Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle: Warfare's Precision Dance, Strategic Mastery in Modern Combat

By Fouad Sabry

What is Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle

A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) is an exoatmospheric ballistic missile payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit a different target. The concept is almost invariably associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads, even if not strictly being limited to them. An intermediate case is the multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) missile which carries several warheads which are dispersed but not individually aimed. All nuclear-weapon states except Pakistan and North Korea are currently confirmed to have deployed MIRV missile systems. Israel is suspected to possess or be in the process of developing MIRVs.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle

Chapter 2: Intercontinental ballistic missile

Chapter 3: UGM-73 Poseidon

Chapter 4: Trident (missile)

Chapter 5: First strike (nuclear strategy)

Chapter 6: LGM-30 Minuteman

Chapter 7: Chevaline

Chapter 8: LGM-118 Peacekeeper

Chapter 9: List of nuclear weapons

Chapter 10: UGM-133 Trident II

(II) Answering the public top questions about multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: Jun 20, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle

A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, often known as a MIRV, is a ballistic missile payload that is designed to travel through the atmosphere and contains many warheads, each of which is capable of being aimed at a different target. Despite the fact that the notion is not exclusively restricted to intercontinental ballistic missiles that carry thermonuclear warheads, it is almost always linked with these missiles. Unitary warheads, on the other hand, consist of a single warhead that is mounted on a single missile. The multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) missile is an example of an intermediate case. This type of missile carries numerous warheads that are distributed but not individually aimed with each other. The United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China are the only countries that have independently confirmed that they have deployed MIRV missile systems. MIRV missile systems are currently being developed by Pakistan. It is believed that Israel either already possesses MIRVs or is in the midst of producing them.

Minuteman III was the first real MIRV design, and it was successfully tested for the first time in 1968. It was not until 1970 that it was deployed in actual operations.

There was a significant shift in the strategic equilibrium as a result of the implementation of MIRV. Prior to this, it was possible to construct a defense that utilized missiles to attack individual warheads. This was possible since each missile contained one warhead for each missile. Any expansion of the enemy's missile fleet might be met with an equal and opposite expansion of interceptors, which would be a countermeasure. In the case of MIRV, the construction of many interceptors was required for a single new enemy missile. This meant that it was significantly less expensive to increase the assault than it was to develop the defense capability. ABM systems were severely limited in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in order to avoid a large arms race. This cost-exchange ratio was so significantly biased against the attacker that it became the dominant idea in strategic planning. In addition, the concept of mutual assured annihilation became the leading concept in strategic planning.

As a military vehicle, a MIRV serves four distinct purposes:

Strengthen the ability of strategic troops to launch their first strike.

The ability to deal more damage to targets while maintaining the same amount of payload for a thermonuclear weapon. There is a significant increase in the target damage area caused by multiple tiny warheads with a lesser yield compared to a single warhead. Consequently, this results in a reduction in the quantity of missiles and launch facilities that are necessary for a specific level of destruction, which is essentially the same as the objective of a cluster munition.

separate-warhead missiles require the launch of a separate missile for each target that they are aimed at. On the other hand, when using a MIRV warhead, the post-boost (or bus) stage has the capability of dispensing the warheads against many targets across a large region.

The effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system that is dependent on the interception of individual warheads is diminished. The United States Minuteman III missile, which was the world's first MIRV and was launched in 1970, posed a danger to rapidly enhance the United States' deployable nuclear arsenal. This resulted in the prospect that the United States would have sufficient bombs to destroy practically all of the nuclear weapons held by the Soviet Union and to prevent any substantial retaliation. The United States of America later developed a concern of the Soviet Union's MIRVs due to the fact that Soviet missiles had a greater throw-weight and could therefore carry more warheads on each missile than the United States could. One example would be that the United States MIRVs might have raised their warhead per missile count by a factor of six, whilst the Soviets might have increased theirs by a factor of ten percent. Furthermore, in comparison to the Soviet Union, the United States of America had a significantly smaller share of its nuclear weapons in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In order to prevent the capacity of bombers from being increased, it was not possible to equip them with MIRV units. As a result, it appeared that the United States did not have as much potential for the utilization of MIRV as the Soviets did. However, the United States had a greater quantity of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which were able to be equipped with MIRVs and helped compensate for the deficit of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In accordance with the START II agreement, land-based MIRVs were prohibited from carrying out attacks because of their ability to launch a first strike. START II was passed by the Russian Duma on April 14, 2000; nevertheless, Russia withdrew from the deal in 2002, after the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

