Air Power and the Arab World 1909-1955: Volume 9 - The Arab Air Forces and a New World Order, 1946-1948

By Dr David Nicolle and Gabr Ali Gabr

Volume 9 of the Air Power and the Arab World 1909-1955 mini-series continues the story of the men and machines of the first half century of military aviation in the Arab World. For those Arab nations which had some degree of independence, the political, cultural and economic strains seen during the Second World War continued to have a major impact, not least upon their military forces. In Egypt, newly independent Syria and Lebanon, and to a lesser extent in Iraq, great effort was put into modernizing these forces. Sometimes this achieved success but such efforts nevertheless failed to produce the degree of improvement which had been hoped. In both Egypt and Iraq mistrust of Great Britain may even have deepened while in Palestine the worsening crisis resulted in a full-blown civil war between the Zionist settler community and the indigenous Arab population. The British remained in theoretical control of Palestine, yet it was becoming obvious that a large part of the British government, British military establishment and broader public were desperate to escape from the Palestine Problem. It was also clear that the major Powers which dominated the newly established United Nations Organization had no intention of becoming militarily involved. Then came the official termination of the British mandate over Palestine, the declaration of the State of Israel and the start of official military intervention by the military forces of several Arab states. Volume 9 covers its subject in greater detail than has been done before because the authors had access to previously unpublished official Arab military documents, supplemented by translations of Arabic books and journal articles containing official and personal accounts by those involved. As usual for this mini-series, Volume 9 is abundantly illustrated with photographs from previously unused, or very rarely used, private and official sources.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Aug 24, 2023
• ISBN: 9781804515266

Book preview

INTRODUCTION

It should be noted that references to ‘the author’ in connection with interviews, correspondence and other forms of personal communication refer to Dr. David Nicolle. Also note that the times given for Middle Eastern radio broadcasts as transcribed by the BBC Monitoring Service are GMT.

1

THE REAF’S STRUGGLE TO GROW

On 4th October 1945, martial law was lifted across Egypt. This was soon followed by major demonstrations and it became obvious that the end of the Second World War was not going to bring peace to the streets of Egypt. Meanwhile, although the Palestine War of 1948–9 would be the dominant event during the last seven years of King Faruq’s reign, Egypt went through significant economic, social and political changes. These had really started in the middle of the Second World War and were characterised by increasing industrialisation, population growth and a major expansion of the educated, outward-looking middle class from whom the majority of the Egyptian officer corps were drawn.

The long-established Wafd Party remained the largest political grouping while other, small groups also had significant influence. As extreme as the Muslim Brotherhood, but royalist rather than Islamist, the Iron Guard twice attempted to assassinate Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd Party. The first attempt was on 6th December 1945, following the facts surrounding the humiliating Abdin Palace Incident of 1942, being made public.

Nevertheless, it was the Muslim Brotherhood or Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin which really threatened to undermine the stability of Egypt. By 1946, its membership had reached around two million people. Its ideology was Islamist, insisting upon a stricter adherence to Sunni Islamic tenets, being totally opposed to the British presence in all its forms and being generally anti-Western in political outlook. As such, the Brotherhood emerged as the Wafd Party’s most effective rival amongst the general public. The apparent and loudly proclaimed puritanism of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin also stood in contrast to increasing corruption within the Wafd.

Almost immediately after the Second World War ended, the Muslim Brotherhood launched a campaign of assassinations which not only became a threat to the British in Egypt, but to the Egyptian state itself. One killing which was blamed upon the Brotherhood was the murder of Amin Uthman, the Minister of Finance in the Wafd government, on 6th January 1946. The killer escaped but was seen and chased by a REAF officer named Mursi. Although Mursi was unable to catch the killer, his detailed description of the man led to the arrest of Hussain Tawfiq whom some accused of being a member or follower of the Muslim Brotherhood. Others maintained that he was linked to the Iron Guard and in truth, there was some degree of overlap between some of Egypt’s violent political groupings. Tawfiq also described Amin Uthman as being a British agent and the Finance Minister clearly had been an important channel of communication between an earlier Wafd government and the British during the Second World War. According to the not entirely reliable testimony of Anwar Sadat, Amin Uthman had, for example, used his private aeroplane to smuggle gold out of Egypt to Swiss banks.

