LST      Landing Ship Tank

MA      Military Attaché

MEW      Ministry of Economic Warfare

MI3       Military Intelligence Eastern Europe and the Balkans

MI5      Military Intelligence domestic security

MI6       Military Intelligence security of Britain’s overseas interests

MI7a       Military Intelligence Section responsible for Press and Propaganda

MI(R)      Military Intelligence (Research)

MOI(SP)  Cover name for SOE ?Ministry of Information Special Purposes

MP      SOE’s Polish Section

MSS       Most Secret Sources

MT      Military Transport

MEF      ?Middle East Force

MTB      Motor Torpedo Boat

MWT      Ministry of War Transport

NA       Naval Attaché

NID      Naval Intelligence Division

NKVD       Norodny Kommissariat Vnutrennich Dyel, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs

OF      The Bulgarian Fatherland Front

OSS      Office of Strategic Services

PID      Political Intelligence Department (Foreign Office)

Pse      Please

P.M.       Prime Minister

POG(D)       ?Port Operations Group (Danube)

POL      ?Polish

PRU      Photo Recognition Unit

PWB      Political Warfare Board

PWE      Political Warfare Executive

Pzns      Partizans

RAF      Royal Air Force

RAN      Royal Australian Navy

RE      Royal Engineers

Recd      Received

RN      Royal Navy

RNVR      Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve

Rgt      Regiment

Rpt      Repeat

S      SOE’s Scandinavian Section

S      George Wiskeman

SAAF       South African Air Force

SASO       ?Special Air Service Officer

SD      Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers, the Nazi Party’s intelligence service

SHAEF      Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

SIS      Secret Intelligence Service

SITREP      Situation report

SMG      Small Machine Gun

SO      Special Operations

SO1      Propaganda

SO2      Sabotage

SO3      Planning

SOC

SOE       Special Operations Executive

SOELIQ       ?SOE Liquidation  (closing down) Team

SPP      Serbian Peasants Party

SR      Service de Renseignement - France’s wartime Military Intelligence

TNT      Trinitrotoluene [explosive]

U      United States

USAFIME United States Air Force in Middle East

Vide      See

W      SOE’s West Africa Section

WEF      With effect from

WT      Wireless Telegraphy

Yr      your/year

ZP      Foreign Office

The Danube river basin (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Commission_for_the_Protection_of_the_Danube_River)

WWII - The Balkans 1941: Invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, April 1941

http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/balkan_1941_april.htm

Wartime map of Balkans

Present day map of South East Europe (https://www.britannica.com/place/Danube-River)

(https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/map/bulgaria-1933)

(https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/map/bulgaria-border-changes-1939-1942)

Chapter One: 1939

Two years after the end of the First World War, representatives of the governments of Belgium, France, Britain, Greece, Italy, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czechoslovakia signed the convention instituting the definitive statute of the River Danube in Paris on 23 July 1921. In accordance with the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, its regulations assured unrestricted navigation.

Clair Price, a New York Times’ journalist, reported in 1925 that Furness, Withy and Company, large British shipowners,  obtained a virtual monopoly of Danube river traffic. ‘It was operating a steamer service from British ports to the Levant [Eastern Mediterranean], the Black Sea and to Sulina, Galatz and Braila, where British tonnage has long been preponderant.’ (Clair Price, New York Times, January 25, 1925, p.4) However, during the 1930s, German shipping companies began to dominate Danube traffic, importing crude oil, petroleum, bauxite, cement, wheat, barley, corn, hides, salt, fish, lumber, wool and tobacco and exporting manufactured goods. Germany’s occupation of Austria in March 1938 gave them greater control of Danube traffic having access to the port facilities in Vienna.

