NATO and Warsaw Pact Armoured Fighting Vehicles of the Cold War

By Michael Green

This authoritative and superbly illustrated book covers the full range of AFVs in service with NATO and WP armies over the four decades of the Cold War.

While tanks were the most recognized armored vehicles during the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact (WP) armies fielded a wide array of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). These included armored cars, armored personnel carriers (APCs), anti-aircraft vehicles and self propelled artillery. Over the Cold War years nations both progressively developed series of AFVs and introduced entirely new ranges.

APCs, vital to all frontline units, evolved from machine gun-armed battlefield taxis such as the US M113 and Soviet BTR-60 series into sophisticated infantry fighting vehicles. The Soviet BMP-1, US Bradley M2/M3, West German Marder and British Warrior and CVR series were classic examples of the latter, with numerous variants.

The Soviet BRDM-2 series was the most numerous armored car. The British Army fielded the Saladin, Ferret and Fox and the German Army introduced the eight-wheeled Luchs and tracked SPZ11-2 Kurz.

Early anti-aircraft vehicles, such as the American M42 with two 40mm Bofors, were superseded by the formidable Soviet ZSU-23-4 Shilka and the West German Geopard with radar-guided guns.

This authoritative and superbly illustrated book covers the full range of AFVs in service with NATO and WP armies over the four decades of the Cold War. It will be an invaluable addition to the libraries of the expert and layman alike.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pen and Sword
• Release date: Mar 8, 2024
• ISBN: 9781399019729

Michael Green

Michael Green (born 1930) was a British theologian, Anglican priest, Christian apologist and author of more than 50 books. He was Principal of St John's College, Nottingham (1969-75) and Rector of St Aldate's Church, Oxford and chaplain of the Oxford Pastorate (1975-86). He had additionally been an honorary canon of Coventry Cathedral from 1970 to 1978. He then moved to Canada where he was Professor of Evangelism at Regent College, Vancouver from 1987 to 1992. He returned to England to take up the position of advisor to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of York for the Springboard Decade of Evangelism. In 1993 he was appointed the Six Preacher of Canterbury Cathedral. Despite having officially retired in 1996, he became a Senior Research Fellow and Head of Evangelism and Apologetics at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford in 1997 and lived in the town of Abingdon near Oxford.

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Introduction

A companion work to the author’s book NATO and Warsaw Pact Tanks of the Cold War released in 2022, this, the author’s newest work covers the many AFVs fielded by the respective sides until February 1991 when the Warsaw Pact officially dissolved. The Soviet Union suffered an internal collapse in December 1991.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appeared in 1949, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), commonly referred to by both sides as the Warsaw Pact (WP), in 1955. The formal name for the WTO/WP was the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’.

The armed forces of those nations that constituted the WTO/WP had little or no say in how their military forces were equipped or trained. They were merely seen as adjuncts to the Soviet Army in the case of a Third World War. All their senior leadership posts were held by Soviet Army officers throughout the Cold War.

NATO lacked the AFV conformity imposed upon the WTO/WP by the Soviet Union. However, during the early years of the Cold War, American-built vehicles dominated most NATO armies; a legacy of American military aid programmes (MAPs) that began in 1949 as well as Lend-Lease inventories from the Second World War. Over time, however, NATO forces strayed from conformity and as economies recovered from the ravages of the Second World War, more ingeniously built vehicles appeared, as shown in this book.

Chapter One

NATO Infantry Vehicles

American industry built more armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) than any other NATO nation during the long-running Cold War. The only other NATO nations to design and build more than one type of AFV through the Cold War were the United Kingdom, France and West Germany.

M3/M3A1 Half-Track

During the Second World War, American industry turned out thousands upon thousands of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). A series of open-topped armoured half-tracks, built in large numbers, were mostly configured as infantry transports. These transports bore the designations M3 or M3A1, carried ten soldiers and in addition to the squad’s personal weapons were armed with an unprotected .50 calibre (12.7mm) machine gun on a ring mount.

