Armoured Warfare: Strategies and Technologies in Modern Combat

By Fouad Sabry

What is Armoured Warfare

Armoured warfare or armored warfare, is the use of armoured fighting vehicles in modern warfare. It is a major component of modern methods of war. The premise of armoured warfare rests on the ability of troops to penetrate conventional defensive lines through use of manoeuvre by armoured units.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Armoured warfare

Chapter 2: Armoured fighting vehicle

Chapter 3: Tank destroyer

Chapter 4: Blitzkrieg

Chapter 5: Mechanized infantry

Chapter 6: Tank

Chapter 7: Combined arms

Chapter 8: Division (military)

Chapter 9: History of the tank

Chapter 10: Anti-tank warfare

(II) Answering the public top questions about armoured warfare.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Armoured Warfare.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: May 29, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Armoured warfare

Ch.

Tanks and other analogous vehicles are utilized by infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units, to a large extent, in armoured warfare.

The First World War, which lasted from 1914 to 1918, saw the advent of modern armored warfare. Strategists sought to end the tactical, operational, and strategic impasses that trench warfare, or entrenched defensive infantry armed with machine guns, had imposed on commanders on the Western Front. Under these circumstances, attacks typically made very slow progress and resulted in high losses. The creators of tanks wanted to bring maneuverability back to warfare, and they discovered a useful way to do it by giving machine guns caterpillar traction so they could cross trenches while also having armor to protect them from small-arms fire (pistol, rifle, and machine gun) while they were moving.

In order to maneuver over the barbed wire and other barriers of no-land man's while avoiding machine gun fire, Britain and France created the first tanks in 1915. On September 15, 1916, British Mark I tanks engaged in combat for the first time at the Somme, Despite the largely unimpressive start, the military and political leadership in both Britain and France supported significant investment in the creation of armored vehicles in 1917. As a result, there were much more tanks available in 1918. Contrarily, the German Empire only started making tanks at the end of the war. During the entire fight, just 20 German A7V tanks were constructed, compared to over 4,400 French and over 2,500 British tanks of various types. However, the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when a group of three German A7V tanks battled a group of three British Mark IV tanks that they met accidently, saw the first tank-versus-tank combat of World War I.

The Entente used tanks in large numbers at the Battle of Soissons (18 to 22 July 1918) and Battle of Amiens (August 1918), which broke the stalemate created by trench warfare on the Western Front, thus ending the war after the final German spring offensives of 21 March to 18 July 1918.

During the war, direct assistance for infantry was frequently given first priority in armour deployment plans. The destruction of machine gun nests and the breaking of barbed wire were thought to be the tank's primary functions, allowing foot forces to advance more easily. The main area of theoretical discussion was whether to utilize a swarm of light tanks or a smaller number of very effective heavier vehicles for this. Although a significant number of British heavy tanks caused a breakthrough during the Battle of Cambrai, armor was unable to take advantage of it. The ability of armies to flank enemy lines should theoretically be restored thanks to the tank's maneuverability. Tank combat was hindered by the new weapon system's technical immaturity, which limited speed, operating range, and reliability, as well as a dearth of efficient armoured tactics, for the most of World War I.

Due in part to these technical constraints as well as the prestige role historically associated with horse-mounted cavalry, the strategic deployment of tanks developed slowly during and soon after World War I. One exception, on paper, was Colonel J. F. C. Fuller's Plan 1919 for the British Army, which called for deep strategic penetrations by mechanized forces composed of tanks and soldiers carried by trucks, supported by airplanes, to paralyze the enemy command-structure.

Following the First World War, the technical and philosophical underpinnings of armored warfare advanced and split into numerous schools of doctrine.

throughout the 1920s, There were only a relatively small number of tanks made.

However, there were, major advances in theory and technology.

Several British and French commanders who were involved in the development of the tank, such as Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne, B.

H.

J Liddell Hart, J.

F.

C.

Fuller, speculated on the potential employment of autonomous armored armies in the future, housing a significant number of tanks, deep strategic penetrations should be carried out.

Liddell Hart in particular produced numerous works on the subject, spreading some of Fuller's ideas.

