Operational Manoeuvre Group: Strategic Gambits, Unleashing the Force of Tactical Mastery

By Fouad Sabry

What is Operational Manoeuvre Group

The operational manoeuvre group (OMG) was a Soviet Army organisational manoeuvre warfare concept created during the early 1950s to replace the cavalry mechanized group which performed the deep operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Operational manoeuvre group

Chapter 2: Blitzkrieg

Chapter 3: Mechanized infantry

Chapter 4: Operation Bagration

Chapter 5: AirLand Battle

Chapter 6: Maneuver warfare

Chapter 7: Shock troops

Chapter 8: Armoured warfare

Chapter 9: Deep operation

Chapter 10: Second Jassy-Kishinev offensive

(II) Answering the public top questions about operational manoeuvre group.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Operational Manoeuvre Group.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: May 31, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Operational manoeuvre group

In order to replace the cavalry mechanized group that carried out deep operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, the Soviet Army developed the operational manoeuvre group (OMG) in the early 1950s.

The Blitzkrieg operations and echelon-based doctrine were later impacted by the deep operations theory, which was created in collaboration between Red Army and Wehrmacht theorists in the 1930s.

According to Soviet Army doctrine, Operational Manoeuvre Groups would be added to take advantage of a Front's breakthrough during a possible conflict with NATO in Europe. According to Soviet doctrine, operational manoeuvre groups would be inserted to capitalize on the breakthrough by employing portions of, or entire, tank armies once motor-rifle units, heavily supported by artillery, helicopters, and close air support aircraft, would have breached NATO front.

An operational maneuver group at the front level could consist of two tank divisions and three to five motor rifle divisions.

{End Chapter 1}

Chapter 2: Blitzkrieg

Blitzkrieg (/ˈblɪtskriːɡ/ BLITS-kreeg, German: [ˈblɪtskʁiːk] ( listen); Blitzkrieg (derived from the words blitz (lightning) and krieg (war)) is a term used to denote a surprise combined weapons attack using a quick, overwhelming force concentration that may include infantry formations that are mechanized, motorized, or armored, in addition to artillery, close air support and aerial attack, with the aim of breaching the defenses of the opposition, then cause the defenders to move, by making it challenging for them to adapt to the constantly shifting front, you can imbalance the adversary, and destroy them in a decisive battle known as a Vernichtungsschlacht.

In order to encircle and defeat enemy forces in a Kesselschlacht, or battle of encirclement, during the interwar period, aircraft and tank technologies advanced and were combined with a methodical application of the traditional German tactic of Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare), deep penetrations, and the bypassing of enemy strong points. shown that the correct combination of terrain, adversary combat capabilities, level of air supremacy, and tactical nuclear capabilities might make the Blitzkrieg concept an effective military tactic in modern warfare.

The German tactical and operational methodology during the first half of the Second World War, which was frequently heralded as a revolutionary method of warfare, is the classic definition of blitzkrieg. The term, which in its strategic sense means flash war or lightning attack, refers to a series of swift and decisive small-scale engagements to provide a fatal blow to an enemy state before it could completely mobilize. Blitzkrieg is a coordinated military operation that uses tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, and aircraft to beat the enemy and breach their defenses by establishing a vast local superiority in fighting strength.

The term blitzkrieg is not clear in its history. A German army or air force manual or military doctrine has never used it as the title, The phrase had been in usage since the 1920s in English and other languages.

In 1914, Carl von Clausewitz, who lived from 1 June 1780 to 16 November 1831, is credited with influencing German strategic thought, Alfred von Schlieffen (28 February 1833 - 4 January 1913) and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (26 October 1800 - 24 April 1891), who promoted the maneuver, bulk and encirclement to set up the scene for a successful battle (Vernichtungsschlacht).

Before the conflict, Officers like Willy Rohr developed strategies to improve battlefield maneuverability.

Light infantry specialists (Stosstruppen), storm forces were to take advantage of gaps to advance with more powerful weaponry and profit from the success by taking advantage of weak points, abandoning isolated strongpoints for pursuing forces.

Short hurricane artillery bombardments were paired with infiltration strategies using massed artillery, devised by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller.

Attacks depended less on the weight of numbers and more on quickness and surprise.

Operation Michael saw significant success using these strategies, 1918 saw the German spring offensive, which temporarily brought back the battle of mobility, following the capture of the Allied trench system.

Moving toward Amiens and eventually Paris, the German armies advanced, before being stopped by lack of supplies and Allied forces at a distance of 120 km (75 mi).

When the Second World War began, their reports have resulted in publications for doctrine and instruction, including H.

Dv.

487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Command and Battle of the Combined Arms), known as das Fug (1921–23) and Truppenführung (1933–34), containing recommended practices for combined-arms combat.

The Reichswehr was influenced by its examination of German military doctrine before to World War I, penetration strategies in particular, which, by the end of the war, had experienced some successes on the Western Front and the maneuver warfare that ruled the Eastern Front.

