Asymmetric Warfare: **Asymmetric Warfare: Strategies and Implications for Modern Combat**

By Fouad Sabry

What is Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare is a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy, or tactics differ significantly. This type of warfare often, but not necessarily, involves insurgents or resistance movement militias who may have the status of unlawful combatants against a standing army.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Asymmetric warfare

Chapter 2: Conventional warfare

Chapter 3: Guerrilla warfare

Chapter 4: Resistance movement

Chapter 5: Military strategy

Chapter 6: People's war

Chapter 7: Low-intensity conflict

Chapter 8: Attrition warfare

Chapter 9: Unconventional warfare

Chapter 10: Insurgency

(II) Answering the public top questions about asymmetric warfare.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Asymmetric Warfare.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: May 26, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Asymmetric warfare

Asymmetric warfare (or asymmetric engagement) refers to a style of conflict involving belligerents with considerably different levels of relative military strength, strategies, or tactics. Insurgents or militias from resistance movements who may be considered unlawful combatants use this style of warfare against a standing army. It can also be used by a lesser standing force against a greater standing army.

A conflict in which the resources of the parties are unequal can also be referred to as asymmetrical warfare since both parties may try to take advantage of their respective disadvantages. Such conflicts sometimes entail unconventional warfare, with the weaker side attempting to employ tactics to make up for deficits in their force size or quality. This is in contrast to symmetrical warfare, in which two states engage in combat with comparable military might, resources, and strategies.

Asymmetric warfare is a type of irregular warfare, which refers to battles in which the opposing side does not use the nation-states' conventional armed forces. It is often used to refer to what is also known as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, revolt, terrorism, and counterterrorism.

The phrase first gained notoriety in Andrew J. R. Mack's 1975 article Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars in the journal World Politics, where asymmetric merely meant a major power imbalance between opposing parties in a war. In this context, power is generally believed to refer to physical strength, as in having a sizable army, cutting-edge weapons, a developed economy, etc. The end of the Cold War spurred a resurgence in academic interest in Mack's thesis, which had received little attention in its day. After 2004, the U.S. military started prioritizing addressing the difficulties posed by asymmetric warfare once again. New research based on Mack's writings was beginning to mature by the late 1990s.

Since 2004, The use of the word asymmetric warfare in diverse ways by academics and military authorities has muddled discussions of this topic, additionally, as evidenced by its intimate connection to guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism.

Military authors frequently use the term asymmetric to describe the indirect tactics that many weak players deploy or the character of the enemy (e.g, asymmetric adversaries can be expected to …) rather than to the relative strength of adversarial forces.

Academic writers frequently concentrate on resolving two conundrums in an asymmetrical battle. First, there must be motivations for weaker actors to choose to battle more strong actors if strength determines the outcome. Key justifications comprise:

Weaker performers might own hidden weaponry.

There may be strong allies for weaker actors.

Threats from more powerful parties cannot be taken seriously.

Extreme requirements are placed on a stronger actor.

When responding to threats from powerful players, the weaker actor must take its regional rivals into account.

Second, there needs to be an explanation for how the weak can defeat the strong if strength, as it is typically understood, results in victory in battle. Key justifications comprise:

Strategic interaction.

willingness of the weak to endure greater suffering or pay higher prices.

external assistance for unreliable performers.

Strong actors' resistance to violence that escalates.

Dynamics within the group.

Enhanced strong actor war objectives.

The development of asymmetric rivals' perspectives on time.

The majority of the time in conventional warfare, both sides use identical types of forces, and the quantity or quality of the opposing forces, such as superior command and control over their own, can be used to forecast the outcome (c2). When this is the case, it might be challenging for opposing parties to engage in combat because conventional troops are not always comparable. The standoff between the marine forces of the British Royal Navy and the continental land forces of the French Army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars serves as an illustration of this. During the battles of 1801, Admiral Jervis said the following: My Lords, I don't claim that the French won't arrive. I simply claim that they won't travel by sea., Asymmetrical warfare's tactical effectiveness depends on at least some of the following presumptions:

One side may possess technological advantages that outweigh an adversary's numerical advantages; the English longbow at the Battle of Crécy is an example.