Such philosophies had to contend with the fact that armored cars first appeared in the 1920s, earliest form of transportation through road, incredibly unreliable, This couldn't be applied to long-term operations.

The more conventional school of thought on the subject attempted to incorporate armored vehicles into the existing infantry and cavalry organization and tactics.

Technical advancement first concentrated on the transmission, engine, and suspension system upgrades to produce cars that were faster, more dependable, and had a longer range than their World War I predecessors. In order to defeat the enemy by cutting off his lines of communication and supply, as cavalry had done during the previous century, both France and Britain eventually built specialized infantry tanks that were more heavily armored to provide infantry support and cavalry tanks that were faster and could exploit a breakthrough.

The Experimental Mechanized Force was established by the British as the first big fully mechanized unit, with approval from the War Office. The unit operated on Salisbury Plain while being studied by the other major powers, including the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Despite being praised for its performance, it was disbanded in 1928.

In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, argued that the British army had pursued innovation recklessly during the interwar period by betting on the combat effectiveness of armored units operating with little infantry or artillery support. The British army had been underfunded and overstretched. The Second World War's earliest setbacks in North Africa were a result of doing this.

With the exception of Germany, which was prohibited from owning armored vehicles by the Treaty of Versailles, all major European nations, the United States, and Japan would develop their own experimental mechanized forces in the late 1920s. Many of these forces would use French or British vehicle designs or even directly purchase vehicles, but they would primarily borrow from both to develop their own doctrines.

Political tensions between the major world powers quickly grew during the 1930s. Early in the 1930s, the Soviet Union and France started to rearm. The succeeding Five Years Plans, a vast general industrialization program in the Soviet Union, included the mechanization of the armed forces. As a result, the nation soon had more tanks than the rest of the world put together, with thousands of them being created each year. German officers were dispatched to the USSR during this time to observe and take part in the formation of armored doctrine before the Nazi Party came to power in Germany. German and Red Army scientists worked together to experiment with different chassis designs and drive trains as they developed the use of tanks based on second generation vehicles with turreted main guns. The purchase of a T3 chassis from US designer John Walter Christie, employing the Christie suspension, turned out to be one significant acquisition for the Red Army. This chassis served as the foundation for the Soviet BT series of rapid tanks. Despite an increase in the number of tanks, financial restrictions prevented all of the armed ground forces from being fully mechanized. Most of the divisions still included infantry that wasn't even motorized, which was necessary. Tanks were typically assigned to specialized armored units as a result, where the expensive and scarce specialist maintenance and training capacity could be concentrated. Only the Soviet Union possessed enough tanks to supply each infantry division with an organic tank battalion. However, France was the first country to establish sizable armored formations, forming two Mechanized Corps in 1934, each with 430 tanks. The Royal Air Force and Royal Navy received primacy during the 1930s in the United Kingdom. The British Army started converting its cavalry from horses to tanks, and by 1939, all but a few regiments had undergone the transition completely. In November 1937, the Mobile Division, the precursor to the British 1st Armoured Division, was created.

Armoured fighting vehicles saw little actual service prior to the Second World War. During the Spanish Civil War, both sides employed Italian, German, and Soviet tanks, but their flimsy armor made them susceptible to antitank weapons. This was a tactic used by traditionalist Red Army members to lessen the impact of mechanization advocates.

Large armoured units of the Panzerwaffe and Cavalry worked in close coordination with active infantry divisions during the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 to break through Polish defenses and pursue the defeated enemy forces. Polish armored units that were more sparse and dispersed were easily eliminated. Additionally, armored divisions were used by the Red Army to invade Poland's eastern region. At the time, it was believed that an armored Blitzkrieg was to blame for the quick demise of the Polish army. Later, it was asserted that the campaign was essentially an illustration of the traditional German idea of the Annihilation Battle from the nineteenth century, in which the significance of deep strategic armoured penetrations was minimal.

Following the Polish campaign, French during the Phoney War, Production of tanks in Britain and Germany rose significantly, both Western allies producing more than Germany.

However, The number of armored divisions fielded by the Anglo-French coalition fell short of that of the Germans, because it was impossible to raise such massive units fast.

