Nance v. Ward
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Apr 25, 2022.Decided on Jun 23, 2022.
Petitioner: Michael Nance.Respondent: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections and Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison.
Advocates: Matthew S. Hellman (for the Petitioner)
Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)
Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondents)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
In 1993, Michael Wade Nance robbed a bank, and, in the process of fleeing, killed a person. In 1997, a jury convicted Nance of murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence and rejected a petition for collateral relief. Nance then filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Then, in 2020, Nance filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State’s lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional as applied to him because of two medical issues. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Nance’s complaint, concluding that it was untimely and failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that because the relief Nance sought implied the invalidity of his death sentence, his complaint must be construed as a habeas petition, and because he had already filed an earlier habeas petition, it was properly considered a “successive” petition, over which a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

Question
What is the proper legal procedure for a death-row inmate’s challenge to the method by which the state intends to execute?

Conclusion
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim even if an order granting the relief requested would necessitate a change in state law. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court.
Both Section 1983 and the federal habeas statute allow a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” However, Section 1983 has an implicit exception for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus”—that is, relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” In two prior cases, the Court allowed a prisoner to bring a method-of-execution claim under Section 1983, but those cases did not require a change in state law, only in an agency’s uncodified protocol. In contrast, here, Nance’s requested relief would require Georgia to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by
firing squad. However, this requirement is not a substantial impediment, nor would it necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence. Thus, Section 1983 remains the proper vehicle for his method-of-execution claim.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court erroneously considered the law as it could exist, rather than as it is. Justice Barrett argued that because the relief Nance requests precludes his execution under current state law, habeas is the proper vehicle for seeking that relief.