Anti Surface Warfare: Strategies, Tactics, and Technologies

By Fouad Sabry

What is Anti Surface Warfare

Anti-surface warfare is the branch of naval warfare concerned with the suppression of surface combatants. More generally, it is any weapons, sensors, or operations intended to attack or limit the effectiveness of an adversary's surface ships. Before the adoption of the submarine and naval aviation, all naval warfare consisted of anti-surface warfare. The distinct concept of an anti-surface warfare capability emerged after World War II, and literature on the subject as a distinct discipline is inherently dominated by the dynamics of the Cold War.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Anti-surface warfare

Chapter 2: Missile

Chapter 3: Anti-ship missile

Chapter 4: Anti-aircraft warfare

Chapter 5: Exocet

Chapter 6: County-class destroyer

Chapter 7: HMS Sheffield (D80)

Chapter 8: Sea Wolf (missile)

Chapter 9: RIM-7 Sea Sparrow

Chapter 10: Sea Dart

(II) Answering the public top questions about anti surface warfare.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Anti Surface Warfare.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: May 29, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Anti-surface warfare

Anti-surface warfare (ASuW or ASUW) is the field of naval warfare that focuses on the elimination of surface combatants. In a broader sense, it includes any weapons, sensors, or actions designed to attack or hinder the effectiveness of the surface ships of an adversary. Before the development of the submarine and naval aviation, anti-surface warfare comprised the entirety of naval conflict. The distinct concept of an anti-surface warfare capability originated after World War II, and the literature on the subject is inevitably dominated by the Cold War's dynamics.

Based on the platform from which weapons are launched, anti-surface warfare can be categorized into four categories:

Anti-surface warfare done by airplanes in the air. Historically, level- or dive-bombing, strafing runs, or air-launched torpedoes were the most common methods (and in some cases by suicide attacks). Today, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) or anti-ship missiles are typically employed in standoff attacks (AShM).

Anti-surface warfare undertaken by naval vessels. These ships are equipped with torpedoes, cannons, surface-to-surface missiles, and mines. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) constitute a new technology. Suicide boat is an example of asymmetric techniques.

Anti-surface warfare undertaken by submerged vessels. Historically, torpedoes and deck guns were used for this. Submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) have been the main anti-ship weapon in recent years due to their much longer range.

Historically, this term refers to the shelling of the shore by coastal artillery, notably cannons. More prevalent are cruise or ballistic missiles launched from land. Moreover, satellites controlled from the ground may offer information on fleet movements.

Harpoon, RBS-15, P-500 Bazalt, Penguin, and Exocet are examples of anti-ship missiles.

Following the outcomes of the Battle of Taranto and the Battle of Midway during World War II, the fleet aircraft carrier became the predominant combatant ship type. After World War II, the ASuW concept focused mostly on the numerous carrier battle groups fielded by the United States Navy, against which the Soviet Union devised specific techniques that were not a 1:1 match of designs.

After World War II, U.S. military planners anticipated that a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe would necessitate a large convoy effort to Europe to support ally forces in theater. In response to the need for logistical and military support, the Soviet Union increased its submarine fleet, which, in the case of hostilities, might have prevented the delivery of supplies to the theater. As military strategists frequently devise counterstrategies to match the capabilities of the opposing force, the West then constructed SOSUS lines to monitor Soviet submarines.

The Soviet naval aviation possessed ASuW capability from the air. The Tupolev Tu-16 Badger G was equipped with anti-ship missiles, followed by the supersonic marine strike bomber Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire. Even the propeller-driven, anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-focused Tu-142 could and did carry anti-ship missiles.

Following the end of the Cold War, ASuW continues to involve asymmetries, which may be more prominent for the time being.