The year 1946 proved to be eventful, with strikes, demonstrations, assassinations and tanks on the streets. January was bad but the following month was much worse. On 17th February, Mahmud Nuqrashi was removed as Prime Minister, to be replaced by Isma’il Sidqi Pasha for whom this was his second term in office. Nuqrashi Pasha would be back as Prime Minister less than nine months later. Meanwhile, the steadying and experienced advice of Muhammad Ahmad Hasanain Pasha, the President of the Royal Court, was removed from King Faruq’s inner circle when the old explorer, pilot and friend of Britain was killed in a motorcar accident on the afternoon of 19th February. At three in the afternoon, Hasanain left the Abdin Palace in his chauffeur-driven car and headed for his home in Duqqi (Dokki). As the car was crossing the Qasr al-Nil Bridge it was hit by a British military vehicle, reportedly an armoured car being driven at a ‘crazy speed’. It was then apparently struck a second time as the confused and perhaps now scared, British Army driver tried to go back the way he had come.

At first Ahmad Hasanain appeared only slightly hurt, but with increasing amounts of blood pouring from his nose, he was transferred to the car of the Minister of Agriculture, who happened to be passing and was hurried to the Anglo-American Hospital. Here, the old explorer and aviator died. In the febrile atmosphere of the time, rumours of an assassination rapidly spread, with a wide range of suspects being suggested. However, it now simply seems to have been a traffic accident caused by a sadly typical piece of British military arrogance.

King Faruq was always volatile when choosing his favourites and closest advisors but Hasanain Pasha had been a stabilising influence even after he was dismissed as the Royal Prince’s tutor. On 2nd May, Egyptian Army tanks entered Cairo University in response to sometimes violent demonstrations, this being followed by mass arrests on 10th and 11th July. The rest of 1946 continued in much the same vein.

During the pre-war years and during the Second World War itself, the crisis in Palestine had been a distant matter for most Egyptians, even for the educated elite and the military. In the post-war years, however, it rapidly imposed itself upon the public consciousness. For the Muslim majority, this awareness largely came through their religious identity and through their attendance at prayers in mosques around the country. So, when the ‘ulama or scholars of the Mosque of al-Azhar in Cairo and of its ancient associated University, took a vote and declared that the liberation of Palestine was a duty for all Muslims, this had a profound impact. This was all the greater because the ‘ulama made it clear that such a duty applied to all Muslims, rich and poor, powerful or weak, male or female, of all countries.

There had been a widespread expectation that relations between Egypt and Britain would improve immediately the Second World War ended. In practice it not only took time for attitudes to change – especially in a victorious although weary Britain – but the huge British military presence in Egypt could not disappear overnight. Germany had surrendered on 4th May, but as one official British report stated just under two months later ‘Cairo still looks like an occupied city with camps all around it and in some of its parks’. Further months would pass before Japan was defeated and in the meantime, Egypt and more particularly the Suez Canal, remained vital to Allied lines of communication and transport.

On the day that Japan formally surrendered, 2nd September 1945, Edward Grigg, Baron Altrincham, the British ex-Minister Resident Middle East and now a member of the Privy Council, wrote a memorandum on the military aspects of British policy in the Middle East. He stated that, ‘ … it is of great political importance that all signs of military occupation should now be rapidly withdrawn. Cairo in particular is an occupied city. It was the natural centre for military headquarters and a host of auxiliary organisations also inhabit many of the city’s chief buildings and a surrounding network of camps’.

He then drew attention to the fact that the statue of Sa’ad Zaglul, Egypt’s nationalist hero, was still surrounded by British military facilities and pointed out that:

This investment of a nationalist monument is symbolic and I mention it on that account, since I came to feel with increased discomfort that our criticism of French display (of military power) in Damascus and Beirut did not tally with our own conduct elsewhere … the Egyptians may be forgiven for feeling that the magnitude of our military occupation three years after (the battles of) Alamein has not been entirely justified by the needs of the latter phases of the war against Germany or the war with Japan.

In careful diplomatic language, Grigg had put his finger on an issue which seemed of minor importance to most people in Britain but was very important to Egyptians. In fact, negotiations with the Egyptian and Iraqi governments failed to progress in the way that the British government had hoped and where Egypt was concerned, these negotiations were in serious trouble as early as October 1946. The two sides were deadlocked, not only over the continued presence of British military forces in Egypt, but also concerning the future of the Sudan. By the following year, disagreement was teetering on the brink of hostility.