The M3/M3A1 infantry-carrying half-tracks served the US Army in the immediate postwar era. They also continued to serve those that received them under Lend-Lease, such as the British and the Free French armies.

With the forming of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the US government began supplying those nations’ armies with different types of surplus wartime AFVs. These went out under Military Aid Programmes (MAPs) and included the infantry transport version of its half-track series. The US government also provided surplus AFVs to some friendly non-NATO armies.

Something better was needed

The US Army had no illusions about its half-tracks being anything more than an interim vehicle. Development, therefore, began on a suitable full-tracked armoured infantry carrier. The main design shortcomings of the gasoline enginepowered half-tracks included their lack of overhead protection, which had been precluded during the Second World War by their limited engine power, chassis/suspension capacity and, in armoured units, the need to keep up with the tanks off road. US Army Colonel S.R. Hinds of the 2nd Armored Division addressed this design issue in an early 1945 report:

While our half-track vehicle is far superior to any other similar vehicle, it falls short of the required cross-country mobility. It should be the equal of a tank in this respect. I believe a full track vehicle with slightly more armor on the sides is necessary in order to have the complete support of the armored infantry when most needed.

US Army M39

At the war’s closing stages in Western Europe, the US Army had fielded a small number of what was designated the M39 and labelled an ‘armoured utility vehicle’. The open-topped armoured vehicle rode on the powertrain and suspension system of the gasoline engine-powered M18 tank destroyer chassis; armament was a .50 calibre machine gun on an unprotected ring mount.

It was initially intended as a prime mover for the 3in towed anti-tank gun M5 and as a reconnaissance vehicle. By the time it reached the front lines in April 1945, the anti-tank gun it was to tow was no longer in use by the US Army. Instead the M39 performed the role of a reconnaissance vehicle and an ad hoc infantry transport, roles it also undertook during the latter stages of the Korean War (1950–53), in addition to becoming a makeshift ammunition/cargo carrier.

The only other NATO army to employ the M39 proved to be that of West Germany, where it would see limited service as an infantry transport at their service’s armour school between 1955 and 1962.

Didn’t Make the Cut

The initial full-tracked infantry transport envisioned by the US Army as a replacement for its half-tracks began as a design study in 1944. It was to incorporate the powertrain and suspension components of the gasoline enginepowered M24 light tank, and received the label T13 Armored Utility Vehicle. The prefix letter ‘T’ stood for experimental, and was dropped if the vehicle received authorization for production.

Unlike the M39, the T13 was to have an armoured roof. The crew and passenger complement envisioned would total between eighteen and twenty-two men. This made it an awkward vehicle to employ in battle as US Army doctrine then revolved around twelve-man infantry squads. However, it was available and waiting for the design and development of a new tracked vehicle better suited to the role was not an option.

Why Armoured Roofs?

US Army Lieutenant Colonel George B. Pickett Jr. wrote in the May-June 1949 issue of the Armored Cavalry Journal titled ‘Armored Personnel Carriers’, explaining the requirement for overhead armour on infantry transports:

The second significant fact now realized is that the armored personnel carrier needs overhead protection from air bursts. In World War II the American Army had exclusive possession of the VT [variable time/radio proximity] fuze. German artillery time fire was not very effective against the Allies. Questioning of German PWs [prisoners of war] clearly indicated their sharp dislike and dread of the air burst, and the VT fuze in particular. But although the American Army introduced the VT fuze to warfare [December 1944 and the US Navy in January 1943], it can expect to encounter a like weapon in possession of the enemy in any possible future war. However, even if the enemy did not possess a VT type fuze, it still would be desirable to have overhead protection since it enables our armored infantry to move under a protective cover of friendly time fire.