Collecting economic, political and military intelligence of other countries was the responsibility of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Responsible for Britain’s overseas security, SIS had links with the Military, Naval, Air and other attachés based in British embassies, consulates and legations overseas. These officers, all men, liaised with their counterparts in the host country, listened to local radio programmes, watched their television programmes, read newspapers, magazines and books and acquired detailed knowledge of the country’s military capabilities, economic activities, politics and social life. Amongst the diplomatic staff were passport control officers, ostensibly to facilitate visas and oversee immigration but amongst them were intelligence officers employed by SIS. They used Passport Control as a cover to collect intelligence, sometimes supplied by agents and sub-agents in return for financial assistance, sometimes acquired through illegal means. The information which was collated and analysed to generate reports that were used to provide the Foreign Office with up-to-date accounts of the situation in the host country to advise the Government on security, defence, and economic policies. The intelligence was also used by MI(R) (Military Intelligence (Research) in preparation for and throughout a war.

In April 1938, Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair, then Head of SIS and known in correspondence as ‘C’, recognised that collecting, collating, analysing and providing reports on other countries’ military potential, economic development and changing politics for government ministries, although invaluable, was not going to be enough during another expected war with Germany. The German war machine was heavily dependent on imported oil that was transported up the Danube from the Baku and Ploesti oilfields. He ordered the creation of a subversive organisation known as Section D or its ‘Sabotage Service’. Headed by Colonel Laurence Grand, its task was to prepare for underground warfare against the Nazis using a combination of sabotage, black propaganda and political warfare. Officers were recruited from the military, industry, business and commerce who began investigating ways of limiting Germany’s access to oil and other materials needed for its war effort. It had access to government funds to recruit agents and acquire explosives, detonators and other sabotage material for various schemes. (Atkin, Malcolm, Section D for Destruction: Forerunner of SOE, Appendix 2: Officers, Agents and Contacts of Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service, Pen and Sword, 2018)

By August 1938, the regime of the International Danube Commission had been swept away by Adolph Hitler’s growing power, putting control of the river in the hands of the Germans. The Munich Agreement in September 1938 granted Germany the Sudetenland, northern Czechoslovakia, and five months later, German troops occupied the whole of the country giving them access to the port city of Bratislava. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commissions_of_the_ Danube_River) Governments of neighbouring countries were concerned.

Nottingham Journal, Tuesday 21 March 1939, ANXIETY CONTINUES IN RUMANIA. Bucharest, Monday. There is extreme nervousness in Bucharest to-night. King Carol at a late hour was still in conference with Rumanian Premier and Chief of General Staff [the head of a group of officers that assisted the commander of a division or larger unit by formulating and disseminating their policies, transmitting their orders, and overseeing their execution]. They are understood to be discussing talks between Rumanian Ministers in London and Paris with British and French Governments. - British United Press. MOST CZECHS OPPOSED TO Germans. Prague. Monday. Foreign observers in Prague believe that more than 90 per cent of the Czech people are still intensely hostile to German rule, and likely to repeat tactics of undermining the regime which they carried on for generations against Austro-Hungarian empire. Believed that if Germany were involved in a war she would have to count on costly sabotage throughout Bohemia and Moravia. German military authorities asked for keys of at least one Czech garrison to-day. Believed they are searching for concealed arms.—British United Press. 

Yorkshire Evening Post, Thursday 20 April 1939, GREATEST GERMAN IS FIFTY TODAY. ORGY OF HITLER WORSHIP but Nazi diplomacy fails. ROUMANIA KEEPING OUT OF AXIS [Germany, Austria, Hungaria and Italy]. Berlin today is the scene of an orgy of Hitler worship, with elaborately staged celebrations in honour of the Nazi party leader's 50th birthday. EVEN on this day of Nazi rejoicing it is admitted in Berlin that Hitler's foreign policy is not altogether succeeding to the extent that it has done in the past. Efforts to win over Romania to the Axis policy have failed, according to information relating to the visit of M. Gafencu, Roumanian Foreign Minister, to the German capital. In a tribute to Hitler in the Nazi newspaper Voelkischer Beobachter to-day, Marshal Goering declares Adolf Hitler is the greatest German of all times. RUMANIA REMAINS FIRM. BERLIN. Thursday. Efforts by Germany to win Roumania to the policy of the Axis Powers have not succeeded, according to reliable circles in Berlin. Dr Gafencu, Roumanian Foreign Minister, who is now in Berlin, has had interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. It is reported that Dr. Gafencu firmly insisted that Roumania was determined in all circumstance to maintain its present absolute neutrality. Both in German and Roumanian circles  however, the talks are described as satisfactory." Dr Gafencu is remaining in Berlin for the celebration of Herr Hitler's birthday. It is understood that It was agreed to continue trade discussions in the near future. These new conversations aim at bringing the trade relations of the two countries even closer than was achieved under the German-Roumanian Agreement negotiated in Budapest.