On a more positive note, on 14th August, even before the surrender of Japan, censorship in Egypt was discontinued. Then on 24th October 1945, the country became one of the earliest members of the United Nations. However, the Egyptian government refused a British request to give British medals to many REAF pilots who had helped the RAF during the Second World War and with very few exceptions, only the REAF’s Commanding Officers were permitted to accept British decorations. The British also complained that many Egyptian officers refused to cooperate with the British Military Mission after the war ended, which was an exaggeration. This they did in the name of Egyptian patriotism, although such an attitude did inhibit the Army’s efforts to modernise. The British further complained that the Egyptian government was reluctant to buy British weapons which Britain believed were best for Egyptian needs. Implicit in all such complaints was a still very paternalistic attitude on the part of the British and an occasionally petulant nationalism of the part of some members of the Egyptian government.

Britain’s new Labour, socialist government tried to respond in various ways, including the sending of a new ambassador to Cairo, Sir Ronald Campbell, in February 1946. On 25th March, Campbell had a private conversation with Isma’il Sidqi Pasha the new Egyptian Prime Minister (in office 17th February to 9th December 1946) in which the latter made it clear that Egypt insisted on being treated as an equal in future relations between the two countries. A new round of British-Egyptian negotiations started on 15th April but these stalled the following month.

On 4th July, British troops handed over the Citadel of Cairo to the Egyptian Army, but on 18th July, the British Services Club was attacked. On 16th October, negotiations restarted in London and on the 25th of that month, the Egyptian and British Foreign Ministers reached a provisional agreement over a new treaty between their countries. A text was published on 10th November and a fortnight later, was rejected by the Egyptian Parliament.

According to the minutes of a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff, the British had hoped that a new treaty might enable Britain to ‘gain facilities for the transit of troops in peacetime and the right to take part in occasional joint air exercises’. From the Egyptian point of view, however, the possible presence of RAF fighter squadrons in Egypt as part of any new treaty was unacceptable because it would be seen by the Egyptian people as posing a threat of British intervention and of making any such intervention much easier. Recognising the inevitable, on 7th May 1946, the British government announced its intention to withdraw all troops and of negotiating a new treaty but as stated above, the hope of a new treaty came to nothing, at least for the foreseeable future.

Negotiations were not quite a dialogue of the deaf, but it was clear that the British and Egyptian positions on future military relations were very far apart. In fact, a note from the Egyptian delegation to their British opposite numbers of 1st August 1946, summed up their side clearly and stated that, in the aftermath of the Second World War; ‘Egypt decided to develop her armed forces and to modernise her armaments, in order herself to ensure the effective defence of her territory until U.N.O. (the UN) would be able to intervene to re-establish peace. In modern war, such a defence places a heavy burden on the States undertaking it. Egypt is disposed to face up to this task’. At the same time, however, the Egyptian government was not inclined to compromise its sovereignty, even to an ally, in order to obtain its military, political or economic support. This would largely remain Egypt’s position until the present day, despite revolution, changes of government and of political alignment in world affairs.

On 18th October, a compromise appeared to have been reached, at least where the British and Egyptian Air Forces were concerned. It was agreed that, under the proposed new treaty, the RAF would retain its existing transit rights after a British military evacuation of Egypt while the REAF would have the same rights over British territory. Seen today, the idea that the Egyptian Air Force would be impressed by an offer of transit rights over British territory seems extraordinary, but in 1946, the British Empire and its assorted dependent territories remained huge and still included Palestine.

On 21st March 1946, a letter from the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office in London to the British Embassy in Cairo focused on the subject of Egypt’s outstanding financial debts to Britain. After referring to what it called the ‘unfortunate failure of the (Miles) Master aircraft’, it looked at the cost of training REAF pilots and other personnel and concluded that ‘at the moment we feel it should be our policy to keep alive every possible (financial) claim against the Egyptian government’. Understandable as this might have been in Britain’s very difficult financial position after the Second World War, still owing vast sums to the United States of America, it was hardly designed to win Egyptian support.

During May, other British Foreign Office documents made clear a British expectation that, following a British military evacuation, the Egyptian government would claim that Britain owed Egypt £400 million for various services provided during the war. This document also badly stated that Britain ‘won’t pay’. These financial claims and potential counter-claims continued through most of 1946 and sometimes involved arguments over seemingly minor accounting differences, such as whether the money owed by Egypt included a 10 percent or 15 percent addition for ‘departmental expenses’. Although the problem was essentially political rather than financial, the net result was the same. Namely a serious delay in the supply of British equipment for the Egyptian Army and the REAF.

Meanwhile, the REAF tried to carry on, not only with its everyday tasks but also in attempts to get new equipment from Britain and elsewhere. A high level REAF mission to the UK and USA was nevertheless interrupted by