Maneuver Warfare: Strategies and Tactics for Modern Combat

By Fouad Sabry

What is Maneuver Warfare

Maneuver warfare, or manoeuvre warfare, is a military strategy which emphasizes movement, initiative and surprise to achieve a position of advantage. Maneuver seeks to inflict losses indirectly by envelopment, encirclement and disruption, while minimizing the need to engage in frontal combat. In contrast to attrition warfare where strength tends to be applied against strength, maneuver warfare attempts to apply strength against weakness in order to accomplish the mission.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Maneuver warfare

Chapter 2: Blitzkrieg

Chapter 3: Combined arms

Chapter 4: Military strategy

Chapter 5: Trench warfare

Chapter 6: Frontal assault

Chapter 7: Skirmisher

Chapter 8: Infiltration tactics

Chapter 9: AirLand Battle

Chapter 10: Stormtroopers (Imperial Germany)

(II) Answering the public top questions about maneuver warfare.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Maneuver Warfare.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: May 27, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Maneuver warfare

A military tactic known as maneuver warfare, or manoeuvre warfare, aims to weaken the enemy's overall cohesiveness and fighting spirit.

A fierce will to succeed, maneuver warfare, the use of initiative, innovation, and the unexpected, However, the emergence of cavalry and motorized vehicles, among other examples of advanced technology, has heightened interest in the ideas of movement warfare and in its use on contemporary battlefields.

Many military doctrines and cultures are built on exhaustive historical examples of maneuver combat, even though most conflicts between established armies have historically been conducted using attrition warfare techniques.

According to this theory, attrition warfare entails sending large amounts of men and equipment against an enemy's strongholds with an emphasis on destroying the enemy's physical assets. Success is determined by the number of enemy combatants killed, the amount of infrastructure and equipment destroyed, and the territory captured or occupied. Attrition warfare frequently employs strict, centralized command structures that don't call for much initiative or creativity from lower-level leaders (also called top-down or command push tactics).

Attrition warfare and maneuver warfare are on opposite sides of a spectrum, according to conventional military doctrine. The enemy is viewed as a group of targets to be located and eliminated in attrition warfare. It makes use of maneuver to deploy weaponry to decimate the adversary's forces. On the other hand, maneuver warfare makes use of firepower and attrition against important elements of the enemy army.

According to maneuver warfare, planned movement can more effectively bring about the defeat of an opposing force than merely coming into touch with and obliterating enemy forces until they are no longer able to fight. Instead, maneuver warfare combines the destruction of specific enemy targets, such as command and control centers, logistics bases, or fire support assets, with the isolating of enemy troops and the movement of enemy forces to exploit enemy weaknesses.

Even when there is minimal physical damage, such as the Maginot Line, bypassing and cutting off an opposing strongpoint frequently causes that strongpoint to fall. In maneuver warfare, opponent positions at breakthrough points are suppressed or destroyed with firepower, which is generally employed to eliminate as many enemy forces as possible in attrition warfare. To create havoc and confusion behind enemy lines, infiltration tactics, whether conventional or using special troops, may be widely deployed.

Robert Leonhard, a retired military commander and author of military theory, describes maneuver warfare theory as an alternative to attrition warfare that aims to preempt, dislocate, and disrupt the opponent.

The success of maneuver warfare depends so heavily on tempo and initiative that command structures tend to be more decentralized and lower-level unit leaders are allowed more tactical latitude. Decentralized command structures, also known as recon-pull tactics or directive control, enable on the ground unit leaders to take advantage of adversary weaknesses as they emerge while still operating within the parameters of the commander's overall vision.

As demonstrated by John Boyd's OODA loop, tempo.

Schwerpunkt (focal point): the focus of an effort, or hitting the enemy at precisely the appropriate moment and location. Van Creveld asserts that the optimal location is one that is both crucial and poorly protected.

Any maneuver should aim to surprise the opponent so that they are unable to counter it. This can be done by keeping them uninformed for as long as feasible.

Utilizing a variety of weapons to assault the enemy produces an opportunity cost for any response. If the enemy successfully defends against one type of attack, they could leave themselves open to another. Additionally, many attack strategies may aid one another through simultaneous action (ex: Infantry supporting armor in such a way that the infantry has more available firepower, and the armor has protection from ambush)

Flexibility: A military force needs to be diverse, self-sufficient, and redundant. By maintaining several lines of attack, whether in strategy, mobility, or any other aspect, possibilities are constantly present and can be taken advantage of.

Rapidly changing circumstances could outstrip centralized command's orders, leaving personnel with directives that are no longer relevant. In order to adjust to a changing environment, lower levels of leadership must comprehend overall intent.

Armies were slower than marching soldiers for the most of history, allowing opposing armies to march around one another for as long as they desired. The location and timing of the battle's start were frequently determined by supply conditions. Prior to the domestication of the horse, the development of chariots, and the growing military application of cavalry, this started to change. It served two main purposes: attacking and breaking infantry formations with its momentum; and cutting communications and isolating formations for a more comprehensive later defeat.

The double envelopment was arguably one of the most well-known early maneuver strategies. At the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, Hannibal utilized it to defeat the Romans. In the Battle of Walaja in 633 AD, Khalid ibn al-Walid defeated the Persian Empire.

Similar maneuvers were utilized by the Athenian forces on the flanks and the center of the Athenian and Platean citizen-soldiers (Hoplites) to retire from Datis' army at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC. The goal was to advance the Saka and Persian axemen, which made up the basis of the Persian army. After driving their rivals from the field, the Hoplite flanks encircled the Persian center. Since the hoplite formations had little meaningful defense against Datis's re-embarked cavalry before the engagement, this significantly weakened his position.