German and Russian armies engaged in a battle of maneuver over thousands of kilometres on the Eastern Front, avoiding the trenches, giving the German command important expertise unavailable to the western Allies.

The Western Front's successful infantry and artillery offensives in late 1918 provided the British Army with valuable insights. The importance of meticulous preparation, strict control, and obedience to commands was put in order to achieve the best cooperation amongst all arms. As part of a combined-arms doctrine of war, mechanization of the army was viewed as a way to prevent massive casualties and the erratic nature of offensives.

Norman Stone detects early blitzkrieg operations in offensives by the French generals Charles Mangin and Marie-Eugène Debeney in 1918.

During the Brusilov Offensive in 1916, General Alexei Brusilov employed surprise and penetration tactics. After the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1920, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937), Georgii Isserson [ru (1898–1976), and other Red Army soldiers created a theory of profound battle. Throughout World War II, the Red Army's doctrine would be based on these ideas. Tukhachevsky, who recognized the shortcomings of infantry and cavalry, favored mechanized forces and the extensive industrialization they required. According to Robert Watt's (2008) analysis, the Soviet deep struggle and the blitzkrieg are very different.

Adolf Hitler disregarded the terms of the Versailles Treaty once he assumed the office of Chancellor (head of government) in Germany in 1933. The command for motorized armored units within the Wehrmacht (founded in 1935) was given the designation Panzerwaffe in 1936. In February 1935, the Luftwaffe (the German air force) was formally founded, and ground-attack aircraft and doctrines were put into development. Hitler enthusiastically endorsed this novel approach. He read Guderian's 1937 book Achtung - Panzer! and said, That is what I want - and that is what I shall get, after seeing armored field drills in Kummersdorf.

The approach to bring the mobile and motorized armored divisions to cooperate and support one another in order to achieve decisive success, as outlined by Guderian, is through combined-arms tactics. He wrote this in his 1950 book, Panzer Leader:

In 1929, I came to the conclusion that tanks operating independently or alongside infantry could never be of decisive importance. My historical research, the English exercises, and our own experience with mock-ups had convinced me that until the other weapons on which the tanks must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and cross-country performance, the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect. The tanks must take the lead in such an all-arms configuration, with the other weapons being secondarily concerned with the needs of the armor. Infantry divisions shouldn't contain tanks; instead, they should have armored divisions with all the supporting weapons necessary to enable tanks to combat effectively.

Guderian thought that the idea needed technological advancements, particularly the wireless communication equipment for armored divisions, particularly tanks. Every tank in the German armored corps needed to have a radio, Guderian stressed to the high command in 1933.

By the 12th Battle of Isonzo (October–November 1917), Rommel had mastered his maneuver-warfare ideas, which were exactly the same ones that were used during the Blitzkrieg against France in 1940, according to David A. Grossman. Rommel was executing a light-infantry operation (and repeated in the Coalition ground offensive against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War).

Since the nineteenth century, the German army has employed the Schwerpunktprinzip as a heuristic tool to help them prioritize decisions ranging from tactics to strategy. Translations of the word focus include center of gravity, crucial, focal point, and place of main endeavor. None of these versions are adequate to convey the significance of the term and the notion of Schwerpunktprinzip in all contexts. Commanders always knew what was most important and why since every unit in the army, from the company to the supreme leadership, decided on a Schwerpunkt through schwerpunktbildung. The German army was prepared to assault with overwhelming firepower while also supporting the Schwerpunkt even when risks were to be taken elsewhere.

Units in the Schwerpunkt were not supposed to engage enemy front line units to the right and left of the breakthrough region after successfully breaking through the enemy's line. The opposing front line had to be pushed back as units poured through the hole toward predetermined targets. German Panzer forces employed motorized mobility to hamper their adversaries' capacity to respond during World War II. Rapidly moving mobile forces took the initiative, took advantage of flaws, and took action before the opposition forces could react. The decision cycle was essential in this (tempo). Mobile forces could move more quickly than the forces against them thanks to greater mobility and speedier decision-making cycles. It was a quick and adaptable way to exercise command. A commander would be informed of his superior's objective and the role that his unit was to play in this notion rather than being given a clear order. The subordinate commander was then free to choose the execution's method. With understanding of their circumstances, the higher layers of command had a lower staff burden. Implementation was assisted by delegation and the promotion of initiative; crucial choices could be made swiftly and communicated verbally or with concise written commands.

When conducting an offensive operation, unconquered pockets of resistance that had been earlier encircled and avoided by the swiftly moving armored and motorized spearheads were destroyed. The cauldron combat of Kesselschlacht was a focused assault on these pockets. Most of the enemy's losses were suffered here, mainly as a result of the widespread capture of weaponry and detainees. Huge encirclements during Operation Barbarossa in 1941 resulted in the production of approximately 3.5 million Soviet captives and tons of equipment.

The medium bomber and dive bomber were used to give close air support. They would assist the primary target of the aerial assault. German victories were directly correlated with how well the Luftwaffe was able to manage the air war during the