The primary rocket motor (or booster) of a MIRV is responsible for propelling a bus (see illustration) into a suborbital ballistic flight path that is free-flying flight. Following the boost phase, the bus will perform maneuvers with the assistance of a computerized inertial guidance system and miniature rocket motors that are located on board. It then releases a warhead along the trajectory that it has taken up, which is a ballistic trajectory that will deliver a re-entry vehicle that is carrying a warhead to a target. Next, it adapts to a different trajectory, thereby releasing an additional warhead, and it continues this procedure until all of the warheads have been released.

The precise technical details are classified as military secrets and are guarded with great care in order to prevent any adversary from developing countermeasures. The propellant that is already on board the bus restricts the distances that individual warheads can travel between their targets to a maximum of a few hundred kilometers. In order to achieve a greater cross-range distance, certain warheads may employ the utilization of tiny hypersonic airfoils during the descent phase. Additionally, many buses, such as the British Chevaline system, have the capability to release decoys, such as aluminized balloons or electronic noisemakers, in order to fool sensors and radars that are used for interception.

Because doubling the accuracy reduces the required amount of warhead energy by a factor of four for radiation damage and by a factor of eight for blast damage, accuracy is of the utmost importance. The accuracy of the warhead target is limited by the accuracy of the navigation system as well as the geophysical information that is available. Some authors are of the opinion that geophysical mapping programs and ocean satellite altitude systems, such as Seasat, which are backed by the government, may have a clandestine aim to map mass concentrations and determine local gravity anomalies. This is done with the intention of improving the accuracy of ballistic missiles. Circular error probable (CEP) is a symbol that is used to express accuracy. When the warhead is pointed specifically at the center of the circle, this is the radius of the circle that it has a fifty percent chance of falling into. The CEP for the Peacekeeper missile and the Trident II missile is around 90–100 meters.

In a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) system for a ballistic missile, numerous warheads are deployed over a single aimpoint. These warheads then drift apart, creating an effect similar to that of a cluster bomb. It is not possible to target any of these warheads individually. Because of the increased coverage, an MRV is more effective than a single warhead. This results in an increase in the overall damage produced within the center of the pattern, which is significantly higher than the damage that could be caused by any single warhead in the MRV cluster. This makes an MRV cluster an effective weapon for area attacks, but it also makes it more difficult for anti-ballistic missiles to intercept it because of the number of warheads that are deployed at the same time. The Soviet Union used three MRVs on the R-27U short-range ballistic missile (SLBM) and three MRVs on the R-36P intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). For further information, please refer to the atmospheric re-entry.

China

(Discontinued, three warheads) DF-3A

3 warheads, DF-4A, which is now retired

DF-5B (operational, with three to eight warheads)

Ten warheads are active on the DF-5C.

Active DF-31A with three to five warheads

Active DF-31B with three to five warheads

(Active, with a maximum of ten warheads) DF-41

active JL-2 with one to three warheads

JL-3 (working on its development)

France

M4 (out of service, six warheads)

There are six warheads on the M45.

M51 (operational, six to ten warheads)

India

Agni-P completed its test firing in October 2022 with flying colors.

Agni-V

Iran

Khorramshahr missile (currently in the process of development, with an optional capability announced)

Israel

There is a possibility that Jericho 3 is operating, has a suspected capacity, but has not been acknowledged.

Pakistan

Ababeel (currently undergoing clinical trials; MIRV demonstration is still forthcoming)

Soviet Union/Russian Federation

With 10-14 warheads, the R-36 mod 4 is now retired.

The R-36 mod 5 currently has ten warheads.

R-29R (reactive, with three warheads)

(Retired, with seven warheads) R-29RK

This is a retired MR-UR-100 Sotka with four warheads.

This is a retired UR-100N mod 3 with six warheads.

RSD-10 Pioneer, which has been retired and has three warheads

R-39 Rif (retired, warheads totaling ten)

R-29RM Shtil, which has been retired and has four warheads

A RT-23 Molodets (ten operational warheads, decommissioned)

The R-29RMU Active Sineva, with either four or ten warheads

Active RS-24 Yars with three to four warheads

Active R-29RMU2 Layner with either four or twelve warheads

With six to ten active warheads, the RSM-56 Bulava

10–15 warheads are currently being developed for