Security Dilemma: Strategic Conundrum, Navigating the Arms Race

By Fouad Sabry

What is Security Dilemma

The security dilemma is a situation that arises in international relations when the increase in the security of one state causes other states to be concerned about their own security situations. As a result, the implementation of security-enhancing measures can result in tensions, escalation, or confrontation with one or more other parties, resulting in an outcome that neither party actually prefers; this is an example of the prisoner's dilemma in the political sphere.

How you will benefit

(I) Insights, and validations about the following topics:

Chapter 1: Security Dilemma

Chapter 2: Mutual Assured Destruction

Chapter 3: Neorealism (international relations)

Chapter 4: International Relations Theory

Chapter 5: Military Alliance

Chapter 6: Deterrence Theory

Chapter 7: John Mearsheimer

Chapter 8: Balancing (international relations)

Chapter 9: Kenneth Waltz

Chapter 10: International Security

(II) Answering the public top questions about security dilemma.

Who this book is for

Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Security Dilemma.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
• Release date: Jun 25, 2024

Book preview

Chapter 1: Security dilemma

In international relations, the security dilemma (also known as the spiral model) occurs when an increase in one state's security (such as a military buildup) causes other states to fear for their own security (because they do not know if the security-increasing state intends to use its growing military for offensive purposes).

Tang observed the following commonalities between Herbert Butterfield, John H. Herz, and Robert Jervis's conceptions of the security dilemma::

Butterfield believed that the security dilemma was the root cause of all war, whereas anarchy was not the root cause of the security crisis. Instead, he linked it to fear and humanity's universal sin – the belief that humanity is capable of committing evil. Herz and Jervis did not believe that the security challenge was the cause of all war. Oft-cited as a counterexample is the Second World War, where there was no dilemma regarding war with the evil Nazi Germany.

The security conundrum is the fundamental premise of defensive realism. According to Kenneth Waltz, because there is no global authority and the globe is anarchic, the primary motivation of states is survival. As a result of their mistrust of the intentions of other states, states always seek to maximize their own security. The conclusion of defensive realism is that states can escape the security issue in certain circumstances.

Offensive and defensive realism are structural realism varieties. They believe in survivalism, statism (the state as the dominant unit), self-help, and anarchy. (See theory of international relations.) In other words, defensive realism argues that security can be balanced in some circumstances and that the security issue can be resolved. While offensive realists do not disagree with the defensive perspective in its entirety, they argue that states will acquire an advantage over other states if they can. In short, the security issue is unavoidable since governments aim to increase their power in this anarchic environment and therefore cannot trust one another.

Offensive realists dispute that the offense-defense balance is a significant determinant of state behavior, arguing that the concept is vague, that offense and defense cannot be distinguished, that the offense-defense balance does not change significantly over time, that perceptions of the offense-defense balance vary even within the same time periods, and that attackers and defenders can use most types of weapons to achieve their goals.

Robert Jervis's offense–defense theory helps determine the severity of the security challenge. Jervis employs four scenarios to illustrate the gravity of the security predicament:

When offensive and defensive behavior are indistinguishable, but offensive behavior has the upper hand, the security problem is very acute and the situation is double perilous. The status quo states will behave aggressively, hence increasing the likelihood of an arms race. Probabilities of international collaboration are minimal.

Where offensive and defensive behavior are indistinguishable but defense has the upper hand, the security problem is intense but not as acute as in the first scenario. In such a scenario, a state may be able to strengthen its security without posing a threat to other states or harming their security.

Where offensive and defensive conduct are discernible, but offensive behavior has the edge, the security dilemma is not acute but there are still security concerns. The setting is safe, yet offensive behavior has an advantage that could eventually lead to aggression.

Where offensive and defensive behavior are distinct and defense has the upper hand, the security issue is little or nonexistent and the environment is doubly secure. Since there is little risk of aggressive action by other states, a state could spend a portion of its defense budget and other resources on domestic growth.

According to Jervis, a state's technological capability and geographical position are two of the most important criteria in determining whether offensive or defensive action is preferable. On a strategic level, he contends that technical and geographical variables favor the defence more. In the 19th century, for instance, the construction of railways and roads drastically altered the composition of states' capacity to attack or defend against other states. Consequently, enormous diplomatic and intelligence resources were devoted to this issue.

After determining the intensity of the security challenge, the spiral model identifies the next stage in thinking about state conduct. Specifically, under the specified conditions of the security conundrum, what procedures could a threatened state take to gain an edge by attacking first? Thus, the spiral model attempts to explain war. In Jervis' spiral model, there are two reasons why a state may end up in conflict. One state may opt to initiate a preventive war if it thinks that the balance of power is moving to the other side, generating an advantage in fighting sooner rather than later because future conditions may not be as favorable as they are currently. A preemptive war may occur when a state decides to attack another state in order to prevent the other state from striking or to thwart the other state's attack, out of concern that the other state is planning to attack.

Preventing an armed attack on a nation's territory (direct deterrence)

Preventing a military assault on the territory of another nation (extended deterrence)

Using deterrence against an imminent attack threat (immediate deterrence)

Under certain conditions, attempts at deterrence can backfire if a potential assailant misinterprets the state's deterrence tactics as prelude to aggressive measures. In such circumstances, a security problem may arise, resulting in the notion of a first strike advantage..

Jervis argues that the security dilemma can result in arms competitions and the development of alliances.

Robert Jervis argues that since the world is anarchic, a state may develop its military for defensive objectives. However, because states are unaware of each other's intentions, other states may interpret a defensive buildup as offensive; if so, and if offensive action against the state that is only building its defenses is advantageous, other states may prefer to adopt an aggressive stance, thereby making the situation unstable. In such a circumstance, an arms race is a strong probability.

The security conundrum could compel states to join new alliances or strengthen existing ones. Stability and collaboration are likely if offensive has less advantages.

In a multipolar global environment, alliance security is interdependent. When one ally decides to participate in a battle, it drags its other allies into the conflict as well; this is known as chain ganging. If the partner does not fully participate in the conflict, it will imperil its ally's safety. According to Waltz, the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany in World War I worked as follows: If Austria-Hungary marched, Germany had to follow: the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have left Germany alone in the center of Europe. If, on the other hand France advanced, and Russia was obligated to follow; a German triumph over France would result in a Russian defeat. It was a vicious spiral since the defeat or defection of a major coalition would have upset the equilibrium, each alliance partner would have upset the equilibrium, and each state was forced to adapt its policy accordingly..

As governments attempt to free-ride on other states, balancing alliances fail to develop in a timely manner in response to a growing threat. States may do so to avoid incurring the costs of war themselves. In World War II, for instance, to use Waltz's example, the French Foreign Minister told the British Prime Minister that Britain was justified in taking action When the Nazis took over the Rhineland, France and Britain took the lead in opposing Germany," but as