Famous Duels of the Fleet and Their Lessons

By H B Money Coutts and Norman Wilkinson

Delve into the thrilling and dramatic world of naval warfare with H. B. Money Coutts's Famous Duels of the Fleet and Their Lessons. This compelling work brings to life some of the most notable naval duels in dur the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, offering readers a detailed and vivid account of these intense maritime conflicts and the strategic insights they provide.

H. B. Money Coutts, a respected historian and naval expert, meticulously examines a series of famous naval engagements, exploring the tactics, leadership, and bravery that defined these encounters. Through clear and engaging narrative, Coutts reconstructs each duel, providing readers with an immersive experience of the action and decision-making that took place on the high seas.

Famous Duels of the Fleet and Their Lessons is an essential read for naval enthusiasts, historians, and anyone interested in the intricacies of maritime warfare. Coutts's thorough research and engaging storytelling make this book both informative and captivating, shedding light on the heroism and strategic genius that have shaped naval history.

Join H. B. Money Coutts on a journey through the high-stakes world of naval duels, and discover the lessons of courage, strategy, and leadership that emerge from these historic encounters. Famous Duels of the Fleet and Their Lessons is a timeless exploration of naval warfare that continues to inspire and educate readers about the enduring legacy of naval conflict.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Porirua Publishing
• Release date: Jun 14, 2024
• ISBN: 9781991312259

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

PREFACE. 4

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 7

I. — BONHOMME RICHARD V. SERAPIS — 23RD SEPTEMBER 1779 8

II. — QUEBEC V. SURVEILLANTE — 6TH OCTOBER 1779 19

III. — FLORA V. NYMPHE — 11TH AUGUST 1780 27

IV. — FOUDROYANT V. PÉGASE — 21ST APRIL 1782 30

V. — NYMPHE V. CLÉOPÂTRE — 19TH JUNE 1793 37

VI. — BLANCHE V. PIQUE — 5TH JANUARY 1795 46

VII. — DROITS DE L’HOMME V. INDEFATIGABLE — 13TH JANUARY 1797 54

VIII. — GENEREUX V. LEANDER — 18TH AUGUST 1798 61

IX. — AMBUSCADE V. BAYONNAISE — 14TH DECEMBER 1798 68

X. — WILHELMINA V. PSYCHE — 11TH APRIL 1804 74

XI. — PHŒNIX V. DIDON — 10TH AUGUST 1805 80

XII. — CONSTITUTION V. JAVA — 29TH DECEMBER 1812 90

XIII. — SHANNON V. CHESAPEAKE — 1ST JUNE 1813 99

XIV. — SHAH V. HUASCAR — 29TH MAY 1877 106

Famous Duels of the Fleet

And their Lessons

BY

H. B. MONEY COUTTS

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS BY NORMAN WILKINSON

PATRI OPTIMO HIC LIBER

PREFACE.

THERE is a school of thought which holds that the study of naval history is of academic interest only, save in so far as the, widest strategical questions are concerned. He would be a hardy agnostic indeed who, in the light of Captain Mahan’s illuminating books, still claimed that the naval strategy of old had no bearing upon the most important problems of the present day.

But it is frequently said that the substitution of steam for sails, of steel for wood, of breech-loading rifled ordnance for smooth-bore muzzleloaders, has fundamentally altered the conditions of naval warfare; that the enormous change which science has produced in the weapons of war during the past century has made it an impossibility to extract any useful lessons from a close examination of the old methods.

To this it must be said that although the external appearance—the superstructure indeed—has been altered almost beyond recognition, yet the foundation and much of the building remain the same. A ship is still a thing incomprehensible to, because remote from and unstudied by, those who dwell ashore; her officers still have to solve the same or much the same questions of discipline and training as those with which their predecessors were concerned; the gun, though changed indeed, remains the principal naval weapon, even if not now the only one, and is essentially the same as in Nelson’s day. Problems of organisation and administration are changed in quantity rather than in quality; the sea is still the sea of the eighteenth century, and presents a battlefield of identical though ever-varying features.

