Warlord: Rise of the Unseen Commander

By Fouad Sabry

What is Warlord

An man who exercises military, economic, and political authority over a territory, typically within a country that does not have a strong national government, is referred to as a warlord. This power is typically exercised by informal or illegal forceful control over the local armed forces. Warlords have been there for a significant portion of history, but in a number of diverse capacities within the political, economic, and social framework of nations or regions that are not administered by a central authority. The phrase is frequently used in the context of China during the Warlord Era, particularly during the time period that corresponds to the end of the Qing Dynasty. It is also possible to use this term to refer to any absolute military commander.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Warlord

Chapter 2: Ahmad Shah Massoud

Chapter 3: European influence in Afghanistan

Chapter 4: Taliban

Chapter 5: Autocracy

Chapter 6: Pashtunistan

Chapter 7: Power vacuum

Chapter 8: Islamic State of Afghanistan

Chapter 9: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001)

Chapter 10: Atta Muhammad Nur

(II) Answering the public top questions about warlord.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Warlord.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: Jun 22, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Warlord

A warlord is an individual who exercises military, economic, and political dominance over an area in a country lacking a strong central government, primarily by coercive control over the armed forces. Throughout much of history, warlords have existed, but in a variety of roles within the political, economic, and social framework of governments or ungoverned territory. The word is most frequently attributed to China between the mid-19th and early-20th centuries. The word is also applicable to any military supreme commander.

In 1856, American philosopher and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson used the term warlord for the first time in a highly critical essay on the English aristocracy: Piracy and war gave way to trade, politics, and letters; the war-lord to the law-lord; the privilege remained, but the means of obtaining it changed. In China, Junfa is used retrospectively to refer to the leaders of regional armies who threatened or utilized violence to expand their control, including those who ascended to head and unify kingdoms.

Historically, warlords existed in either pre-modern or weak state societies, as well as in contemporary fragile state or failed state countries. In states where warlordism occurs, the political, economic, and societal organization, structure, and institutions are extremely diverse. In the field of political science, there are also differing perspectives on what precisely constituted warlordism, particularly in the context of historical background.

Regarding the relationship between warlords and a state, there are two important functional characteristics.

The first is one in which the warlord functions inside the political framework by bargaining with the state regime, such that the warlord, sometimes independently and sometimes in collaboration with other warlords, acts with the agreement of, or at least in accordance with, the regime. This can be interpreted as warlord politics.

The other scenario is one in which the warlord operates independently from the state and is considered as a rebel, insurgent, or strategic political rival of the regime. This is usually referred to as warlordism.

Warlords may also fall into a hybrid category, joining a warlord coalition briefly in conjunction with the regime or defecting for political expediency – shifting from one paradigm to the other according on their strategic goals.

The other significant consideration when classifying warlords is historical context. Warlordism was a pervasive, hegemonic political framework that governed the majority of the world's societies until the rise of the modern state. In pre-modern state history, warlord authority was frequently built along tribal or familial lines and was consistent with early conceptions of nation. In colonial empires, warlords functioned in both cooperative and rebellious political capacities. In contemporary governments, the presence of warlords is frequently interpreted as a sign of state weakness or failure. David G. Herrmann, an American historian, stated, Warlordism is the default condition of humanity.

The economist Stergios Skaperdas views warlordism as a default — albeit inefficient — competitive economic model that emerges in states with low state capacity, but that inherently evolves into an institution that governs political order by using violence or the threat of violence to secure its access to rent-producing resources. It has the potential to stabilize a region. In both instances, the strategy is inherently inefficient since resources are wasted on fruitless armament and fighting. He contends that the state's monopoly on crime, in this case the warlords, is intended to provide protection against external and internal political rivals.

Jesse Driscoll, a political scientist, uses the term redistribution politics to describe the bargaining process between warlords and the regime in states where cooperative warlord politics predominates, and when this bargaining leads to accords or informal arrangements regarding the extraction of rent, which can refer to natural resources, territory, labor, revenue, or privilege. In his analysis of warlordism in Georgia and Tajikistan, Driscoll identifies land reform, property ownership and transfers, privatization in non-transparent closed-bid settings, complex credit swaps cemented via marriages, money laundering, price-fixing schemes, and bribery as the primary sources of exchange in redistribution politics.

Noted theorist Max Weber argued that classic feudalism in pre-modern European states was an example of warlordism, as the state regime was unable to exercise a monopoly on the use of force within its territory, indicating that these early European states were weak and the relationship between the crown and feudal lords constituted the form of interdependent warlordism known as cooperative warlord politics.