Despite the fact that the French had more tanks,, frequently better equipped and armored, At the army level, Bataillons de Chars de Combat (battle tank battalions) received half of these for infantry support.

early in 1940, The German command adopted a high-risk strategy after concluding that an attrition-based war was impossible to win.

They concurred with the Manstein Plan, envisioning the majority of German infantry units making a breakthrough through the Ardennes, with seven armored divisions leading the way, while the main mobile French reserve consisting of three Cavalry armoured divisions (Divisions Légères Mécaniques or Mechanised Light Divisions) – the only armoured units organised on the lines of the German armoured divisions – would be lured into the Low Countries by a feint attack with a lesser force, three armored divisions, among others.

In May 1940, at the time of the Battle of France, There were several uncertain armor battles as a result of the German feint, The Battle of Hannut is among them, the biggest tank fight to that point.

both at once, West of the Ardennes, German motorized soldiers forced the Meuse River crossings, massive carpet bombing of the crossing locations helping.

In the initial scheme, The infantry divisions and the armored divisions were once more expected to work closely together.

In reality, Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian, two armored commanders, promptly escaped the bridgeheads, starting a drive in the direction of the English Channel, It was accomplished in a week.

The four Infantry armoured divisions of the French reserve, the Divisions cuirassées, lacked the strategic flexibility to stop this.

The Belgian army was enveloped by the strategic envelopment, the best French troops and the British Expeditionary Force.

As a result, Dunkirk was evacuated, and Operation Fall Rot ultimately brought France to an end.

In addition to abruptly altering the geostrategic landscape and giving Germany hegemonic status on the European continent, the remarkable and unexpected success appeared to support the views of Fuller and Liddell-Hart. From the summer of 1940 onward, the armed forces of all remaining major nations modified their tactical doctrine, unit organization, strategic planning, and tank production plans in response to the unquestionable potential of armoured manoeuvre warfare. Frieser claimed that even Germany, who had just officially accepted blitzkrieg strategies, could attest to this.

The British came up with an alternative strategy in the dunes of North Africa, combining artillery, infantry, and armored vehicles to create a balanced, combined arms squad. The Commonwealth troops of the 8th Army quickly overcame the poorly equipped and poorly commanded 10th Italian Army of Maresciallo (Marshal) Rodolfo Graziani.

The arrival of the German Afrika Korps, led by General der Panzertruppe Erwin Rommel, exposed the shortcomings of the British strategy: while the small numbers of infantry and artillery in each armored division were adequate when attacking the stationary and poorly coordinated Italian troops, they were insufficient when facing the highly mobile, well-coordinated German units.

Due to improper tactics, specifically running armored formations into opposing anti-tank positions, the Allies struggled in armoured battles in the North African desert between 1941 and 1942; however, they had some notable successes at Crusader and 1st Alamein, and under Montgomery they finally achieved decisive victories, particularly at the Second Battle of El Alamein.

According to Kendrick Kuo, an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, the British army in North Africa first operated its armored divisions with little infantry or artillery support due to causes dating back to the interwar period. The Germans, however, had mechanized their infantry, artillery, and armor. The British were only able to regain their fighting effectiveness after removing their unnecessary emphasis on armor.

Much of the theoretical work done by officers like Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov in the mid- to late 1930s served as the foundation for Red Army tank development. This was done in accordance with the two-direction notions, one of which was an infantry-focused wide front and the other was a army of shock..

The shock army demanded manoeuvre tanks (fast tanks with medium guns) used in conjunction with motorized forces and mechanised cavalry, which would operate in depth as strategic cavalry combined with developing airborne troops, in contrast to the infantry-based part of the doctrine, which called for powerful tanks (heavy tanks armed with infantry guns and machineguns) and tankettes (light, frequently amphibious tanks with machineguns). The 1936 Field Service Regulations, sometimes known as PU-36, is the product of these concepts.