After the introduction of dependable, long-range, guided missiles, it was envisioned that air ASuW would involve a mass attack by high-speed jet aircraft launching a sufficient number of missiles to overwhelm a fleet's air defenses. Some analysts considered that this capability was continually undervalued. During the Falklands War, Exocet anti-ship missile assaults against the Royal Navy led to the use of 'Exocet' as a slang term for a'sharp, destructive, and unexpected attack.' The USS Stark incident demonstrated that a medium-sized power could seriously destroy a modern frigate, with the attack of a single aircraft on a single ship capable of causing heavy damage, much alone a multi-ship flight scenario.

The same advantages that made aircraft so effective against surface ships during World War II now present. Aircraft can attack in large numbers with little warning and can carry a variety of armaments capable of incapacitating ships. While warships are equipped with potent defensive technologies, the requirement to intercept and destroy every incoming missile puts them at a disadvantage. Missiles and supersonic planes are extremely tough targets to hit, and even the most modern systems cannot guarantee their interception with absolute surety. The divide was at its widest point during the Cold War, when saturation missile assaults were a major concern, but it has narrowed slightly in recent years. The introduction of phased array radar on ships permits them to track and target a far larger number of targets simultaneously, hence increasing the number of missiles required to overwhelm defenses. The advent of vertical launching systems permits almost simultaneous deployment of dozens of SAMs from each ship, a significant improvement over prior missile launchers that could only fire one or two missiles before reloading. 'Soft kill' countermeasures are supplemented by the introduction of the point-defence close-in weapon system (CIWS), which is typically a rapid-fire autocannon sometimes combined with a missile system as a last line of defense. The emergence of networked fleet-level defense direction employing multiple radars and multiple launch platforms to intercept a cloud of missiles enables a more efficient use of defense resources. Previously, each ship had to operate independently against a coordinated attack, resulting in redundant defensive fire against the same targets. Due to the radar horizon, networked information from airborne radar provides significantly more range than any shipboard radar could accomplish.

In addition, modern communication and intelligence tools make it more difficult to strike carrier fleets than in earlier decades. In the 1970s, the difficulty for a carrier was to efficiently employ its air arm against oncoming bombers. It was impossible to maintain a constant combat air patrol over hundreds of miles of water because of the fighters' relatively short range and loiter time. Due to the range of anti-ship missiles, bombers are often out of range of launching fighters when an attack is detected, nullifying a significant portion of the fleet's anti-air defenses. The ability to provide the fleet with real-time intelligence from long-range radars and satellite images improves the use of fighters against aerial assaults.

These enhancements do not render a fleet immune to missile attack, but they boost its ability to defend itself and the number of attackers required to overwhelm defenses. The edge remains with the attackers because a fleet is still relatively static and must be effective against every incoming missile to prevent severe casualties, but attackers just need a few hits to be successful. The most significant difference is that attackers must now devote more resources to each attack. To successfully overwhelm defenses, larger formations of aircraft are required, but if this is accomplished, the aircraft will cause extremely severe damage. Even a single missile may be capable of penetrating defenses and sinking a ship, and even the most effective defense systems cannot guarantee an interception, only a greater probability of one.

Today, the majority of naval boats are equipped with long-range anti-surface missiles, such as Harpoon and Exocet, that may cripple or kill opposing ships with a single hit. These are meant to target other warships and can be launched from vertical launch systems or independent launch tubes. Smaller ships, such as the littoral combat ship of the United States Navy, employ surface-to-surface missiles, such as the AGM-114 Hellfire, that are less suited to assault warships but nonetheless hazardous against swift attack craft, smugglers, and pirates, as well as land targets.

Compared to other combatants, a surface ship has numerous significant limitations as a ship-to-ship missile platform. Due to the radar horizon, proximity to the surface significantly affects radar range, making it more difficult to locate targets and decreasing the maximum range at which a missile might be launched effectively. In addition, launching from low altitude requires more fuel than launching from the air, which further reduces a missile's potential range. However, ships can carry many more missiles than any other vehicle, allowing them to attack more targets or maintain a battle for longer.

The prevalence of anti-ship missiles makes it unlikely