With Britain’s economy largely dependent on trade with its empire, its merchant shipping, defended by the Royal Navy, had a presence in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. During the 1930s, the British Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was actively collecting up-to-date information about the importance of the Danube in helping Germany rebuild its economy and military capabilities. The British Government set up its own Danube Committee with Admiral Roger Bellairs, the co-ordinator of Secret Intelligence as chairman. Part of its remit was to examine ways of limiting the use of the river by the Germans and Section D was allocated the task of implementing their plans.

Sinclair’s deputy in SIS was Sir Stewart Menzies who, concerned that a future war would lead to the evacuation of British embassies and consulates and the loss of their intelligence-gathering potential, purchased Bletchley Park, a secluded mansion with extensive grounds, a few minutes’ walk from Bletchley railway station, about fifty miles northwest of London. He planned to train men in espionage skills, wireless telegraphy and sabotage and infiltrate them back into Europe to re-establish links with SIS’s existing contact to ensure Britain had up-to-date intelligence and instigate sabotage against Germany’s military and economic interests.

Menzies’ plans had to change when the government relocated their Codes and Cypher Section to Bletchley Park. He then arranged the requisition of Brickendonbury Manor, another secluded mansion with extensive grounds near Hertford, about twenty-five miles northeast of London. This became Section D’s sabotage school and, once trained and briefed, its agents were flown out of nearby airfields and parachuted into Europe. Initially, they took pigeons to send their reports back to the loft above the station commander’s garage in Bletchley Park. Later the agents were dropped with wireless sets in heavily padded packages.

Malcolm Atkin’s research into Section D revealed that their representative in Rumania and Hungary was Horace Emery, a Canadian who had been director of Allied Electrical Appliances (Great Britain) and a former employee of Singer Motor Car Company. He was by Section D to work in their Scientific Section where he assisted in the design of the mechanics of the ‘Time Pencil’. This small device contained a specific concentration of sulphuric acid which dissolved a metal spring over a predetermined amount of time, releasing a detonator which set off an explosive charge. He then became a supply officer for the Balkans. Based in Romania and Hungary, he was particularly concerned with negotiations to purchase the Balkan tug fleets for Section D and attempts to engage pilots of the Balkan tug fleets to work for the British rather than for the Germans. (Atkin, op.cit. p.24)

Section D’s representative in Yugoslavia was Hugh Seton-Watson who Atkin described as  ‘The son of Robert Seton-Watson, a prominent campaigner for Serbian independence before the First World War and who was an intelligence officer working on propaganda in the Balkans. Hugh was educated at Winchester College and New College, Oxford. After graduating in 1938 he travelled across the Balkans, meeting former friends of his father including Jovan Djonovic [Serbian journalist] and Iuliu Maniu [former Prime Minister of Rumania], who were to become important allies of Section D and SOE [referred to later]. He joined the Foreign Office, working at the start of the Second World War in the Press Office of the Bucharest Legation and then in Belgrade where he worked closely with Section D.’ (Atkin, op.cit. p.65)

Alan Ogden’s Through Hitler’s Back Door, an account of SOE’s operations in the Balkans, shed light on Romania’s oilfields before the start of the Second World War and Britain’s involvement.

Astra Romana, the largest, was 60-75 per cent owned by Royal Dutch Shell (in turn 60 per cent Dutch and 40 per cent British), the remainder by French and Romanian shareholders. Astra was run out of London.