The Red Army was transitioning and recuperating from the 1937 suppression of the officer corps at the onset of the Second World War, particularly its armored divisions. The Red Army depended on advice from politically chosen officers who had served in the Spanish Civil War rather than the lessons from Nomonhan, which had been successfully carried out by General Zhukov. The outcome was a dismal performance during the Winter War. The Red Army's tank fleet was enormous, with some 24,000 tanks, but many of them were out-of-date or unusable due to problems obtaining spare parts and a shortage of skilled support personnel.

The development of the T-34, which occurred just before the war and had an impact on Soviet armoured doctrine and tank design for a decade, was one significant advance. In the first German encounter of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, the T-34 proved to be a shock to the German forces since it was built on the Christie suspension chassis and used sloping armor for the first time. The T-34 possessed a great balance of firepower, protection, and mobility. The T-34's wide tracks allowed it to navigate terrain in bad weather, something that plagued German designs for a long time.

The Red Army came to the conclusion that it should apply operational procedures built before the conflict after evaluating the effectiveness of the German Blitzkrieg strategy, operational methods, and tactics, leading to the creation of the Tank Armies. Heavy tanks, self-propelled artillery, and tank destroyers were also created to compliment the T-34. Throughout all of the Red Army's strategic operations in World War II, which were carried out in utmost secrecy and based on the Principle of Surprise, armored forces were concentrated.

Although the other Arms of Service did not share this opinion prior to 1940 in Germany, in-depth research using theoretical techniques, wargaming, and drills helped the Panzertruppe establish confidence in the armoured formation as the primary fighting formation (and Hitler's political support). The inclusion of radios in every tank was a fundamental component of this doctrine, although this objective was hampered by the fact that the majority of tanks only had receiver sets.

The German armoured forces benefited from significantly more extensive and adaptable training on a tactical and operational level at the start of World War II than did the Allies. German tank commanders were able to take advantage of their vehicles' maneuverability by operating their tanks under radio control.

Even after the invasion of Poland, the term Blitzkrieg lacked a precise definition in terms of strategy. Guderian and von Manstein came up with a plan that included what would eventually be considered to be the core of the Blitzkrieg: grouped panzer units carrying out quick deep penetrations. German High Command initially rejected this plan of action. However, the Schwerpunkt at Sedan, which was given to such forces, was a key component of the final plans for the 1940 invasion of France. Due to this operation's enormous success, Blitzkrieg was incorporated into wartime strategic planning.

German tanks were capable of traveling about 200 kilometers with the gasoline and supplies they carried, as well as three to nine days' worth of food. But just as Blitzkrieg emerged as a determined military philosophy in 1941, although first enjoying stunning success on the eastern front, it ultimately failed.

prior to the war, It was in Heinz Guderian's Achtung-Panzer! proposed fully mechanizing the German military.

By 1942, Increased AFV production made it possible to fully realize this objective.

Now, a large united armored force could be assembled, different from an infantry-only or cavalry-only configuration.

However, The Panzertruppe saw an increasing amount of AFV production redirected elsewhere.

The Artillery formed its own Sturmgeschütz units and infantry divisions were given their own Panzerjäger companies.

Even though their formal biological strength has decreased, beginning in the summer of 1943, The armored divisions lacked tanks structurally.

Although the United States had created the Tank Corps during World War I using French Renault FT light tanks and British Mark V and Mark V* heavy tanks, and although some officers, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr., initially emerged from that war as ardent supporters of continuing and developing an American armoured force, the rapid reduction of the forces as well as apathy and even antipathy towards funding and maintaining armed forces in the inter-war years led to relative stagnation. In the late 1920s and into the 1930s, Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., almost alone, promoted the creation of proper training, tools, and doctrine for armoured combat.

The Tank Battalion was founded at Fort Meade, Maryland, and a minor Armored Force School was also constructed since the American Force considered the French Army to be the best army in Europe.

This doctrine instructed U.S. tank crews from both armored divisions and GHQ tank battalions on how to engage in tank-on-tank combat. The infantry received criticism from the armored force during and after the conflict for employing the GHQ tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions solely for infantry support.

Air support, artillery, engineers, and a tank component with the addition of tank destroyers organized into separate tank destroyer battalions made up the U.S. combined weapons team. Lesley J. McNair, the Chief of Army Ground Forces, is most closely associated with the latter. After researching the early German victories, McNair came