Canadian Civil-Military Relations

By Bill Featherstone

This book is a continuation of Bill Featherstone's research into Civil-Military Relations in Canada during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The topic of Civil-Military Relations has been expanded to chronicle the Canadian experience from 1964 to the present. He introduces the three legs of the Civil-Military Relations triangle: the Military, the Civil/Government and the Public/People. He examines how they each interacted with Canadian defence policy in the form of White Papers and Canadian Armed Forces deployments.

 

"Bill Featherstone reengages with an important topic from a practitioner's point of view. An important topic in today's contested world."

 

Dr. Andrea Charron: Director, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS). University of Manitoba

 

 

• Language: English
• Publisher: Kootboneau Press
• Release date: May 1, 2024
• ISBN: 9781738108312

Bill Featherstone

Bill Featherstone is a veteran of the Royal Canadian Navy (1960 - 1970).He has BA (2018) and MA (2020) in Political Science from the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Manitoba. His primary focus of study has been Canadian Cold War defence policies and their evolution to date. His current concerns are of Arctic climate change and the impact that has on defence, security, and sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago..

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Canadian Civil-Military Relations: [epub]

Re-Examining Defence White Papers and Operations, 1964 to the Present

Bill E. Featherstone

Kootboneau Press ©

Copyright © 2023 by Bill E. Featherstone

All rights reserved. This book was self-published by author under Kootboneau Press ©

No portion of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior and express permission from the publisher or author. This book reflects the ideas and opinions of the author alone and does not represent those of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Government of Canada. Any errors herein are those of the author alone

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Featherstone, Bill E. 1943-

Canadian Civil-Military Relations: Re-examining Defence White Papers and Operations,1964 to the Present / Bill Edward Featherstone

(Studies in Canadian military history). Includes bibliographical references and index

ISBN: 978-1-7381083-0-5 [Softcover], ISBN: 978-1-7381083-1-2 [Epub]

Year of Publication: First Edition, 2024

Cover design by: Jennifer Antonio from Dragonfly Branding, Winnipeg, MB

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For Bird, Michael, and Dana

Contents

Principal/Agent Figures

Appendix Tables - Canadian/U.S. Resources and Soviet Threat

Preface

Acknowledgments

Prologue

Introduction

Part I - Civil - Military Relations

History and Theory

Chapter 1, Early History

Chapter 2, Post-Cold War - Beyond Huntington

Part II - Canadian Defence Policy

From Brooke Claxton (1946) to the Present

Chapter 3, 1964 - 1990

Defence Policy and White Papers

Chapter 4, 1990 - 2010

Defence Policy and White Papers

Chapter 5, 2010 to Present

Defence Policy and the 2017 White Paper

Chapter 6, Canadian Peacekeeping and Combat missions

Part III - Future Defence Policy

Arctic & International Security Concerns

Chapter 7, Arctic Climate Change

Chapter 8, The Arctic Council

Chapter 9, Russian Aggression

Chapter 10, Canadian Defence Considerations in Arctic

Chapter 11, Canadian Armed Forces - Culture and Gender Equality

Appendix: Civil-Military Relations Case Study

The Canadian Civil-Military Relations Context for the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

Chapter 12, War Books, Harkness Papers

Chapter 13, John G. Diefenbaker

Chapter 14, NORAD/NATO

Chapter 15, Other Voices

Appendix: Tables

Cuban Missile Case Study Information

Conclusion

Author Photographs, NATO FALLEX 1962 ©

Abbreviations

Bibliography

Principal/Agent Figures

Fig. 1 – Civil Control, Location and Intensity of Threat, (See page 75 )

Fig. 2 – Civil Principal - Intrusive/Non-Intrusive vs. Military Agent - Work/Shirk, (See page 75)

Appendix Tables - Canadian/U.S. Resources and Soviet Threat

Appendix – Cuban Missile Crisis, October – November 1962

(See pages 205 -209)

App - 1. RCN 5th Escort Squadron (NATO Duty)

App - 2. Maritime Command Atlantic (MARLANT), Halifax, NS.

App - 3. Maritime Command Pacific (MARPAC), Esquimalt, BC.

App - 4. NORAD Air Defence (Canadian)

App - 5. Canadian & U.S. Alert Equivalences

App - 6. Civil-Military Leadership

App - 7. USSR (Soviet) Submarine threat in North Atlantic

Preface

My interest in Canadian Civil-Military Relations (CMR) began in the mid-1960s, and is the culmination of many years wondering about the relative silence and controversy surrounding Canada’s involvement in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

I had a small part in that history as a Sonar Operator in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) on board HMCS Kootenay DDE 258, part of the 5th Escort Squadron on NATO duty. Kootenay was an Anti-Submarine Destroyer Escort and part of my rotational duty was closed up in the Sonar Control Room (SCR), during the interdiction of Soviet submarines throughout the North Atlantic during the crisis (See Tables, App - 1).