Another instance of surprising the enemy's defenses is Khalid's assault of Roman Syria in July 634, which he carried out by entering Syria through the Syrian desert. While Khalid, who was in Iraq, marched through the Syrian desert and entered northern Syria, completely taking the Byzantine army by surprise and cutting off their communications with northern Syria, was holding the Muslim forces in southern Syria while the Byzantine army had anticipated reinforcement from the traditional Syria-Arabia road in the south.

The military tactics of the Mongol monarch Genghis Khan centered on swift, decisive maneuver and made use of the prowess and stamina of his cavalry. He beat nearly every opposing force he faced by employing operational movement, command and control, deception, and precision battlefield tactics that were far superior to those of his opponents in China, Russia, Persia, and Eastern Europe.

Similar tactics could likewise be employed with appropriately trained soldiers. Napoleon I prevented the early deployment of the enemy forces by using preemptive cavalry and swift infantry operations. This gave him the freedom to attack whenever and wherever he pleased, concentrating his forces and perhaps taking advantage of the terrain. It prevented enemy forces from effectively coordinating, even when they outnumbered them. That was tactically and strategically sound.

Napoleon's reputation as a commander and ultimately as the basis of his power to lead France was built on a successful and fluid war in northern Italy against the numerically superior Austrians. Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne, was one of the main influences on his plan, according to him.

He taught a typical, if rather sloppy, French Army of Italy to move more quickly than was generally supposed to be possible. That was partially due to the fact that his troops had no significant logistical tail and lived off the land. He was regarded as unbeatable, even when facing stronger and larger forces, thanks to his renowned skill at maneuvering vast armies into position for combat and the strategy he chose.

To enable a quicker response to enemy action, Napoleon also organized his troops into what would be called battle groups of combined weapons formations today. Carl von Clausewitz resorted to the tactic, which is crucial to bolstering the efficiency of maneuver warfare.

Napoleon's main tactics included moving quickly to engage the enemy before it could organize, engaging lightly while moving to turn the flank that guarded the main supply route, enveloping and deploying blocking forces to prevent reinforcement, and thoroughly defeating those forces contained in the envelopment. All of those actions imply swifter movement than the opposition as well as quicker responses to their moves.

The trademarks of maneuver warfare include their headquarters, swift mass marches used to obtain a strategic advantage, cavalry probes and screens used to conceal his movements, deliberate movement used to acquire a psychological advantage by isolating forces from one another. One of his main worries was how slowly infantry movements moved in comparison to cavalry movements.

The Prussians, directed by Clausewitz, underwent a significant doctrinal examination of the demonstrated power of maneuver warfare as a result of that and subsequent setbacks. The Franco-Prussian War showed the impact of that review.

Trains powered by steam were the first automated mode of transportation to be introduced in the middle of the 19th century. Significant logistical improvements came forth as a result. The tempo of the march was no longer a speed barrier for opposing forces. During the American Civil War in the 1860s, some train-borne maneuvering took place, but the system could only offer a limited amount of support due to the proportions of the armies involved. One of the first armored battle vehicles used by humans was the armored train.

Knowing that the French might field a larger force than theirs during the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussians devised a quick plan known as the Kesselschlacht, or cauldron battle, which involved encircling the French strongpoints and destroying or avoiding them. The remainder of the army could march without resistance to capture crucial goals. In the event of a declaration of war, Prussia might organize fast, invade, annihilate French field forces, and triumph before the French army could completely respond. Since Prussian armies surrounded and routed French forces, seized Napoleon III, and besieged Paris in 1870, that approach was used to deadly effect. Similar warfare strategies were used by the Germans in World War I. In the Schlieffen Plan, Germany attempted to deliver a similar knock-out blow to the French army. However, throughout the preceding four decades, technology advanced dramatically; the machine gun and more potent artillery weapons tipped the scales of power in favor of the defenders. All combatants wanted to move the front again, although it was difficult to do so.

Near the close of World War I, Germany developed new strategies to get around resistance, including infiltration and the use of shock troops of stormtroopers. Similar strategies were employed by Russian General Aleksei Brusilov in 1916 on the Eastern Front during the Brusilov Offensive.

The development of fully armored tanks in a succession of more effective operations offered a path out of the stalemate of trench warfare and attrition, but World War I ended before the British had amassed enough tanks to launch a significant offensive. In his Plan 1919, Fuller suggested using tanks to burst through the defenses before wreaking havoc on the German supply and communication lines.

With the Experimental Mechanized Force, the British developed concepts for completely automated, all-arms combat during the interwar years. The Germans expanded on infiltration methods and amplified them with motor transport as they updated their doctrine and strategy. Leading proponent of armored combat was Heinz Guderian. The German military placed a strong emphasis on a number of essential components, including close air support, quick movement and force concentration (Schwerpunkt), and aggressive, independent local initiative. Radio was used to carefully coordinate everything, which helped develop new strategies for the 1940 Battle of France. The interwar views of British officers J.F.C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, which the British army failed to adopt and completely understand, have some similarities to thoughts concerning armored warfare in Germany.

Blitzkrieg and the Soviet idea of Deep Battle, which the Soviets deployed to great effect in 1944 and continued to use as a doctrine throughout the Cold War, share certain parallels.

Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky created and incorporated the idea of Deep Battle into Red Army field regulations doctrine in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s.

One crucial idea in maneuver warfare, according to the US Marine Corps, is that maneuver is typically viewed as a spatial concept—the use of maneuver to achieve an advantage in one's position. Nevertheless, the US Marines' definition of maneuver is a warfighting strategy that tries to fracture the opponent's cohesion through a variety of rapid, targeted, and unexpected actions that create a tumultuous and rapidly deteriorating scenario with which the enemy cannot deal.

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