Steaua Romana was over 50 per cent owned by Romanians (State 19 per cent, banks 19.8 per cent and others 12.4 per cent), the rest by French and British interests, mainly Anglo-Iranian (BP) and Royal Dutch Shell through Steaua British, and OMNIUM-Paribas. In reality, it was run by the British and the French.

Concordia was 60 per cent Romanian owned (mainly Banca Commerciala Romana) and the rest by Petrofina, itself owned by Societe Generale de Belgique and Banque de l’Union Parisienne. Again, run by Petrofina.

Unirea, owned by Phoenix Oil and Transport London.

Colombia, entirely French owned (L’Omnium Francais des Petroles and Group Desmarais).

Creditul Minier, purely Romania.

Romana Americana, a subsidiary of Standard Oil.

The Germans who, under the terms of the Treaty of San Remo in 1920, had been dispossessed of all their holdings in the Romanian oil industry, had made slow progress in re-establishing themselves and by 1937 controlled Mirafor, Consortuil Petroluliu and Buna Speranta, which together accounted for a paltry 0.22 per cent of production compared to the 67 per cent of Britain France, Belgium and Holland.

In 1939, after a hesitant start when the British Treasury was reluctant to make good the commercial agreement signed that May between Britain and Romania, which pledged to stimulate the production and export of oil to Britain, Britain had subsequently successfully its strategic and commercial interests in Romania by some quick-footed economic warfare against Germany. On 6 September, the British Ambassador to Bucharest, Sir Reginald Hoare, called a meeting of Astra, Steaua and Unirea, the three oil companies owned by the British, They agreed to purchase the greatest possible amount of petrol produced by their Romanian subsidiaries, thereby cornering the market and at the same time to stop sales to Germany. By 16 September, Steaua and Unirea had ceased trading with Germany. (Ogden, Alan, Through Hitler’s back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, Pen and Sword, 2010, pp.226-7)

The Danube River file in the National Archive started in August 1939 with a collection of maps generated by officers employed by the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) which showed potential sabotage targets. The Danube was part of the longest waterway system in Europe which transported coal, oil, cement, foodstuffs, machinery, etc between the Black Sea, the Baltic and the North Sea. In advance of another war in Europe, the British intelligence service had prepared detailed plans to attack targets which would produce a serious economic impact on Germany’s military potential. Their industrial economy was fuelled by coal available in vast quantities in Germany, France and Poland but their tanks, military transport, aircraft, ships and submarines needed oil.  Before the use of pipelines, petroleum, oil and lubricant products (POL) from Rumanian oilfields and refineries were brought to Germany by barge tankers. In some parts of the river, where navigation was difficult, experienced pilots were needed who used tug boats to pull the barges.

Maps of potential sabotage targets on the River Danube (TNA HS5/204)

The maps accompanied a series of reports on potential sabotage targets on the Danube.

REPORT relating to certain weak points in navigation and water-carriage on the river Danube.

The Danube is one of the great sovereigns of the world. The very fact that the Danube has chosen to direct its course southwards from the Vienna basin makes it one of the greatest calamities for the ambitions of the Germanic race.

An area of terrific power of this great highway, the river Danube, may be formed by the fact that the quantity of water which flows at high-water level amounts to 15,000m3 /sec. or 900,000t /min! 

However, this mighty giant has certain definite weak spots which make regular navigation very precarious and difficult even in peace time. In the case of war these weak spots have a great significance inasmuch as they might be chosen to block up the course of the water and interrupt temporarily or even definitely navigation of this river.

In order to prevent such a calamity and guard against it one must know exactly these weak spots, explain how they might be utilised in blocking up the course of the water thus causing the break up in traffic and navigation on the Danube.

The most vulnerable spots on the Danube are the following:

1) Jutz channel situated between Km 986-987,5. This spot is just close to the little town of Donji Milanovatz.

2) the narrowest point lies exactly in the defile of Kazan. On this point the Danube is only 115 m wide. This spot lies on Km. 967.5.

3) The Canal of Sip.

