Global Journey: Navigating the World of Economics and Finance, Unlocking the Legacy of Barry Eichengreen

By Fouad Sabry

Who is Global Journey

Barry Julian Eichengreen is an American economist and economic historian who is the George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 1987. Eichengreen is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a research fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights about the following:

Chapter 1: Barry Eichengreen

Chapter 2: Gold standard

Chapter 3: Deflation

Chapter 4: Monetary economics

Chapter 5: Bretton Woods system

Chapter 6: Causes of the Great Depression

Chapter 7: Impossible trinity

Chapter 8: European Payments Union

Chapter 9: Financial crisis

Chapter 10: John E. Floyd

Chapter 11: José De Gregorio

Chapter 12: A Monetary History of the United States

Chapter 13: Great Depression

Chapter 14: Takatoshi Ito

Chapter 15: Exorbitant privilege

Chapter 16: Gold bloc

Chapter 17: Charles Wyplosz

Chapter 18: Brigitte Granville

Chapter 19: Stanley Engerman

Chapter 20: Kevin O'Rourke

Chapter 21: Michael D. Bordo

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information about Global Journey.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: Apr 20, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Barry Eichengreen

Barry Julian Eichengreen (born 1952) is an American economist and economic historian who has taught at the University of California, Berkeley, since 1987, holding the title of George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science. Eichengreen is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research at present.

Eichengreen's mother was Holocaust survivor and novelist Lucille Eichengreen.

Eichengreen has conducted study on the history and contemporary functioning of the international monetary and financial system and written extensively on the subject. In 1974, he earned his Bachelor of Arts from UC Santa Cruz. a Master of Arts in economics, a Master of Philosophy in economics, a Master of Arts in history, and a Doctor of Philosophy in economics from Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut.

In 1997 and 1998, he was a senior policy counselor for the International Monetary Fund, although he has subsequently been critical of the IMF. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1997.

Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939, published by Oxford University Press in 1992, is his most famous work. In his own book on the Great Depression, Ben Bernanke provided the following summary of Eichengreen's argument::

... [T]he immediate root of the global financial crisis was a fundamentally faulty and poorly administered worldwide gold standard... Late in the 1920s, monetary policy in numerous major nations became contractionary for a number of reasons, including the Federal Reserve's determination to contain the US stock market boom; this contraction was transmitted globally through the gold standard. When the banking and currency crises of 1931 sparked a worldwide scramble for gold, a previously moderate deflationary trend started to accelerate. Sterilization of gold inflows by surplus nations [the United States and France], substitution of gold for foreign currency reserves, and runs on commercial banks all led to rises in the gold backing of money and, as a result, dramatic unanticipated drops in national money supply. In turn, monetary contractions were significantly linked to declining prices, production, and employment. Effective international collaboration may have theoretically enabled a global monetary growth despite the limits of the gold standard, but debates over World War I reparations and war debts, as well as the Federal Reserve's isolationism and inexperience, precluded this conclusion. Individual nations could only escape the deflationary spiral by unilaterally leaving the gold standard and re-establishing domestic monetary stability, a process that dragged on haltingly and incoherently until France and the other Gold Bloc nations ultimately abandoned gold in