Grand Strategy: Mastering the Art of War and Peace in the Modern Era

By Fouad Sabry

What is Grand Strategy

Grand strategy or high strategy is a state's strategy of how means can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term. Issues of grand strategy typically include the choice of military doctrine, force structure and alliances, as well as economic relations, diplomatic behavior, and methods to extract or mobilize resources.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Grand Strategy

Chapter 2: Isolationism

Chapter 3: Neorealism (international relations)

Chapter 4: Hegemony

Chapter 5: John Mearsheimer

Chapter 6: Balancing (international relations)

Chapter 7: Hegemonic stability theory

Chapter 8: Realism (international relations)

Chapter 9: Polarity (international relations)

Chapter 10: Offshore balancing

(II) Answering the public top questions about grand strategy.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Grand Strategy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: Jun 2, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Grand strategy

Grand strategy or high strategy is a state's plan for advancing and achieving national goals via the use of means.

B. H. Liddell Hart, a military historian, defines Grand Strategy as:

The function of grand strategy – or higher strategy – is to coordinate and direct all of a nation's or group of countries' resources toward achieving the political objective of the conflict — the objective established by basic policy.

The grand strategy must both assess and cultivate the economic resources and manpower of countries in order to support the armed forces. Also the moral resources - for fostering the people's cooperative spirit is often as vital as possessing more tangible kinds of power. The grand plan should also govern the power allocation among the various services and between the services and industry. In addition, combat force is just one of the tools of grand strategy, which must also take into consideration and use the power of financial pressure and, last but not least, ethical pressure in order to undermine the opponent's will.

In addition, although the scope of strategy is limited by the conflict, the scope of grand strategy extends beyond the fight to the succeeding peace. It should not only unite the different tools, but also control their use so as to prevent harm to the future state of peace - for the sake of its security and prosperity.

In three ways, grand strategy extends upon the conventional concept of strategy:

Expanding strategy to incorporate diplomatic, financial, economic, and informational measures, among others.

Examining internal forces in addition to external ones — taking into consideration both the many tools of power and the internal policies required for their application — is a complementary approach to analyzing external forces (conscription, for example)

incorporating examination of peaceful eras with warfare

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, a chronicle of the conflict between the Peloponnesian League (headed by Sparta) and the Delian League, is one of the first works on grand strategy (led by Athens).

From the time of Hadrian forward, Roman emperors utilized a military strategy consisting of Imperial preclusive security involves the creation of a linear perimeter defense barrier. The Legions were stationed in massive fortifications.

These fortresses existed throughout the Empire's boundary, sometimes accompanied by genuine walls (such as Hadrian's Wall). Due to the belief that these perimeter fortifications were impregnable, the Emperors maintained no central reserve army. The Roman road network made it relatively easy for troops to go from one border to another (during a siege) in order to provide reinforcements. These roads also gave Rome a logistical edge over her foes, since both troops and supplies could be transported quickly over the Roman road network. Thus, if the legions were unable to win a fight via military combat ability or greater numbers, they could simply outlast the invaders, who, according to historian E.A. Thompson, did not consider millions of bushels of wheat.

Emperor Constantine unified the legions from the borders into one wandering army to save money and defend the wealthy residents inside the cities. According to historical accounts, this grand plan had severe implications on the Roman empire by weakening its border fortifications and making it vulnerable to invasion by enemy troops. Also, once the Roman soldiers went, residents living near the Roman boundaries would appeal to the barbarians for security. This argument is believed to have originated in Eunapius's writings.

Many contemporary historians regard this accusation by Zosimus to be a great exaggeration and erroneous judgment of the fourth century under Constantine. B.H. Warmington, for example, argues that the statement by Zosimus is oversimplified, reminding us that the charge of exposure of the frontier regions is at best anachronistic and likely reflects Zosimus' prejudices against Constantine; the corruption of the soldiers who lived in the cities was a literary cliché.

Modern grand strategy is shown by the choice of the Allies in World War II to prioritize the defeat of Germany. The decision, a collective agreement reached after the 1941 assault on Pearl Harbor drew the United States into the war, was prudent since Germany was the most powerful member of the Axis and posed an existential danger to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. In contrast, although Japan's conquests received tremendous public attention, they mostly occurred in colonial regions that planners and policymakers judged less vital. Therefore, the details of Allied military strategy in the Pacific War were dictated by the limited resources available to theater commanders.

During the Cold War, the United States and the United Kingdom used containment as part of their grand strategy.

The United States has shifted from a strategy of continental expansion, isolation from European conflicts, and opposition to European empires in the Western hemisphere in its first century to a major counterinsurgency war in Vietnam, resulting in a significant shift in the national discourse on grand strategy. With the conclusion of the Cold War, an early strategic discussion evolved into a policy of primacy, which culminated in the 2003 war of Iraq. The repercussions of this conflict, coupled with an economic slump, a mounting national debt, and a developing political stalemate, have sparked a fresh strategic debate based on two primary schools of thought: primacy and restraint. Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, two renowned political scientists, have also recommended a return to offshore balancing.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union eliminated the Soviet Union as the central focus of U.S. policy. The future course of U.S. foreign policy was the subject of a heated discussion. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, in a 1997 article for International Security titled Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, highlighted four