Under the feudal system of Europe, the nobility—whether feudal lords, knights, princes, or barons—served as warlords, exercising military, economic, and political authority over subnational territory and maintaining private armies to maintain that status. While their political power to enforce social order, welfare, and regional security within their realm was derived from inherited rights or royal decrees, their military superiority gave them independence and the ability to negotiate for privileges. Should the feudal lord or other noble withdraw his support from the monarch, either in revolt or to create an alliance with a rival kingdom, the feudal lord or noble was now a member of the ungoverned warlordism political order.

There is a growing amount of scholarship and analysis in political science on the emergence of warlordism in weak states that achieved independence after the collapse of an empire. The former European colonies of Africa and the former Soviet republics of Eurasia have a disproportionate number of warlord regimes.

While warlords are often considered as regional leaders who pose a danger to a state's sovereignty, there are a number of governments in which the central government collaborates with warlords to achieve its aim of exerting sovereignty over regions that would otherwise be outside its control. In such decentralized nations, especially those in which armed factions contest national sovereignty, warlords can be helpful allies for a central government that is unable to establish a monopoly on the use of force within its national boundaries.

As documented by political scientist Dr. Ariel Hernandez, one example is the Philippines, where successive presidential administrations — at least since the accession of Ferdinand Marcos to power in 1965 — have franchised violence to regional warlords to combat the incursions of communist insurgents, Islamic rebels, and organized criminal gangs. This has resulted in the formation of at least 93 Partisan Armed Groups, armed militias loyal to regional warlords who, in exchange for their loyalty and willingness to use their private armies to quell threats from opposition groups, are granted a degree of autonomy within designated regions, the exclusive right to use violence, and the right to profit from the 'economy of violence' that they establish in their own areas..

In Afghanistan, another state where the central government is unable to exert political, military, or bureaucratic control over significant swathes of territory beyond the capital, warlordism sometimes functions harmoniously within the state's structure. With their organized militias, warlords are able to retain a monopoly on violence in particular territories. They establish coalitions with rival warlords and local tribal leaders to provide a challenge to the central authority, and typically the state would negotiate to acquire access to resources or rent, warlord loyalty, and regional peace.

In his study of warlordism in Georgia and Tajikistan, political scientist Jesse Driscoll emphasizes how the dissolution of the Soviet Union precipitated the rise of militant, independence-seeking nationalist movements within the republics, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus, resulting in armed conflict and civil war. Numerous strongman warlords had served in Soviet armed forces, police units, or intelligence services and had expertise functioning within highly structured bureaucracies. These warlords formed well-structured militias that not only established political and economic control over territories, but also institutionalized bureaucracies to establish and maintain their monopolies over violence and rent, as well as incentivizing the behavior of citizens within a specific geographical space..

The American economist Mancur Olson pioneered the hypothesis that warlords can function like stationary bandits. In certain African governments, warlord politics can be a result of abundant, extractable natural resources. Some nations, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, have had stationary bandits who employ the extraction of conflict resources such as diamonds, cobalt, and lumber to build their political influence. They frequently assert their right to these resources on the pretext of defending the people.

Due to their economic ties to international corporations, stationary bandits are able to gain power. In order to achieve authority, warlords frequently resort to violence. Once in power, these warlords might expropriate the property or resources of the people and land and redistribute them for monetary gain. When individuals inhabit a place governed by a warlord, they have the option of fleeing or living within the warlords' political framework. If the warlords provide protection against external threats of violence, it is likely that the people will continue to live and work in the territory while being extorted. This political structure is prevalent in peripheral regions of countries without a strong central government, where protection is exchanged for extraction.

Modern-day Afghanistan is a multiethnic, multilingual country inhabited by various and frequently competing tribal societies; its official borders were not established until 1919, when the United Kingdom and the Emirate of Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi. Afghanistan was once a democratic nation before a coup in 1973 led to the April Revolution of 1978. Outside of Kabul, tribal warlords continue to maintain political influence and control throughout the country.

While the majority of warlords derive their authority from ancient tribal norms, others occupy legitimate regional government positions; yet, in both circumstances, participation with the central government is voluntary and contingent on incentives.

During the Russian Civil War (1918–1922), warlordism was widespread. Neither the Red administration in Petrograd (later Moscow) nor the White governments in Omsk and Rostov controlled the majority of the territory. These territories were governed by warlords of different political hues. The Cossack ataman Semyonov controlled areas in the Transbaikalia region, and the Bloody Baron Ungern von Sternberg briefly ruled Mongolia. White generals such as