For the Jutz channel captain Popescu, one of the ablest of our officers on the Danube says: Jutz is our most vulnerable and most dangerous spot on the Danube. At high-water level the current is so swift that a steam-boat always runs a risk of being thrown upon the cliffs. Five to six barges sunk longitudinally here in this channel would break up completely navigation of the Danube.

The same holds good for the channel of Sip, where the same method of blocking could be used. Kilometrage computed from the Black Sea. (Ibid, 27 August 1939)

KAZAN PASS.

The Kazan pass offers possibilities of impeding transport by blasting the cliffs alongside into the channel of the river. The river in some places is 40 metres deep, so that it would take a large amount of material to constitute an obstruction of traffic. The channel is so narrow, however, for the amount of water passing through, that any appreciable amount of material dumped into the river would so increase the current as to slow down traffic. If the work of blasting down the cliffs was done progressively, there is sufficient material close at hand almost entirely to spoil the possibility of navigation of this stretch of the river for some time to come.

The amount of work it would be possible to do depends on the length of time that could be taken for doing the job.

The cliffs lend themselves to blasting economically, as the construction is in some places limestone, and in other places granite, but in both cases heavily fissured, so that the disposition of charges of explosives would be quite easy. The approach to the position would not be so easy.

It will be noted on Map No. 35 attached, that the position of the village of KAZAN is on the Roumanian side of the river. There is a road running along that side of the river, in places cut out of the solid rock. The majority of blasting, however, would be done from the opposite bank of the river, that is, the Yugoslavian side, where the roads run within a certain distance of the hills in question; but the top of the cliffs is only approached by narrow footpaths. The placing of explosives will have to be carried out by people who are accustomed to carrying heavy weights up very steep slopes. These men could undoubtedly be found in the district by Army Sapper [engineer] officers. If it were done after the outbreak of hostilities, it would take the form of guerilla warfare [spelt guerrilla in some documents].

H. [Julius Hanau, referred to later] can secure the necessary supply of explosives, and arrange for its delivery somewhere near the scene of action. the country at this point is so wild, that it would be very easy to find hidden storing places for a large amount of explosives. I think that 100 tons of explosives should produce a first class job.

Attached Charts

Chart No. 22 (See Pilots Charts Danube). Shows steep cliffs on the Roumanian shore, between kilometre posts 971-972. The river narrows about two thirds of the way upstream between No. post 973-974, with a depth of 20 metres. It is no use trying to do anything on the Yugoslav side of the river at this point, as the stone formation slopes up gradually, too gradually to be much use without very heavy work. On the Roumanian side there are several places where charges of explosives could be laid, that would release a considerable quantity of stone, which would completely block the roadway, and cause a considerable change in the speed of the current, and the general navigation of this part of the river.

Personnel This job would have to be done in conjunction with the Roumanian Government. My understanding is that their collaboration in a scheme of this kind is doubtful, as generally speaking, they are not so fearful of being controlled by Germany as the Serbians. (Ibid.)

Report No. 3                   9 September 1939

Since the blocking up of the Danube at or in the section of Iron Gates could raise trouble with neutral Roumania and Yugoslavia, a second alternative could be contemplated.

The Danube between Budapest and Vienna covers about 280 kilometres (170 miles). Halfway there is a little town called Goenyue. Between Goenyue and Bratislava (49 miles). The Danube is divided in several small channels, of which only one or two are kept navigable by continual dragging work.

The channels are marked on the map and their mouths up and down stream are well known to special local pilots.

The blocking up of such a channel would stop the navigation until either the junk ships are lifted or another channel is dragged to a sufficient depth.

Any section or channel down stream of Bratislava, if blocked up, will leave the trade between the neutral countries, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary free, but would stop transports for German or German occupied ports (Bratislava, Vienna, etc.)

British ships are not operating now on these shores. Other means must be considered for this task and the only way is the following.

Reliable men (British or Czech) should proceed there (Bratislava or Hungarian small ports across the Danube) and cause an explosion of a German ship, preferably a big tugboat, going downstream.

