Operational Level of War: Strategic Chess, Navigating the Battlefield from A to Z

By Fouad Sabry

What is Operational Level of War

In the field of military theory, the operational level of war represents the level of command that connects the details of tactics with the goals of strategy.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Operational level of war

Chapter 2: Blitzkrieg

Chapter 3: On War

Chapter 4: Military science

Chapter 5: Military strategy

Chapter 6: Military

Chapter 7: Military doctrine

Chapter 8: Military operation

Chapter 9: AirLand Battle

Chapter 10: Maneuver warfare

(II) Answering the public top questions about operational level of war.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Operational Level of War.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: May 31, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Operational level of war

Regarding military theory, operational art, often known as the operational level of conflict, as derived from Russian: оперативное искусство, or operational warfare) denotes the chain of command that links tactical specifics to strategic objectives.

Operational art is described as the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means in Joint U.S. military doctrine.

Time, space, methods, and purpose are the four fundamental components of battle that are addressed at the operational level. Operational art seeks to provide an ideal (or at least near-optimal) development and application of military power by, among other things, commanding troops and distributing (limited) resources. A plan may be adopted or revised, for instance, to determine where, how many, what sort, and how many troops should man defensive fortifications. Military initiatives to enhance logistics and decision-making during the 20th century led to the emergence of the burgeoning area of operations research.

The operational level of war lies between tactics, which entails assembling and deploying combatants on or near the front lines, and strategy, which includes elements of long-term, high-level theater operations and the leadership of the state. When it was originally established as a component of the deep operation military theory that its armed services developed during the 1920s and 1930s and applied during the Second World War, the Soviet Union became the first nation to formally differentiate this third level of military thinking.

Grand tactics and maneuver tactics were words used interchangeably in the 18th and early 19th centuries.

Four key components make up operational art: time, space, means, and purpose. At the operational level as opposed to the tactical or strategic level, each piece is more complex. This is partly true since operational art must take into account and include more of the tactical and strategic levels than those levels must do the same for the operational level. While each of the four components can be studied in depth on its own, it is only when they are combined that operational art is shown for what it truly is: an intricate fabric.

The mission analysis and end state are the most important of the operational-level strategist's many instruments for framing and directing thought. What needs to be completed is answered by mission analysis. The operational-level planner combines political goals and military objectives through mission analysis. By doing this, the planner chooses the use of military force that will generate military strength to accomplish the political goal. Determining goals and centers of gravity are subordinate procedures in this context, but an undue reliance on analytical mechanisms might lead to illusory security. Success, not the strength of the case, is rewarded on the final exam. Contrarily, the planner cannot expect to feel their way to success because complexity necessitates the fusion of intellect and work.

End state offers a solution to the problem of What will constitute success? The campaign's final state is more than just the desired continuation of the military objective. Additionally, it creates a reference point for tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The final state makes the desired effects of military power manifest and highlights any limitations. In fact, achieving a goal may need for using non-military aspects of national power. As a result, it acknowledges that relying solely on military might not be sufficient to achieve political victory.

A strategy at the operational level must continuously assess time, space, means, and goal, projecting outcomes and likelihood from them. Practitioners require both knowledge and experience, as well as talent and theory, to achieve this. At the operational level, expertise and abilities must typically be gained indirectly through formal education, military history, and practical application.

Operational art has been present throughout recorded history, despite the recent emergence of the field and the creation of a distinct operational level of conflict. Peoples and commanders have traditionally sought political objectives through military acts, and from the existential perspective of operational art, one can study battles of any age. History can be studied in terms of operational art since current schools of operational philosophy share the core idea that military success can only be determined by the accomplishment of political-strategic goals.

{End Chapter 1}

Chapter 2: Blitzkrieg

Blitzkrieg (/ˈblɪtskriːɡ/ BLITS-kreeg, German: [ˈblɪtskʁiːk] ( listen); Blitzkrieg (derived from the words blitz (lightning) and krieg (war)) is a term used to denote a surprise combined weapons attack using a quick, overwhelming force concentration that may include infantry formations that are mechanized, motorized, or armored, in addition to artillery, close air support and aerial attack, with the aim of breaching the defenses of the opposition, then cause the defenders to move, by making it challenging for them to adapt to the constantly shifting front, you can imbalance the adversary, and destroy them in a decisive battle known as a Vernichtungsschlacht.

In order to encircle and defeat enemy forces in a Kesselschlacht, or battle of encirclement, during the interwar period, aircraft and tank technologies advanced and were combined with a methodical application of the traditional German tactic of Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare), deep penetrations, and the bypassing of enemy strong points. shown that the correct combination of terrain, adversary combat capabilities, level of air supremacy, and tactical nuclear capabilities might make the Blitzkrieg concept an effective military tactic in modern warfare.