The more fragile infrastructure, which can be attacked with disastrous effects, typically negates technological advantage. Multiple electric lines, roads, or water supply systems being destroyed in densely populated places might have catastrophic effects on the economy and morale. On the other hand, the weaker side might not have any of these structures.

A smaller force may be able to defeat a much bigger one because to training, tactics, and technology. For several centuries, for instance, the employment of phalanx by the Greek hoplites (heavy infantry) proved them vastly superior to their adversaries. Another battle that made significant use of the terrain was the Battle of Thermopylae.

It may be possible to utilize unconventional strategies, such as hit-and-run and selective conflicts where the superior force is weaker, as an efficient way of harassment without breaking the laws of war if the inferior power is in a position of self-defense, i.e., under attack or occupation. The American Revolutionary War, the French Resistance, and Soviet and Yugoslav partisans are perhaps the most well-known historical instances of this concept. This tactic can be employed against democratic aggressor countries to exploit the electorate's endurance of the fight (as in the Vietnam War and other recent conflicts), inciting demonstrations and ensuing disagreements among elected politicians.

However, the effectiveness of the weaker power depends on the stronger power abstaining from similar methods if it adopts an aggressive stance or uses other strategies that are against the jus in bello laws of war. For instance, using a flag of truce or specially marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush is forbidden by the rules of ground warfare. However, the success of an asymmetric combatant adopting this forbidden strategy depends on how strictly the superior power abides by the relevant law. Similar to this, warfare laws forbid combatants from using civilian populations, facilities, or settlements as military bases. However, when a weaker force employs this strategy, it depends on the assumption that the stronger one will respect the law that the inferior one is breaking and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do, the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.

Regarding the connection between asymmetric warfare and terrorism, there are two conflicting points of view. Asymmetrical conflict is increasingly seen as a part of fourth-generation warfare in the current world. Though rarely by its practitioners or their supporters, it is frequently labeled as terrorism when done outside of the laws of war. The opposing viewpoint asserts that asymmetrical conflict is unrelated to terrorism.

The smaller force can exploit terrain that restricts mobility, like forests and mountains, to its advantage while the larger force, especially one operating far from its logistical base, can use it against it as a force inhibitor. Such terrain is referred to be challenging terrain. Although they often have strong transportation access, cities offer a huge number of ready-made defensive positions with easy escape routes and can also turn into tough terrain if a protracted battle leaves the streets covered in debris.

The land's shape helps the army estimate risks and distance while measuring up adversaries to determine victory. Those who engage in combat without understanding these will lose.

— Sun Tzu, Art of War

The guerrillas must maneuver among the populace like a fish in the water.

— Mao Zedong.

An early instance of terrain advantage is the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, where the Persian soldiers' numerical superiority was used to funnel them into a position where they could not use their bulk as an advantage due to the narrow topography of a defile.

In the Nizari Ismaili state in the 12th century, outlaws known as the Assassins were successful. The state was made up of fortifications (like the Alamut Castle) perched in highlands and on strategic mountaintops that were difficult to approach and bordered by hostile territory. The Crusaders were among the high-value targets that the Assassins created strategies to assassinate, endangering their security.

Patriot Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion, also known as the Swamp Fox, used unconventional strategies, inner lines, and the South Carolina woods to impede greater British regular forces during the American Revolution.

Beginning in 1941 as small detachments in and around mountain communities, the Yugoslav Partisans fought the German and other Axis occupation troops, effectively surviving despite their small numbers by taking advantage of the hostile terrain. They gradually drove their adversaries back over the course of the following four years, reclaiming population centers and resources, before eventually becoming the regular Yugoslav Army.

In an asymmetrical conflict, civilians may be crucial to the result. Tips on the date or location of insurgent action can seriously weaken the resistance in such situations, as it is simple for insurgents to blend into the populace soon after an attack. An information-central framework offers a paradigm to better explain the dynamics of such wars when civilian information-sharing is essential. In this framework, civilians are primarily considered as sources of strategic information rather than resources. The framework presupposes:

As a result, civilians (non-combatants) should share intelligence rather than giving combatants supplies, recruitment, or refuge.

Without putting the person relaying the information in danger, information can be exchanged anonymously.

Given the further supposition that the government is the greater or more powerful force, the framework implies the following conclusions:

Government and rebel forces provide services to civilians as a reward for providing