Our forefathers were wonderful fighters; and quite apart from any technical or professional lesson which can be gleaned from an account of the great deeds of old, many of these naval duels present a moral example which every Englishman proud of his birthright ought to study. What man has endured man can endure; and a determination to equal his predecessors in fortitude is a necessary part of the psychical equipment of every fighting man,—particularly of every executive officer. A great tradition is of incalculable value to any military body, and a consciousness that he will be tried by the touchstone of ideals formed by centuries of stubborn fighting is the sharpest incentive to a man to give of the best that is in him. We all have a natural and healthy tendency towards hero-worship; but it is best to worship with knowledge and discernment.

The lessons to be learned from these famous tales need not be capitulated here; but there is one important point which must be dealt with now, or the reader would soon be weary of its reiteration in the account of every combat.

In the old days men knew that a battle, to be decisive, must be fought at close quarters, and every captain who really meant business preferred pistol-range to any other. Now this was not altogether because of the inaccuracy of the old weapons: a long smooth-bore gun had a much longer range than many people suppose, and a good captain who trained his crew in gunnery could be sure that his ship would make very fair practice up to a thousand yards. But it was not a decisive range, any more than ten thousand yards is now, though some folk (worshippers of material) would have us believe that all battles are to be fought with the foe hull-down somewhere on the horizon.

The captains knew well that the shorter the range and the sharper the fight the more likely were good training and discipline to bring their meet reward. We are the only power with a long-service navy, and should shape our tactics accordingly. If we are going to confine the fighting to the spotting and fire control officers, we are making a very disastrous mistake. There is a kind of genius for close fighting in men of Anglo-Saxon blood not to be found in most foreign nations, although they may excel us in other military virtues. The more terrible the battle, the sterner the fighting, the greater will be the difference between our long-trained sailors and the enemy’s conscripts. There is an idea that there is room in a modern ship-of-war for a certain proportion of sea-labourers—men who can learn to do all that is required of them in a few months or even weeks. On this assumption indeed conscript navies are bound to build; but although you can teach a man to take his place in an ammunition party, or as a loading number at a 6-inch gun, in a short time, you cannot properly discipline him in that time, or trust him implicitly to keep cool and do his work amidst the awful sights and sounds of battle.

A British admiral should seek to bring about the closest kind of action, in which guns, torpedoes, the ram even, shall all play their part. His fleet will suffer, but the enemy will be destroyed.

It is to be feared, though, that long months and years of indecisive struggle will probably be needed before the truth is generally recognised. Everything almost at the present day points to the naval battle of the immediate future consisting of a fire-duel at long range, deciding nothing, governed by luck, in which veteran and conscript scramble on equal terms. Byng was the victim of the obsession of a false idea, and the false current of thought briefly outlined will be more likely to float another Byng to its surface than another Nelson.

A battle at extreme range will be indecisive, first, because of the extreme delicacy and vulnerability of the controlling paraphernalia; secondly, on account of the impossibility of checking the range with absolute accuracy save under exceptionally favourable circumstances, and it is upon accurate range-finding that all else depends. Upon a calm day, at a stationary target, a varying range can be picked up fairly easily by watching the fall of the shot. But when the target is an enemy’s ship, firing back, moving at fifteen knots, on a squally day, with rain pouring down and almost blotting her out at frequent intervals, the problem is not so simple. And in a fleet action other ships will be firing at the same target, and it will be impossible, especially in rough weather when waves are breaking, to tell which particular far-distant column of spray is caused by the projectiles from one’s own guns. Then again the accuracy of a modern gun diminishes with some rapidity as the rifling wears, and the propulsive qualities of cordite vary from hour to hour with the temperature.