The German tactical and operational methodology during the first half of the Second World War, which was frequently heralded as a revolutionary method of warfare, is the classic definition of blitzkrieg. The term, which in its strategic sense means flash war or lightning attack, refers to a series of swift and decisive small-scale engagements to provide a fatal blow to an enemy state before it could completely mobilize. Blitzkrieg is a coordinated military operation that uses tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, and aircraft to beat the enemy and breach their defenses by establishing a vast local superiority in fighting strength.

The term blitzkrieg is not clear in its history. A German army or air force manual or military doctrine has never used it as the title, The phrase had been in usage since the 1920s in English and other languages.

In 1914, Carl von Clausewitz, who lived from 1 June 1780 to 16 November 1831, is credited with influencing German strategic thought, Alfred von Schlieffen (28 February 1833 - 4 January 1913) and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (26 October 1800 - 24 April 1891), who promoted the maneuver, bulk and encirclement to set up the scene for a successful battle (Vernichtungsschlacht).

Before the conflict, Officers like Willy Rohr developed strategies to improve battlefield maneuverability.

Light infantry specialists (Stosstruppen), storm forces were to take advantage of gaps to advance with more powerful weaponry and profit from the success by taking advantage of weak points, abandoning isolated strongpoints for pursuing forces.

Short hurricane artillery bombardments were paired with infiltration strategies using massed artillery, devised by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller.

Attacks depended less on the weight of numbers and more on quickness and surprise.

Operation Michael saw significant success using these strategies, 1918 saw the German spring offensive, which temporarily brought back the battle of mobility, following the capture of the Allied trench system.

Moving toward Amiens and eventually Paris, the German armies advanced, before being stopped by lack of supplies and Allied forces at a distance of 120 km (75 mi).

When the Second World War began, their reports have resulted in publications for doctrine and instruction, including H.

Dv.

487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Command and Battle of the Combined Arms), known as das Fug (1921–23) and Truppenführung (1933–34), containing recommended practices for combined-arms combat.

The Reichswehr was influenced by its examination of German military doctrine before to World War I, penetration strategies in particular, which, by the end of the war, had experienced some successes on the Western Front and the maneuver warfare that ruled the Eastern Front.

German and Russian armies engaged in a battle of maneuver over thousands of kilometres on the Eastern Front, avoiding the trenches, giving the German command important expertise unavailable to the western Allies.

The Western Front's successful infantry and artillery offensives in late 1918 provided the British Army with valuable insights. The importance of meticulous preparation, strict control, and obedience to commands was put in order to achieve the best cooperation amongst all arms. As part of a combined-arms doctrine of war, mechanization of the army was viewed as a way to prevent massive casualties and the erratic nature of offensives.

Norman Stone detects early blitzkrieg operations in offensives by the French generals Charles Mangin and Marie-Eugène Debeney in 1918.

During the Brusilov Offensive in 1916, General Alexei Brusilov employed surprise and penetration tactics. After the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1920, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937), Georgii Isserson [ru (1898–1976), and other Red Army soldiers created a theory of profound battle. Throughout World War II, the Red Army's doctrine would be based on these ideas. Tukhachevsky, who recognized the shortcomings of infantry and cavalry, favored mechanized forces and the extensive industrialization they required. According to Robert Watt's (2008) analysis, the Soviet deep struggle and the blitzkrieg are very different.

Adolf Hitler disregarded the terms of the Versailles Treaty once he assumed the office of Chancellor (head of government) in Germany in 1933. The command for motorized armored units within the Wehrmacht (founded in 1935) was given the designation Panzerwaffe in 1936. In February 1935, the Luftwaffe (the German air force) was formally founded, and ground-attack aircraft and doctrines were put into development. Hitler enthusiastically endorsed this novel approach. He read Guderian's 1937 book Achtung - Panzer! and said, That is what I want - and that is what I shall get, after seeing armored field drills in Kummersdorf.

The approach to bring the mobile and motorized armored divisions to cooperate and support one another in order to achieve decisive success, as outlined by Guderian, is through combined-arms tactics. He wrote this in his 1950 book, Panzer Leader:

In 1929, I came to the conclusion that tanks operating independently or alongside infantry could never be of decisive importance. My historical research, the English exercises, and our own experience with mock-ups had convinced me that until the other weapons on which the tanks must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and cross-country performance, the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect. The tanks must take the lead in such an all-arms configuration, with the other weapons being secondarily concerned with the needs of the armor. Infantry divisions shouldn't contain tanks; instead, they should have armored divisions with all the supporting weapons necessary to enable tanks to combat effectively.

Guderian thought that