The crisis had been brewing since early summer, but by mid October 1962, world tension escalated as it became evident that the Soviet Union had begun installing offensive nuclear missile facilities in Cuba, despite insisting earlier that these were only defensive facilities. This was all happening just as we were nearing completion of the NATO FALLEX 1962 Exercise.

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HMCS Kootenay returning to Halifax. (DND Photo Archives. Public Domain)

United States President John F. Kennedy made his famous television address to the world on October 22nd that the U.S. would be installing a naval blockade around Cuba at a time of their choosing and demanded that the missiles be dismantled and removed immediately.

On October 24th, the blockade around Cuba went into effect. On October 25th the Canadian government finally granted authority for the Canadian military to match the U.S. equivalent alert state of Defence Condition Three (DEFCON 3) (See Tables, App - 5). All available RCN vessels sailed to conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) surveillance.

The RCN’s main task became surveillance, tracking and the interdiction as and if required of Soviet submarines off the Canadian and American coast, to enable the United States Navy (USN) to fulfill their role of enforcing the naval blockade of Cuba in the Caribbean. The period between October 22nd and the 25th was the nexus of Canadian civil-military relations and the Cuban missile crisis, that will be described in the Appendix case study.

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HMCS Gatineau, (DND Photo Archives. Public Domain)

There were three significant events over the years since then that ultimately led me to re-examine this history first as a Master’s thesis, specifically Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian military’s involvement in the Cuban missile crisis, especially the RCN’s role. That thesis led to this book, looking deeper into Canadian CMR over the decades since.

The first of those events involved Commander Pat Ryan, the Commanding Officer of HMCS Kootenay during the 1962 crisis. We had a few chance encounters over the following four years. In 1963 we were both posted to HMCS Gatineau, a sister ship to the Kootenay. In 1964, Commander Ryan who was also an RCN naval pilot received his fourth ring, becoming a full Captain, and was posted to HMCS Shearwater, the RCN Naval Air Base, near Dartmouth, Nova Scotia as the new base Commanding Officer.

In 1965, I left my full-time sea-going duties and re-mustered into the Fleet Air Arm of the RCN as an Avionics Technician. HMCS Shearwater became my home base.

By this time, the Cuban missile crisis, only three years past, had essentially become ancient history, which no one seemingly cared to even talk about.

As I took up my new duties at HMCS Shearwater in 1965, I recall thinking it a remarkable coincidence that Captain Ryan and I would share three postings in just four years.

I didn’t think any more of it, until one particular afternoon, during the summer of 1966. I was returning to my Squadron hanger (VX-10) after lunch, when a staff car pulled up beside me and Captain Ryan stepped out from the back seat. While I do not recall the exact conversation, we did exchange salutes and he asked me if we had met each other before.

He obviously recognized me, and I guessed where this was likely going. I replied with my rank, name, and something to the effect, "Yes sir, SCR on the Kootenay, Fall 1962 and later on the Gatineau. He acknowledged and commented, relating how busy and tense it had been during the Cuban mess," referring to our time together on the Kootenay. I felt we shared an unspoken moment on that roadway along ‘Hanger Row’.

A few more exchanges such as, what I was doing now and when had I transferred to the Fleet Air Arm. We shook hands, saluted and he got back into his staff car and drove away. Unfortunately, our paths never crossed again. Captain David Hugh Pat Ryan passed away at age 79, December 4th, 2002.

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Captain D. H. Pat Ryan, HMCS Kootenay Commander, October 1962 (Courtesy of Shearwater Aviation Museum)

The second event was many years later, in 1997 when I read Commander (Retd) Peter T. Haydon’s book, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (1993). What particularly struck me while reading his account, was an incident he detailed involving the Kootenay on November 7th 1962.

By then the crisis had been significantly reduced to a bilateral operation of the USN and the RCN, which at that time was essentially flushing out Soviet submarines from around our combined coasts and making sure they were headed back to the Soviet Union.