The tugboat should not be taken at random, but chosen to be a big one and towing a great convoy of barges and tankers. If such a tugboat explodes and sinks the following towed barges and tankers will strike the sunk ship and block up the channel for a considerable period of time. Detonators or time arranged machines should be used to explode two or three hours later.

If approaching a German ship is a too difficult task a Slovak convoy could be contemplated. If suitable connections with Czech leaders in this country or in France could be established, the scheme of blocking up the Danube with the help of the Slovak Shipping Company could be realised with the maximum of efficiency.

The managers and higher staffs of the Slovak (former Czecho-Slovak) Co. are known to me and are profoundly anti-Nazi. I am sure some of the crew are the same.

Details concerning channels and points of the section suitable for the scheme could be given only by the map to hand. The only map I had is in your files.

Mem. I remember the suggestion for cooperation with the French Shipping Co. on the Danube. (See Report No. 1). (Ibid. 9 September 1939)

Following Hitler’s order for the invasion of Poland at the beginning of September, Britain declared war on Germany in support of her ally. According to a Foreign Office report, the Polish General Staff submitted a proposal from their secret intelligence service to the British Government, a plan to sabotage the River Danube. The Poles’ idea was that it would stop the barge traffic carrying oil from the oilfields in Russia and Rumania to Germany, vital to Hitler’s war effort. If the British supplied the sabotage materials, the Poles would supply the saboteurs and the funds. (TNA FO1093/187)  The Foreign Office, as shall be seen, was against acts of sabotage being undertaken in neutral countries. However, as shall be seen, some SIS officers were in favour.

Northern Whig, Wednesday 13 September 1939, GERMAN DEMANDS ON YUGO-SLAVIA. Double the Delivery of Pigs. ("Times'' Telegram.) Belgrade, Tuesday, It is reported in Belgrade that Germany is demanding from Yugoslavia double the deliveries of pigs at present fixed at 150,000 annually against credit. The northward flow of Yugoslav exports has slackened because of transport difficulties, as 7,000 railway waggons and 170 Danube barges are held up in Germany. This and the credit terms requested are causing Yugoslav resistance to the German demand, though the Government maintains a strictly neutral policy based on a close economic collaboration with Germany. The main bulk of the wheat due to Germany has already been delivered, but bauxite, on the British contraband list, proceeding to Germany was seized at Gibraltar. Copper from the Bor mines, with output of 20,000 tons refined and 60,000 tons unrefined annually, will be sold only against free currency. Increased domestic demands for emergency storage purposes in Yugoslavia are expected to cause the exports of beans and maize to Germany to fall below promises.—Per Press Association.

Caesar, who Despard was asked to consult, was Section D’s codename for Julius Hanau who Atkin described the Section’s main agent in the Balkans. Hanau has a personnel file in the National Archive which includes a form stating that he was a British businessman born on 25 April 1885. According to Atkin, he was

Born into a South African Jewish family but converted to Christianity and became a British citizen. He lived for five years in South America but at the start of the First World War, he returned to England in order to enlist. He was commissioned into the Army Service Corps as a Second Lieutenant in September 1916 and was Mentioned in Dispatches in 1918 for service in Salonica; in November 1919 he was awarded the Serbian Order of the White Eagle (with swords) 4th class. Hanau was demobilised with the rank of Major but was already an agent of SIS. He lived in Yugoslavia from 1920 as director of the ABC Hire Purchase company and a commercial agent for other British companies, including Vickers Engineering.

Julius Hanau, codenamed CAESAR, was D Section’s main agent in the Balkans (TNA HS9/653/2)

In addition, he sent monthly reports back to SIS on the state of Yugoslavia, with firm instructions that this work was to be kept secret from the British Legation. Hanau was in contact with Laurence Grand from December 1938 and, following a visit to London, formally joined Section D as head agent in Yugoslavia in March 1939 at a salary of £1,000 p.a. (making him one of Section D’s highest paid officers). He immediately began sabotage operations against the Nazis in Yugoslavia, using alliances with sympathetic Slovenian, Czech and Croat groups and with good contacts within the Yugoslav police and intelligence services (such as Ante Anić [referred to later]). The Nazis tried to retaliate but Grand warned that any attacks on Hanau’s agents would be met by the assassination of Gestapo agents in the country. Hanau was one of Section D’s and later SOE’s most important and successful officers, although his anti-Nazi fanaticism coupled with a mischievous sense of humour meant that he perhaps ‘needled’ [annoyed] the Germans unnecessarily at times, drawing undue attention both from the enemy and the British Minister in Belgrade. (Atkin, op.cit. p.34)