Besides the infantry transport role, other jobs considered for the proposed T13 included reconnaissance, carrying cargo and serving as a prime mover. The vehicle envisioned would have been underpowered for the cargo-carrying role, and the US Army cancelled the T13 before production commenced in favour of another armoured utility vehicle.

US Army M44

The replacement for the never-built T13 was the even larger T16 Armored Utility Vehicle. With a crew of three – driver, bow gunner and vehicle commander – it could carry twenty-four passengers. It made even less sense than the T13 regarding US Army infantry squad doctrine. Like the M39, the T16 was based on the powertrain and suspension system of the M18 tank destroyer.

In April 1945, the US Army authorized the production of six examples of the T16 for delivery in June 1945. The vehicle became the M44 Armored Utility Vehicle. It had an unprotected pintle-mounted .50 calibre machine gun and a small-calibre bow machine gun. In October 1946, the US Army approved construction of a single modified version of the M44, designated the M44E1.

The bow machine-gun position came off the M44E1, and the hull vision and gun ports and escape doors of the M44 were welded shut. Instead, there appeared overhead hatches for the passengers to gain terrain awareness and fire their weapons over the sides of the vehicle. Despite the various modifications made to the M44E1, it was clear to the US Army that it did not represent the vehicle they wanted and the programme ended.

US Army M75

In September 1944, the US Army established another full-tracked infantry transport requirement. It was to have a crew of five: vehicle commander, driver, assistant driver, two machine-gunners and carry a ten-man infantry squad.

The vehicle was to use the powertrain and suspension system of the Cargo Carrier T43E1 derived from the T41 light tank. The new full-tracked infantry transport received the designation T18 Armored Utility Vehicle, with four pilots ordered in September 1946.

Generally pleased with the T18, the US Army authorized its production, with the vehicle therefore becoming the M75. The label Armored Utility Vehicle was done away with and replaced with the new title ‘Armored Infantry Vehicle’. Like its predecessors, the M75 had no amphibious capability.

The production M75 had only a vehicle commander and driver. The US Army had given up on remote-controlled machine guns for the M75. In their place, the vehicle commander’s cupola had an unprotected pintle-mounted .50 calibre machine gun.

Not Easy to Control

An interesting comment on the effectiveness of the .50 calibre (12.7mm) machine gun, or its lack thereof, appeared in the July–August 1986 issue of Infantry magazine:

The .50 caliber machine gun is notorious for its inaccuracy when fired on the move. This was demonstrated during my unit’s mechanized gunnery training at the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California] when only one or two men could effectively handle the gun while firing on the move, and both of those men were unusually big and strong. Then again, ‘effective’ is a relative term. But they kept their bullets in the general direction of the targets, which was better than the other men could do.

Both the International Harvester Company, the designer of the M75, and the Food Machinery and Chemical Company (renamed FMC in 1973 and United Defense in 1994) received contracts to build the vehicle. The US Army envisioned the requirement for a version of the M75 armed with a 4.2in mortar, but that did not happen. The reason was the decision to have a mortar-armed version of the follow-on APC, the M59.

The ten-man infantry squad carried by the M75 entered and left the vehicle through two large doors in the rear of the hull, the same way as passengers of the M44 and M44E1. The M75 lacked the M44’s hull vision and gun ports, but it did feature overhead hatches.

On level roads the M75 had a range of about 115 miles. Total production of the steel-armoured vehicle amounted to 1,780 examples built between 1952 and 1954, with some seeing use during the closing stage of the Korean War in the summer of 1953.

From the January–February 1954 issue of Infantry magazine, an article on the M75 and the initial impressions: ‘The M75 did the job it was designed to do and performed all through the action in a manner that left little to be desired. It hauled men and supplies, evacuated the wounded and the dead, and proved itself to be a fine vehicle from the maintenance standpoint.’