Peter Haydon made a specific reference about this incident in his book, that he obtained from previously classified documents. The Kootenay had acquired a solid sonar contact with a submarine close to a group of Soviet fishing trawlers, 40 miles off the American coast near Cape Cod. ¹

An RCN CS2F Tracker aircraft and a USN P2V Neptune aircraft were in the area and also had sonar contact with the sub. Shortly after 12:00 pm local time that particular day, two Soviet fishing trawlers aggressively broke away from their pack and charged the Kootenay in an apparent attempt to drive us off our sonar contact. ²

I clearly recall Commander Ryan having to take drastic evasive action, in order to avoid a collision with the Soviet trawlers and a potential new international crisis, quite beyond the current one, which we were just hoping to get through unscathed! Kootenay and the accompanying aircraft regained and maintained sonar contact with the submarine.

There was something cathartic reading about this incident in his book, after having only a passing acquaintance with it the first time, three decks below the Bridge all those many years ago. I knew then, while reading about this event in Peter Haydon’s book, there was more work for me to do.

The third event was more recent. Rear-Admiral John Newton, Commander Canadian Maritime Forces Atlantic (Halifax) ³ gave an address to Fleet staff at an event in 2013, shortly after taking up his post. I read his address after it was posted on the Maritime Command Atlantic website. He talked about the forgotten ‘lost generation’ veterans of the Cold War. This struck a chord with me and stirred many memories, as I had never heard of my generation acknowledged as such.

I sent him an email of thanks for not ‘forgetting’ and related my experiences during the Cold War and the Cuban crisis. He replied a few days later that he had shared my experience with his ailing father in the hospital, who found some comfort and respite from hearing another old sailor’s story.

His father was also a ‘lost generation’ veteran and coincidentally had served on HMCS Swansea, an escort frigate with the 9th Escort Squadron during the crisis. Admiral Newton has recently retired, and he and I are in contact from time to time.

These three events were what set the course I eventually took.

There are differing opinions about what the state of Canadian civil-military relations were during those first few days of the crisis. Much of the detail regarding this period is still remarkably unknown or just pure conjecture, as most of the principal people have since passed on.

Other than the Minister of National Defence (MND) Doug Harkness's accounting of the crisis in his papers ⁴, Dr. Brad Gladman and Dr. Peter Archambault in their work on the War Books ⁵, and Peter Haydon’s collective works ⁶, it’s unclear in much of the Canadian literature about who said what, when it was said, and what is fact or fiction.

At the height of the crisis, prior to October 25th, RCN/RCAF Maritime Command Atlantic (MARLANT), Commander Rear-Admiral Ken L. Dyer was extremely anxious about the absence of orders from Ottawa. He had only to look out of his Flag Office window to see the Soviet trawler fleet periodically coming into Halifax Harbour for supplies.

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Rear-Admiral Ken L. Dyer MARLANT Commander, October 1962. (DND Photo Archive, Public domain)

The Soviet trawler fleet support role for the Soviet submarine fleet was well known and understood. He was not about to have his fleet caught in Halifax Harbour with a potential war looming in front of him, the ghosts from Pearl Harbour in 1941 were still very clear in every naval commander’s mind.

To meet the immediate crisis, Admiral Dyer simply had the Canadian portion of the Joint NATO exercise FALLEX 1962 continue. The USN had primarily pulled out of FALLEX to commence with the Cuban blockade. These joint operations were exclusively Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) exercises, and the Canadian portion, labeled MARLEX for those RCN vessels still at sea, could be conducted entirely under Admiral Dyer’s sole authority.

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In spite of what many critics and academics alike have declared since, his actions did not contravene CMR, and the MND Doug Harkness did not exceed his authority. These events are also covered in more detail in the Cuban Missile Crisis Case Study in the Appendix.

The relative Canadian government silence about the events of October 1962, right after the crisis and since have intrigued me. These events compelled me to seek out what really occurred regarding Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) involvement.

In 2018, as I was completing my BA in political science, an opportunity to do more research, to examine and detail the CMR implications of Canadian involvement in the Cuban crisis presented itself.

I completed my MA thesis in 2020 based on that research. Subsequent to that, findings from my thesis research were published in Canadian Naval Review. ⁷

As such, the Cuban crisis, without a doubt was the driving force behind my interest in Canadian defence policy, and CMR policies specifically, which has led to this book.

B.E.F. Spring, 2024

Winnipeg, MB.

1. This contact, later de-classified, was disclosed as (Echo) E -58, a Soviet FOXTROT Class patrol submarine.

2. Peter T. Haydon, (1993). The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered. (p. 168). Haydon’s note #41, is the CANCOMARLANT message of the incident and is on page 174 of his book.