A key contact of Section D in Yugoslavia was Major Ante Anić, codenamed Magpie. According to Atkin, he was a Croatian major in the Yugoslav military intelligence,

Serving in 1939 as the commander of the border police in Maribor. A long-established anti-fascist, Anić was one of those Yugoslav officials that Julius Hanau, head agent in Yugoslavia, had cultivated over many years. Anić collaborated closely with Hanau and Trevor Glanville in Section D during 1939 – 40, continuing to work with Glanville in SOE until the German invasion of April 1941. Glanville’s appreciation of his services, as contained in a note of 1945 in Anić’s SOE file, includes railway sabotage by ‘hot-boxing’, infiltration of ‘doped’ coal into engine tenders (coal with inserted plastic explosives as developed at Aston House and later found in Geoffrey Frodsham’s flat), misdirecting enemy railway traffic by altering movement tickets, running propaganda into enemy territory, destroying German propaganda, ‘eliminating enemy agents’, helping to organise the Austrian Social Democratic Party, distributing allied propaganda in Yugoslavia, organising Yugoslav police to act as Section D couriers and smoothing over any incidents between Section D and the authorities. In 1941 Anić was briefly arrested for distributing allied propaganda but was released in time to assist with the Yugoslav demolition scheme that followed the German invasion. After the German invasion he established an effective intelligence organisation working with SIS, with a headquarters first in Ljubljana and then in Trieste. His group in Split was organised by Vladimir  Feller and Milko Brezigar who had both also worked previously with Section D. Anić’s organisation was finally broken by German intelligence in 1944 and was followed by a roundup of pro-allied politicians and academics. Anić survived the war but as a known collaborator with British Intelligence, he was obliged to flee communist Yugoslavia. Having become a stateless person, he finally emigrated with his family from Italy to Brazil in 1955 under the name of Antonio Anić. Glanville concluded in 1945 that Anić was unlikely to accept a monetary reward but considered that his sabotage work merited a British decoration. (Atkin, op.cit. pp.5-6)

Atkin also provided an account of Trevor Glanville.

Born in Rhodesia, the son of a GPO linesman. He was educated at Christ’s Hospital and became an articled clerk in 1925. Glanville was known as ‘Sancho’ or ‘Buster’ with a keen interest in steam trains and speaking fluent Serbo-Croat, French, German and Russian. From 1935 he worked as a chartered accountant for Price Waterhouse and Co. in Zagreb, meeting his Russian wife there, who he married in 1941. Having been rejected for service by Naval Intelligence, he joined Section D at end of October 1939, being described as loyal ‘but likely to put his foot in it’ and also worked simultaneously for MEW and MOI. As cover and to provide a degree of legal protection for his activities, he officially became Vice-Consul in Zagreb in March 1940. His work was mainly in the field of propaganda, including being involved with the production of the underground newspaper Alarm. Glanville also organised a railway sabotage group of Slovenian allies, working with Ante Anić from Yugoslav intelligence. After the demise of Section D, Glanville continued working for SOE in Yugoslavia and was commissioned as an army officer onto the General List in March 1941. He was briefly arrested in April 1941 in Zagreb by pro-Nazi Croats but was exchanged for some Italian prisoners and was then evacuated with the rest of the Belgrade Legation. Glanville brought out of captivity information on the operations in the Balkans of the Abwehrkommando, the special intelligence assault units of the Abwehr. Ironically George Taylor, formerly of Section D but now Chief of Staff in SOE, although enthusiastic about a British equivalent, had to explain that collecting intelligence was beyond the remit of SOE and that SIS – with the demise of Section D – no longer had a suitable offensive section. Both Naval Intelligence and the War Office were attracted to the concept with SIS maintaining an interest in discussions through Commander Arnold-Forster, also formerly of Section D. In March 1942 Ian Fleming of Naval Intelligence revived discussion of the concept and the Joint Intelligence Board eventually established the Inter-Services Special Intelligence Unit in August 1942 (later re-designated 30 Assault Unit), under Commander Ryder and administered by Combined Operations. In November 1941 Glanville took a job at the Lisbon Embassy as a civilian working jointly for MEW, SIS and SOE, relinquishing his army commission. He resigned in April 1943 and joined 30 Assault Unit, being re-invented as a sub-lieutenant in the RNVR. Their task was to move ahead of advancing allied forces to capture intelligence assets. He saw action with 30 Assault Unit in Sicily, Salerno, the D Day landings (for which he was the targeting officer) and in Germany. He then commanded a detachment in Indo-China during 1945. He wrote the official history of 30 Assault Unit after the war and co-edited the later published account in Attain by Surprise (1997). (Ibid, p.27)