US Army M59

Despite its performance in Korea, the US Army regarded the M75 as too expensive to procure in the numbers required. In response, what eventually became FMC in 1973 developed the less costly M59, which weighed about the same as the M75 and had similar dimensions. The US Army began referring to both vehicles as ‘armoured personnel carriers’ (APCs) rather than armoured infantry carriers.

Despite being about the same weight and dimensions as the M75, the M59 was amphibious in calm inland waterways, propelled by the movement of its tracks. The M59 was much larger than required to carry a single infantry squad because it had to displace a certain minimum amount of water to remain afloat.

From an article in the September 1956 issue of the Army Information Digest on the M59 is the following passage:

The M59 can operate in calm water at speeds of from 4 to 5½ miles an hour. It requires no special preparations for operating in the water, and it can crawl up steep riverbanks without submerging its exhaust pipes. On maneuvers in Germany in September 1955, the 2d Armored Division set a pattern for future river crossing operations by infantry mounted in M59s across the Rhine, a major military obstacle throughout history, in a matter of minutes. The M59s had no difficulty in crossing despite the 4- to 6-knot current.

Like the M75, the M59 was gasoline engine-powered but had two engines rather than the M75’s one. To keep costs down, those in the M59 were standard militarytype truck engines and transmissions. The US Army fielded approximately 6,300 M59s between 1953 and 1960. The unit cost of the M59 came to $28,000.00.

The M59 had a crew of two and carried ten infantrymen. It started its career with a .50 calibre machine gun on an unprotected pintle attached to the vehicle commander’s cupola, as with those APCs before it. Later-production examples of the M59 had an enclosed cupola armed with a .50 calibre machine gun for the vehicle commander. This was a design feature intended for all M59s, but production delays pushed back its introduction onto the assembly lines.

Rather than having rear hull doors like its predecessor, the M59 had a large hydraulically-operated rear ramp. This proved to be a key innovation. It allowed the onboard infantry squad to exit the vehicle simultaneously in two fire teams (i.e. half squads) on the run, thus minimizing the time the vehicle needed to halt to deploy its passengers. It was the critical transitional element in the evolution of the APC from the armoured infantry vehicle.

The rear ramp included a door in cases where conditions did not warrant lowering the rear ramp. As with the M75, the M59 had two overhead armoured hatches and no vision or firing ports.

The only variant of the M59 was the 4.2in, full-tracked, self-propelled mortar M84. Eventually, the US Army decided to convert all weapon calibres from inches to millimetres. Hence the 4.2in mortar became the 107mm mortar.

The M59 series proved popular with the US Army early on. However, its twin gasoline-powered truck engine arrangement proved underpowered in the field. Another issue concerning the US Army was the M59 series’ inadequate operational range, a limitation the series shared with the M75. The manufacturer proposed some fixes for this, but the US Army proved uninterested.

A New Type of Armour

The US Army’s eventual loss of interest in the M59 led it to explore other options, beginning in June 1954. The main desire was a vehicle costing less.

There were other essential design requirements for the next-generation APC. It had to fit within the fuselage of the soon-to-be-introduced C-130 Hercules transport plane, due to enter US Air Force (USAF) service in 1956.

Because the vehicle had to be amphibious, its dimensions revolved around the minimum amount of water it needed to displace to remain afloat. It also had to serve as a platform capable of many other roles besides that of an APC. These would include an ambulance, a mortar carrier, an engineering vehicle and a command post vehicle.

A possible solution to keep the weight down on a next-generation multipurpose APC appeared with a new manufacturing technology mastered by FMC. It involved the development of lightweight aluminium armour alloys and the technology to weld large plates of this material together.

The employment of aluminium armour in the design of the next-generation APC would allow for a significant weight saving. This in turn reduced the minimum water displacement requirement, allowing a reduction of the vehicle’s size. The size reduction lessened its vulnerability to enemy fire and allowed it to fit within the USAF’s new transport aircraft.