3. Rear-Admiral Newton in 2013 ironically had the same position that Rear-Admiral Dyer held in October 1962 (Maritime Command Atlantic).

4. Harkness Papers, The Citizen (Ottawa), The Calgary Herald, (simultaneously) October 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 1977.

5. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Confronting the ‘Essence of Decision’: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis" [Brad Gladman & Peter Archambault] Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM 2010-250 (Nov 2010).

6. Haydon, (1993). The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered. Also articles, 2012, 2007, 2003.

7. Bill E. Featherstone, Canadian Civil-Military Relations: 1962 and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Canadian Naval Review Vol. 16, No. 2. (Winter 2020).

Acknowledgments

There are so many people to thank for their assistance and encouragement, I couldn't possibly list everyone who has had an influence on my going forward with this project. I would, however, be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge Dr. Sarah Hannan.

She was my first professor and one of my biggest cheerleaders when I returned to the University of Manitoba at the age of 71 to complete my BA. She and Dr. Andrea Rounce encouraged me to continue beyond my BA. This was essentially a complete change of focus for me.

The research of Dr. Brad Gladman and Dr. Peter Archambault regarding the Canadian Government War Books and Canadian military authority during the Cuban missile crisis has been most helpful and enlightening throughout my research. I am most grateful, and thank you both. ¹

I must mention Peter Haydon and his collective works about the Cuban crisis. There is no better chronicle of the crisis from a Canadian perspective. I do thank you for our many conversations. ²

I would also like to acknowledge Rear-Admiral (Retd) John Newton for his encouragement and kind guidance through my thesis and my early thoughts of this book.

Two of my professors at the University of Manitoba, Dr. James Fergusson and Dr. Andrea Charron planted the seed that moved me through the thesis stage of my MA and eventually led to this venture into authorship. They have continued in their support and encouragement. It is most appreciated.

To all of my Professors throughout this venture into academia, I am most appreciative of your support over the years. Thank you.

To my fellow grad classmates, Chris Hunt, Colin Ijebor, Nora Ampomah, and Amanda Huddleston, it was indeed a pleasure. What a great time we had together, and you have been most inspiring all the way!

To all my other former classmates and colleagues from day one, you absolutely rock! You kept me challenged and fooled into thinking I was young again! It has been a remarkable ride I will never forget!

Early in my research for the book, it became clear to me, that a more thorough understanding of Arctic climate change and implications it held for Canadian defence policy was essential, as it relates to security, defence, and sovereignty in the North.

In April 2021, I was afforded a unique opportunity and subsequent appointment as a Research Affiliate by Dr. David Barber, Associate Dean and Director of Research at the Centre for Earth Observation Science (CEOS), University of Manitoba. COVID had kept most of us apart until about March 2022. Unfortunately, Dr. Barber passed away very suddenly in April 2022, just as he and I were beginning our collaboration.

A portion of this book is dedicated to the memory of Dr. David Barber and the vision he saw for that collaboration.

I am most grateful for all the in-kind support I have received from CEOS, in terms of office space and facilities to conduct my research and write. I saw your friendly CEOS faces every day at coffee and in the hallways, so you know who you are! A most heartfelt thank you!

CEOS colleague Wayne Chan with whom I share office space requires a mention. He is a fellow author and we talked daily about our respective projects. I am most grateful for his continued interest and for sharing his knowledge about self-publishing.

I would also like to acknowledge the help and assistance from Jennifer Antonio for the cover design, Mike Taniguchi at Hignell Printing, and Maura Blain Brown for the indexing. Thank you all!

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Lastly but certainly not least, a huge hug and thank you to my spouse Dana Beljanic, who has been my rock from the beginning. She has never wavered from believing in me and is the ultimate copy editor and continues to make me appear more clever than I deserve! I could not have done this without her love and unrelenting support. She has been with me all the way, often reminding me when it was time to stop for a meal.

1. Canada, Department of National Defence, Confronting the ‘Essence of Decision’: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis [Brad Gladman & Peter Archambault] Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM 2010-250 (Nov 2010).

2. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (1993). Also articles in 2007, 2012, Canadian Navel Review.

Prologue

This book is about Canadian defence policy, and the evolutionary nature of Civil-Military Relations, but more specifically the role CMR has played and continues to play within the broader scope of Canadian defence policy.

It will briefly examine the period just after the end of World War II, but with more detailed discussion after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

The eight White Papers from 1964 through to the current, ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’ (SSE) 2017, which is still in force, will be examined chronologically for CMR implications surrounding each White Paper.

The Cuban missile crisis proved to be a pivotal