The longer the range the greater the cumulative effect of every minor error. Two feet wrong at two thousand yards is a miss at ten thousand, and it is only the hits which count. We have exalted the machine above the man—a singularly foolish error, as the men are so good. Let us have accurate shooting at all ranges so far as is possible, by all means, but let it be recognised that, as in the days of old, a hot fire at pistol-range was usually only the prelude to a rush of boarders, so now a long-range fire should be only a preliminary to a crushing and decisive fire at a point-blank range (i.e., about 2000 yards). With this exception, any suggestions which each fight seems to contain are noticed as they arise.

It is no doubt true that the old fleet actions point many of the same lessons which are noteworthy in the ship-to-ship duels, and on a larger scale. But when reading an account of the Nile, say, or Trafalgar, the canvas is so vast that the eye cannot take in the detail, but is held rather by the magnificence of the total effect. In these smaller studies the brushes used can be smaller, the detail more clearly discernible.

It is not, of course, pretended that the subject has been dealt with in an exhaustive way. Many famous fights have been left out, such as that between the Amethyst and Thetis; those described are selected on account of their bearing on some subject which still remains of interest at the present time.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

THE SHANNON HAULED UP AND REEFED TOP-SAILS,...SO THAT THE CHESAPEAKE MIGHT OVERTAKE HER

THE TWO SHIPS WERE NOW LOCKED FAST TOGETHER

THE QUEBEC WAS DOOMED

THE FOUDROYANT QUICKLY TOOK THE LEAD

IN CONSEQUENCE OF THIS DOUBLE DISASTER SHE CAME ROUND WITH HER BOW TO THE NYMPHE’S BROADSIDE

BUT FAULKNOR KNEW THAT TRICK, AND BORE AWAY TOO

FALLING ON BOARD OF HER VERY SOON AFTER HER HELM HAD BEEN PUT UP

AT ABOUT TWELVE O’CLOCK THE DIDON’S FOREMAST WENT OVER THE SIDE AS SHE ROLLED

THE HUASCAR CAME ON TILL SHE WAS WITHIN 400 YARDS OF THE OTHER SHIP

I. — BONHOMME RICHARD V. SERAPIS — 23RD SEPTEMBER 1779

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BONHOMME RICHARD V. SERAPIS.

23RD SEPTEMBER 1779.

OF the minor characters of history, few are more interesting than Paul Jones, the hero of this battle. American writers from the first have naturally defended him, while English chroniclers have heaped unmitigated abuse upon him, calling him pirate and worse,—an accusation that comes ill from a nation who take such a patriotic and righteous pride in the doings of the great adventurers, Drake and his imitators and successors.

Even the best and fairest of our naval historians damn him with the faintest praise, laying the greatest possible emphasis on the less satisfactory episodes in his career, and generally leading one to suppose that he was a highly objectionable braggart, whose one redeeming feature was a knowledge of the sea and of sea-fighting.

It has remained for an American, Professor A. C. Buell, to set Paul Jones in his proper place, and to show to those who take an interest in the past what the man really was. Tout savoir c’est tout pardonner, and Mr. Buell has done wonders in collecting a mass of authentic evidence, long undiscovered, bearing on Jones’s character and career. It is beyond the scope of this account to enter into the matter in detail, but it may be said that almost every new fact has been to the advantage of his reputation. His character was so grossly misrepresented, very largely because so little was known about him.

The customary libel that he was a pirate, or little better, was sedulously fostered by the English Government of the time, and found ready credence with a nation which naturally enough looked upon the American Colonists in arms as traitors and rebels. The doings at the house of the Earl of Selkirk, when some of his men carried off a few pieces of silver plate (which were afterwards restored intact at considerable expense to himself) are always quoted in support of the pirate theory; but this and much more might have been forgiven a man whose house had been burnt and whose entire property had been destroyed by British troops. At the time of this encounter he was a duly commissioned officer of the American Continental Navy, as it was then called, and so were the officers under him. He desired above all things that the newly united and still struggling States should find favour and respect in the eyes of the European world, and this idea is expressed in the most striking manner in many of his letters and memoirs. He wished to lay the foundations of a maritime reputation for his people, and