US Army M113

The US Army hedged its bets and ordered sixteen pilots of what became the T117 and T113. Eight of the gasoline engine-powered T117 vehicles were to have conventional steel armour and the other eight designated the T113 would have the new aluminium armour. After some design changes, the US Army selected the 11-ton aluminium armoured T113 from FMC that eventually became the M113 APC. Production began in 1960.

In the July–September 1958 issue of Infantry magazine in an article titled ‘A New Lift for the Infantryman’ is this passage on what the US Army wanted with the T113, the forerunner of the M113:

It has the speed and mobility to transport troops over the atomic battlefield. It will permit the infantry commander to decentralize his force until time of need and then to concentrate or reinforce quickly where and when required. Visualized as organic to the rifle company and the battle group, and driven by infantrymen, the T113 will improve further the infantryman’s inherent versatility of movement.

Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Steven Russell remarked when comparing the M59 and M113:

The M113 was more successful as a concept because it coincided with the doctrine of placing the vehicle in the hands of the infantry. The M59 was assigned to the transport corps on a one-to-three ratio for infantry battalions. The idea was that these ‘trucks’ would be available on ‘an as needed’ basis and be maintained and driven by transport soldiers. The M113 changed all that. It became part of the infantry like the half-track.

With the introduction of the M113 in the early 1960s into US Army service, the American government began transferring the then outdated M75s and M59s to several NATO countries under military aid programmes. Belgium received 600 M75s that lasted in service until the 1980s. Greece acquired 200 M59s, and the much larger Turkish Army took on 1,550 of the M59s.

Does Aluminium Armour Plate Burn?

From the July–August 1983 issue of Armor magazine is the following passage from an article titled ‘Improving Combat Crew Survivability’ by Donald R. Kennedy, a civilian weapons expert:

For the record, aluminum armor plate does not burn. Fuels, propelling charges, hydraulic fluids, and other organic materials do burn. Aluminum in a molten state can burn. In a finely divided form (e.g. powder, flake, ribbon, etc.), many materials, including aluminum and steel (even corn), can burn in a short duration event that is similar to an industrial dust explosion (e.g. grain silo explosion). This point is emphasized because of the great amount of incorrect public information concerning ‘burning aluminum’, which was given much space in the press following the HMS Sheffield [a British destroyer] sinking in the Falklands in the spring of 1982. The Sheffield was in fact constructed of mild steel throughout.

M113 Description

The M113 received power from a commercial gasoline military truck engine and had an operational range on level roads of almost 200 miles. The US Army eventually took into service 5,300 examples of the vehicle.

Replacement of the gasoline engine with a diesel engine in 1964 led to the M113A1 designation. It had an operational range of around 300 miles on level roads. The US Army acquired a fleet of almost 13,000 examples of this variant.

The M113A1’s diesel engine reflected the US Army’s vehicle-wide transition to more fuel-efficient diesel engines beginning in 1958. A US Army belief that diesel fuel was not flammable like gasoline also provided another reason for its adoption, but eventually proved incorrect.

Like the M59, the M113 had a power-operated rear ramp that included a rear door. Unlike its larger predecessor that had two overhead armoured hatches, the M113 series APCs had only a single overhead hatch.

Armour protection on all the M113 series only offered immunity from some types of small-arms fire and artillery splinters. The only onboard weapon provided was an unprotected pintle-mounted .50 calibre machine gun operated by the vehicle commander, located behind the engine compartment.

Continuous M113 Upgrades

Progressive improvements to the M113A1 would lead to introduction into US Army service in 1978 of the heavier M113A2. About 2,600 were newly-built vehicles and the rest were rebuilt M113s and M113A1s.

In 1987, FMC began a programme to upgrade the US Army’s existing inventory of M113A2s into an improved version classified as the M113A3. Due to its increased weight, the US Army banned the M113A3 from peacetime amphibious use. Conversion of the US Army’s M113A2s into the M113A3 version would continue until 2001.

M113 Numbers