G. Taylor

George Taylor, first head of SOE’s Balkans and Middle East Section, later Director of SOE’s Overseas Groups and Missions and one of SOE’s Chiefs of Staff. (https://www.specialforcesroh.com/index.php?Threads/taylor-george-francis.31561/)

George Taylor, who had worked as a journalist and for Shell Oil Company before the war was recruited by Grand in July 1939 to head Section D’s Balkan network with Leslie Sheridan as his second in command. In January 1940, Sheridan was replaced by Arthur Goodwill, an Oxford graduate who had also worked with Shell in Australia and was a friend of Taylor. (TNA HS9/500/3)

According to Taylor’s biography, his first task was to staunch the flow of Romanian oil to Germany,

…but his contribution lay as much in defining strategy and tactics as it did in conducting operations. Before the fall of France, he advocated sabotage of communications by local patriots under British direction; after June, he was an architect of the 'secret army' strategy, by which Britain hoped to foment uprisings in occupied Europe.

The Special Operations Executive, created in July 1940, incorporated Section D. Taylor became chief of staff to Sir Frank Nelson, S.O.E.'s first executive head. Finding that Taylor's Balkan organization was the only functional asset inherited from the section, Nelson sent him to the region in January 1941 to oversee measures to counter the Germans' expected offensive. When the Yugoslav government succumbed to Nazi coercion on 25 March, S.O.E. agents promoted the military coup which toppled it thirty-six hours later. After the Germans invaded, Taylor and most of his colleagues were captured by the Italians while trying to escape from the Adriatic coast. Mistakenly assumed to be a diplomat, he was held for two months before being released. Back in London, he was made director of [SOE’s] overseas groups and missions in March 1942. (Wheeler, Mark, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 16 , 2002; https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ taylor-george-francis-11827)

A document in Hanau’s personnel file stated that ‘He [Hanau] was well known throughout Yugoslavia for his desire to promote prosperity for the British Empire and to enhance its prestige.’ He was recruited by Grand in March 1939, several months before the war started. Given the code number 422, Hanau proceeded to Paris at the request of Grand as Chief of the Balkans area in the ‘Field’, the contemporary term for occupied territory. His file contained details of his work.

23.10.39 British Legation, Belgrade advised: The Minister sent for me and amongst other things said that 422 was badly compromised, etc., Prince Paul is supposed to be the author of the story and it has probably been planted on him by some German agent. However it is vitally important that 422 should act with the greatest discretion and get under guard as much as possible. H.M.R.  [His Majesty’s Representative – Sir Robert H. Campbell, the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia] and his staff will not set the Danube alight but a change will do good; there is plenty they can do to help but appear more interested in making sure that nothing is done to injure Yugoslav interests rather than seeing what they can do to aid British interest.

18.12.39. Caesar advised D. The Huns are making things hot for me – the personal threats leave me very cold – but they have lodged formal protests with the Foreign Office here, the General Staff and the Prime Minister’s Office. The minimum